Search results for 'Phenomena' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Brigitte Falkenburg (2011). What Are the Phenomena of Physics? Synthese 182 (1):149-163.score: 18.0
    Depending on different positions in the debate on scientific realism, there are various accounts of the phenomena of physics. For scientific realists like Bogen and Woodward, phenomena are matters of fact in nature, i.e., the effects explained and predicted by physical theories. For empiricists like van Fraassen, the phenomena of physics are the appearances observed or perceived by sensory experience. Constructivists, however, regard the phenomena of physics as artificial structures generated by experimental and mathematical methods. My (...)
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  2. James F. Woodward (2011). Data and Phenomena: A Restatement and Defense. Synthese 182 (1):165-179.score: 18.0
    This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced, ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms.
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  3. Samuel Schindler (2011). Bogen and Woodward's Data-Phenomena Distinction, Forms of Theory-Ladenness, and the Reliability of Data. Synthese 182 (1):39-55.score: 18.0
    Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claimed that theories predict and explain phenomena, but not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness, which has it that our (...)
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  4. Eran Tal (2011). From Data to Phenomena and Back Again: Computer-Simulated Signatures. Synthese 182 (1):117-129.score: 18.0
    This paper draws attention to an increasingly common method of using computer simulations to establish evidential standards in physics. By simulating an actual detection procedure on a computer, physicists produce patterns of data (‘signatures’) that are expected to be observed if a sought-after phenomenon is present. Claims to detect the phenomenon are evaluated by comparing such simulated signatures with actual data. Here I provide a justification for this practice by showing how computer simulations establish the reliability of detection procedures. I (...)
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  5. Michela Massimi (2011). From Data to Phenomena: A Kantian Stance. Synthese 182 (1):101-116.score: 18.0
    This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward’s data-to-phenomena inferences. I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister’s view about phenomena as patterns in data sets.
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  6. Jim Bogen (2011). 'Saving the Phenomena' and Saving the Phenomena. Synthese 182 (1):7-22.score: 18.0
    Empiricists claim that in accepting a scientific theory one should not commit oneself to claims about things that are not observable in the sense of registering on human perceptual systems (according to Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism) or experimental equipment (according to what I call liberal empiricism ). They also claim scientific theories should be accepted or rejected on the basis of how well they save the phenomena in the sense delivering unified descriptions of natural regularities among things that meet (...)
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  7. Uljana Feest (2011). What Exactly is Stabilized When Phenomena Are Stabilized? Synthese 182 (1):57-71.score: 18.0
    The last two decades have seen a rising interest in (a) the notion of a scientific phenomenon as distinct from theories and data, and (b) the intricacies of experimentally producing and stabilizing phenomena. This paper develops an analysis of the stabilization of phenomena that integrates two aspects that have largely been treated separately in the literature: one concerns the skills required for empirical work; the other concerns the strategies by which claims about phenomena are validated. I argue (...)
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  8. Rudolph Bauer (2012). Symbolization (Part 2) as the Purity of All Phenomena. Transmission 3.score: 18.0
    This paper focuses on symbolization as purity and translucidity of phenomena.
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  9. Cynthia Sue Larson (2014). Evidence of Macroscopic Quantum Phenomena and Conscious Reality Selection. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 10 (1):34-47.score: 18.0
    The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of emergent examples of macroscopic quantum phenomena. While quantum theory asserts that such quantum behaviors as superposition, entanglement, and coherence are possible for all objects, assumptions that quantum processes operate exclusively within the quantum realm have contributed to on-going bias toward presumed primacy of classical physics in the macroscopic realm. Non-trivial quantum macroscopic effects are now recognized in the fields of biology, quantum physics, quantum computing, quantum astronomy, and neuroscience, (...)
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  10. Stefano Siccardi (2011). Spontaneous Anomalystic Phenomena, Pragmatic Information and Formal Representations of Uncertainty. Axiomathes 21 (2):287-301.score: 18.0
    I discuss the application of the Model of Pragmatic Information to the study of spontaneous anomalystic mental phenomena like telepathy, precognition, etc. In these phenomena the most important effects are related to anomalous information gain by the subjects. I consider the basic ideas of the Model, as they have been applied to experimental anomalystic phenomena and to spontaneous phenomena that have strong physical effects, like poltergeist cases, highlighting analogies and differences. Moreover, I point out that in (...)
