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Peter Vallentyne [160]Peter L. Vallentyne [1]
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Profile: Peter Vallentyne (University of Missouri, Columbia)
  1.  89
    Peter Vallentyne (2002). Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities. Ethics 112 (3):529-557.
  2.  99
    Peter Vallentyne (1997). Intrinsic Properties Defined. Philosophical Studies 88 (2): 209-219.
    Intuitively, a property is intrinsic just in case a thing’s having it (at a time) depends only on what that thing is like (at that time), and not on what any wholly distinct contingent object (or wholly distinct time) is like. A property is extrinsic just in case it is non-intrinsic. Redness and squareness are intrinsic properties. Being next to a red object is extrinsic.
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  3. Peter Vallentyne (2008). Brute Luck and Responsibility. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):57-80.
    The concept of agent-responsibility for an outcome (that is, of the outcome reflecting the autonomous choice of the agent) is central to both ethics and political philosophy. The concept, however, remains radically under-explored. In particular, the issue of partial responsibility for an outcome needs further development. I propose an account of partial responsibility based on partial causal contribution. Agents who choose autonomously in full knowledge of the consequences are agent-responsible, I claim, for the shift in the objective probability of the (...)
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  4. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Nozick’s Libertarian Theory of Justice. In Ralf Bader & John Meadowcroft (eds.), Anarchy, State, and Utopia--A Reappraisal. Cambridge University Press
  5. Peter Vallentyne (2007). Distributive Justice. In Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge (eds.), Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers
    The word “justice” is used in several different ways. First, justice is sometimes understood as moral permissibility applied to distributions of benefits and burdens (e.g., income distributions) or social structures (e.g., legal systems). In this sense, justice is distinguished by the kind of entity to which it is applied, rather than a specific kind of moral concern.
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  6. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Responsibility and False Beliefs. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemploska (eds.), Justice and Responsibility. Oxford University Press
    An individual is agent-responsible for an outcome just in case it flows from her autonomous agency in the right kind of way. The topic of agent-responsibility is important because most people believe that agents should be held morally accountable (e.g., liable to punishment or having an obligation to compensate victims) for outcomes for which they are agent-responsible and because many other people (e.g., brute luck egalitarians) hold that agents should not be held accountable for outcomes for which they are not (...)
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  7. Peter Vallentyne (2003). Brute Luck Equality and Desert. In Sabrina Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press
    In recent years, interest in desert-based theories of justice has increased, and this seems to represent a challenge to equality-based theories of justice.[i] The best distribution of outcomeadvantage with respect to desert, after all, need not be the most equal distribution of outcomeadvantage. Some individuals may deserve more than others. Outcome egalitarianism is, however, implausible, and so the conflict of outcome desert with outcome equality is of little significance.[ii] Most contemporary versions of egalitarianism are concerned with neutralizing the differential effects (...)
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  8. Peter Vallentyne & Shelly Kagan (1997). Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory. Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):5-26.
    000000001. Introduction Call a theory of the good—be it moral or prudential—aggregative just in case (1) it recognizes local (or location-relative) goodness, and (2) the goodness of states of affairs is based on some aggregation of local goodness. The locations for local goodness might be points or regions in time, space, or space-time; or they might be people, or states of nature.1 Any method of aggregation is allowed: totaling, averaging, measuring the equality of the distribution, measuring the minimum, etc.. Call (...)
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  9. Peter Vallentyne (2007). Consequentialism. In Hugh La Follette (ed.), Ethics in Practice 3rd edition. Blackwell Publishers
    Ethics in Practice, 3rd edition, edited by Hugh La Follette (Blackwell Publishers, forthcoming 2007).
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  10.  53
    Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner (eds.) (2000). Left Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate. Palgrave Publishers Ltd..
    This book contains a collection of important recent writing on left-liberalism, a political philosophy that recognizes both strong liberty rights and strong ...
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  11. Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner & And Michael Otsuka (2005). Why Left-Libertarianism is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):201–215.
    Over the past few decades, there has been increasing interest in left-libertarianism, which holds (roughly) that agents fully own themselves and that natural resources (land, minerals, air, etc.) belong to everyone in some egalitarian sense. Left-libertarianism agrees with the more familiar right-libertarianism about self-ownership, but radically disagrees with it about the power to acquire ownership of natural resources. Merely being the first person to claim, discover, or mix labor with an unappropriated natural resource does not—left-libertarianism insists—generate a full private property (...)
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  12. Peter Vallentyne (2002). Equality, Brute Luck, and Initial Opportunities. Ethics 112:529-557.
    In the old days, material egalitarians tended to favor equality of outcome advantage, on some suitable conception of advantage (happiness, resources, etc.). Under the influence of Dworkin’s seminal articles on equality[i], contemporary material egalitarians have tended to favor equality of brute luck advantage—on the grounds that this permits people to be held appropriately accountable for the benefits and burdens of their choices. I shall argue, however, that a plausible conception of egalitarian justice requires neither that brute luck advantage always be (...)
