269 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Philip Pettit (Princeton University, Australian National University)
  1.  220 DLs
    Christian List & Philip Pettit (2006). Group Agency and Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
    Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on that (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2.  200 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). Program Explanation: A General Perspective. Analysis 50 (2):107-17.
    Some properties are causally relevant for a certain effect, others are not. In this paper we describe a problem for our understanding of this notion and then offer a solution in terms of the notion of a program explanation.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3.  186 DLs
    Philip Pettit (1997). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford University Press.
    This is the first full-length presentation of a republican alternative to the liberal and communitarian theories that have dominated political philosophy in recent years. The latest addition to the acclaimed Oxford Political Theory series, Pettit's eloquent and compelling account opens with an examination of the traditional republican conception of freedom as non-domination, contrasting this with established negative and positive views of liberty. The first part of the book traces the rise and decline of this conception, displays its many attractions, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4.  164 DLs
    Philip Pettit (1990). The Reality of Rule-Following. Mind 99 (393):1-21.
  5.  148 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). In Defense of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54.
    It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6.  129 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1995). Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7.  124 DLs
    Philip Pettit (1974). A Theory of Justice? Theory and Decision 4 (3-4):311-324.
    AnsrRAcr. This is a critical analysis of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Rawls offers a theoretical justihcation of social democratic principles of justice. He argues that they are the principles which rational men would choose, under defined constraints, in an original position of social contract. The author criticises Rawls’s assumption that men of any background, of any socialisation, would choose these principles in the original position. He argues that the choice which Rawls imputes to his contractors reflects a specific (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8.  121 DLs
    Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit (eds.) (2006). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Blackwell Publishing.
    This authoritative collection of the seminal texts in post-war political philosophy has now been updated and expanded. Reprints key articles, mainly unabridged, touching upon the nature of the state, democracy, justice, rights, liberty, equality and oppression. Includes work from politics, law and economics, as well as from continental and analytic philosophy. Now includes thirteen additional texts, taking account of recent developments in the field and reflecting the most pressing concerns in international affairs. Can be used alongside A Companion to Contemporary (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9.  117 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1996). Moral Functionalism, Supervenience and Reductionism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):82-86.
    We respond to Mark van Roojen's discussion of our 'Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation', "Philosophical Quarterly", 45 (January, 1995): 20-40. There we assumed that ethical language makes claims about how things are and sought to make plausible under this assumption a view of moral language modelled on David Lewis's treatment of theoretical terms. Van Roojen finds the idea of treating ethical terms as theoretical terms attractive but doubts that we 'have succeeded in offering a reduction of evaluative properties to natural (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10.  110 DLs
    Philip Pettit & David Schweikard (2006). Joint Actions and Group Agents. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
    University of Cologne, Germany Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints of consistency (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11.  108 DLs
    Alan Hájek & Philip Pettit (2004). Desire Beyond Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77-92.
    David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the `Desire-as- Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewis's negative results. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12.  104 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1998). A Problem for Expressivism. Analysis 58 (4):239–251.
    Expressivists hold that ethical sentences express attitudes. We argue that it is very hard for expressivists to give an account of the relevant sense of 'express' which has some plausibility and also delivers the kind of noncognitivist account of ethical sentences they affirm. Our argument draws on Locke's point that words are voluntary signs.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13.  103 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2007). Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency. Dialectica 61 (4):495-519.
    The rationality of individual agents is secured for the most part by their make-up or design. Some agents, however – in particular, human beings – rely on the intentional exercise of thinking or reasoning in order to promote their rationality further; this is the activity that is classically exemplified in Rodin’s sculpture of Le Penseur. Do group agents have to rely on reasoning in order to maintain a rational profile? Recent results in the theory of judgment aggregation show that under (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14.  101 DLs
    Philip Pettit, The Demarcation of Metaphor.
    There are three major issues which crop up in the discussion of metaphor among philosophers of language. They are: whether metaphor is cognitive, whether it is descriptive, and whether it is innovative. Those who deny that metaphor is cognitive are a group more often imagined than encountered, but if they existed they would consign the study of metaphor to affective stylistics, stressing the ornamentative and related effects which the phenomenon is likely to have.‘ Those who admit that metaphor is cognitive (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15.  98 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2006). When to Defer to Majority Testimony – and When Not. Analysis 66 (291):179–187.
    How sensitive should you be to the testimony of others? You saw the car that caused an accident going through traffic lights on the red; or so you thought. Should you revise your belief on discovering that the majority of bystanders, equally well-equipped, equally well-positioned and equally impartial, reported that it went through on the green? Or take another case. You believe that intelligent design is the best explanation for the order of the living universe. Should you revise that belief (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16.  97 DLs
    Michael Slote & Philip Pettit (1984). Satisficing Consequentialism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:139-163+165-176.
