Search results for 'Phenomenal Intentionality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.score: 240.0
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support (...)
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  2. Uriah Kriegel (2013). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 1.score: 210.0
    We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
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  3. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.score: 210.0
  4. Farid Masrour (2013). Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian Account.”. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP.score: 204.0
    Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. Rather, we seem to encounter facts, objects, and properties that are independent from our mind. In short, perceptual experience has phenomenal objectivity. This paper proposes and defends a Kantian account of phenomenal objectivity that grounds it in experiences of lawlike regularities. The paper offers a novel account of (...)
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  5. Arnaud Dewalque (2013). Brentano and the Parts of the Mental: A Mereological Approach to Phenomenal Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):447-464.score: 204.0
    In this paper, I explore one particular dimension of Brentano’s legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole relations rather than (...)
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  6. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.score: 180.0
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends (...)
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  7. Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.score: 180.0
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The (...)
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  8. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.score: 180.0
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving (first) an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and (second) the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation (all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality). The (...)
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  9. Terry Horgan (2011). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):447 - 455.score: 180.0
    Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2 Authors Terry Horgan, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  10. Uriah Kriegel (ed.) (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    Phenomenal intentionality is supposed to be a kind of directedness of the mind onto the world that is grounded in the conscious feel of mental life. This book of new essays explores a number of issues raised by the notion of phenomenal intentionality.
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  11. Farid Masrour (2013). Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. 116.score: 180.0
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  12. Frederick Kroon (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. 137.score: 180.0
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  13. Brian Loar (2003). Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 229--258.score: 162.0
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  14. Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.score: 150.0
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but (we argue) highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  15. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter.score: 150.0
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  16. Terence Horgan (2013). Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2):232-251.score: 150.0
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  17. Uriah Kriegel & Terence Horgan (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.score: 150.0
  18. Ben Sheredos (forthcoming). Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology:1-5.score: 150.0
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  19. Terry Horgan & George Graham (2012). Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy. In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter.score: 150.0
  20. Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.score: 150.0
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  21. Robert van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.score: 132.0
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  22. Dana K. Nelkin (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality. Psyche 7 (13).score: 126.0
    Siewert identifies a special kind of conscious experience, phenomenal consciousness, that is the sort of consciousness missing in a variety of cases of blindsight. He then argues that phenomenal consciousness has been neglected by students of consciousness when it should not be. According to Siewert, the neglect is based at least in part on two false assumptions: (i) phenomenal features are not intentional and (ii) phenomenal character is restricted to sensory experience. By identifying an essential tension (...)
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  23. Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (8).score: 126.0
    _The Significance of Consciousness_ . Princeton: Princeton University Press. $42.50 hbk. x + 374pp. ISBN: 0691027242. ABSTRACT: I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to.
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  24. Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.score: 120.0
    One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper is to consider whether the thesis is true, in light of recent work on intentionality (...)
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  25. William S. Robinson, Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Vive la Difference!score: 120.0
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  26. Robert Van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness? Philosophical Perspectives 9:271 - 289.score: 120.0
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  27. Adam Pautz (2013). Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford. 194-234.score: 114.0
    I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases" (independently discussed by Horgan here), "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence (not natuarlness) plays the central role in (...)
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  28. Andrew R. Bailey & Bradley Richards (2014). Horgan and Tienson on Phenomenology and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.score: 102.0
    Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries (...)
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  29. William Lycan (2008). Phenomenal Intentionalities. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233 - 252.score: 100.0
    There is now a considerable literature that goes under the heading of “phenomenal intentionality.” But it features a number of distinct issues. What they have in common is the claim that intentionality bears a closer relation to phenomenology than had previously been recognized. There is a basic thesis, which is controversial, and there are further arguments attempting to draw more exciting morals from the basic thesis. My purpose in this paper is to survey these issues, see what (...)
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  30. Adam Pautz (2010). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Bealer and Koons (ed.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford. 25--66.score: 90.0
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
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  31. John Tienson (2013). Kasimir Twardowski on the Content of Presentations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):485-499.score: 90.0
    In On the Content and Object of Presentations, Kasimir Twardowski presents an interesting line of thought concerning the content of a presentation and its relation to the object of that presentation. This way of thinking about content is valuable for understanding phenomenal intentionality, and it should also be important for the project of “naturalizing” the mental (or at least for discovering the neural correlates of the phenomenal). According to this view, content is that by virtue of which (...)