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  11. Peter Carruthers (2001). Consciousness: Explaining the Phenomena. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. 61-85.score: 15.0
    Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an.
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  12. Ratan Dasgupta & Sisir Roy (2008). Multinomial Distribution, Quantum Statistics and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Like Phenomena. Foundations of Physics 38 (4):384-394.score: 15.0
    Bose-Einstein statistics may be characterized in terms of multinomial distribution. From this characterization, an information theoretic analysis is made for Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen like situation; using Shannon’s measure of entropy.
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  13. Norton Nelkin (1994). Phenomena and Representation. Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-47.score: 15.0
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  14. Teed Rockwell (1996). Awareness, Mental Phenomena, and Consciousness: A Synthesis of Dennett and Rosenthal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):463-76.score: 15.0
  15. Mark Sentesy & Jean-Luc Nancy (2011). Fantastic Phenomena. Research in Phenomenology 41 (2):228-237.score: 15.0
    The subject of this essay is the thing itself, examined through the fantastic character of phenomenality, that is, through the coming into being or opening up of the world. The world of appearance emerges from a simple, absolute nothing: there is nothing behind or before the world. There are right away many things, a world: one thing implies others, since for one to be it must distinguish itself from another. Thus, if `to be' means `to distinguish,' Being begins with the (...)
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  16. Charlotte Delmar (2006). The Phenomenology of Life Phenomena – in a Nursing Context. Nursing Philosophy 7 (4):235-246.score: 15.0
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  17. John W. Cotton & Allan Rechtschaffen (1958). Replication Report: Two- and Three-Choice Verbal-Conditioning Phenomena. Journal of Experimental Psychology 56 (1):96.score: 15.0
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  18. J. W. Gebhard (1943). Chromatic Phenomena Produced by Intermittent Stimulation of the Retina. Journal of Experimental Psychology 33 (5):387.score: 15.0
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  19. Michaela Mojžišová (2013). The Reflection of Negative Social Phenomena in Contemporary Opera Practice. Human Affairs 23 (1):66-74.score: 15.0
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  20. Donald L. Schurman, Charles W. Eriksen & John Rohrbaugh (1968). Masking Phenomena and Time Intensity Reciprocity for Form. Journal of Experimental Psychology 78 (2p1):310.score: 15.0
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  21. Edward A. Bilodeau (1952). Massing and Spacing Phenomena as Functions of Prolonged and Extended Practice. Journal of Experimental Psychology 44 (2):108.score: 15.0
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  22. L. A. Jeffress (1928). Galvanic Phenomena of the Skin. Journal of Experimental Psychology 11 (2):130.score: 15.0
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  23. L. E. Misbach (1932). Effect of Pitch of Tone-Stimuli Upon Body Resistance and Cardio-Vascular Phenomena. Journal of Experimental Psychology 15 (2):167.score: 15.0
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  24. Sorin Bangu (2009). Understanding Thermodynamic Singularities: Phase Transitions, Data, and Phenomena. Philosophy of Science 76 (4):488-505.score: 12.0
    According to standard (quantum) statistical mechanics, the phenomenon of a phase transition, as described in classical thermodynamics, cannot be derived unless one assumes that the system under study is infinite. This is naturally puzzling since real systems are composed of a finite number of particles; consequently, a well‐known reaction to this problem was to urge that the thermodynamic definition of phase transitions (in terms of singularities) should not be “taken seriously.” This article takes singularities seriously and analyzes their role by (...)
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  25. Alexandre Korolev, The Norton-Type Lipschitz-Indeterministic Systems and Elastic Phenomena: Indeterminism as an Artefact of Infinite Idealizations.score: 12.0
    The singularity arising from the violation of the Lipschitz condition in the simple Newtonian system proposed recently by Norton (2003) is so fragile as to be completely and irreparably destroyed by slightly relaxing certain (infinite) idealizations pertaining to elastic phenomena in this model. I demonstrate that this is also true for several other Lipschitz-indeterministic systems, which, unlike Norton's example, have no surface curvature singularities. As a result, indeterminism in these systems should rather be viewed as an artefact of certain (...)
