The paper explores the notion of communicative success as a match between the speaker's communicative intention and the audience's interpretation. The first part argues that it cannot be generalized to all kinds of communication. The second part characterizes various types of relations between the speaker's and the audience's beliefs on which this kind of communicative success can be based. It shows that the requirements concerning agreement between these beliefs are rather modest.
Ve FČ 4/2000 demonstroval Petr Koťátko svůj soustavný kritický zájem o mé práce tentokrát polemikou s názory, které jsem vyslovil ve své knize Význam a struktura (OIKOYMENH, Praha, 1999). Nad mým chápáním významu jakožto ‘zhmotnění’ inferenční role si Koťátko klade otázku „co je za takovými formulacemi, a především: co je zde reálně navíc v porovnání s funkcí, kterou strukturám (včetně inferenčních) běžně přiznáváme, aniž bychom se deklarovali jako strukturalisté“. Nemohu než konstatovat, že o tom, co za nimi je, je (...) moje kniha. Nevím ovšem, jakou roli strukturám přiznává Koťátko a ti ostatní, za které mluví – mojí zkušeností je, že inferencialismus, který v knize obhajuji (ať už úspěšně nebo ne), je pro většinu lidí zabývajících se jazykem dost těžko stravitelnou věcí (viz například moji diskusi s Pavlem Maternou ve FČ 5/2000). (shrink)
The year is 1901. Two minor celebrities from opposite corners of the globe share an evening meal in Chicago. Both are politically left-leaning, both are evolutionists of a sort, both are concerned with the plight of the poor in the face of the escalation of the Industrial Revolution. The Russian man has been giving a series of lectures to the people of Chicago; he is staying at the American woman's settlement house-Hull House. They are Jane Addams, Chicago's activist social worker (...) and Petr Kropotkin, Russian nobleman by birth, anarchist in politics, and naturalist by inclination. Each awaits publication of their first full-length book concerning politics and moral development: Democracy and Social Ethics (1902) on .. (shrink)
In this article the most important text of twentieth-century Russian intellectual history, Landmarks (Vekhi) (1909) comes under reexamination. Looking at the rivalry of the volume''s two organizers, Mikhail Gershenzon and Petr Struve, Professor Brian Horowitz explains why Landmarks succeeded in offering such a biting critique of radical ideology, while lacking its own internal intellectual unity.
I present and argue for twotheses: the first concerns the degree to whichChaadaev''s thought represents a breakthrough inthe development of Russian social philosophyand the second concerns the Hegelian characterof this thinking. I also show that Chaadaev''stheory retained an open character closely tiedto the crisis character of the social realityof his time and that it depended for itsjustification on the further course of thehistorical process, which is impossible topredict. All this leads to an interpretation ofChaadaev''s view according to which the standardopposition (...) of Chaadaev''s two best-known texts,The Philosophical Letters, with theirpredominantly pessimistic picture of Russia,and the Apology of a Madman, whichrefutes this evaluation, is rejected. (shrink)
Nová kniha Petra Koláře, Pravda a fakt (Filosofia, Praha, 2002) je věnována tématu, kterým se Kolář částečně zabýval již ve své předchozí knize: teoriím pravdivosti a zejména teorii korespondenční. Diskuse o tom, jak explikovat pojem pravdy či pravdivosti se analytickou filosofií táhnou od jejích počátků, a rozdmychány byly zejména výsledky Tarského matematických analýz tohoto pojmu1. Kolář v první části knihy probírá a srovnává hlavní kategorie těch teorií, které jsou výsledky těchto diskusí (některé z nich samozřejmě tak či onak existovaly dávno (...) před Tarskim): dělí je na korespondenční, koherenční, pragmatistické, minimalistické, redundanční a sémantické (tou poslední je de facto původní Tarského varianta). Způsobu, jak Kolář tyto teorie vykládá, lze, myslím, vytýkat skutečně pramálo: jeho výklad je systematický, jasný a názorný. Také shrnutí na koncích jednotlivých kapitol jsou velice užitečná a dokumentují autorovu pedagogickou pečlivost. Přesto bych si k této části dovolil mít dvě drobné a jednu zásadnější připomínku. Zaprvé se mi nezdá příliš adekvátní, jak Kolář používá termíny deflacionismus a minimalismus: za deflacionistickou prohlašuje každou teorii, která rezignuje na explikaci pojmu pravdy, takže mu do této kolonky spadne jak horwichovský minimalismus, tak davidsonovský názor, že pojem pravdy nelze explikovat ne proto, že by byl triviální, ale naopak proto, že je příliš fundamentální (tady se dere na jazyk termín maximalismus). To se ale těžko slučuje s Davidsonovým výslovným odmítáním deflacionismu2. Zdá se mi, že termín deflacionismus je spíše víceméně synonymní s termínem minimalismus a ty oba se mi zdají do velké míry krýt i s redundanční teorií. Druhou drobnou výhradou je, že mi připadá škoda, že Kolář v rámci pojednávání pragmatistických teoriích zcela pominul současný pragmatismus. Škoda to je pro to, že pragmatismus v současné době zažívá velký revival a i různé pragmatistické teorie pravdivosti se proto dostávají na pořad dne (včetně například kontextu matematiky). Za.... (shrink)
