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Peter Vallentyne [145]Peter L. Vallentyne [1]
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Profile: Peter Vallentyne (University of Missouri, Columbia)
  1. Peter Vallentyne, Social Contract.
    Social contract theory is a theory about how the moral assessment of actions, practices, institutions, laws, constitutions, or related items is based – directly or indirectly – on the consent – actual or hypothetical – of the members of society. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant represent the main historical figures. Rawls, Gauthier, and Scanlon are the main contemporary figures.
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  2. Peter Vallentyne, On Mack on Locke on Property. Liberty Matters.
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  3. Peter Vallentyne (2013). On the Duty of Altruism. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):118-120.
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  4. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2013). Liberal Resourcism: Problems and Possibilities. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (4):348-369.
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  5. Peter Vallentyne (2012). Left-Libertarianism. In David Estlund (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 152.
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  6. Peter Vallentyne (2012). Taxation, Redistribution and Property Rights. In Andrei Marmor (ed.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law. Routledge.
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  7. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Equal Negative Liberty and Welfare Rights. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):237-41.
    In Are Equal Liberty and Equality Compatible?, Jan Narveson and James Sterba insightfully debate whether a right to maximum equal negative liberty requires, or at least is compatible with, a right to welfare. Narveson argues that the two rights are incompatible, whereas Sterba argues that the rights are compatible and indeed that the right to maximum equal negative liberty requires a right to welfare. I argue that Sterba is correct that the two rights are conceptually compatible and that Narveson is (...)
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  8. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Enforcement Rights Against Non-Culpable Non-Just Intrusion. Ratio 24 (4):422-442.
    I articulate and defend a principle governing enforcement rights in response to a non-culpable non-just rights-intrusion (e.g., wrongful bodily attack by someone who falsely, but with full epistemic justification, believes that he is acting permissibly). The account requires that the use of force reduce the harm from such intrusions and is sensitive to the extent to which the intruder is agent-responsible for imposing intrusion-harm.
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  9. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Libertarianism and the Rejection of a Basic Income. Basic Income Studies 6:1-12.
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  10. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Nozick’s Libertarian Theory of Justice. In Ralf Bader & John Meadowcroft (eds.), Anarchy, State, and Utopia--A Reappraisal. Cambridge University Press.
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  11. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Responsibility and False Beliefs. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemploska (eds.), Justice and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    An individual is agent-responsible for an outcome just in case it flows from her autonomous agency in the right kind of way. The topic of agent-responsibility is important because most people believe that agents should be held morally accountable (e.g., liable to punishment or having an obligation to compensate victims) for outcomes for which they are agent-responsible and because many other people (e.g., brute luck egalitarians) hold that agents should not be held accountable for outcomes for which they are not (...)
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  12. Marc Fleurbaey, Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2009). On the Possibility of Nonaggregative Priority for the Worst Off. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):258-285.
    We shall focus on moral theories that are solely concerned with promoting the benefits (e.g., wellbeing) of individuals and explore the possibility of such theories ascribing some priority to benefits to those who are worse off—without this priority being absolute. Utilitarianism (which evaluates alternatives on the basis of total or average benefits) ascribes no priority to the worse off, and leximin (which evaluates alternatives by giving lexical priority to the worst off, and then the second worst off, and so on) (...)
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  13. Hillel Steiner & Peter Vallentyne (2009). Libertarian Theories of Intergenerational Justice. In Axel Gosseries & Lucas Meyer (eds.), Justice Between Generations. Oxford University Press.
    Justice and Libertarianism The term ‘justice’ is commonly used in several different ways. Sometimes it designates the moral permissibility of political structures (such as legal systems). Sometimes it designates moral fairness (as opposed to efficiency or other considerations that are relevant to moral permissibility). Sometimes it designates legitimacy in the sense of it being morally impermissible for others to interfere forcibly with the act or omission (e.g., my failing to go to dinner with my mother may be wrong but nonetheless (...)
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  14. Hillel Steiner & Peter Vallentyne (2009). Of Intergenerational Justice. In Gosseries Axel & Meyers L. (eds.), Intergenerational Justice. Oxford University Press. 50.