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  26. David A. Leopold & Nikos K. Logothetis (1999). Multistable Phenomena: Changing Views in Perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (7):254-264.score: 12.0
    Traditional explanations of multistable visual phenomena (e.g. ambiguous figures, perceptual rivalry) suggest that the basis for spontaneous reversals in perception lies in antagonistic connectivity within the visual system. In this review, we suggest an alternative, albeit speculative, explanation for visual multistability – that spontaneous alternations reflect responses to active, programmed events initiated by brain areas that integrate sensory and non-sensory information to coordinate a diversity of behaviors. Much evidence suggests that perceptual reversals are themselves more closely related to the (...)
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  27. Rae Langton (2006). Kant's Phenomena: Extrinsic or Relational Properties? A Reply to Allais. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):170–185.score: 12.0
    Kant’s claim that we are ignorant of things in themselves is a claim that we cannot know ‘the intrinsic nature of things’, or so at least I argued in Kantian Humility.2 I’m delighted to find that Lucy Allais is in broad agreement with this core idea, thinking it represents, at the very least, a part of Kant’s view. She sees some of the advantages of this interpretation. It has significant textual support. It does justice to Kant’s sense that we are (...)
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  28. Anders Nes (2008). Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional? Analysis 68 (299):205–215.score: 12.0
    I question Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. The common gloss on intentionality in terms of directedness does not justify the claim that intentionality is sufficient for mentality. One response to this problem is to lay down further requirements for intentionality. For example, it may be said that we have intentionality only where we have such phenomena as failure of substitution or existential presupposition. I consider a variety of such requirements for intentionality. I argue (...)
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  29. John Matthewson & Brett Calcott (2011). Mechanistic Models of Population-Level Phenomena. Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):737-756.score: 12.0
    This paper is about mechanisms and models, and how they interact. In part, it is a response to recent discussion in philosophy of biology regarding whether natural selection is a mechanism. We suggest that this debate is indicative of a more general problem that occurs when scientists produce mechanistic models of populations and their behaviour. We can make sense of claims that there are mechanisms that drive population-level phenomena such as macroeconomics, natural selection, ecology, and epidemiology. But talk of (...)
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  30. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.score: 12.0
    In Chapter 3 of Book I of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano articulates what he takes to be the four most basic and central tasks of psychology. One of them is to discover the ‘fundamental classification’ of mental phenomena. Brentano attends to this task in Chapters 5-9 of Book II of the Psychology, reprinted (with appendices) in 1911 as a standalone book (Brentano 1911a). The classification is further developed in an essay entitled “A Survey of So-Called Sensory and (...)
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  31. Marcus Arvan (forthcoming). A Unified Explanation of Quantum Phenomena? The Case for the Peer-to-Peer Simulation Hypothesis as an Interdisciplinary Research Program. Philosophical Forum.score: 12.0
    In my 2013 article, “A New Theory of Free Will”, I argued that several serious hypotheses in philosophy and modern physics jointly entail that our reality is structurally identical to a peer-to-peer (P2P) networked computer simulation. The present paper outlines how quantum phenomena emerge naturally from the computational structure of a P2P simulation. §1 explains the P2P Hypothesis. §2 then sketches how the structure of any P2P simulation realizes quantum superposition and wave-function collapse (§2.1.), quantum indeterminacy (§2.2.), wave-particle duality (...)
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  32. Demetris Portides (2011). Seeking Representations of Phenomena: Phenomenological Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):334-341.score: 12.0
    A distinction is made between theory-driven and phenomenological models. It is argued that phenomenological models are significant means by which theory is applied to phenomena. They act both as sources of knowledge of their target systems and are explanatory of the behaviors of the latter. A version of the shell-model of nuclear structure is analyzed and it is explained why such a model cannot be understood as being subsumed under the theory structure of Quantum Mechanics. Thus its representational capacity (...)