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  32. Kenneth Williford (2013). Husserl's Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.score: 84.0
    In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of (...)
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  33. Timothy L. Hubbard (2013). Phenomenal Causality II: Integration and Implication. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 23 (3):485-524.score: 84.0
    The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. Different potential types of phenomenal causality and variables that influence phenomenal causality were considered in Part I (Hubbard 2012b) of this two-part series. In Part II, broader questions regarding properties of phenomenal causality and connections of phenomenal causality to other perceptual or cognitive phenomena (different types of phenomenal causality, effects of spatial and temporal variance, phenomenal causality in infancy, (...)
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  34. Timothy L. Hubbard (2013). Phenomenal Causality I: Varieties and Variables. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 23 (1):1-42.score: 84.0
    The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (i.e., the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. In Part I of this two-part series, different potential types of phenomenal causality (launching, triggering, reaction, tool, entraining, traction, braking, enforced disintegration and bursting, coordinated movement, penetration, expulsion) are described. Stimulus variables (temporal gap, spatial gap, spatial overlap, direction, absolute velocity, velocity ratio, trajectory length, radius of action, size, motion type, modality, animacy) and observer variables (attention, eye movements and fixation, prior experience, (...)
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  35. Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2013). Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.score: 72.0
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various (...)
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  36. Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality and Consciousness. In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.score: 66.0
    Intentionality is usually defined as the directedness of the mind toward something other than itself. My desire for a cold beer is directed at the cold beer in front of me. Much of consciousness is intentional, my conscious experiences are usually directed at something. However, conscious experiences typically have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like for me to see the deep blue of the Pacific Ocean and to feel the warm water lapping over my feet, (...)
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  37. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 79--102.score: 66.0
    Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non- conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. In this paper, I compare and contrast four possible accounts of unconscious (...)
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  38. Antti Kauppinen (2013). A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.score: 66.0
    According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, according to which (...)
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  39. Adam Pautz (2010). Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.score: 66.0
    Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
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  40. John Drummond (2008). Moral Phenomenology and Moral Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.score: 66.0
    This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense (drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the (...)
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  41. Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics. Dissertation, Princeton Universityscore: 66.0
    This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
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  42. Uwe Meixner (2006). Classical Intentionality. Erkenntnis 65 (1):25-45.score: 66.0
    In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it (...)
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  43. Brie Gertler (2001). The Relationship Between Phenomenality and Intentionality: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (17).score: 66.0
    Charles Siewert offers a persuasive argument to show that the presence of certain phenomenal features logically suffices for the presence of certain intentional ones. He claims that this shows that (some) phenomenal features are inherently intentional. I argue that he has not established the latter thesis, even if we grant the logical sufficiency claim. For he has not ruled out a rival alternative interpretation of the relevant data, namely, that (some) intentional features are inherently phenomenal.
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  44. Sebastian Watzl (2010). The Significance of Attention. Dissertation, Columbia Universityscore: 66.0
    This dissertation investigates the nature, the phenomenal character and the philosophical significance of attention. According to its central thesis, attention is the ongoing mental activity of structuring the stream of consciousness or phenomenal field. The dissertation connects the scientific study of attention in psychology and the neurosciences with central discussions in the philosophy of mind. Once we get clear on the nature and the phenomenal character of attention, we can make progress toward understanding foundational issues concerning the (...)
     
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  45. Dan Zahavi (2003). Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):63-92.score: 66.0
    In his book The Conscious Mind David Chalmers introduced a by now familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers, 1996, 4, 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means (...)
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  46. Matjaž Potrč (2002). Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):231-267.score: 66.0
    Phenomenology is intrinsically intentional for Brentano. Qualitative conscious experiences are individuated by their phenomenal space. Examples concerning the phenomenal take account of both experiential and physical spaces. As directedness at an object and reflexive directedness of the act at itself come interwoven, there is the intrinsic phenomenology of intentionality. Both intentionality of phenomenology and phenomenology of intentionality present the wholes with mutually pervading and only logically distinguishable parts. The above theses establish balance between phenomenology and (...)
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  47. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):n/a-n/a.score: 60.0
  48. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 161-179.score: 60.0
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  49. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.score: 60.0
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object reflected in (...)
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