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  1. Peter Zachar (2013). Evidence-Based Medicine and Modernism: Still Better Than the Alternatives. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (4):313-316.
    Thomas, Bracken, and Timimi (2012) make an important contribution in critiquing the extent to which the profession of psychiatry can be so bureaucratic that patients are treated as problems to be solved in an ‘efficient’ assembly line fashion rather than as individual persons. The trouble with bureaucracies is that they promote a cold and impersonal accounting approach in which critical reflection on purposes is circumvented by decision-making algorithms (Zachar and Bartlett 2009). Psychotherapy treatment manuals definitely satisfy the bureaucratic instinct, and (...)
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  2. Peter Zachar (2013). Why the One and the Many Will Not Go Away. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (2):131-136.
    The Contrast Between the nomothetic versus the idiographic was popularized in psychology by Gordon Allport (1937). In the early 1930s, Allport made his name by advocating for a quantitative, trait-based approach to the study of personality in contrast with the prevailing case study approach. In doing so, he was following the trend toward greater reliance on measurement in psychology as a whole. Allport, however, had grave doubts about the sufficiency of quantitative measurement for developing an understanding of individual psychological functioning. (...)
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  3. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Scott Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue. Part 4: General Conclusion. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):14-.
    In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further (...)
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  4. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Scott Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue Part 1: Conceptual and Definitional Issues in Psychiatric Diagnosis. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):1-29.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  5. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue Part 2: Issues of Conservatism and Pragmatism in Psychiatric Diagnosis. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):8-.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  6. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael A. Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah S. Decker, Michael B. First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew C. Hinderliter, Warren A. Kinghorn, Steven G. LoBello, Elliott B. Martin, Aaron L. Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph M. Pierre, Ronald W. Pies, Harold A. Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael A. Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome C. Wakefield, G. Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue Part 3: Issues of Utility and Alternative Approaches in Psychiatric Diagnosis. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):9-.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  7. James Phillips, Allen Frances, Michael Cerullo, John Chardavoyne, Hannah Decker, Michael First, Nassir Ghaemi, Gary Greenberg, Andrew Hinderliter, Warren Kinghorn, Steven LoBello, Elliott Martin, Aaron Mishara, Joel Paris, Joseph Pierre, Ronald Pies, Harold Pincus, Douglas Porter, Claire Pouncey, Michael Schwartz, Thomas Szasz, Jerome Wakefield, G. Scott Waterman, Owen Whooley & Peter Zachar (2012). The Six Most Essential Questions in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Pluralogue Part 2: Issues of Conservatism and Pragmatism in Psychiatric Diagnosis. [REVIEW] Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):1-16.
    In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...)
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  8. Douglas Porter & Peter Zachar (2012). Recovery and the Partitioning of Scientific Authority in Psychiatry. In Abraham Rudnick (ed.), Recovery of People with Mental Illness: Philosophical and Related Perspectives. Oup Oxford. 203.
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  9. Peter Zachar (2012). A Partial (and Speculative) Reconstruction of the Biological Basis of Emotionality. Emotion Review 4 (3):249-250.
    It is argued that Mason and Capitanio (2012) are not clear on what would count as a “basic emotion,” and their reconstruction appears more geared toward emotionality in general. Their notion that species-typical outcome is the criterion of basicness requires making speculative assumptions about what is expected and average. Suggestions about an epigenetic approach to social construction of emotionality are also offered.
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  10. Peter Zachar (2012). Is Incremental Validity Too Incremental in the Long Run? A Commentary on Stoyanov D., Machamer P.K. & Schaffner, K.F. (2012). [REVIEW] Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (1):157-158.
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  11. Peter Zachar (2012). Progress and the Calibration of Scientific Constructs: The Role of Comparative Validity. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford. 21.
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  12. Peter Zachar (2012). Validity, Utility and Reality: Explicating Schaffner's. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford. 190.
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  13. Peter Zachar & Kenneth Kendler (2012). The Removal of Pluto From the Class of Planets and Homosexuality From the Class of Psychiatric Disorders: A Comparison. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):4-.
    We compare astronomers' removal of Pluto from the listing of planets and psychiatrists' removal of homosexuality from the listing of mental disorders. Although the political maneuverings that emerged in both controversies are less than scientifically ideal, we argue that competition for "scientific authority" among competing groups is a normal part of scientific progress. In both cases, a complicated relationship between abstract constructs and evidence made the classification problem thorny.
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  14. Peter Zachar (2011). The Clinical Nature of Personality Disorders: Answering the Neo-Szaszian Critique. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):191-202.
    When i was in graduate school, I inadvertently walked in on a fellow student taking his comprehensive exams. He was extremely frustrated because two of the questions asked about conceptual issues in personality and personality disorders. This student was not expecting such questions and considered them to be unfair. I knew other students in that same program who would have considered it a gift to get such “interesting” questions. Those clinical and counseling psychologists with theoretical–philosophical interests are often attracted to (...)
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  15. Peter Zachar (2010). Defending the Validity of Pragmatism in the Classification of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (2):113-116.
    I critically analyze Kagan’s claim that in order to advance the science of emotion we should abandon the practice of referring to emotions with common folk psychological names, such as fear and anger. Kagan recommends discovering more homogenous constructs that are segregated by the type of evidence used to infer those constructs. He also argues that variable origins, biological implementations, and psychological and sociocultural contexts may combine to create distinct kinds of emotional states that require distinct names. I acknowledge that (...)
