46 found
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  1.  8
    Philip Johnson-Laird (2006). How We Reason. OUP Oxford.
    Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet, it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This new book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning.
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  2.  5
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1992). Modal Reasoning, Models, and Manktelow and Over. Cognition 43 (2):173-182.
  3.  21
    Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2013). The Acquisition of Boolean Concepts. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):128-133.
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  4. Philip Johnson-Laird, Paolo Legrenzi, Vittorio Girotto, Maria Sonino Legrenzi & Jean-Paul Caverni (1999). Naive Probability: A Mental Model Theory of Extensional Reasoning. Psychological Review 106 (1):62-88.
    This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which it occurs. (...)
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  5.  35
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1977). Procedural Semantics. Cognition 5 (3):189-214.
  6.  19
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2001). Mental Models and Deduction. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):434-442.
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  7.  73
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Vittorio Girotto (2009). The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer. Topoi 28 (1):75-80.
    This paper replies to Politzer’s ( 2007 ) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.
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  8.  15
    Csongor Juhos, Ana Cristina Quelhas & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2012). Temporal and Spatial Relations in Sentential Reasoning. Cognition 122 (3):393-404.
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  9.  2
    Philip Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (2002). Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference. Psychological Review 109 (4):646-678.
    The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a (...)
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  10.  11
    Carlos Santamaría, Juan A. García-Madruga & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1998). Reasoning From Double Conditionals: The Effects of Logical Structure and Believability. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):97-122.
    We report three experimental studies of reasoning with double conditionals, i.e. problems based on premises of the form: If A then B. If B then C. where A, B, and C, describe everyday events. We manipulated both the logical structure of the problems, using all four possible arrangements (or “figures” of their constituents, A, B, and C, and the believability of the two salient conditional conclusions that might follow from them, i.e. If A then C, or If C then A. (...)
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  11.  14
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1994). Mental Models and Probabilistic Thinking. Cognition 50 (1-3):189-209.
  12. Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1983). A Computational Analysis of Consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6:499-508.
     
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  13.  22
    Keith Oatley & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2011). Basic Emotions in Social Relationships, Reasoning, and Psychological Illnesses. Emotion Review 3 (4):424-433.
    The communicative theory of emotions postulates that emotions are communications both within the brain and between individuals. Basic emotions owe their evolutionary origins to social mammals, and they enable human beings to use repertoires of mental resources appropriate to recurring and distinctive kinds of events. These emotions also enable them to cooperate with other individuals, to compete with them, and to disengage from them. The human system of emotions has also grafted onto basic emotions propositional contents about the cause of (...)
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  14.  11
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1993). Précis of Deduction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):323.
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  15.  1
    Yingrui Yang & Philip Johnson-Laird (2000). Illusions in Quantified Reasoning: How to Make the Impossible Seem Possible, and Vice Versa. Memory and Cognition 28 (3):452-465.
    The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally represent only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences. Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Two experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in inferences about what is possible from disjunctions of quantified assertions, such as, “at least some of the plastic beads are not red.” Experiment 1 showed that (...)
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  16.  7
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2005). Mental Models and Thought. In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge Univ Pr 185--208.
  17. Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1972). The Three-Term Series Problem. Cognition 1 (1):57-82.
  18.  7
    Ruth Mj Byrne, Philip N. Johnson-Laird, M. Oaksford & N. Chater (2010). Conditionals and Possibilities. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thought. Oxford University Press
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  19.  12
    Walter Schaeken & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2000). Strategies in Temporal Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 6 (3):193 – 219.
    This paper reports three studies of temporal reasoning. A problem of the following sort, where the letters denote common everyday events: A happens before B. C happens before B. D happens while B. E happens while C. What is the relation between D and EEfficacylls for at least two alternative models to be constructed in order to give the right answer for the right reason. However, the first premise is irrelevant to this answer, and so if reasoners were to ignore (...)
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  20.  10
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1978). What's Wrong with Grandma's Guide to Procedural Semantics: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. Cognition 9 (September):249-61.
  21.  9
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1997). Rules and Illusions: A Critical Study of Rips's the Psychology of Proof. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (3):387-407.
  22. Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Philip Johnson-Laird (2005). Reasoning About Relations. Psychological Review 112 (2):468-493.
    Inferences about spatial, temporal, and other relations are ubiquitous. This article presents a novel model-based theory of such reasoning. The theory depends on 5 principles. The structure of mental models is iconic as far as possible. The logical consequences of relations emerge from models constructed from the meanings of the relations and from knowledge. Individuals tend to construct only a single, typical model. They spontaneously develop their own strategies for relational reasoning. Regardless of strategy, the difficulty of an inference depends (...)
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  23.  15
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1995). Mental Models, Deductive Reasoning, and the Brain. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press 999--1008.
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  24. Manuel de Vega, Margaret Jean Intons-Peterson, Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Michel Denis & Marc Marschark (1996). Models of Visuospatial Cognition. Oxford University Press Usa.
    This second volume in the Counterpoints Series focuses on alternative models of visual-spatial processing in human cognition. The editors provide a historical and theoretical introduction and offer ideas about directions and new research designs.
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  25.  4
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne (1993). Mental Models or Formal Rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):368.
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  26. Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1981). Mental Models of Meaning. In A. Joshi, Bruce H. Weber & Ivan A. Sag (eds.), Elements of Discourse Understanding. Cambridge University Press 106--126.
     
