1.  98 DLs
    Philip J. Bartok (2005). Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (4):437-460.
    : Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have interpreted Brentano's intentionality thesis, and his empirical psychology more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano's distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely Òon the wayÓ to a truly phenomenological approach. (...)
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  2.  10 DLs
    Philip J. Bartok (2004). Review of Dale Jacquette (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (10).
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    Philip J. Bartok (2004). Perceiving Structure: Phenomenological Method and Categorial Ontology in Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Phenomenologists call for the abandoning of all philosophical theorizing in favor of a descriptive study of the "things themselves" as they are given. On its face, such a study of appearances would appear to have little to contribute to ontology, traditionally understood as the science of being and its most fundamental categories. But phenomenologists have not hesitated to draw ontological conclusions from their phenomenological investigations. Phenomenology and its ontological pretensions have come under attack, however, from philosophers of a wide variety (...)
     
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