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  1. Philip Cam (2013). Philosophy for Children, Values Education and the Inquiring Society. Educational Philosophy and Theory:1-9.
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  2. Philip Cam (2011). Matthew Lipman (1923–2010). Diogenes 58 (4):116-118.
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  3. Philip Cam (2008). Éduquer à la Démocratie. Diogène 224 (4):44.
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  4. Philip Cam (2008). The Two Adam Smiths. Think 7 (20):107-112.
    Philip Cam argues that we need to rise above Smith's fixation on self-interest in economic affairs.
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  5. Philip Cam (ed.) (2007). Philosophy with Young Children: A Classroom Handbook. Acsa.
     
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  6. Philip Cam (1990). Insularity and the Persistence of Perceptual Illusion. Analysis 50 (October):231-5.
  7. Philip Cam (1990). Searle on Strong AI. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):103-8.
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  8. Philip Cam (1989). Notes Toward a Faculty Theory of Cognitive Consciousness. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer. 167--191.
  9. Philip Cam (1988). Modularity, Rationality, and Higher Cognition. Philosophical Studies 53 (March):279-94.
  10. Philip Cam (1987). Propositions About Images. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):335-8.
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  11. Philip Cam (1985). Phenomenology and Speech Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):357-68.
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  12. Philip Cam (1984). Consciousness and Content-Formation. Inquiry 27 (December):381-98.
    How can materialists begin to do justice to the experiencing subject? Some materialists, whom I call ?structuralists?, believe that the brain sciences offer at least the distant prospect of a materialist psychology with an experiencing subject. Others, and notably those materialists who are functionalists, believe that this faith is misplaced, and offer us instead a functional psychology. I argue, briefly, that functionalism cannot deliver the goods, and go on to elaborate and defend the structuralist claim that consciousness or experience is (...)
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  13. Philip Cam (1984). Dennett on Intelligent Storage. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):247-62.
  14. Philip Cam (1978). "Rorty Revisited", or "Rorty Revised"? Philosophical Studies 33 (May):377-86.