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  33. Michela Massimi (2007). Saving Unobservable Phenomena. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):235 - 262.score: 12.0
    In this paper I argue-against van Fraassen's constructive empiricism-that the practice of saving phenomena is much broader than usually thought, and includes unobservable phenomena as well as observable ones. My argument turns on the distinction between data and phenomena: I discuss how unobservable phenomena manifest themselves in data models and how theoretical models able to save them are chosen. I present a paradigmatic case study taken from the history of particle physics to illustrate my argument. The (...)
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  34. James W. McAllister (1997). Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets. Erkenntnis 47 (2):217-228.score: 12.0
    Bogen and Woodward claim that the function of scientific theories is to account for 'phenomena', which they describe both as investigator-independent constituents of the world and as corresponding to patterns in data sets. I argue that, if phenomena are considered to correspond to patterns in data, it is inadmissible to regard them as investigator-independent entities. Bogen and Woodward's account of phenomena is thus incoherent. I offer an alternative account, according to which phenomena are investigator-relative entities. All (...)
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  35. Jacques Derrida (1973). Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs. Evanston,Northwestern University Press.score: 12.0
  36. Matthias Kaiser (1991). From Rocks to Graphs — the Shaping of Phenomena. Synthese 89 (1):111 - 133.score: 12.0
    Assuming an essential difference between scientific data and phenomena, this paper argues for the view that we have to understand how empirical findings get transformed into scientific phenomena. The work of scientists is seen as largely consisting in constructing these phenomena which are then utilized in more abstract theories. It is claimed that these matters are of importance for discussions of theory choice and progress in science. A case study is presented as a starting point: paleomagnetism and (...)
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  37. Jim Woodward (2000). Data, Phenomena, and Reliability. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):179.score: 12.0
    This paper explores how data serve as evidence for phenomena. In contrast to standard philosophical models which invite us to think of evidential relationships as logical relationships, I argue that evidential relationships in the context of data-to-phenomena reasoning are empirical relationships that depend on holding the right sort of pattern of counterfactual dependence between the data and the conclusions investigators reach on the phenomena themselves.
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  38. James W. McAllister (2004). Thought Experiments and the Belief in Phenomena. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1164-1175.score: 12.0
    Thought experiment acquires evidential significance only on particular metaphysical assumptions. These include the thesis that science aims at uncovering "phenomena"universal and stable modes in which the world is articulatedand the thesis that phenomena are revealed imperfectly in actual occurrences. Only on these Platonically inspired assumptions does it make sense to bypass experience of actual occurrences and perform thought experiments. These assumptions are taken to hold in classical physics and other disciplines, but not in sciences that emphasize variety and (...)
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  39. Susan G. Sterrett (2006). Models of Machines and Models of Phenomena. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):69 – 80.score: 12.0
    Experimental engineering models have been used both to model general phenomena, such as the onset of turbulence in fluid flow, and to predict the performance of machines of particular size and configuration in particular contexts. Various sorts of knowledge are involved in the method - logical consistency, general scientific principles, laws of specific sciences, and experience. I critically examine three different accounts of the foundations of the method of experimental engineering models (scale models), and examine how theory, practice, and (...)
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  40. Michael Esfeld & Antonio Vassallo (2013). From Quantum Gravity to Classical Phenomena. In Tilman Sauer & Adrian Wüthrich (eds.), New Vistas on Old Problems. Max Planck Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge.score: 12.0
    Quantum gravity is supposed to be the most fundamental theory, including a quantum theory of the metrical field (spacetime). However, it is not clear how a quantum theory of gravity could account for classical phenomena, including notably measurement outcomes. But all the evidence that we have for a physical theory is based on measurement outcomes. We consider this problem in the framework of canonical quantum gravity, pointing out a dilemma: all the available accounts that admit classical phenomena presuppose (...)
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  41. Antti Revonsuo (1999). Neuroscience and the Explanation of Psychological Phenomena. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):847-849.score: 12.0
    Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. (...)
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  42. Alisa Bokulich (2008). Can Classical Structures Explain Quantum Phenomena? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-235.score: 12.0
    In semiclassical mechanics one finds explanations of quantum phenomena that appeal to classical structures. These explanations are prima facie problematic insofar as the classical structures they appeal to do not exist. Here I defend the view that fictional structures can be genuinely explanatory by introducing a model-based account of scientific explanation. Applying this framework to the semiclassical phenomenon of wavefunction scarring, I argue that not only can the fictional classical trajectories explain certain aspects of this quantum phenomenon, but also (...)