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  16. Peter Zachar (2010). Has There Been Conceptual Progress in The Science of Emotion? Emotion Review 2 (4):381-382.
    Izard’s claim that the term emotion works well as an adjective is closer to B. F. Skinner’s position than is acknowledged. Based on Izard’s survey of scientists, I argue that the lack of consensus on emotion as a unitary construct could be considered to represent the dissolution of emotions. Given that something similar has happened in biology with the dissolution of the unitary gene construct, this development in psychology may not be as problematic as it initially sounds.
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  17. Peter Zachar (2010). The Abandonment of Latent Variables: Philosophical Considerations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):177-178.
    Cramer et al.'s critique of latent variables implicitly advocates a type of scientific anti-realism which can be extended to many dispositional constructs in scientific psychology. However, generalizing Cramer et al.'s network model in this way raises concerns about its applicability to psychopathology. The model could be improved by articulating why a given cluster of symptoms should be considered disordered.
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  18. Peter Zachar & Nancy Nyquist Potter (2010). Personality Disorders: Moral or Medical Kinds—Or Both? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (2):101-117.
    In the sociopolitical domain, psychiatry runs the risk of excusing immoral behavior by claiming it is ‘disordered’ and, conversely, of assigning moral blame to what are more properly considered illnesses (O’Malley 2004; Wiseman 1961). This debate is often played out in terms of the relationship between psychotic states and crimes such as murder. Examples include debates about whether Andrea Yates should have been executed for filicide. A similar controversy would have likely emerged had Seung-Hui Cho lived after committing mass murder (...)
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  19. Peter Zachar & Nancy Nyquist Potter (2010). Valid Moral Appraisals and Valid Personality Disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (2):131-142.
    We are thankful for the opportunity to reflect more on the difficult problem of the relationship between moral evaluations and the construct of personality disorders in response to the commentaries by Mike Martin and Louis Charland. We begin by emphasizing to readers that this important problem is complicated by the different perspectives of the various disciplines involved, especially, philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology. Incredulity, anger, and dismay are among the reactions we encountered in discussions of these issues, especially with some mental (...)
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  20. Peter Zachar (2009). Psychiatric Comorbidity: More Than a Kuhnian Anomaly. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):13-22.
  21. Peter Zachar & Scott Bartlett (2009). Technological Rationality in Psychiatry : Immanent Critique, Critical Theory, and a Pragmatist Alternative. In James Phillips (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Technology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
     
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  22. Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.) (2008). Fact and Value in Emotion; Consciousness and Emotion Book Series. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
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  23. Jose Miguel Fernandez Dols Colombetti, Peter Zachar & Louise Sundararajan (2008). James A. Russell. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 53.
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  24. Kenneth S. Kendler & Peter Zachar (2008). The Incredible Insecurity of Psychiatric Nosology. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  25. Nancy Nyquist Potter & Peter Zachar (2008). Vice, Mental Disorder, and the Role of Underlying Pathological Processes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (1):27-29.
  26. Peter Zachar (2008). A Triptych on Affective Science: Response to the Commentary. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):444-453.
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  27. Peter Zachar (2008). Comment: Psychiatry, Scientific Laws, and Realism About Entities. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. 5--38.
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  28. Peter Zachar (2008). Real Kinds but No True Taxonomy : An Essay in Psychiatric Systematics. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press.
     
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  29. Peter Zachar (2006). The Classification of Emotion and Scientific Realism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 26 (1-2):120-138.
  30. Peter Zachar (2006). Les troubles psychiatriques et le modèle des espèces pratiques. Philosophiques 33 (1):81-97.
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  31. Peter Zachar (2006). Reconciliation as Compromise and the Management of Rage. In Nancy Potter (ed.), Trauma, Truth and Reconciliation: Healing Damaged Relationships. Oup Oxford. 67--81.
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  32. Ralph D. Ellis, Natika Newton & Peter Zachar (2002). Irwin Goldstein. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
  33. Ralph D. Ellis, Natika Newton & Peter Zachar (2002). Luc Faucher and Christine Tappolet. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):105-144.
  34. Peter Zachar (2002). The Practical Kinds Model as a Pragmatist Theory of Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (3):219-227.
  35. Peter Zachar (2002). When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts by G. Lynn Stephens George Graham. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):273-280.
  36. Peter Zachar & S. Bartlett (2002). Basic Emotions and Their Biological Substrates: A Nominalistic Interpretation. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):189-221.
    The thesis of this article is that an attitude akin to pragmatism is internal to the scientific enterprise itself, and as a result many scientists will make the same types of non-essentialistic interpretations of their subject matter that are made by pragmatists. This is demonstrably true with respect to those scientists who study the biological basis of emotion such as Panksepp, LeDoux, and Damasio. Even though these scientists are also influenced by what cognitive psychologists call the essentialist bias, their research (...)
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  37. Peter Zachar (2001). Aaron Ben-Ze Ev: The Subtlety of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):180-188.
  38. Peter Zachar (2000). Child Development and the Regulation of Affect and Cognition in Consciousness: A View From Object Relations Theory. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins. 205-222.
  39. Peter Zachar (2000). Folk Taxonomies Should Not Have Essences, Either: A Response to the Commentary. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):191-194.
  40. Peter Zachar (2000). Psychiatric Disorders Are Not Natural Kinds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):167-182.