Search results for 'Phenomenal Intentionality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  27
    Walter Ott (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.
    According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core (...)
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  2. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support (...)
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  3. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which (...)
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  4. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.
    This is an introduction to a special issue on the history of phenomenal intentionality.
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  5.  4
    Farid Masrour (2016). Revisiting Phenomenal Intentionality. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):99-107.
    : This essay has two goals. The goal of the first section is to raise a few clarificatory questions about the exact contour of Crane’s account of intentionality, its relation to phenomenology, and his motivation for it. The second section aims to describe a general worry about programs that combine a broadly anti-externalist outlook on intentionality with the idea that there is an intimate connection between phenomenology and intentionality. I argue that programs like this either suffer from (...)
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  6. Uriah Kriegel (2013). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press
    We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
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  7. Farid Masrour (2013). Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian Account.”. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP 116.
    Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. Rather, we seem to encounter facts, objects, and properties that are independent from our mind. In short, perceptual experience has phenomenal objectivity. This paper proposes and defends a Kantian account of phenomenal objectivity that grounds it in experiences of lawlike regularities. The paper offers a novel account of (...)
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  8.  64
    Arnaud Dewalque (2013). Brentano and the Parts of the Mental: A Mereological Approach to Phenomenal Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):447-464.
    In this paper, I explore one particular dimension of Brentano’s legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole relations rather than (...)
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  9. Uriah Kriegel (ed.) (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Phenomenal intentionality is supposed to be a kind of directedness of the mind onto the world that is grounded in the conscious feel of mental life. This book of new essays explores a number of issues raised by the notion of phenomenal intentionality.
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  10. Nicholas Georgalis (2003). The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The (...)
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  11. Terry Horgan (2011). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):447 - 455.
    Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2 Authors Terry Horgan, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  12.  9
    Frederick Kroon (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP Usa 137.
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  13. Terry Horgan (2007). Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection. Psyche 13.
    I explore the prospects for overcoming the prima facie tension in the following four claims, all of which I accept: the phenomenal character of experience is narrow; virtually all aspects of the phenomenal character of experience are intentional; the most fundamental kind of mental intentionality is fully constituted by phenomenal character; and yet introspection does not by itself reliably generate answers to certain philosophically important questions about the phenomenally constituted intentional content of experience. The apparent tension (...)
     
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  14. Charles Siewert (2003). Eliminativism, First-Person Knowledge and Phenomenal Intentionality A Reply to Levine. Psyche 9.
    Levine suggests the following criticisms of my book. First, the absence of a positive account of first-person knowledge in it makes it vulnerable to eliminativist refutation. Second, it is a relative strength of the higher order representation accounts of consciousness I reject that they offer explanations of the subjectivity of conscious states and their special availability to first-person knowledge. Further, the close connection I draw between the phenomenal character of experience and intentionality is unwarranted in the case of (...)
     
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  15. Brian Loar (2003). Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press 229--258.
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  16. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation. The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously (...)
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  17. Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  18. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter
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  19. Terry Horgan & George Graham (2012). Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy. In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter
  20. Terence Horgan (2013). Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2):232-251.
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  21.  32
    Joseph Levine (2015). Phenomenal Intentionality, Edited by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW] Mind 124 (495):924-927.
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  22.  44
    Ben Sheredos (2014). Phenomenal Intentionality. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):924-928.
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  23.  3
    Alex Byrne (2013). Review of Kriege (Ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:xx-yy.
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  24. Jennifer Matey (forthcoming). Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience. Topics in Cognitive Science.
     
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  25.  96
    Robert van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.
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  26.  88
    Preston J. Werner (2015). Character (Alone) Doesn't Count: Phenomenal Character and Narrow Intentional Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):261-272.
    Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. If this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. Using a twin-earth style case, I argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, I conclude by considering a few (...)
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  27. Dana K. Nelkin (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality. Psyche 7 (13).
    Siewert identifies a special kind of conscious experience, phenomenal consciousness, that is the sort of consciousness missing in a variety of cases of blindsight. He then argues that phenomenal consciousness has been neglected by students of consciousness when it should not be. According to Siewert, the neglect is based at least in part on two false assumptions: phenomenal features are not intentional and phenomenal character is restricted to sensory experience. By identifying an essential tension in Siewert's (...)
     
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  28. Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (8).
    _The Significance of Consciousness_ . Princeton: Princeton University Press. $42.50 hbk. x + 374pp. ISBN: 0691027242. ABSTRACT: I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to.
     
