Search results for 'Philip Kitcher, Scientific realism, Reference, Joseph Priestley, Phlogiston, Principle of humanity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  58
    Stathis Psillos (1997). Kitcher on Reference. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (3):259 – 272.
    In his (1978) and parts of (1993), Philip Kitcher advances a new context-sensitive theory of reference which he applies to abandoned theoretical expression-types, such as Joseph Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’, in order to show that, although qua types they fail to refer uniformly, they nonetheless have referential tokens. This piece offers a critical examination of Kitcher’s theory. After a general investigation into the overall adequacy of Kitcher’s theory as a general account of reference, I focus on the case of (...)
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  2. Wenceslao J. González (ed.) (2011). Scientific Realism and Democratic Society: The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher. Rodopi.
    Philip Kitcher is among the key philosophers of science of our times. This volume offers an up to date analysis of his philosophical perspective taking into account his views on scientific realism and democratic society. The contributors to the volume focus on four different aspects of Kitcher’s thought: the evolution of his philosophy, his present views on scientific realism, the epistemological analysis of his modest realism, and his conception of scientific practice. In the final chapter, the (...)
     
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  3. James Ladyman (2011). Structural Realism Versus Standard Scientific Realism: The Case of Phlogiston and Dephlogisticated Air. Synthese 180 (2):87 - 101.
    The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the (...)
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  4. Kenneth R. Westphal (2014). ‘Hegel’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference, Newton’s Methodological Rule 4 and Scientific Realism Today’. Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):9-67.
    Empirical investigations use empirical methods, data and evidence. This banal observation appears to favour empiricism, especially in philosophy of science, though no rationalist ever denied their importance. Natural sciences often provide what appear to be, and are taken by scientists as, realist, causal explanations of natural phenomena. Empiricism has never been congenial to scientific realism. Bas van Fraassen’s ‘Constructive Empiricism’ purports that realist interpretations of any scientific theory in principle always transcend whatever can be justified by that (...)
     
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  5.  23
    M. Solomon (1995). Legend Naturalism and Scientific Progress: An Essay on Philip Kitcher's the Advancement of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (2):205-218.
    Philip Kitcher's The Advancement of Science sets out, programmatically, a new naturalistic view of science as a process of building consensus practices. Detailed historical case studies--centrally, the Darwinian revolution--are intended to support this view. I argue that Kitcher's expositions in fact support a more conservative view, that I dub 'Legend Naturalism'. Using four historical examples which increasingly challenge Kitcher's discussions, I show that neither Legend Naturalism, nor the less conservative programmatic view, gives an adequate account of scientific progress. (...)
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  6.  67
    Anders Landig (2014). Partial Reference, Scientific Realism and Possible Worlds. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:1-9.
    Theories of partial reference have been developed in order to retrospectively interpret rather stubborn past scientific theories like Newtonian dynamics and the phlogiston theory in a realist way, i.e., as approximately true. This is done by allowing for a term to refer to more than one entity at the same time and by providing semantic structures that determine the truth values of sentences containing partially referring terms. Two versions of theories of partial reference will be presented, a conjunctive (by (...)
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  7.  14
    Eduardo Salles O. Barra (2010). Valores epistêmicos no naturalismo normativos de Philip Kitcher. Principia 4 (1):1-26.
    This paper aims at analyzing Philip Kitcher's naturalistic epistemology, particularly its normative features, which are viewed as a sort of response to negative assessments made by radical naturalists on the plurality of epistemic values. According to them such values are ineffective for normative ends, e.g. theory choice. Differently from that quite excessive evaluation, Kitcher argues rather for explanatory unity as the most important and universal epistemic value. Even though Kitcher's arguments are sound, there remains some serious gaps as regards (...)
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  8. Pierre Cruse (2004). Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
    It is often thought that questions of reference are crucial in assessing scientific realism, construed as the view that successful theories are at least approximately true descriptions of the unobservable; realism is justified only if terms in empirically successful theories generally refer to genuinely existing entities or properties. In this paper this view is questioned. First, it is argued that there are good reasons to think that questions of realism are largely decided by convention and carry no epistemic significance. (...)
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  9.  14
    Dionysis Christias (forthcoming). Can Sellars’ Argument for Scientific Realism Be Used Against His Own Scientia Mensura Principle? Synthese:1-27.
    The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Lange’s argument in support of Sellars’ scientific realism, which, if successful, surprisingly, undermines Sellars’ scientia mensura principle and justifies the anti-Sellarsian view to the effect that certain domains of discourse which use irreducibly normative descriptions and explanations are explanatorily autonomous. It will be argued that Lange’s argument against the layer-cake view is not strictly speaking Sellarsian, since Lange interprets Sellars’ argument in an overly abstract or formal manner. Moreover, I will (...)