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  15. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Broome on Moral Goodness and Population Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):739 - 746.
    and Overview In an earlier book, Weighing Goods1, John Broome gave a sophisticated defense of utilitarianism for the cases involving a fixed population. In the present book, Weighing Lives, he extends this defense to variable population cases, where different individuals exist depending on which choice is made. Broome defends a version of utilitarianism according to which there is a vague positive level of individual wellbeing such that adding a life with more than that level of wellbeing makes things morally better (...)
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  16. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Infinite Utility and Temporal Neutrality. Utilitas 6 (02):193-.
    Suppose that time is infinitely long towards the future, and that each feasible action produces a finite amount of utility at each time. Then, under appropriate conditions, each action produces an infinite amount of utility. Does this mean that utilitarianism lacks the resources to discriminate among such actions? Since each action produces the same infinite amount of utility, it seems that utilitarianism must judge all actions permissible, judge all actions impermissible, or remain completely silent. If the future is infinite, that (...)
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  17. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Pp. IX + 231. Utilitas 21 (4):532-535.
  18. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Left-Libertarianism as a Promising Form of Liberal Egalitarianism. Philosophical Exchange:56-71.
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  19. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Left-Libertarianism and Liberty. In Thomas Christiano & John Christman (eds.), Debates in Political Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers. 17--137.
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  20. Peter Vallentyne (2009). On the Possibility of Non-Aggregative Priority for the Worst Off. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):258-285.
    We address the question of whether there is a prioritarian moral theory that both (1) avoids giving absolute priority to the worst off (as leximin does) but (2) does not allow arbitrarily small benefits to enough extremely affluent people to take priority over a significant benefit to a worst off person in abject poverty. We argue that this is possible only if one rejects some seemingly plausible conditions.
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  21. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Responsibility and Compensation Rights. In Stephen De Wijze, Matthew H. Kramer & Ian Carter (eds.), Hillel Steiner and the Anatomy of Justice: Themes and Challenges. Routledge.
    I address an issue that arises for rights theories that recognize rights to compensation for rightsintrusions. Do individuals who never pose any risk of harm to others have a right, against a rightsintruder, to full compensation for any resulting intrusion-harm, or is the right limited in some way by the extent to which the intruder was agent-responsible for the intrusion-harm (e.g., the extent to which the harm was a foreseeable result of her autonomous choices)? Although this general issue of strict (...)
     
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  22. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Sen on Sufficiency, Priority, and Equality. In Christopher W. Morris (ed.), Amartya Sen. Cambridge University Press.
  23. Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner (2009). Libertarian Theories of Intergenerational Justice. In Axel Gosseries & Lukas Meyer (eds.), Justice Between Generations. Oxford University Press.
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  24. Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner & Michael Otsuka (2009). Left-Libertarianism and Liberty Forthcoming in Debates in Political Philosophy. In Thomas Christiano & John Christman (eds.), Debates in Political Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers.
    I shall formulate and motivate a left-libertarian theory of justice. Like the more familiar rightlibertarianism, it holds that agents initially fully own themselves. Unlike right-libertarianism, it holds that natural resources belong to everyone in some egalitarian manner. Left-libertarianism is, I claim, a plausible version of liberal egalitarianism because it is suitably sensitive to considerations of liberty, security, and equality.
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  25. Giacomo Bonanno, Christian List, Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2008). Introduction to the Special Issue of Economics and Philosophy on Neuroeconomics. Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):301-302.
    ABSTRACT The past fifteen years or so have witnessed considerable progress in our understanding of how the human brain works. One of the objectives of the fast-growing field of neuroscience is to deepen our knowledge of how the brain perceives and interacts with the external world. Advances in this direction have been made possible by progress in brain imaging techniques and by clinical data obtained from patients with localized brain lesions. A relatively new field within neuroscience is neuroeconomics, which focuses (...)
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  26. Peter Vallentyne (2008). Brute Luck and Responsibility. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):57-80.
    The concept of agent-responsibility for an outcome (that is, of the outcome reflecting the autonomous choice of the agent) is central to both ethics and political philosophy. The concept, however, remains radically under-explored. In particular, the issue of partial responsibility for an outcome needs further development. I propose an account of partial responsibility based on partial causal contribution. Agents who choose autonomously in full knowledge of the consequences are agent-responsible, I claim, for the shift in the objective probability of the (...)
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  27. Peter Vallentyne (2008). Enforcement Rights and Rights to Reparation. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:813-820.