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  29. Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
    One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper is to consider whether the thesis is true, in light of recent work on intentionality (...)
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  30.  56
    David Leech Anderson (2012). Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem. In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), The Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer 312-333.
    According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a family of theories we will refer to as “functional intentionality,” a machine can have genuine intentional states so long as it has functionally characterizable mental states that are causally hooked up to the world in the right way. This paper considers a detailed description of a robot that seems to meet the conditions of functional intentionality, but which falls victim to what I call “the composition problem.” One obvious (...)
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  31.  74
    William S. Robinson, Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Vive la Difference!
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  32.  7
    Robert Van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness? Philosophical Perspectives 9:271 - 289.
  33. Adam Pautz (2013). Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford 194-234.
    I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases", "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence plays the central role in fixing mental content and ruling out deviant (...)
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  34. Andrew R. Bailey & Bradley Richards (2014). Horgan and Tienson on Phenomenology and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.
    Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries (...)
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  35.  30
    Howard Robinson (2009). Why Phenomenal Content is Not Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):79-93.
    I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.
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  36. Adam Pautz (2010). Consciousness: A Simple Approach. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. OUP Oxford 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
     
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  37. Adam Pautz (2009). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau’s worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are ’reference magnets’.
     
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  38. David Bourget (2015). Representationalism, Perceptual Distortion and the Limits of Phenomenal Concepts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.
    This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal (...)
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  39.  23
    John Tienson (2013). Kasimir Twardowski on the Content of Presentations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):485-499.
    In On the Content and Object of Presentations, Kasimir Twardowski presents an interesting line of thought concerning the content of a presentation and its relation to the object of that presentation. This way of thinking about content is valuable for understanding phenomenal intentionality, and it should also be important for the project of “naturalizing” the mental (or at least for discovering the neural correlates of the phenomenal). According to this view, content is that by virtue of which (...)
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  40.  22
    Timothy L. Hubbard (2013). Phenomenal Causality I: Varieties and Variables. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 23 (1):1-42.
    The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (i.e., the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. In Part I of this two-part series, different potential types of phenomenal causality (launching, triggering, reaction, tool, entraining, traction, braking, enforced disintegration and bursting, coordinated movement, penetration, expulsion) are described. Stimulus variables (temporal gap, spatial gap, spatial overlap, direction, absolute velocity, velocity ratio, trajectory length, radius of action, size, motion type, modality, animacy) and observer variables (attention, eye movements and fixation, prior experience, (...)
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  41.  26
    Timothy L. Hubbard (2013). Phenomenal Causality II: Integration and Implication. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 23 (3):485-524.
    The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. Different potential types of phenomenal causality and variables that influence phenomenal causality were considered in Part I (Hubbard 2012b) of this two-part series. In Part II, broader questions regarding properties of phenomenal causality and connections of phenomenal causality to other perceptual or cognitive phenomena (different types of phenomenal causality, effects of spatial and temporal variance, phenomenal causality in infancy, (...)
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  42.  48
    Kenneth Williford (2013). Husserl's Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
    In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of (...)
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  43. David Bourget (2015). The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1).
    One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the (...)
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  44.  79
    Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2013). Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various (...)
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  45. Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar (2015). No Mental Life After Brain Death: The Argument From the Neural Localization of Mental Functions. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 135-170.
    This paper samples the large body of neuroscientific evidence suggesting that each mental function takes place within specific neural structures. For instance, vision appears to occur in the visual cortex, motor control in the motor cortex, spatial memory in the hippocampus, and cognitive control in the prefrontal cortex. Evidence comes from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, neurochemistry, brain stimulation, neuroimaging, lesion studies, and behavioral genetics. If mental functions take place within neural structures, mental functions cannot survive brain death. Therefore, there is no mental (...)
     
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  46. Antti Kauppinen (2013). A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.
    According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, according to which (...)
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  47. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal (...)
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  48.  10
    Peter V. Forrest (forthcoming). Can Phenomenology Determine the Content of Thought? Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    According to a number of popular intentionalist theories in philosophy of mind, phenomenology is essentially and intrinsically intentional: phenomenal properties are identical to intentional properties of a certain type, or at least, the phenomenal character of an experience necessarily fixes a type of intentional content. These views are attractive, but it is questionable whether the reasons for accepting them generalize from sensory-perceptual experience to other kinds of experience: for example, agentive, moral, aesthetic, or cognitive experience. Meanwhile, a number (...)
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  49. Dan Zahavi (2005). Intentionality and Experience. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):299-318.
    Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind , it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the (...)
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  50. Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics. Dissertation, Princeton University
    This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
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