  17.  97 DLs
    Philip Pettit (1993). Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican. European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):15-38.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18.  95 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2001). Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 1 Capability and Freedom: A Defence of Sen. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):1-20.
    In a recent discussion of Amartya Sen's concept of the capabilities of people for functioning in their society – and the idea of targeting people's functioning capabilities in evaluating the society – G. A. Cohen accuses Sen of espousing an inappropriate, ‘athletic’ image of the person (Cohen, 1993, pp. 24–5). The idea is that if Sen's formulations are to be taken at face value, then life is valuable only so far as people actively choose most facets of their existence: if (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19.  93 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2007). Responsibility Incorporated. Ethics 117 (2):171-201.
    The Herald of Free Enterprise, a ferry operating in the English Channel, sank on March 6, 1987, drowning nearly two hundred people. The official inquiry found that the company running the ferry was extremely sloppy, with poor routines of checking and management. “From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness.”1 But the courts did not penalize anyone in what might seem to be an appropriate measure, failing to identify individuals in the company or on (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20.  93 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2010). A Republican Law of Peoples. European Journal of Political Theory 9 (1):70-94.
    Assuming that states will remain a permanent feature of our world, what is the ideal that we should hold out for the international order? An attractive proposal is that those peoples that are already organized under non-dominating, representative states should pursue a twin goal: first, arrange things so that they each enjoy the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination in relation to one another and to other multi-national and international agencies; and second, do everything possible and productive to facilitate the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21.  92 DLs
    Philip Pettit, Agency-Freedom and Option-Freedom.
    The recent debates about the nature of social freedom, understood in a broadly negative way, have generated three main views of the topic: these represent freedom respectively as non-limitation, non-interference and non-domination. The participants in these debates often go different ways, however, because they address different topics under common names, not because they hold different intuitions on common topics. Social freedom is sometimes understood as option-freedom, sometimes as agency-freedom and the different directions taken by the theories can often be explained (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22.  89 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2004). Descriptivism, Rigidified and Anchored. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):323-338.
    Stalnaker argues that, while the two-dimensional framework can be used to give expression to the claims associated with rigidified descriptivism, it cannot be used to support that position. He also puts forward some objections to rigidified descriptivism. I agree that rigidified descriptivism cannot be supported by appeal to the two-dimensional framework. But I think that Stalnaker’s objections can be avoided under a descriptivism that introduces a causal as well as a descriptive element – a descriptivism in which the relevant descriptions (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23.  87 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2011). The Instability of Freedom as Noninterference: The Case of Isaiah Berlin. Ethics 121 (4):693-716.
  24.  84 DLs
    Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1996). Freedom in Belief and Desire. Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
  25.  83 DLs
    Philip Pettit (1994). Consequentialism and Moral Psychology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1):1 – 17.
    Consequentialism ought not to make an impact, explicit or implicit, on every decision. All it ought generally to enjoy is what I describe as a virtual presence in the deliberation that produces decisions. [...] The argument that we have conducted suggests that the virtuous agent ought in general to remain faithful to his or her instincts and ingrained habits, only occasionally breaking with them in the name of promoting the best consequences.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26.  80 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2006). Freedom in the Market. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (2):131-149.
    The market is traditionally hailed as the very exemplar of a system under which people enjoy freedom, in particular the negative sort of freedom associated with liberal and libertarian thought: freedom as noninterference. But how does the market appear from the perspective of a rival conception of freedom (freedom as non-domination) that is linked with the Roman and neo-Roman tradition of republicanism? The republican conception of freedom argues for important normative constraints on property, exchange, and regulation, without supporting extremes to (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27.  80 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2001). Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma. Noûs 35 (s1):268-299.
    Taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions, the ideal of deliberative democracy is inherently ambiguous. Consider the idealised case where it is agreed on all sides that a certain conclusion should be endorsed if and only if certain premises are admitted. Does deliberative democracy recommend that members of the group debate the premises and then individually vote, in the light of that debate, on whether or not to support the conclusion? Or does it recommend (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28.  79 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2002). Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner. Political Theory 30 (3):339-356.
    There has recently been a good deal of interest in the republican tradition, particularly in the political conception of freedom maintained within that tradition. I look here at the characterisation of republican liberty in a recent work of Quentin Skinner1and argue on historical and conceptual grounds for a small amendment—a simplification—that would make it equivalent to the view that freedom in political contexts should be identified with nondomination.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29.  79 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2000). Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):175-190.
    If non-consequentialists are to embrace the requirement of universalizability, then they will have to adopt a surprisingly relativistic stance. Not only will they say, in familiar vein, that the premises adduced in moral argument may be only agent-relative in force, that is, may involve the use of an indexical – as in the consideration that this or that option would advance my commitments, discharge my duty, or benefit my children – and may provide reasons only for the indexically relevant agent, (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30.  77 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). Causation and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:195-214.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31.  75 DLs
    Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1993). Practical Unreason. Mind 102 (405):53-79.