On the Notion "Type of Language" Petr Sgall It is well known that the high frequency of terminological vagueness and confusion has been a serious obstacle ...
Some aspects of vagueness as presented in Shapiro’s book Vagueness in Context [23] are analyzed from the point of fuzzy logic. Presented are some generalizations of Shapiro’s formal apparatus.
The starting point of this work is the gap between two distinct traditions in information engineering: knowledge representation and data-driven modelling. The first tradition emphasizes logic as a tool for representing beliefs held by an agent. The second tradition claims that the main source of knowledge is made of observed data, and generally does not use logic as a modelling tool. However, the emergence of fuzzy logic has blurred the boundaries between these two traditions by putting forward fuzzy rules as (...) a Janus-faced tool that may represent knowledge, as well as approximate non-linear functions representing data. This paper lays bare logical foundations of data-driven reasoning whereby a set of formulas is understood as a set of observed facts rather than a set of beliefs. Several representation frameworks are considered from this point of view: classical logic, possibility theory, belief functions, epistemic logic, fuzzy rule-based systems. Mamdani's fuzzy rules are recovered as belonging to the data-driven view. In possibility theory a third set-function, different from possibility and necessity plays a key role in the data-driven view, and corresponds to a particular modality in epistemic logic. A bi-modal logic system is presented which handles both beliefs and observations, and for which a completeness theorem is given. Lastly, our results may shed new light in deontic logic and allow for a distinction between explicit and implicit permission that standard deontic modal logics do not often emphasize. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: Part I. Historical Context - Gödel's Contributions and Accomplishments: 1. The impact of Gödel's incompleteness theorems on mathematics Angus Macintyre; 2. Logical hygiene, foundations, and abstractions: diversity among aspects and options Georg Kreisel; 3. The reception of Gödel's 1931 incompletabilty theorems by mathematicians, and some logicians, to the early 1960s Ivor Grattan-Guinness; 4. 'Dozent Gödel will not lecture' Karl Sigmund; 5. Gödel's thesis: an appreciation Juliette C. Kennedy; 6. Lieber Herr Bernays!, Lieber Herr Gödel! Gödel on (...) finitism, constructivity, and Hilbert's program Solomon Feferman; 7. Computation and intractability: echoes of Kurt Gödel Christos H. Papadimitriou; 8. From the entscheidungsproblem to the personal computer - and beyond B. Jack Copeland; 9. Gödel, Einstein, Mach, Gamow, and Lanczos: Gödel's remarkable excursion into cosmology Wolfgang Rindler; 10. Physical unknowables Karl Svozil; Part II. A Wider Vision - The Interdisciplinary, Philosophical, And Theological Implications of Gödel's Work: 11. Gödel and physics John D. Barrow; 12. Gödel, Thomas Aquinas, and the unknowability of God Denys A. Turner; 13. Gödel's mathematics of philosophy Piergiorgio Odifreddi; 14. Gödel's ontological proof and its variants Petr Hájek; 15. The Gödel theorem and human nature Hilary Putnam; 16. Gödel, the mind, and the laws of physics Roger Penrose; Part III. New Frontiers - Beyond Gödel's Work in Mathematics and Symbolic Logic: 17. Gödel's functional interpretation and its use in current mathematics Ulrich Kohlenbach; 18. My forty years on his shoulders Harvey M. Friedman; 19. My interaction with Kurt Gödel: the man and his work Paul J. Cohen; 20. The transfinite universe W. Hugh Woodin; 21. The Gödel phenomena in mathematics: a modern view Avi Wigderson. (shrink)
Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying "x is true" and satisfying the "dequotation schema" $\varphi \equiv \text{Tr}(\bar{\varphi})$ for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Lukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.