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  13. Peter Vallentyne (2003). The Rights and Duties of Childrearing. William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 11:991-1010.
    What rights and duties do adults have with respect to raising children? Who, for example, has the right to decide how and where a particular child will live, be educated, receive health care, and spend recreational time? I argue that neither biological (gene-provider) nor..
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  14. Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner (2009). Libertarian Theories of Intergenerational Justice. In Axel Gosseries & Lukas Meyer (eds.), Justice Between Generations. Oxford University Press
    Justice and Libertarianism The term ‘justice’ is commonly used in several different ways. Sometimes it designates the moral permissibility of political structures (such as legal systems). Sometimes it designates moral fairness (as opposed to efficiency or other considerations that are relevant to moral permissibility). Sometimes it designates legitimacy in the sense of it being morally impermissible for others to interfere forcibly with the act or omission (e.g., my failing to go to dinner with my mother may be wrong but nonetheless (...)
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  15.  72
    Michael Otsuka, Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner (2005). Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):201-215.
    In a recent review essay of a two volume anthology on left-libertarianism (edited by two of us), Barbara Fried has insightfully laid out most of the core issues that confront left-libertarianism. We are each left-libertarians, and we would like to take this opportunity to address some of the general issues that she raises. We shall focus, as Fried does much of the time, on the question of whether left-libertarianism is a well-defined and distinct alternative to existing forms of liberal egalitarianism. (...)
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  16. Peter Vallentyne (2007). Libertarianism and the State. Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (1):187-205.
    Although Robert Nozick has argued that libertarianism is compatible with the justice of a minimal state—even if does not arise from mutual consent—few have been persuaded. I will outline a different way of establishing that a non-consensual libertarian state can be just. I will show that a state can—with a few important qualifications—justly enforce the rights of citizens, extract payments to cover the costs of such enforcement, redistribute resources to the poor, and invest in infrastructure to overcome market failures. Footnotesa (...)
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  17. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Equal Negative Liberty and Welfare Rights. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):237-41.
    In Are Equal Liberty and Equality Compatible?, Jan Narveson and James Sterba insightfully debate whether a right to maximum equal negative liberty requires, or at least is compatible with, a right to welfare. Narveson argues that the two rights are incompatible, whereas Sterba argues that the rights are compatible and indeed that the right to maximum equal negative liberty requires a right to welfare. I argue that Sterba is correct that the two rights are conceptually compatible and that Narveson is (...)
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  18. Peter Vallentyne (2003). Justice in General: An Introduction. In Equality and Justice: Justice in General. Routledge
    This is the first volume of Equality and Justice, a six-volume collection of the most important articles of the twentieth century on the topic of justice and equality. This volume addresses the following three (only loosely related) issues: (1) What is the concept of justice? (2) Is justice primarily a demand on individuals or on societies? (3) What are the relative merits of conceptions of justice based on equality, based on priority for those who have less, and based on ensuring (...)
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  19. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Left-Libertarianism and Liberty. In Thomas Christiano & John Christman (eds.), Debates in Political Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers 17--137.
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  20. Peter Vallentyne (1992). Moral Dilemmas and Comparative Conceptions of Morality. Southern Journal of Philosophy (1):117-124.
    In recent years the problem of moral dilemmas has received the attention of a number of philosophers. Some authors[i] argue that moral dilemmas are not conceptually possible because they are ruled out by certain valid principles of deontic logic. Other authors[ii] insist that moral dilemmas are conceptually possible, and argue that therefore the principles of deontic logic that rule them out must be rejected.
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  21. Peter Vallentyne (2011). Libertarianism and the Rejection of a Basic Income. Basic Income Studies 6:1-12.
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  22. Peter Vallentyne (2012). Taxation, Redistribution and Property Rights. In Andrei Marmor (ed.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law. Routledge
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  23. Peter Vallentyne (2006). Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (June 30, 2008). In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell Publishers 6--21.
    Maximizing act consequentialism holds that actions are morally permissible if and only if they maximize the value of consequences—if and only if, that is, no alternative action in the given choice situation has more valuable consequences.[i] It is subject to two main objections. One is that it fails to recognize that morality imposes certain constraints on how we may promote value. Maximizing act consequentialism fails to recognize, I shall argue, that the ends do not always justify the means. Actions with (...)
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  24. R. Jay Wallace, Gerald Dworkin, John Deigh, T. M. Scanlon, Peter Vallentyne & Alan Patten (2002). 10. William A. Edmundson, Ed., The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings William A. Edmundson, Ed., The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings (Pp. 614-616). [REVIEW] Ethics 112 (3).