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  10.  77
    Michael A. Bishop & Stephen P. Stich (1998). The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 65 (1):33-49.
    The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, and that (...)
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  11. Philip Kitcher (1991). Critical Notice: Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon,(Eds.), Scientific Explanation; and Wesley C. Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation* James H. Fetzert. [REVIEW] In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press 58--288.
     
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  12. Julia Friederike Göhner & Markus Seidel (2013). Promiscuous Objects, Hybrid Truth and Scientific Realism. In Marie Kaiser & Ansgar Seide (eds.), Philip Kitcher. Pragmatic Naturalism. Ontos 111-127.
    Philip Kitcher’s account of scientific realism in 'The Advancement of Science' (AS) differs from his account in 'Science, Truth and Democracy' (STD). We demonstrate that (1) contrary to appearance, Kitcher in AS proposes a so-called Kantian realism that is accompanied not by a correspondence theory, but by a hybrid conception of truth. (2) Also, we point out that Kitcher does not pertain to the “promiscuous realism” proposed in STD stringently, but falls back on his Kantian realism of AS (...)
     
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  13.  2
    Robert E. Schofield (1957). The Scientific Background of Joseph Priestley. Annals of Science 13 (3):148-163.
  14.  9
    James H. Fetzer (1991). Book Review:Scientific Explanation Philip Kitcher, Wesley C. Salmon; Four Decades of Scientific Explanation Wesley C. Salmon. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 58 (2):288-.
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  15.  11
    Arnold Thackray (1968). A Scientific Autobiography of Joseph Priestley (1733-1804). Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (4):400-401.
  16. Pierluigi Barrotta (2000). Scientific Dialectics in Action: The Case of Joseph Priestley. In Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 153--176.
  17. Maurice Finocchiaro (1991). Scientific Explanation by Philip Kitcher; Wesley C. Salmon; Four Decades of Scientific Explanation by Wesley C. Salmon. Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 82:781-782.
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  18. D. M. Knight (1969). Eighteenth Century A Scientific Autobiography of Joseph Priestley : Selected Scientific Correspondence. Edited with Commentary by Robert E. Schofield. Cambridge, Mass. And London: M.I.T. Press. 1966. Pp. Xiv + 415. $13.50. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 4 (3):301.
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  19. Isaac Kramnick (1992). Eighteenth-Century Science and Radical Social Theory: The Case of Joseph Priestley's Scientific Liberalism. In Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), The Scientific Enterprise. Kluwer 1--31.
  20. W. Walker (1934). The Beginnings of the Scientific Career of Joseph Priestley. Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 21:81-97.
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  21.  81
    Grzegorz Bugajak (2009). Philosophy of Nature, Realism, and the Postulated Ontology of Scientific Theories. In Adam Świeżyński (ed.), Philosophy of Nature Today, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa. 59–80.
    The first part of the paper is a metatheoretical consideration of such philosophy of nature which allows for using scientific results in philosophical analyses. An epistemological 'judgment' of those results becomes a preliminary task of this discipline: this involves taking a position in the controversy between realistic and antirealistic accounts of science. It is shown that a philosopher of nature has to be a realist, if his task to build true ontology of reality is to be achieved. At the (...)
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  22. Michael Hallett (1990). Goldfarb Warren. Poincaré Against the Logicists. History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, Edited by Aspray William and Kitcher Philip, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1988, Pp. 61–81.Friedman Michael. Logical Truth and Analyticity in Carnap's “Logical Syntax of Language.” History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, Edited by Aspray William and Kitcher Philip, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1988, Pp. 82–94.Moore Gregory H.. The Emergence of First-Order Logic. History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, Edited by Aspray William and Kitcher Philip, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1988, Pp. 95–135.Dauben Joseph W.. Abraham Robinson and Nonstandard Analysis: History, Philosophy, and Foundations of Mathematics. History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, Edited by Aspray William. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (3):1315-1319.
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  23. W. A. Smeaton (1968). A Scientific Autobiography of Joseph Priestley, 1733-1804. Selected Scientific Correspondence,Edited with a CommentaryRobert E. Schofield. [REVIEW] Isis 59 (2):236-237.
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  24. W. Cameron Walker (1934). The Beginnings of the Scientific Career of Joseph Priestley. Isis 21 (1):81-97.
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  25.  91
    Howard Sankey (2008). Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science. Ashgate.
    Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific (...)
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  26.  33
    Gerald Doppelt (2014). Best Theory Scientific Realism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):271-291.
    The aim of this essay is to argue for a new version of ‘inference-to-the-best-explanation’ scientific realism, which I characterize as Best Theory Realism or ‘BTR’. On BTR, the realist needs only to embrace a commitment to the truth or approximate truth of the best theories in a field, those which are unique in satisfying the highest standards of empirical success in a mature field with many successful but falsified predecessors. I argue that taking our best theories to be true (...)
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  27.  94
    Jaana Eigi (2012). Two Millian Arguments: Using Helen Longino’s Approach to Solve the Problems Philip Kitcher Targeted with His Argument on Freedom of Inquiry. Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (1):44-63.
    Philip Kitcher argued that the freedom to pursue one's version of the good life is the main aim of Mill's argument for freedom of expression. According to Kitcher, in certain scientific fields, political and epistemological asymmetries bias research toward conclusions that threaten this most important freedom of underprivileged groups. Accordingly, Kitcher claimed that there are Millian grounds for limiting freedom of inquiry in these fields to protect the freedom of the underprivileged. -/- I explore Kitcher's argument in light (...)
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  28. Seungbae Park (2011). Coherence of Our Best Scientific Theories. Foundations of Science 16 (1):21-30.
    Putnam (1975) infers from the success of a scientific theory to its approximate truth and the reference of its key term. Laudan (1981) objects that some past theories were successful, and yet their key terms did not refer, so they were not even approximately true. Kitcher (1993) replies that the past theories are approximately true because their working posits are true, although their idle posits are false. In contrast, I argue that successful theories which cohere with each other are (...)
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  29.  16
    Holger Andreas (2011). Semantic Challenges to Scientific Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):17 - 31.
    This paper is concerned with connections between scientific and metaphysical realism. It is not difficult to show that scientific realism, as expounded by Psillos (1999) clearly qualifies as a kind of metaphysical realism in the sense of Putnam (1980). The statement of scientific realism therefore must not only deal with underdetermination and the dynamics of scientific theories but also answer the semantic challenges to metaphysical realism. As will be argued, the common core of these challenges is (...)
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  30.  49
    Lydia Patton (2015). Methodological Realism and Modal Resourcefulness: Out of the Web and Into the Mine. Synthese 192 (11):3443-3462.
    Psillos, Kitcher, and Leplin have defended convergent scientific realism against the pessimistic meta-induction by arguing for the divide et impera strategy. I argue that DEI faces a problem more serious than the pessimistic meta-induction: the problem of accretion. When empirically successful theories and principles are combined, they may no longer make successful predictions or allow for accurate calculations, or the combination otherwise may be an empirical failure. The shift from classical mechanics to the new quantum theory does not reflect (...)
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  31.  61
    Ignacio Mastroleo (2011). The evaluation of scientific research in democratic societies: Kitcher, Rawls and the approach of scientific significant truths. Revista Redbioética/UNESCO 2 (4):43-60.
    This paper critically assesses the model of evaluation of scientific research for democratic societies defended by Philip Kitcher. The “significant truth” approach proposes a viable alternative to two classic images of science: that of the “critics”, who believe that science always serves the interests of the powerful and that of the “faithful”, who argue that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is always valuable and necessary. However, the democratic justification of Kitcher’s proposal is not compatible with the ethical (...)
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  32.  21
    Ann-Sophie Barwich (2013). A Pluralist Approach to Extension: The Role of Materiality in Scientific Practice for the Reference of Natural Kind Terms. Biological Theory 7 (2):100-108.
    This article argues for a different outlook on the concept of extension, especially for the reference of general terms in scientific practice. Scientific realist interpretations of the two predominant theories of meaning, namely Descriptivism and Causal Theory, contend that a stable cluster of descriptions or an initial baptism fixes the extension of a general term such as a natural kind term. This view in which the meaning of general terms is presented as monosemantic and the referents as stable, (...)
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  33. Gerhard Schurz (2011). Structural Correspondence, Indirect Reference, and Partial Truth: Phlogiston Theory and Newtonian Mechanics. Synthese 180 (2):103-120.
    This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T* which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions which were responsible for T’s success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston versus oxygen theories (...)
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  34.  55
    Michael A. Bishop (2003). The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
    Scientific realism says of our best scientific theories that (1) most of their important posits exist and (2) most of their central claims are approximately true. Antirealists sometimes offer the pessimistic induction in reply: since (1) and (2) are false about past successful theories, they are probably false about our own best theories too. The contemporary debate about this argument has turned (and become stuck) on the question, Do the central terms of successful scientific theories refer? For (...)