ukasiewicz''s four-valued modal logic is surveyed and analyzed, together with ukasiewicz''s motivations to develop it. A faithful interpretation of it in classical (non-modal) two-valued logic is presented, and some consequences are drawn concerning its classification and its algebraic behaviour. Some counter-intuitive aspects of this logic are discussed in the light of the presented results, ukasiewicz''s own texts, and related literature.
V kontextu české filosofie, kde není nouze o vzdělané a chytré lidi, ale kde se to nijak nehemží skutečnými individualitami, představuje Petr Vopěnka zcela zvláštní případ. Je matematik nejenom vzděláním, ale v matematice i leccos dokázal. Jeho knihy o filosofii matematiky, zejména jeho tetralogie Rozprav s geometrií1, jsou velice vyhraněné: Vopěnka v nich předkládá svůj originální obraz a příliš se nestará o to, aby ho konfrontoval s tím, co si o tom myslí jiní. Jak sám připouští, i historické osoby, (...) o kterých ve svých knihách píše, mu slouží spíše jako kompars, na jehož pozadí rozehrává svá barvitá líčení ‚dobrodružství poznání‘. Vopěnka ve svých knihách protestuje proti tomu, že moderní věda do obrazu světa, který buduje, vůbec nevpustila tak zásadní determinanty našeho přirozeného světa, jakými jsou neostrost či existence horizontu, který činní náš obraz světa v jistém smyslu ‘nehomogenní‘. Proti tomu se samozřejmě nabízí námitka, že to je v podstatě věci, že vědecký obraz světa je svou podstatou ostrý a homogenní. Že chtít po něm, aby byl jiný, pramení pouze z nepochopení jeho povahy a hlavně jeho role: neboť svět vykreslovaný vědou má být světem pouze v metaforickém slova smyslu, je jenom jakýmsi ‚orientačním plánkem‘, který nám má pomoci orientovat se ve světě ‚přirozeném‘. (Tím ovšem nechci říci, že by tohle nepochopení nebylo fakticky dosti rozšířené.) Vopěnka však ukazuje, že vědu, zejména matematiku, by bylo možné dělat i jinak, než jak se to považuje za víceméně samozřejmé: že je možné vytvořit matematizovaný obraz světa, ze kterého nejsou neostrost či horizont vymeteny. (I tento obraz si samozřejmě zachovává jistý druh ostrosti a homogenity, která z něj činí něco kvalitativně odlišného od přirozeného světa, avšak k přirozenému světu má blíže než ten standardní.) Tento jeho návrh je velice originální a pozoruhodný a je škoda, že mu není věnována větší pozornost a není předmětem soustavnější diskuse, ve které by se ověřila jeho nosnost. Originalita.. (shrink)
This article begins with Gedankenexperiment proposed in The Adventure of Difference by Gianni Vattimo: Following his suggestion to read Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in terms of Nietzsche’s The Birth of the Tragedy, we attempt to reinterpret the distinction of the authentic and inauthentic existence in the light of the difference between the Dionysian and Apollonian element, which brings us also to a new view on the existential finitude, individuality and co-existence with others. In the background of these existential features we discover (...) the notion of event that breaks the ecstatic unity of temporality and marks the hermeneutical continuity of existence by the radical discontinuity. The image of existence exposed to the power of event is further elaborated with the help of Henri Maldiney who has introduced into the frame of the fundamental ontology the concepts of trans-possibility and trans-passibility that express the existential openness to the event. Such a reformulation of the fundamental ontology, however, brings us into the sphere of heteronomous thought that, instead of preserving its essential autonomy, unity and integrity, becomes other in its relation to the otherness that is encountered in the event. (shrink)
We prove that Standardization fails in every nontrivial universe definable in the nonstandard set theory BST, and that a natural characterization of the standard universe is both consistent with and independent of BST. As a consequence we obtain a formulation of nonstandard class theory in the ∈-language.
