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Profile: Philip Goff (University of Liverpool)
  1.  70
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Is Realism About Consciousness Compatible with a Scientifically Respectable World View? Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  2.  22
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism, and the Grounding Relation. In William Seager (ed.), Routledge Panpsychism Handbook. Routledge
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  3. Philip Goff (2011). A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
    Dualists say plausible things about our mental concepts: there is a way of thinking of pain, in terms of how it feels, which is independent of causal role. Physicalists make attractive ontological claims: the world is wholly physical. The attraction of a posteriori physicalism is that it has seemed to do both: to agree with the dualist about our mental concepts, whilst retaining a physicalist ontology. In this paper I argue that, in fact, a posteriori physicalism departs from the dualist's (...)
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  4. Philip Goff (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem. In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press
  5.  26
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Fundamentality and the Mind-Body Problem. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    In the recent metaphysics literature, a number of philosophers have independently endeavoured to marry sparse ontology to abundant truth. The aim is to keep ontological commitments minimal, whilst allowing true sentences to quantify over a vastly greater range of entities than those which they are ontologically committed to. For example, an ontological commitment only to concrete, microscopic simples might be conjoined with a commitment to truths such as ‘There are twenty people working in this building’ and ‘There are prime (...)
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  6. Philip Goff (2010). Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear From Ghosts Than Zombies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.
    Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature focuses on considering how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost.
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  7. Philip Goff (forthcoming). Against Constitutive Russellian Monism. In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press
  8. Philip Goff (2009). Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness. Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.
    This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
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  9.  84
    Philip Goff & David Papineau (2014). What's Wrong with Strong Necessities? Philosophical Studies 167 (3):749-762.
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  10. Philip Goff (2012). Does Mary Know I Experience Plus Rather Than Quus? A New Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):223-235.
    Realism about cognitive or semantic phenomenology, the view that certain conscious states are intrinsically such as to ground thought or understanding, is increasingly being taken seriously in analytic philosophy. The principle aim of this paper is to argue that it is extremely difficult to be a physicalist about cognitive phenomenology. The general trend in later 20th century/early 21st century philosophy of mind has been to account for the content of thought in terms of facts outside the head of the thinker (...)
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  11. Philip Goff (2010). Orthodox Truthmaker Theory Cannot Be Defended by Cost/Benefit Analysis. Analysis 70 (1):45-50.
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  12.  20
    Philip Goff (ed.) (2012). Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  13. Philip Goff (2006). Experiences Don't Sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):53-61.
  14.  36
    Philip Goff (2007). Kirk on Empirical Physicalism. Ratio 20 (1):122-129.
  15.  15
    Philip Goff (2012). A Priori Physicalism, Lonely Ghosts and Cartesian Doubt. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):742-746.
    A zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of ghosts, are somewhat neglected. In this paper I argue that ghostly arguments have a number of (...)
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  16.  64
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Real Acquaintance and Physicalism. In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
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  17.  62
    Philip Goff (2010). Real Materialism and Other Essays – Galen Strawson. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):652-656.
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  18.  28
    Philip Goff (2013). The Zombie Threat to a Science of Mind. Philosophy Now 96:6-7.
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  19.  66
    Philip Goff (2008). A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Austere Nominalism. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43–54.
    How do we account for resemblance between concrete particular objects? What is it about reality which makes a sentence such as the following true? (1) x and y are both spherical Realists about properties claim that, at a fundamental level, this sentence is true because x and y both exemplify the property of sphericity. Michael Loux favours this account of resemblance. Nevertheless, Loux concedes that austere nominalism, which I understand to be the view that nothing exists over and above particular (...)
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  20.  19
    Philip Goff (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias: Durham: Acumen, 2011, Pp. 256,£ 17.99 (Paperback). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):1-3.
    (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain, by Dimitris Platchias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 617-620. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2013.788529.
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  21. Philip Goff (2004). Mario Bunge, Emergence and Convergence. Qualitative Novelty and the Unity of Knowledge Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 24 (6):389-391.
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  22.  23
    Philip Goff (2011). Review of Cynthia MacDonald, Graham MacDonald (Eds.), Emergence in Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
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  23.  4
    Philip Goff (2012). Ghosts Are Still Scarier Than Zombies–Reply to Diaz-Leon's Reply to 'A Priori Physicalism, Lonely Ghosts and Cartesian Doubt'. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):749-750.
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  24.  2
    Philip Goff (2006). Propertied Objects as Truth-Makers. In Paolo Valore (ed.), Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher 181.
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  25. Nikk Effingham, Helen Beebee & Philip Goff (2010). Metaphysics: The Key Concepts. Routledge.
    _‘Informative, accessible, and fun to read— this is an excellent reference guide for undergraduates and anyone wanting an introduction to the fundamental issues of metaphysics. I know of no other resource like it.’– __Meghan Griffith, Davidson College, USA_ _'Marvellous! This book provides the very best place to start for students wanting to take the first step into understanding metaphysics.Undergraduates would do well to buy it and consult it regularly. The quality and clarity of the material are consistently high.' – __Chris (...)
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  26. Nikk Effingham, Helen Beebee & Philip Goff (2011). Metaphysics: The Key Concepts. Routledge.
    _‘Informative, accessible, and fun to read— this is an excellent reference guide for undergraduates and anyone wanting an introduction to the fundamental issues of metaphysics. I know of no other resource like it.’– __Meghan Griffith, Davidson College, USA_ _'Marvellous! This book provides the very best place to start for students wanting to take the first step into understanding metaphysics.Undergraduates would do well to buy it and consult it regularly. The quality and clarity of the material are consistently high.' – __Chris (...)
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  27. Philip Goff (2012). There is More Than One Thing. In Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan 113-22.
     
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