    I shall develop and defend a view of the reparation (e.g., rights to compensation) and enforcement rights (i.e., rights to use force) that individuals have in response to rights-transgressions. The general nature of the account is intermediate to two well-developed alternatives. Pure responsibility accounts hold that reparation and enforcement rights hold only to the extent that the transgressor is culpable, or in some way responsible, for the transgression or resulting harm. Strict liability accounts hold that reparation and enforcement rights hold (...)
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  28. Peter Vallentyne, Libertarianism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves and have moral powers to acquire property rights in external things under certain conditions. It is normally advocated as a theory of justice in the sense of the duties that we owe each other. So understood, it is silent about any impersonal duties (i.e., duties owed to no one) that we may have.
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  29. Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2007). Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd..
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  30. Peter Vallentyne (2007). “Answers to Five Questions on Normative Ethics”. In Jesper Ryberg & Thomas S. Peterson (eds.), Normative Ethics: Five Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
    I came late to philosophy and even later to normative ethics. When I started my undergraduate studies at the University of Toronto in 1970, I was interested in mathematics and languages. I soon discovered, however, that my mathematical talents were rather meager compared to the truly talented. I therefore decided to study actuarial science (the applied mathematics of risk assessment for insurance and pension plans) rather than abstract math. After two years, however, I dropped out of university, went to work (...)
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  31. Peter Vallentyne (2007). Consequentialism. In Hugh La Follette (ed.), Ethics in Practice 3rd edition. Blackwell Publishers.
    Ethics in Practice, 3rd edition, edited by Hugh La Follette (Blackwell Publishers, forthcoming 2007).
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  32. Peter Vallentyne (2007). Distributive Justice. In Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge (eds.), Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers.
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  33. Peter Vallentyne (2007). Libertarianism and the State. Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (1):187-205.
    Although Robert Nozick has argued that libertarianism is compatible with the justice of a minimal state—even if does not arise from mutual consent—few have been persuaded. I will outline a different way of establishing that a non-consensual libertarian state can be just. I will show that a state can—with a few important qualifications—justly enforce the rights of citizens, extract payments to cover the costs of such enforcement, redistribute resources to the poor, and invest in infrastructure to overcome market failures. Footnotesa (...)
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  34. Peter Vallentyne (2007). On Original Appropriation. In Malcolm Murray (ed.), Liberty, Games, and Contracts: Jan Narveson and the Defence of Libertarianism. Aldershot: Ashgate Press.
    Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves. Lockean libertarianism further holds that agents have the moral power to acquire private property in external things as long as a Lockean Proviso—requiring that “enough and as good” be left for others—is satisfied. Radical right-libertarianism, on the other hand, holds that satisfaction of a Lockean Proviso is not necessary for the appropriation of unowned things. This is sometimes defended on the ground that the initial status of external resources as unowned precludes any (...)
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  35. Peter Vallentyne (2007). Review of Dale F. Murray, Nozick, Autonomy and Compensation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12).
    In this nicely written book, Dale Murray critically discusses the moral rights posited by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. His focus is on these rights and not on Nozick's arguments about the justness of the state. He argues that Nozick's rights to compensation give rise to rights to government-financed health care and that Nozick should recognize a natural right to enough goods to ensure a reasonable chance of living a decent and meaningful life (if feasible for all). Murray (...)
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  36. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2007). Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd.
    in Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability, edited by John Roemer and Kotaro Suzumura, (Palgrave Publishers Ltd., forthcoming 2007), ch.11.
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  37. Peter Vallentyne (2006). Hurley on Justice and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):433 - 438.
    In Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, Susan Hurley defends a reason-responsive account of responsibility, argues that appeals to responsibility cannot provide a justification or non-trivial specification of brute luck egalitarian theories of justice, and sketches her own cognitive-bias-neutralizing theory of justice. Throughout, Hurley is concerned with normative (as opposed to causal) responsibility, where this is understood as that which licenses (moral or prudential) praise, blame, and other reactive attitudes and which implies at least partial (substantive) moral accountability in principle for choices (...)
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  38. Peter Vallentyne (2006). Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (June 30, 2008). In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell Publishers. 6--21.
    Maximizing act consequentialism holds that actions are morally permissible if and only if they maximize the value of consequences—if and only if, that is, no alternative action in the given choice situation has more valuable consequences.[i] It is subject to two main objections. One is that it fails to recognize that morality imposes certain constraints on how we may promote value. Maximizing act consequentialism fails to recognize, I shall argue, that the ends do not always justify the means. Actions with (...)