     
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  25.  61
    Peter Vallentyne (2009). On the Possibility of Non-Aggregative Priority for the Worst Off. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):258-285.
    We address the question of whether there is a prioritarian moral theory that both (1) avoids giving absolute priority to the worst off (as leximin does) but (2) does not allow arbitrarily small benefits to enough extremely affluent people to take priority over a significant benefit to a worst off person in abject poverty. We argue that this is possible only if one rejects some seemingly plausible conditions.
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  26. Peter Vallentyne (1988). Explicating Lawhood. Philosophy of Science 55 (4):598-613.
    D. M. Armstrong, Michael Tooley, and Fred Dretske have recently proposed a new realist account of laws of nature, according to which laws of nature are objective relations between universals. After criticizing this account, I develop an alternative realist account, according to which (1) the nomic structure of a world is a relation between initial world-histories and world-histories, and (2) a law of nature is a fact that holds solely in virtue of nomic structure (and not, for example, in virtue (...)
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  27. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Left-Libertarianism as a Promising Form of Liberal Egalitarianism. Philosophical Exchange:56-71.
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  28. Peter Vallentyne (2013). On Mack on Locke on Property. Liberty Matters.
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  29. Peter Vallentyne (2007). On Original Appropriation. In Malcolm Murray (ed.), Liberty, Games, and Contracts: Jan Narveson and the Defence of Libertarianism. Aldershot: Ashgate Press
    Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves. Lockean libertarianism further holds that agents have the moral power to acquire private property in external things as long as a Lockean Proviso—requiring that “enough and as good” be left for others—is satisfied. Radical right-libertarianism, on the other hand, holds that satisfaction of a Lockean Proviso is not necessary for the appropriation of unowned things. This is sometimes defended on the ground that the initial status of external resources as unowned precludes any (...)
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  30.  60
    Peter Vallentyne (1993). Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217.
    Traditional act utilitarianism judges an action permissible just in case it produces as much aggregate utility as any alternative. It is often supposed that utilitarianism faces a serious problem if the future is infinitely long. For in that case, actions may produce an infinite amount of utility. And if that is so for most actions, then utilitarianism, it appears, loses most of its power to discriminate among actions. For, if most actions produce an infinite amount of utility, then few actions (...)
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  31.  40
    Luc Lauwers & Peter Vallentyne (2004). Infinite Utilitarianism: More is Always Better. Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):307-330.
    We address the question of how finitely additive moral value theories (such as utilitarianism) should rank worlds when there are an infinite number of locations of value (people, times, etc.). In the finite case, finitely additive theories satisfy both Weak Pareto and a strong anonymity condition. In the infinite case, however, these two conditions are incompatible, and thus a question arises as to which of these two conditions should be rejected. In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero (2000) have argued (...)
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  32. Peter Vallentyne (1999). Left-Libertarian Theories of Justice. Revue Economique 50:859-878.
    Libertarian theories of justice hold that agents, at least initially, own themselves fully, and thus owe no service to others, except through voluntary action. The most familiar libertarian theories are right-libertarian in that they hold that natural resources are initially unowned and, under a broad range of realistic circumstances, can be privately appropriated without the consent of, or any significant payment to, the other members of society. Leftlibertarian theories, by contrast, hold that natural resources are owned by the members of (...)
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  33.  57
    Marc Fleurbaey, Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2009). On the Possibility of Nonaggregative Priority for the Worst Off. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):258-285.
    We shall focus on moral theories that are solely concerned with promoting the benefits (e.g., wellbeing) of individuals and explore the possibility of such theories ascribing some priority to benefits to those who are worse off—without this priority being absolute. Utilitarianism (which evaluates alternatives on the basis of total or average benefits) ascribes no priority to the worse off, and leximin (which evaluates alternatives by giving lexical priority to the worst off, and then the second worst off, and so on) (...)
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  34. Peter Vallentyne (2012). Left-Libertarianism. In David Estlund (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy. Oxford University Press 152.
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  35.  86
    Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2006). Who Are the Least Advantaged? In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Oxford University Press
    The difference principle, introduced by Rawls (1971, 1993), is generally interpreted as leximin, but this is not how he intended it. Rawls explicitly states that the difference principle requires that aggregate benefits (e.g., average or total) to those in the least advantaged group be given lexical priority over benefits to others, where the least advantaged group includes more than the strictly worst off individuals. We study the implications of adopting different approaches to the definition of the least advantaged group and (...)
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  36.  94
    Peter Vallentyne (2013). On the Duty of Altruism. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):118-120.
