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Profile: Philip Clark (University of Toronto)
  1. Philip Clark, Mackie's Motivational Argument Philip Clark.
    Mackie doubted anything objective could have the motivational properties of a value. In thinking we are morally required to act in a certain way, he said, we attribute objective value to the action. Since nothing has objective value, these moral judgments are all false. As to whether Mackie proved his error theory, opinions vary. But there is broad agreement on one issue. A litany of examples, ranging from amoralism to depression to downright evil, has everyone convinced that Mackie vastly overstated (...)
     
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  2. Philip Clark (2010). Aspects, Guises, Species and Knowing Something to Be Good. In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press. 234.
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  3. Philip Clark (2009). Appearances of the Good and Appearances of the True. Dialogue 48 (02):405-.
    For a very long time now, philosophers have been inclined to distinguish two kinds of reasoning. There is theoretical reasoning, in which one aims to figure out what is true, and there is practical reasoning, in which one aims to figure out what to do. Figuring out what to do (e.g. what to eat, when to leave, what to say…) is something we do all the time, but it’s not so easy to say just what this activity is. On its (...)
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  4. Philip Clark (2009). Mackie's Motivational Argument. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  5. Philip Clark (2007). How Reason Can Be Practical: A Reply to Hume. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):213-230.
  6. Philip Clark (2004). Kantian Morals and Humean Motives. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):109–126.
    The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.
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  7. Philip Clark (2002). The Meaning of 'Good' and the Possibility of Value. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):31 - 38.
    Moore held that to call something good is to ascribe a property to it. But he denied that the property could be expressed in non-evaluative terms. Can one accept this view of the meaning of good without falling into skepticism about whether anything can be, or be known to be, good? I suggest a way of doing this. The strategy combines the idea that good is semantically entangled, as opposed to semantically isolated, with the idea that rational agents have a (...)
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  8. Philip Clark (2001). The Action as Conclusion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):481-505.
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  9. Philip Clark (2001). Velleman's Autonomism. Ethics 111 (3):580–593.
    People sometimes think they have reasons for action. On a certain naive view, what makes them true is a connection between the action and the agent’s good life. In a recent article, David Velleman argues for replacing this view with a more Kantian line, on which reasons are reasons in virtue of their connection with autonomy. The aim in what follows is to defend the naive view. I shall first raise some problems for Velleman's proposal and then fend off the (...)
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  10. Philip Clark (2000). What Goes Without Saying in Metaethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):357-379.
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  11. Philip Clark (1997). Practical Steps and Reasons for Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):17 - 45.
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