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  1. Peter Vanderschraaf (2011). The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences, Herbert Gintis. Princeton University Press, 2009. Xviii + 281 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):88-96.
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  2. Peter Vanderschraaf (2010). The Invisible Foole. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):37 - 58.
    I review the classic skeptical challenges of Foole in Leviathan and the Lydian Shepherd in Republic against the prudential rationality of justice. Attempts to meet these challenges contribute to the reconciliation project (Kavka in Hobbesian moral and political theory , 1986 ) that tries to establish that morality is compatible with rational prudence. I present a new Invisible Foole challenge against the prudential rationality of justice. Like the Lydian Shepherd, the Invisible Foole can violate justice offensively (Kavka, Hobbesian moral and (...)
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  3. Peter Vanderschraaf (2008). Game Theory Meets Threshold Analysis: Reappraising the Paradoxes of Anarchy and Revolution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):579-617.
    I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some political theorists apply game theory to analyze the paradox of anarchy: War is apparently inevitable in anarchy even though all warring parties prefer peace over war. Others apply tipping threshold analysis to resolve the paradox of revolution: Joining a revolution is apparently always irrational even when an overwhelming majority of the population wish to replace their regime. The usual game theoretic analysis of anarchy yields the conclusion (...)
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  4. Peter Vanderschraaf, Common Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  5. Peter Vanderschraaf (2007). Covenants and Reputations. Synthese 157 (2):167 - 195.
    In their classic analyses, Hobbes and Hume argue that offensively violating a covenant is irrational because the offense ruins one’s reputation. This paper explores conditions under which reputation alone can enforce covenants. The members of a community are modeled as interacting in a Covenant Game repeated over time. Folk theorems are presented that give conditions under which the Humean strategy of performing in covenants only with those who have never offensively violated or performed with an offensive violator characterizes an equilibrium (...)
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  6. Peter Vanderschraaf (2006). The Circumstances of Justice. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (3):321-351.
    In this article, I analyze the circumstances of justice, that is, the background conditions that are necessary and sufficient for justice to exist between individual parties in society. Contemporary political philosophers almost unanimously accept an account of these circumstances attributed to David Hume. I argue that the conditions of this standard account are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for justice. In particular, I contend that both a Hobbesian state of nature and a prisoner’s dilemma are cases in which the conditions (...)
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  7. Peter Vanderschraaf (2006). War or Peace?: A Dynamical Analysis of Anarchy. Economics and Philosophy 22 (2):243-279.
    I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic (...)
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  8. Marc Ereshefsky, Mohan Matthen, Matthew H. Slater, Alex Rosenberg, D. M. Kaplan, Kevin Js Zollman, Peter Vanderschraaf, J. McKenzie Alexander, Andreas Hüttemann & Gordon Belot (2005). 10. The Facts of the Matter: A Discussion of Norton's Material Theory of Induction The Facts of the Matter: A Discussion of Norton's Material Theory of Induction (Pp. 188-197). [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 72 (1).
     
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  9. Peter Vanderschraaf, Reputational Enforcement of Covenants.
    Peter Vanderschraaf. Reputational Enforcement of Covenants.
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  10. Peter Vanderschraaf & J. McKenzie Alexander (2005). Follow the Leader: Local Interactions with Influence Neighborhoods. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):86-113.
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  11. Peter Vanderschraaf & Brian Skyrms (2003). Learning to Take Turns. Erkenntnis 59 (3):311 - 348.
    Learning to take turns in repeated game situations is a robust phenomenon in both laboratory experiments and in everyday life. Nevertheless, it has received little attention in recent studies of learning dynamics in games. We investigate the simplest and most obvious extension of fictitious play to a learning rule that can recognize patterns, and show how players using this rule can spontaneously learn to take turns.
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  12. Peter Vanderschraaf (2001). Instituting the Hobbesian Commonwealth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3‐4):383-405.
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  13. Peter Vanderschraaf (2001). Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention. Routledge.
    Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.
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  14. Peter Vanderschraaf (1999). Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):325–358.
  15. Peter Vanderschraaf (1999). Hume's Game-Theoretic Business Ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (1):47-67.
    In recent years, a number of authors have used gametheoretic reasoning to explain why purely self-interested agentswould ever conform their economic activities with the requirements of justice, when by doing so they forego opportunities to reapunilateral net gains by exploiting others. In this paper, I argue that Hume's justification of honest economic exchanges between self-interested agents in the Treatise foreshadows this contemporary literature. Hume analyzes the problem of explaining justice in self-interested economic exchange as a problem of agents coordinating on (...)
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  16. Peter Vanderschraaf (1999). Introduction. Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (1):1-9.
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  17. Peter Vanderschraaf (1998). The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention. Economics and Philosophy 14 (02):215-.
  18. Peter Vanderschraaf, Common Knowledge: Analysis and Applications.
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  19. Peter Vanderschraaf, Common Knowledge: Analysis and Applications.
    One does not simply predict where the other will go, which is wherever the first predicts the second to predict the first to go, and so ad infinitum. Not "What would I do if I were she?" but "What would I do if I were she wondering what she would do if she were wondering what I would do if I were she...?".
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  20. Peter Vanderschraaf & Diana Richards (1997). Joint Beliefs in Conflictual Coordination Games. Theory and Decision 42 (3):287-310.
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  21. Peter Vanderschraaf (1996). Special Issue of the Business Ethics Quarterly. Journal of Business Ethics 15 (239).
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  22. Peter Vanderschraaf (1995). Convention as Correlated Equilibrium. Erkenntnis 42 (1):65 - 87.
    Aconvention is a state in which agents coordinate their activity, not as the result of an explicit agreement, but because their expectations are aligned so that each individual believes that all will act so as to achieve coordination for mutual benefit. Since agents are said to follow a convention if they coordinate without explicit agreement, the notion raises fundamental questions: (1) Why do certain conventions remain stable over time?, and (2) How does a convention emerge in the first place? In (...)
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  23. Peter Vanderschraaf (1995). Endogenous Correlated Equilibria in Noncooperative Games. Theory and Decision 38 (1):61-84.
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