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  43. Scott Scheall, Lesser Degrees of Explanation: Some Implications of F.A. Hayek’s Methodology of Sciences of Complex Phenomena.score: 12.0
    From the early-1950s on, F.A. Hayek was concerned with the development of a methodology of sciences that study systems of complex phenomena. Hayek argued that the knowledge that can be acquired about such systems is, in virtue of their complexity (and the comparatively narrow boundaries of human cognitive faculties), relatively limited. The paper aims to elucidate the implications of Hayek’s methodology with respect to the specific dimensions along which the scientist’s knowledge of some complex phenomena may be limited. (...)
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  44. Paul E. Griffiths (2007). The Phenomena of Homology. Biology and Philosophy 22 (5):643-658.score: 12.0
    Philosophical discussions of biological classification have failed to recognise the central role of homology in the classification of biological parts and processes. One reason for this is a misunderstanding of the relationship between judgments of homology and the core explanatory theories of biology. The textbook characterisation of homology as identity by descent is commonly regarded as a definition. I suggest instead that it is one of several attempts to explain the phenomena of homology. Twenty years ago the ‘new experimentalist’ (...)
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  45. Benedikt Löwe & Thomas Müller (2011). Data and Phenomena in Conceptual Modelling. Synthese 182 (1):131-148.score: 12.0
    The distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward (Philosophical Review 97(3):303–352, 1988) was meant to help accounting for scientific practice, especially in relation with scientific theory testing. Their article and the subsequent discussion is primarily viewed as internal to philosophy of science. We shall argue that the data/phenomena distinction can be used much more broadly in modelling processes in philosophy.
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  46. Neil Tennant (2002). Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena. Mind 111 (443):551-582.score: 12.0
    consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a non-trivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called ‘semantical argument’ for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that the (...)
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  47. Hugues Bersini (2012). Emergent Phenomena Belong Only to Biology. Synthese 185 (2):257-272.score: 12.0
    In this philosophical paper, I discuss and illustrate the necessary three ingredients that together could allow a collective phenomenon to be labelled as “emergent.” First, the phenomenon, as usual, requires a group of natural objects entering in a non-linear relationship and potentially entailing the existence of various semantic descriptions depending on the human scale of observation. Second, this phenomenon has to be observed by a mechanical observer instead of a human one, which has the natural capacity for temporal or spatial (...)
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  48. Vieri Benci (1999). Quantum Phenomena in a Classical Model. Foundations of Physics 29 (1):1-28.score: 12.0
    This work is part of a program which has the aim to investigate which phenomena can be explained by nonlinear effects in classical mechanics and which ones require the new axioms of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we construct a nonlinear field equation which admits soliton solutions. These solitons exibit a dynamics which is similar to that of quantum particles.
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  49. William Harper & Robert DiSalle (1996). Inferences From Phenomena in Gravitational Physics. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):54.score: 12.0
    Newton's methodology emphasized propositions "inferred from phenomena." These rest on systematic dependencies that make phenomena measure theoretical parameters. We consider the inferences supporting Newton's inductive argument that gravitation is proportional to inertial mass. We argue that the support provided by these systematic dependencies is much stronger than that provided by bootstrap confirmation; this kind of support thus avoids some of the major objections against bootstrapping. Finally we examine how contemporary testing of equivalence principles exemplifies this Newtonian methodological theme.
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  50. Bruce Glymour (2000). Data and Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 52 (1):29-37.score: 12.0
    Bogen and Woodward (1988) advance adistinction between data and phenomena. Roughly, theformer are the observations reported by experimentalscientists, the latter are objective, stable featuresof the world to which scientists infer based onpatterns in reliable data. While phenomena areexplained by theories, data are not, and so theempirical basis for an inference to a theory consistsin claims about phenomena. McAllister (1997) hasrecently offered a critique of their version of thisdistinction, offering in its place a version on whichphenomena are theory (...)
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