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  39. Peter Vallentyne (2006). Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (December 2, 2010) in Moral Theories Edited by Jamie Dreier (Blackwell Publishers, 2006), Pp. 21-37. [REVIEW] In Dreier Jamie (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell Publishers.
    Maximizing act consequentialism holds that actions are morally permissible if and only if they maximize the value of consequences—if and only if, that is, no alternative action in the given choice situation has more valuable consequences.1 It is subject to two main objections. One is that it fails to recognize that morality imposes certain constraints on how we may promote value. Maximizing act consequentialism fails to recognize, I shall argue, that the ends do not always justify the means. Actions with (...)
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  40. Peter Vallentyne (2006). Left-Libertarianism and Private Discrimination. San Diego Law Review 43:981-994.
    Left-libertarianism, like the more familiar right-libertarianism, holds that agents initially fully own themselves. Unlike right-libertarianism, however, it views natural resources as belonging to everyone in some egalitarian manner. Left-libertarianism is thus a form of liberal egalitarianism. In this article, I shall lay out the reasons why (1) left-libertarianism holds that (a) private discrimination is not intrinsically unjust and (b) it is intrinsically unjust for the state to prohibit private discrimination, and (2) that, nonetheless, a plausible version of left-libertarianism holds that (...)
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  41. Peter Vallentyne (2006). “Natural Rights and Two Conceptions of Promising”. Chicago-Kent Law Review 81 (9):9-19.
    Does one have an obligation to keep one’s promises? I answer this question by distinguishing between two broad conceptions of promising. On the normativized conception of promising, a promise is made when an agent validly offers to undertake an obligation to the promisee to perform some act (i.e., give up a liberty-right in relation to her) and the promisee validly accepts the offer. Keeping such promises is morally obligatory by definition. On the non- normativized conception, the nature of promising does (...)
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  42. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2006). Who Are the Least Advantaged? In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Oxford University Press.
    The difference principle, introduced by Rawls (1971, 1993), is generally interpreted as leximin, but this is not how he intended it. Rawls explicitly states that the difference principle requires that aggregate benefits (e.g., average or total) to those in the least advantaged group be given lexical priority over benefits to others, where the least advantaged group includes more than the strictly worst off individuals. We study the implications of adopting different approaches to the definition of the least advantaged group and (...)
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  43. Michael Otsuka, Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner (2005). Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):201-215.
    In a recent review essay of a two volume anthology on left-libertarianism (edited by two of us), Barbara Fried has insightfully laid out most of the core issues that confront left-libertarianism. We are each left-libertarians, and we would like to take this opportunity to address some of the general issues that she raises. We shall focus, as Fried does much of the time, on the question of whether left-libertarianism is a well-defined and distinct alternative to existing forms of liberal egalitarianism. (...)
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  44. Peter Vallentyne (2005). Capabilities Vs. Opportunities for Well-Being. Journal of Political Philosophy 13:359-371.
    Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have argued that justice is concerned, at least in part, with the distribution of capabilities (opportunities to function). Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, and John Roemer have argued that justice is concerned with something like the distribution of opportunities for well-being. I argue that, although some versions of the capability view are incompatible with some versions of the opportunity for well-being view, the most plausible version of the capability view is identical to a slight generalization of (...)
     
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  45. Peter Vallentyne (2005). Debate: Capabilities Versus Opportunities for Well-Being. Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (3):359–371.
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  46. Peter Vallentyne (2005). Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):403 - 433.
    Can material Egalitarianism (requiring, for example, the significant promotion of fortune) include animals in the domain of the equality requirement? The problem can be illustrated as follows: If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal mice are included in this egalitarian requirement, then normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because their wellbeing is much lower (...)
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  47. Peter Vallentyne (2005). On the Possibility of Paretian Egalitarianism. Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):126-154.
    We here address the question of how, for a theory of justice, a concern for the promotion of equality can be combined with a concern for making people as well off as possible. Leximin, which requires making the worst off position as well off as possible, is one way of combining a concern for making people’s lives go well with a special concern for those who are especially poorly off. Many egalitarians, however, reject its near-monomaniacal focus on the worst off (...)
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