Fuzzy logic is understood as a logic with a comparative and truth-functional notion of truth. Arithmetical complexity of sets of tautologies (identically true sentences) and satisfiable sentences (sentences true in at least one interpretation) as well of sets of provable formulas of the most important systems of fuzzy predicate logic is determined or at least estimated.
Are Lévinas and Deleuze two allies in their effort to break away from the Western ontology, which is based on the logic of the One and the Same, or do their philosophies represent two distant galaxies? The purpose of this paper is not to argue for either possibility, but to show the issue in all its complexity. Conjunctions as well as disjunctions of Lévinas' metaphysical thinking and Deleuze's nomadic philosophy should be dealt with on the background of the problems of (...) sexual difference and human face that play an important part in both conceptions. The analysis of these phenomena shall allow us to see the common denominator of both philosophical conceptions in the relation of thought to the outside, even though they approach the outside in two different ways. (shrink)
We construct a faithful interpretation of ukasiewicz's logic in product logic (both propositional and predicate). Using known facts it follows that the product predicate logic is not recursively axiomatizable.We prove a completeness theorem for product logic extended by a unary connective of Baaz [1]. We show that Gödel's logic is a sublogic of this extended product logic.
Thomas Aquinas de contingentia in rebusTractatio haec explicat, quomodo Thomas Aquinas argumentum Aristotelis contra determinismum et pro contingentia in rebus interpretatur. Radix huius sententiae determinismum respuentis in assertione, quae dicit dari aliquid in rebus per se incausatum (scil. effectus per accidens), consistit. Unde sequitur quod dato aliquo eventu per accidens, sit e, non datur continuus nexus causalis, qua e cum aliquo eventu praesenti vel praeteriti coniungeretur. Thomae autem, qui est Aristotelicus Christianus, alteram difficultatem oportet solvere – eam nempe, quae ex (...) doctrina de divina providentia et praedeterminatione huiusmodi eventuum provenit. Solutio s. Thomae in hoc consistit, quod dicti actus divini transcendunt omnem determinationem modalem, i.e. sunt praeter necessitatem et contingentiam. Translatio: Lukáš NovákThomas Aquinas on Contingency in NatureThe paper deals with Aristotle’s argument against determinism and in favor of contingency in nature as interpreted by Thomas Aquinas. The case against determinism is based on the idea that there are properly uncaused accidental events in reality. This means that in case there is some coincidental future event e, one cannot trace an unbroken causal chain leading to e back to the present or the past. For a Christian Aristotelian, such as Aquinas, there arises a difficulty concerning divine foreknowledge and volitional determination of events of this sort. Thomas’s solution is based on the claim that the latter divine acts are not within the scope of modal determination (necessity/contingency). (shrink)
In the last few decades many formal systems of fuzzy logics have been developed. Since the main differences between fuzzy and classical logics lie at the propositional level, the fuzzy predicate logics have developed more slowly (compared to the propositional ones). In this text we aim to promote interest in fuzzy predicate logics by contributing to the model theory of fuzzy predicate logics. First, we generalize the completeness theorem, then we use it to get results on conservative extensions of theories (...) and on witnessed models. (shrink)
Whereas the political battle between literary activists and industry over the tenets of bioregionalism in the American West has ignored the question of social justice, effectively silencing a sizeable population—the working poor—by creating an economic situation in which labor must choose between two oppressors, mutual aid as championed by Petr Kropotkin offers more potential for reform than the model of political competition has yielded thus far. If literary activists were to extend Jared Diamond's call to social action in Collapse (...) by becoming advocates of laborers injured by industrial catastrophes, and if eco-activists were to imagine economic alternatives to the policies they oppose, then bioregionalism could hope to gain more ground as a grassroots movement. (shrink)
A very simple many-valued predicate calculus is presented; a completeness theorem is proved and the arithmetical complexity of some notions concerning provability is determined.