  37. Peter Vallentyne (2009). Infinite Utility and Temporal Neutrality. Utilitas 6 (2):193.
    Suppose that time is infinitely long towards the future, and that each feasible action produces a finite amount of utility at each time. Then, under appropriate conditions, each action produces an infinite amount of utility. Does this mean that utilitarianism lacks the resources to discriminate among such actions? Since each action produces the same infinite amount of utility, it seems that utilitarianism must judge all actions permissible, judge all actions impermissible, or remain completely silent. If the future is infinite, that (...)
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  38.  5
    Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner & Michael Otsuka (2005). Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried. Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):201-215.
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  39. Peter Vallentyne (2008). Libertarianism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves and have moral powers to acquire property rights in external things under certain conditions. It is normally advocated as a theory of justice in the sense of the duties that we owe each other. So understood, it is silent about any impersonal duties (i.e., duties owed to no one) that we may have.
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  40.  33
    Peter Vallentyne (1988). Gimmicky Representations of Moral Theories. Metaphilosophy 19 (3-4):253-263.
    The teleological/deontological distinction is generally considered to be the fundamental classificatory distinction for ethics. I have argued elsewhere (Vallentyne forthcoming (a), and Ch.2 of Vallentyne 1984) that the distinction is ill understood and not as important as is generally supposed. Some authors have advocated a moral radical thesis. Oldenquist (1966) and Piper (1982) have both argued that the purported distinction is a pseudo distinction in that any theory can be represented both as teleological and as deontological. Smart (1973, p.13, and (...)
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  41.  67
    Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2013). Liberal Resourcism: Problems and Possibilities. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (4):348-369.
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  42.  28
    Peter Vallentyne (1996). Response-Dependence, Rigidification and Objectivity. Erkenntnis 44 (1):101 - 112.
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  43. Peter Vallentyne (1998). The Nomic Role Account of Carving Reality at the Joints. Synthese 115 (2):171-198.
    Natural properties are those that carve reality at the joints. The notion of carving reality at the joints, however, is somewhat obscure, and is often understood in terms of making for similarity, conferring causal powers, or figuring in the laws of nature. I develop and assess an account of the third sort according to which carving reality at the joints is understood as having the right level of determinacy relative to nomic roles. The account has the attraction of involving very (...)
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  44.  41
    Peter Vallentyne (2006). Hurley on Justice and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):433 - 438.
    In Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, Susan Hurley defends a reason-responsive account of responsibility, argues that appeals to responsibility cannot provide a justification or non-trivial specification of brute luck egalitarian theories of justice, and sketches her own cognitive-bias-neutralizing theory of justice. Throughout, Hurley is concerned with normative (as opposed to causal) responsibility, where this is understood as that which licenses (moral or prudential) praise, blame, and other reactive attitudes and which implies at least partial (substantive) moral accountability in principle for choices (...)
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  45.  59
    Peter Vallentyne (2005). Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):403 - 433.
    Can material Egalitarianism (requiring, for example, the significant promotion of fortune) include animals in the domain of the equality requirement? The problem can be illustrated as follows: If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal mice are included in this egalitarian requirement, then normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because their wellbeing is much lower (...)
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  46. Peter Vallentyne & Bertil Tungodden (2007). Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size. In John Roemer & Kotaro Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability. Palgrave Publishers Ltd
    Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...)
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  47. Peter Vallentyne (1998). The Nomic Role Account of Carving Reality at the Joints. Synthese 115 (2):171-198.
    Natural properties are those that carve reality at the joints. The notion of carving reality at the joints, however, is somewhat obscure. It is sometimes understood in terms of making for similarity, sometimes in terms of conferring causal powers, and sometimes in terms of figuring in the laws of nature. I develop and assess an account of the third sort according to which carving reality at the joints is understood as having the right level of determinacy relative to nomic roles. (...)
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  48.  26
    Peter Vallentyne (1989). How to Combine Pareto Optimality with Liberty Considerations. Theory and Decision 27 (3):217-240.
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  49.  46
    Peter Vallentyne (2004). Infinite Utilitarianism: More Is Always Better. Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):307-330.
    We address the question of how finitely additive moral value theories (such as utilitarianism) should rank worlds when there are an infinite number of locations of value (people, times, etc.). In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero have argued that Weak Pareto is implausible in the infinite case and defended alternative principles. We here defend Weak Pareto against their criticisms and argue against an isomorphism principle that they defend. Where locations are the same in both worlds but have no natural (...)
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  50. Peter Vallentyne (2002). Equality and the Duties of Procreators. In David Archard & Colin Macleod (eds.), Children and Political Theory. Oxford University Press
    I formulate and defend a theory of special procreative duties in the context of a liberal egalitarian theory of justice. I argue that (1) the only special duty that procreators owe their offspring is that of ensuring that their life prospects are non-negative (worth living), and (2) the only special duty that procreators owe others is that of ensuring that they are not disadvantaged by the procreators’ offspring (a) violating their rights or (b) adversely affecting their equality rights and duties.
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