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  27. Philip Johnson-Laird (1999). Deductive Reasoning. Annual Review of Psychology 50 (1):109-135.
    This chapter describes the main accounts of deductive competence, which explain what is computed in carrying out deductions. It argues that people have a modicum of competence, which is useful in daily life and a prerequisite for acquiring logical expertise. It outlines the three main sorts of theory of deductive performance, which explain how people make deductions: They rely on factual knowledge, formal rules, or mental models. It reviews recent experimental studies of deductive reasoning in order to help readers to (...)
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  28.  1
    Ruth M. J. Byrne, Simon J. Handley & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1995). Reasoning From Suppositions. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 48 (4):915-944.
    Two experiments investigated inferences based on suppositions. In Experiment 1, the subjects decided whether suppositions about individuals' veracity were consistent with their assertions—for example, whether the supposition “Ann is telling the truth and Beth is telling a lie”, is consistent with the premises: “Ann asserts: I am telling the truth and Beth is telling the truth. Beth asserts: Ann is telling the truth”. It showed that these inferences are more difficult than ones based on factual premises: “Ann asserts: I live (...)
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  29.  7
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1994). A Model Theory of Induction. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1):5 – 29.
    Abstract Theories of induction in psychology and artificial intelligence assume that the process leads from observation and knowledge to the formulation of linguistic conjectures. This paper proposes instead that the process yields mental models of phenomena. It uses this hypothesis to distinguish between deduction, induction, and creative forms of thought. It shows how models could underlie inductions about specific matters. In the domain of linguistic conjectures, there are many possible inductive generalizations of a conjecture. In the domain of models, however, (...)
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  30. Philip Johnson-Laird & Fabien Savary (1996). Illusory Inferences About Probabilities. Acta Psychologica 93 (1–3):69-90.
    The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises. A conclusion is possible if it holds in at least one model of the premises; it is probable if it holds in most of the models; and it is necessary if it holds in all of the models. The theory also postulates that reasoners represent as little information as possible in explicit models and, in particular, that they represent only information about what is true. One (...)
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  31.  11
    Ruth M. J. Byrne & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2010). Models Redux: Response to Evans and Over. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):6.
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  32. Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. Byrne & Walter Schaeken (1992). Propositional Reasoning by Model. Psychological Review 99 (3):418-439.
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  33.  28
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1997). An End to the Controversy? A Reply to Rips. Minds and Machines 7 (3):425-432.
  34. Philip Johnson-Laird & Yevgeniya Goldvarg (1997). How to Make the Impossible Seem Possible. Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
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  35.  16
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2005). Flying Bicycles: How the Wright Brothers Invented the Airplane. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 4 (1):27-48.
    This paper explores the ways in which Wilbur and Orville Wright thought as they tackled the problem of designing and constructing a heavier-than-air craft that would fly under its own power and under their control. It argues that their use of analogy and their use of knowledge in diagnostic reasoning lies outside the scope of current psychological theories and their computer implementations. They used analogies based on mental models of one system, such as the wings, to help them to develop (...)
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  36.  2
    Philip Johnson-Laird & Paolo Legrenzi (1992). Science as Heuristic Search: Some Comments on Simon 's Theory. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (1):35 – 39.
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  37. Bruno G. Bara, Monica Bucciarelli & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1995). Development of Syllogistic Reasoning. American Journal of Psychology 108:157-157.
    The following values have no corresponding Zotero field: PB - University of Illinois Press.
     
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  38.  5
    Ruth M. J. Byrne & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2009). Corrigendum: ‘If’ and the Problems of Conditional Reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (9):371.
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  39.  5
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2005). If Bears Eat in the Woods? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):43-44.
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  40. Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1993). How the Mind Thinks. In George A. Miller & Gilbert Harman (eds.), Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller. L. Erlbaum Associates
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  41.  2
    Yingrui van Der HenstYang & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2002). Strategies in Sentential Reasoning. Cognitive Science 26 (4):425-468.
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  42.  2
    Vittorio Girotto & Philip N. Johnson-Laird (2010). Conditionals and Probability. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thought. Oxford University Press 103--115.
  43.  3
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1994). Reply to the Commentators on a Model Theory of Induction. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1):73 – 96.
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  44.  1
    Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1988). How is Meaning Mentally Represented. In Umberto Eco (ed.), Meaning and Mental Representations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 496--99.
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  45. Philip N. Johnson-Laird (1990). Human Thinking and Mental Models. In K. A. Mohyeldin Said, W. H. Newton-Smith, R. Viale & K. V. Wilkes (eds.), Modelling the Mind. Clarendon Press 155--170.
     
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  46. Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson, Amos Tversky, P. Legrenzi, V. Girotto, Pn Johnson-Laird, Edward E. Smith, Daniel Osherson & Nancy Pennington (1993). Numbers L-2. Cognition 49 (297):297.
     
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