Rational Pavelka logic extends Lukasiewicz infinitely valued logic by adding truth constants r̄ for rationals in [0, 1]. We show that this is a conservative extension. We note that this shows that provability degree can be defined in Lukasiewicz logic. We also give a counterexample to a soundness theorem of Belluce and Chang published in 1963.
Two alternatives are considered: (1) the notion of utterance meaning as constituted by the match between the communicative intention and interpretation, (2) the notion of utterance meaning as a set of the utterance's normative consequences. (1) is criticised for its being based on a notion of communicative success limited to a certain type of discourse. On the contrary, (2) allows for a variety of types of discourse governed by different principles of the determination of utterance meanings: they differ in particular (...) in the role assigned to linguistic conventions and to hypotheses about speaker's intentions. A special kind of these hypotheses which can be relevant within both accounts of utterance meaning is analysed in detail. (shrink)
Libertas et necessitasDissertatio proposita circa varias species fatalismi versatur, quae aut super determinismum causalem, aut super principium semanticum dicens quod propositiones de futuro verae esse possint in praesenti, aut super divinam omniscientiam fundantur. Auctor formam, quae omnibus argumentis pro fatalismo est communis, manifestat et notionem modi “necessitatis impotentiae”, qui locum principalem in dictis argumentis occupat, explicat. Denique doctrinam “Occamismi”, ope cuius fatalismus theologicus oppugnari posset, examinat, necnon rationes alias, quibus nonnuli “principium transferendi (scil. necessitatem impotentiae)”, quo argumenta praedicta omnia sunt (...) innixa, refutare conantur. Translatio: L. NovákFreedom and necessityThe paper deals with various species of fatalism originating either in causal determinism, in the semantic fact that propositions about the future may be true in the present, or in divine omniscience. The common argument form is identified as well as the relevant notion of modality at play, that of power necessity. Finally, the paper examines briefly a strategy to combat theological fatalism, the socalled Ockhamism and various attempts to disprove the underlying transfer principle (of power necessity). (shrink)
Doctrina aliquorum ex Thomistis de analogiaIn hac dissertatione, quid Thomistae praecipui, qui saec. 15.–17. florebant (Thomas de Vio – Caietanus, Silvester Ferrariensis, Joannes Versor, Joannes a S. Thoma), ad Scoti contra analogiam obiectiones responderint et quomodo Doctoris sui doctrinam defenderint, exponitur. Auctor primo medullam doctrinae “semanticae” de analogia proponit, deinde modum, quo Caietanus et ceteri optimae notae Thomistae ex nonullis ab Aquinate de hac re obiter dictis doctrinam bene ordinatam aedificaverunt, declarat.Some Thomists on AnalogyThe article is a presentation of the (...) Thomist response to Scotist criticism of analogy; namely, the defense of St. Thomas’ teaching in some leading renaissance and post-renaissance Thomists: Thomas de Vio, better known as Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, John Versor and John of Saint Thomas. The author first explains the general core of the semantic doctrine of analogy and outlines the basic terminology. Then he exposes the way Cajetan and other Thomists knit Aquinas’ dispersed remarks on analogy into a systematic doctrinal whole. (shrink)
Each closed (i.e. variable free) formula of interpretability logic is equivalent in ILF to a closed formula of the provability logic G, thus to a Boolean combination of formulas of the form n.
Two variants of monadic fuzzy predicate logic are analyzed and compared with the full fuzzy predicate logic with respect to finite model property (properties) and arithmetical complexity of sets of tautologies, satisfiable formulas and of analogous notion restricted to finite models.
It is shown that the low basis theorem is meaningful and provable in I∑ 1 and that the priority-free solution to Post's problem formalizes in this theory.
