Search results for 'Phenomenal Relation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. T. Bresnick & R. Levin (2006). Phenomenal Qualities of Ayahuasca Ingestion and its Relation to Fringe Consciousness and Personality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):5-24.score: 48.0
    Ayahuasca, a hallucinogen with profound consciousness- altering properties, has been increasingly utilized in recent studies (e.g., Strassman, 2001; Shanon, 2002a,b). However, other than Shanon's recent work, there has been little attempt to examine the effects of ayahuasca on perceptual, affective and cognitive experience, its relation to fringe consciousness or to pertinent personality variables. Twenty-one volunteers attending a seminar on ayahuasca were administered personality measures and a semi-structured interview about phenomenal qualities of their experience. Ayahuasca ingestion was associated with (...)
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  2. Antti Revonsuo (2003). The Contents of Phenomenal Consciousness: One Relation to Rule Them All and in the Unity Bind Them. Psyche 9 (8).score: 48.0
    commentary on Dainton, B. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. London: Routledge. ABSTRACT: Stream of Consciousness is a detailed and insightful analysis of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, especially its unity at a time and continuity over stretches of time. I find Dainton's approach to phenomenal consciousness in many ways sound but I also point out one major source of disgreement between us. Dainton believes that to explain phenomenal unity and continuity, no reference (...)
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  3. Philip Goff (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):617 - 620.score: 48.0
    (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 617-620. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.788529.
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  4. Güven Güzeldere & Murat Aydede (1997). On the Relation Between Phenomenal and Representational Properties. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):151-153.score: 39.0
    We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.
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  5. Robert van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.score: 36.0
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  6. John M. DePoe (2011). Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):347-359.score: 36.0
    Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer’s account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer’s premise that all justified beliefs are formed on (...)
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  7. Dimitris Platchias (2011). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding The Relation Between Neural Processes And Experience. Acumen.score: 36.0
  8. Alba Papa-Grimaldi (2008). Temporal Relations Vs. Logical Reduction: A Phenomenal Theory of Causality. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 18 (3):339-358.score: 36.0
    Kant, in various parts of his treatment of causality, refers to determinism or the principle of sufficient reason as an inescapable principle. In fact, in the Second Analogy we find the elements to reconstruct a purely phenomenal determinism as a logical and tautological truth. I endeavour in this article to gather these elements into an organic theory of phenomenal causality and then show, in the third section, with a specific argument which I call the “paradox of phenomenal (...)
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  9. M. Almotahari (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain * by Dimitris Platchias. Analysis 73 (1):196-198.score: 36.0
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  10. Robert Van Gulick (1995). How Should We Understand the Relation Between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness? Philosophical Perspectives 9:271 - 289.score: 36.0
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  11. Philip Goff (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias: Durham: Acumen, 2011, Pp. 256,£ 17.99 (Paperback). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.score: 36.0
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  12. Philip Goff (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):617-620.score: 36.0
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  13. Dimitris Platchias (2011). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain. Acumen.score: 36.0
     
