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  1. Phil Dowe, Paul Noordhof & Clark Glymour, Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition.
    For most of the contributions to this volume, the project is this: Fill out “Event X is a cause of event Y if and only if……” where the dots on the right are to be filled in by a claims formulated in terms using any of (1) descriptions of possible worlds and their relations; (2) a special predicate, “is a law;” (3) “chances;” and (4) anything else one thinks one needs. The form of analysis is roughly the same as that (...)
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  2. Phil Dowe (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  3. Phil Dowe (2014). 'The Universe As We Find It', by Heil, John. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):614-614.
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  4. Phil Dowe (2013). Moore's Account of Causation and Responsibility, and the Problem of Omissive Overdetermination. Jurisprudence 4 (1):115-120.
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  5. Phil Dowe (2011). Darwin, God, and Chance. In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3. Oup Oxford.
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  6. Phil Dowe (2011). The Causal-Process-Model Theory of Mechanisms. In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oup Oxford.
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  7. Phil Dowe (2010). Proportionality and Omissions. Analysis 70 (3):446-451.
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  8. Phil Dowe (2009). Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-Locality. The Monist 92 (1):23-40.
    I argue that so-called ‘absence causation’must be treated in terms of counterfactuals about causation such as ‘had a occurred, a would have caused b’. First, I argue that some theories of causation that accept absence causation are unattractive because they undermine the idea of possible causation. And second, I argue that accepting absence causation violates a principle commonly associated with relativity.
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  9. Phil Dowe (2009). Causal Process Theories. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oup Oxford.
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  10. Phil Dowe (2009). Every Now and Then: A-Theory and Loops in Time. Journal of Philosophy 106 (12):641-665.
  11. Phil Dowe (2009). Every Now and Then. Journal of Philosophy 106 (12):641-665.
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  12. Phil Dowe, The Power of Possible Causation.
    In this paper I consider possible causation, specifically, would-cause counterfactuals of the form ‘had an event of kind A occurred, it would have caused an event of kind B’. I outline some difficulties for the Lewis program for understanding would-cause counterfactuals, and canvass an alternative. I then spell out a view on their significance, in relation to (i) absence causation, where claims such as ‘A’s not occurring caused B’s not occurring’ seem to make sense when understood in terms of the (...)
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  13. Phil Dowe (2009). Would‐Cause Semantics. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):701-711.
    This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would‐cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal‐modeling approaches do not have these problems. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e‐mail: p.dowe@uq.edu.au.
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  14. David Etlin, Maarten Van Dyck, Phil Dowe, Julian Reiss, Thomas Ac Reydon, Sabina Leonelli, Marshall Abrams, William Bechtel, Joshua Filler & Yoichi Ishida (2009). 10. The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals (Pp. 676-688). Philosophy of Science 76 (5).
     
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  15. Phil Dowe, Causal Processes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  16. Phil Dowe (2007). Constraints on Data in Worlds with Closed Timelike Curves. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):724–735.
    It is claimed that unacceptable constraints on initial data are imposed by certain responses to paradoxes that threaten time travel, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and other backwards causation hypotheses. In this paper I argue against the following claims: to say “contradictions are impossible so something must prevent the paradox” commits in general to constraints on initial data, that for fixed point dynamics so-called grey state solutions explain why contradictions do not arise, and the latter have been proved to avoid constraints (...)
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  17. Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe (2005). Endurance is Paradoxical. Analysis 65 (285):69-74.
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  18. Harold Coward, Andrew J. Weaver, Alan Dershowitz, Jose van Dijck & Phil Dowe (2005). David Boonin and Graham Oddie. What's Wrong? New York: Oxford Press, 2005, 746 Pp. ISBN 0-19-516761-9 (Pb). Stephen Boyden. The Biology of Civilisation. Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press, 2004, 189 Pp (Indexed). ISBN 0-8840-766-6, $22.50 (Pb). [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 39:543-545.
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  19. Phil Dowe (2005). Retrocausación. Enrahonar 37:101-111.
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  20. Phil Dowe (2004). Causation and Misconnections. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):926-931.
    In this paper I show how the conserved quantity theory, or more generally the process theory of Wesley Salmon and myself, provides a sufficient condition in an analysis of causation. To do so I will show how it handles the problem of alleged 'misconnections'. I show what the conserved quantity theory says about such cases, and why intuitions are not to be taken as sacrosanct.
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  21. Phil Dowe (2004). Causes Are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions Are Not Causes. In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Pub.. 189--196.
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  22. Phil Dowe (2004). Chance-Lowering Causes. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
     
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  23. Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.) (2004). Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    Cause and Chance is a collection of specially written papers by world-class metaphysicians. Its focus is the problems facing the "reductionist" approach to causation: the attempt to cover all types of causation, deterministic and indeterministic, with one basic theory.
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  24. Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe (2003). Paradoxes of Multi-Location. Analysis 63 (2):106–114.
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  25. Phil Dowe (2003). A Dilemma for Objective Chance. In Jr Kyburg & Mariam Thalos (eds.), Probability is the Very Guide of Life: The Philosophical Uses of Chance. Open Court. 153--64.
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  26. Phil Dowe (2003). The Coincidences of Time Travel. Philosophy of Science 70 (3):574-589.
    In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. I conclude that unless there is something faulty (...)
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  27. Phil Dowe (2002). What is Determinism?'. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 309--20.
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  28. Phil Dowe (2001). Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S89-.
    According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the 'law of large numbers', causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops.
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  29. Phil Dowe & Jonathan Schaffer (2001). Reviews-Physical Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):809-814.
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  30. Phil Dowe (2000). Causality and Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):165-174.
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  31. Phil Dowe (2000). Physical Causation. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a clear and original account of causation based firmly in contemporary science. Dowe discusses in a systematic way an original, positive account of causation: the conserved quantities account of causal processes which he has been developing over the last ten years. The book describes causal processes and interactions in terms of conserved quantities: a causal process is the worldline of an object which possesses a conserved quantity, and a causal interaction involves the exchange of conserved quantities. Further, things (...)
     