1. Prof. PhDr. František Daneš, DrSc. ; Prof. PhDr. Eva Hajičová, DrSc. ; PhDr. Pavel Jančák, CSc. ; Prof PhDr. Miroslav Komárek, DrSc. ; Doc. PhDr. Iva Nebeská, CSc. ; Prof. PhDr. Bohumil Palek, DrSc. ; PhDr Jaromír Povejšil, CSc. ; PhDr. Marie Těšitelová, DrSc. ; Prof. PhDr. Oldřich Uličný, DrSc. ; Prof. PhDr. Radoslav Večerka, DrSc. -- 2. Jan Balhar, Zoe Hauptová, Milan Jelínek, Jan Kořenský, Jiří Kraus, Jaroslav Kuchař, Zdena Palková, Petr Sgall, Dušan Šlosar, Ludmila Uhlířová.
Compactness is an important property of classical propositional logic. It can be defined in two equivalent ways. The first one states that simultaneous satisfiability of an infinite set of formulae is equivalent to the satisfiability of all its finite subsets. The second one states that if a set of formulae entails a formula, then there is a finite subset entailing this formula as well. In propositional many-valued logic, we have different degrees of satisfiability and different possible definitions of entailment, hence (...) the questions of compactness is more complex. In this paper we will deal with compactness of Gödel, GödelΔ, and Gödel∼ logics. (shrink)
De argumento ontologico modaliIn haec dissertatione variae formae sic dicti „secundi seu modalis argumenti ontologici“ a nostrae auctoribus (inde a N. Malcolmio usque ad P. Tichý) propositae examinantur. Tria praecipua huius argumenti praesupposita deteguntur ac perpenduntur. Difficultatem maximam, qua argumentum omnibus in formis laboret, in existentia necessaria Deo tribuenda sitam esse demonstratur. Si enim huiusmodi existentia Deo tribueretur, nullum mundum possibilem talem existere dicendum esset, in quo Deus non adesset. Talem vero mundum possibilem non occurere falsum esse videtur.On the Modal (...) Ontological Argument.The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence of God. However, this seems to be wrong. (shrink)
Praescriptivismus universalis R. M. HariiDisseratinis huius finis est, R. M Harii doctrinam ethicam, quae in libris, quibus tituli The language of Morals (1952) et Freedom and Reason (1963) exponitur, et systematice proponere et critice interpretari. Haec doctrina, quamquam ob multa apte dicta magna attentione digna est, difficultatibus tamen gravibus expers esse non videtur. Praecipua harum difficultatum in hoc consistit, quod, unde principiorum seu praeceptorum moralium vis obligandi proveniat, auctor non prodit.Universal Prescriptivism of R. M. HareThe article is a critical systematic (...) presentation of R. M. Hare's ethical concepts and doctrine as outlined in his books The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963). The theory merits attention for many reasons, yet it appears to suffer from some weaknesses; the chief among them being the lack of explanation for the source of binding force of moral principles. (shrink)
An arithmetical interpretation of dynamic propositional logic (DPL) is a mapping f satisfying the following: (1) f associates with each formula A of DPL a sentence f(A) of Peano arithmetic (PA) and with each program α a formula f(α) of PA with one free variable describing formally a supertheory of PA; (2) f commutes with logical connectives; (3) f([α] A) is the sentence saying that f(A) is provable in the theory f(α); (4) for each axiom A of DPL, f(A) is (...) provable in PA (and consequently, for each A provable in DPL, f(A) is provable in PA). The arithmetical completeness theorem is proved saying that a formula A of DPL is provable in DPL iff for each arithmetical interpretation f, f(A) is provable in PA. Various modifications of this result are considered. (shrink)
A model for kinetics of circular substrate cleavage by restriction endonuclease was formulated. The aim of the analysis of the model was to extract kinetic constants for all target sites from time-dependence of fragment concentration in reaction products. That was proved to be possible for molecules with an odd number of fragments only. A symmetry of the molecules with an even number of fragment is the cause. A solution for molecules with an odd number of fragments was found and (...) methods for dealing with the other molecules were suggested. (shrink)
Petr Kot'átko (2006). Having a Concept. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.score: 3.0