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  14. Sebastian Watzl (2010). The Significance of Attention. Dissertation, Columbia Universityscore: 33.0
    This dissertation investigates the nature, the phenomenal character and the philosophical significance of attention. According to its central thesis, attention is the ongoing mental activity of structuring the stream of consciousness or phenomenal field. The dissertation connects the scientific study of attention in psychology and the neurosciences with central discussions in the philosophy of mind. Once we get clear on the nature and the phenomenal character of attention, we can make progress toward understanding foundational issues concerning the (...)
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  15. Georg Northoff (2012). From Emotions to Consciousness – A Neuro-Phenomenal and Neuro-Relational Approach. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 30.0
    The James-Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and instrumental i.e. modulatory role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a (...)
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  16. Sebastian Watzl (2011). Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 145.score: 27.0
    This paper defends and develops the structuring account of conscious attention: attention is the conscious mental process of structuring one’s stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than others. In the first part of the paper, I motivate the structuring account. Drawing on a variety of resources I argue that the phenomenology of attention cannot be fully captured in terms of how the world appears to the subject, as well as against an atomistic conception of (...)
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  17. Garry Young (2008). Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.score: 27.0
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the (...)
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  18. Prof Max Velmans, A Brief Note on How Phenomenal Objects Relate to Objects Themselves.score: 24.0
    This brief note corrects some basic errors in Meijsing’s (2011) JCS paper on “The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space”, concerning the status of phenomenal objects in the reflexive model of perception. In particular I clarify the precise sense in which a phenomenal object relates to the object itself (the noumenal object) in visual perception.
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  19. Arnaud Dewalque (2013). Brentano and the Parts of the Mental: A Mereological Approach to Phenomenal Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):447-464.score: 23.0
    In this paper, I explore one particular dimension of Brentano’s legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole relations rather than as a supervenience (...)
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  20. Katalin Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 292--312.score: 21.0
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special (...)
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  21. William Lycan (2008). Phenomenal Intentionalities. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233 - 252.score: 21.0
    There is now a considerable literature that goes under the heading of “phenomenal intentionality.” But it features a number of distinct issues. What they have in common is the claim that intentionality bears a closer relation to phenomenology than had previously been recognized. There is a basic thesis, which is controversial, and there are further arguments attempting to draw more exciting morals from the basic thesis. My purpose in this paper is to survey these issues, see what may (...)
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  22. Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Introspection and Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.score: 21.0
    […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to (...)
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  23. Richard Brown, The Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness.score: 21.0
    One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call (...)
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  24. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.score: 21.0
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving (first) an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and (second) the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation (all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality). The solution (...)
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  25. Antti Revonsuo (1999). Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):173-85.score: 21.0
    The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem. Some of them make no mention of consciousness, whereas others are directly related to aspects of phenomenal experience. Certain formulations of the binding problem are closely connected to the classical (...)
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  26. Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark (2011). Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience. Synthese 181 (3):375-394.score: 21.0
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for (...)
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  27. Benj Hellie (2006). Beyond Phenomenal Naivete. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (2):1-24.score: 21.0
    The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a (...)
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  28. Benj Hellie (2007). That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.score: 21.0
    I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary (...)
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  29. Martina Fürst (2004). Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts as Basis of the Knowledge Argument. Acta Analytica 19 (32):143-152.score: 21.0
    The central attempt of this paper is to explain the underlying intuitions of Frank Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument” that the epistemic gap between phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge points towards a corresponding ontological gap. The first step of my analysis is the claim that qualia are epistemically special because the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of a quale x requires the experience of x. Arguing what is so special about phenomenal concepts and pointing at the inherence-relation (...)
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  30. Rosanna Keefe (2011). Phenomenal Sorites Paradoxes and Looking the Same. Dialectica 65 (3):327-344.score: 21.0
    Taking a series of colour patches, starting with one that clearly looks red, and making each so similar in colour to the previous one that it looks the same as it, we appear to be able to show that a yellow patch looks red. I ask whether phenomenal sorites paradoxes, such as this, are subject to a unique kind of solution that is unavailable in relation to other sorites paradoxes. I argue that they do not need such a (...)
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  31. Nicholas Shea (2012). Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):307-344.score: 21.0
    Block’s well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual connections between the two. The scientific literature about whether they come apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obstacle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puzzle (...)
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  32. Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (8).score: 21.0
    _The Significance of Consciousness_ . Princeton: Princeton University Press. $42.50 hbk. x + 374pp. ISBN: 0691027242. ABSTRACT: I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to.
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  33. René Jagnow (2010). Shadow-Experiences and the Phenomenal Structure of Colors. Dialectica 64 (2):187-212.score: 21.0
    It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of (...)
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  34. Dalia Drai (2007). The Phenomenal Sorites and Response Dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):619 – 631.score: 21.0
    Since Nelson Goodman 1951, the assumption that phenomenal indiscriminability is non-transitive is taken generally for granted. Moreover, this assumption was used (by Goodman 1951, Travis 1985, Dummett 1975 and others) to argue against the existence or coherence of subjective and/or observational properties. Recently, however, the assumption has been questioned [Fara 2001] and I agree with Fara that the assumption is much more problematic than was thought, partly because it is not clear what is meant by the relation of (...)
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  35. Peter Fazekas (2011). Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.score: 21.0
    The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their (...)
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  36. Gianfranco Soldati, Intentionalism and Phenomenal Error.score: 21.0
    In this paper we shall address some issues concerning the relation between the content and the nature of perceptual experience. More precisely, we shall ask whether the claim that perceptual experiences are by nature relational implies that they cannot be intentional. As we shall see, much depends in this respect on the way one understands the possibility for one to be wrong about the phenomenal nature of one’s own experience. We shall argue that once this very possibility is (...)
     
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  37. Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati, Intentionalism, Experiential and Phenomenal Error.score: 21.0
    In this paper we shall address some issues concerning the relation between the content and the nature of perceptual experiences. More precisely, we shall ask whether the claim that perceptual experiences are by nature relational implies that they cannot be intentional. As we shall see, much depends in this respect on the way one understands the possibility for one to be wrong about the phenomenal nature of one’s own experience. We shall describe and distinguish a series of errors (...)
     
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  38. Greg Janzen (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 44 (04):707-733.score: 21.0
    ABSTRACT: This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves selfconsciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is (...)
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  39. Sara McClintock (2014). Kamalaśīla on the Nature of Phenomenal Content (Ākāra) in Cognition: A Close Reading of TSP Ad TS 3626 and Related Passages. Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):327-337.score: 21.0
    Traditional as well as contemporary interpreters of Indian Yogācāra divide that tradition into a variety of doxographical camps depending on whether awareness is understood tobe endowed with phenomenal content (ākāra) and, if so, whether that content is understood to be real or true. Kamalaśīla’s extensive commentary on his teacher Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha contains passages that throw into question certain doxographical equivalencies, especially the equivalencies sometimes proposed betweenthe doctrine that awareness is endowed with phenomenal content (sākāravāda) and the doctrine that (...)
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  40. Katalin Balog (2012). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.score: 18.0
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, (...)
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  41. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.score: 18.0
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic struc-ture (...)
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  42. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.score: 18.0
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories (...)
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  43. Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.score: 18.0
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; (...)
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  44. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab, Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.score: 18.0
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution (...)
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  45. Michael Huemer (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.score: 18.0
    John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.
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  46. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):559-578.score: 18.0
    Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenological investigations provide a basis for defending what I will call (...)
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  47. John Zeimbekis (2009). Phenomenal and Objective Size. Noûs 43 (2):346-362.score: 18.0
    Definitions of phenomenal types (Nelson Goodman’s definition of qualia, Sydney Shoemaker’s phenomenal types, Austen Clark’s physicalist theory of qualia) imply that numerically distinct experiences can be type-identical in some sense. However, Goodman also argues that objects cannot be replicated in respect of continuous and densely ordered types. In that case, how can phenomenal types be defined for sizes, shapes and colours, which appear to be continuously ordered types? Concentrating on size, I will argue for the following points. (...)
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  48. Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.score: 18.0
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in (...)
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  49. Jonathan Ellis (2010). Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.score: 18.0
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal (...)
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