    Some contemporary theories treat phenomena like weakness of will, compulsion and wantonness as practical failures but not as failures of rationality: say, as failures of autonomy or whatever. Other current theories-the majority see the phenomena as failures of rationality but not as distinctively practical failures. They depict them as always involving a theoretical deficiency: a sort of ignorance, error, inattention or illogic. They represent them as failures which are on a par with breakdowns of theoretical reason; the failures may not (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32.  74 DLs
    Christian List & Philip Pettit (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
    Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33.  71 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1988). Functionalism and Broad Content. Mind 97 (July):318-400.
  34.  69 DLs
    Philip Pettit (1989). Consequentialism and Respect for Persons. Ethics 100 (1):116-126.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35.  69 DLs
    Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):438 – 455.
    paper offers both explication and defence. Standard consequentialism is a theory of decision. It attempts to identify, for any set of alternative options, that which it is right that an agent should..
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36.  68 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2003). Looks as Powers. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
    Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37.  68 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (2003). Locke, Expressivism, Conditionals. Analysis 63 (1):86–92.
    The sentence ‘x is square’ might have had different truth conditions from those it in fact has. It might have had no truth conditions at all. Its having truth conditions and its having the ones it has rest on empirical facts about our use of ‘x is square’. What empirical facts? Any answer that goes into detail is inevitably highly controversial, but we think that there is a rough answer that is, by philosophers’ standards, relatively uncontroversial. It goes back to (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38.  67 DLs
    Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1990). Backgrounding Desire. Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
    Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39.  66 DLs
    Philip Pettit (1996). Freedom as Antipower. Ethics 106 (3):576-604.
  40.  65 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2001). A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Oxford University Press.
    The view he develops--which includes the seemingly paradoxical notion that we are free to the extent that we are capable of being held responsible--will make...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41.  65 DLs
    Philip Pettit, A Republican Right to Basic Income?
    The basic income proposal provides everyone in a society, as an unconditional right, with access to a certain level of income. Introducing such a right is bound to raise questions of institutional feasibility. Would it lead too many people to opt out of the workforce, for example? And even if it did not, could a constitution that allowed some members of the society to do this – at whatever relative cost – prove acceptable in a society of mutually reciprocal, equally (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42.  64 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2000). Winch's Double-Edged Idea of a Social Science. History of the Human Sciences 13 (1):63-77.
    Peter Winch’s 1958 book The Idea of a Social Science contains two distinguishable sets of theses, one set bearing on the individual-level understanding of human beings, the other on the society-level understanding of the regularities and institutions to which human beings give rise. The first set of claims is persuasive and significant but the second is a mixed bunch: none is well established and only some are sound.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43.  64 DLs
    Peter Menzies & Philip Pettit (1994). In Defence of Fictionalism About Possible Worlds. Analysis 54 (1):27 - 36.
    Modal functionalism is the view that talk about possible worlds should be construed as talk about fictional objects. The version of modal fictionalism originally presented by Gideon Rosen adopted a simple prefixing strategy for fictionalising possible worlds analyses of modal propositions. However, Stuart Brock and Rosen himself in a later article have independently advanced an objection that shows that the prefixing strategy cannot serve fictionalist purposes. In this paper we defend fictionalism about possible worlds by showing that there are other (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44.  62 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2005). On Rule-Following, Folk Psychology, and the Economy of Esteem: A Reply to Boghossian, Dreier and Smith. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 124 (2):233-259.
  45.  62 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (2002). Response-Dependence Without Tears. Noûs 36 (s1):97 - 117.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46.  59 DLs
    Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1993). Some Content is Narrow. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
    ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require 0f contcnt in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47.  59 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2012). A Question for Tomorrow: The Robust Demands of the Good. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 7 (3):7-12.
  48.  57 DLs
    Philip Pettit (1993/1996). The Common Mind. Oxford University Press.
    What makes human beings intentional and thinking subjects? How does their intentionality and thought connect with their social nature and their communal experience? How do the answers to these questions shape the assumptions which it is legitimate to make in social explanation and political evaluation? These are the broad-ranging issues which Pettit addresses in this novel study. The Common Mind argues for an original way of marking off thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49.  55 DLs
    John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Philip Pettit (1996). Strategies for Free Will Compatibilists. Analysis 56 (4):191-201.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50.  54 DLs
    Philip Pettit (2012). Freedom in Hobbes's Ontology and Semantics: A Comment on Quentin Skinner. Journal of the History of Ideas 73 (1):111-126.
1 — 50 / 269