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  32. Phil Dowe (2000). The Case for Time Travel. Philosophy 75 (3):441-451.
    This idea of time travel has long given philosophers difficulties. Most recently, in his paper ‘Troubles with Time Travel’ William Grey presents a number of objections to time travel, some well known in the philosophical literature, others quite novel. In particular Grey's ‘no destinations’ and ‘double occupation’ objections I take to be original, while what I will call the ‘times paradox’ and the ‘possibility restriction argument’ are versions of well known objections. I show how each of these can be answered, (...)
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  33. Phil Dowe (2000). The Conserved Quantity Theory Defended. Theoria 15 (1):11-31.
    I defend the conserved quantity theory of causation against two objections: firstly, that to tie the notion of “cause” to conservation laws is impossible, circular or metaphysically counterintuitive; and secondly, that the conserved quantity theory entails an undesired notion of identity through time. My defence makes use of an important meta-philosophical distinction between empirical analysis and conceptual analysis. My claim is that the conserved quantity theory of causation must be understood primarily as an empirical, not a conceptual, analysis of causation.
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  34. Phil Dowe (1999). Good Connections: Causation and Causal Processes. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer. 247--263.
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  35. Phil Dowe (1999). The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):501.
    In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of 'misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular (...)
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  36. Brian Ellis, Phil Dowe, Brian Skyrms & John Forge (1999). The Really Big Questions. Metascience 8 (1):63-85.
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  37. Phil Dowe (1998). Critical Notice:'The Facts of Causation'. Philosophy of Science 65 (1):162-170.
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  38. Phil Dowe (1998). Book Review:The Facts of Causation D. H. Mellor. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 65 (1):162-.
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  39. Phil Dowe (1997). A Defense of Backwards in Time Causation Models in Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 112 (2):233-246.
    This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramer's transactional account, which is shown to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries such as Schrödinger's cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in assessing Cramer's theory was (...)
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  40. David Oldroyd, Phil Dowe, Adrian Mackenzie, Alison Bashford, Geoffrey C. Bowker, Alan Chalmers, I. J. Crozier, John Dargavel, Wendy Riemens & Andrew Dowling (1997). A Miller's Tale. Metascience 6 (1):105-184.
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  41. Phil Dowe (1996). Backwards Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes. Mind 105 (418):227-248.
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  42. Phil Dowe (1996). Recent Work on Leibniz on Miracles. The Leibniz Review 6:160-163.
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  43. Phil Dowe (1995). Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):321-333.
    In a recent paper (1994) Wesley Salmon has replied to criticisms (e.g., Dowe 1992c, Kitcher 1989) of his (1984) theory of causality, and has offered a revised theory which, he argues, is not open to those criticisms. The key change concerns the characterization of causal processes, where Salmon has traded "the capacity for mark transmission" for "the transmission of an invariant quantity." Salmon argues against the view presented in Dowe (1992c), namely that the concept of "possession of a conserved quantity" (...)
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  44. Phil Dowe (1995). What's Right and What's Wrong with Transference Theories. Erkenntnis 42 (3):363 - 374.
    This paper examines the Transference Theory of causation, developed originally by Aronson (1971) and Fair (1979). Three difficulties for that theory are presented: firstly, problems associated with the direction of transference and causal asymmetry; secondly, the case of persistence as causation, for example where a body's own inertia is the cause of its motion; and thirdly the problematic notion of identity through time of physical quantities such as energy or momentum. Finally, the theory is compared with the Conserved Quantity Theory (...)
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  45. Phil Dowe (1994). John Dupré, The Disorder of Things Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (6):387-389.
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  46. Phil Dowe (1993). On the Reduction of Process Causality to Statistical Relations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):325-327.
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  47. Phil Dowe (1992). An Empiricist Defence of the Causal Account of Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):123 – 128.
    Abstract Kitcher (1989) and others have criticized Salmon's (1984) causal account of explanation on the grounds that it is epistemologically inadequate. The difficulty is that Salmon's principle of ?mark transmission? fails to achieve its intended purpose, namely to distinguish causal processes from other types of processes. This renders Salmon's account of causality epistemically inaccessible. In this paper that critique is reviewed and developed, and a modification to Salmon's theory, the ?conserved?quantity? theory (Dowe, 1992) is presented. This theory is shown to (...)
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  48. Phil Dowe (1992). Process Causality and Asymmetry. Erkenntnis 37 (2):179-196.
    Process theories of causality seek to explicate causality as a property of individual causal processes. This paper examines the capacity of such theories to account for the asymmetry of causation. Three types of theories of asymmetry are discussed; the subjective, the temporal, and the physical, the third of these being the preferred approach. Asymmetric features of the world, namely the entropic and Kaon arrows, are considered as possible sources of causal asymmetry and a physical theory of asymmetry is subsequently developed (...)
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  49. Phil Dowe (1992). Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):195-216.
    This paper examines Wesley Salmon's "process" theory of causality, arguing in particular that there are four areas of inadequacy. These are that the theory is circular, that it is too vague at a crucial point, that statistical forks do not serve their intended purpose, and that Salmon has not adequately demonstrated that the theory avoids Hume's strictures about "hidden powers". A new theory is suggested, based on "conserved quantities", which fulfills Salmon's broad objectives, and which avoids the problems discussed.
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