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  35. D. Cummiskey (1992). Reference Failure and Scientific Realism: A Response to the Meta-Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (1):21-40.
    Pure causal theories of reference cannot account for cases of theoretical term reference failure and do not capture the scientific point of introducing new theoretical terminology. In order to account for paradigm cases of reference failure and the point of new theoretical terminology, a descriptive element must play a role in fixing the reference of theoretical terms. Richard Boyd's concept of theory constituitive metaphors provides the necessary descriptive element in reference fixing. In addition to providing a plausible account of (...)
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  36. Richard Dawid (2007). Scientific Realism in the Age of String Theory. Physics and Philosophy.
    String theory currently is the only viable candidate for a unified description of all known natural forces. This article tries to demonstrate that the fundamental structural and methodological differences that set string theory apart from other physical theories have important philosophical consequences. Focussing on implications for the realism debate in philosophy of science, it is argued that both poles of that debate face new problems in the context of string theory. On the one hand, the claim of underdetermination of (...) theory by the available empirical data, which is a pivotal element of empiricism, loses much of its plausibility. On the other hand, the dissolution of any meaningful notion of an external ontological object destroys the basis for conventional versions of scientific realism. String theory seems to suggest an intermediate position akin to Structural Realism that is based on a newly emerging principle, to be called the principle of theoretical uniqueness. (shrink)
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  37.  10
    Inmaculada Perdomo (2012). The Characterization of Epistemology in Philip Kitcher: A Critical Reflection From New Empiricism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):113-138.
    While the earlier work of Philip Kitcher, in particular The Advancement of Science (1993), continues to inform his more recent studies, such as Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001), there are significant "changes of opinion" from those articulated in the 1990s. One may even speak of two different stages in the configuration of epistemological proposals. An analysis, from an empiricist standpoint, of the shifts between one and the other indicates further evolution towards realist positions but much more modest ones than (...)
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  38.  10
    Elizabeth Victor (2014). Scientific Research and Human Rights: A Response to Kitcher on the Limitations of Inquiry. Science and Engineering Ethics 20 (4):1045-1063.
    In his recent work exploring the role of science in democratic societies Kitcher claims that scientists ought to have a prominent role in setting the agenda for and limits to research. Against the backdrop of the claim that the proper limits of scientific inquiry is John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle , he identifies the limits of inquiry as the point where the outcomes of research could cause harm to already vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, Kitcher argues against explicit limitations on (...)
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  39. Daniel Attala Pochon (1997). Dos escepticismos y desafío escéptico en The Advancement of Science, de Philip Kitcher (Two Skepticism and Skeptic Challenge in Philip Kitcher's The Advancement of Science). Theoria 12 (2):317-335.
    En este artículo me propongo analizar el punto de partida epistemológico de un reciente libro de Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) a través de su discusión con las concepciónes ‘escépticas’. Podemos distinguir entre dos tipos de escepticismo en Ia trama deI libro de Kitcher: uno débil y otro radical. Intentamos difinir el tipo de realismo que Kitcher defiende, para finalmente mostrar que tal tipo de realismo es posible para Kitcher en Ia medida que no toma en cuenta el (...)
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  40.  37
    T. Shanahan (1997). Kitcher's Compromise: A Critical Examination of the Compromise Model of Scientific Closure, and its Implications for the Relationship Between History and Philosophy of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (2):319-338.
    In The Advancement of Science (1993) Philip Kitcher develops what he calls the 'Compromise Model' of the closure of scientific debates. The model is designed to acknowledge significant elements from 'Rationalist' and 'Antirationalist' accounts of science, without succumbing to the one-sidedness of either. As part of an ambitious naturalistic account of scientific progress, Kitcher's model succeeds to the extent that transitions in the history of science satisfy its several conditions. I critically evaluate the Compromise Model by identifying (...)
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  41.  8
    Alan Tapper (2003). Reid and Priestley on Method and the Mind. In John Haldane Stephen Read (ed.), The Philosophy of Thomas Reid. 98-112.
    Reid said little in his published writings about his contemporary Joseph Priestley, but his unpublished work is largely devoted to the latter. Much of Priestley's philosophical thought- his materialism, his determinism, his Lockean scientific realism- was as antithetical to Reid's as was Hume's philosophy in a very different way. Neither Reid nor Priestley formulated a full response to the other. Priestley's response to Reid came very early in his career, and is marked by haste and immaturity. In his (...)
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  42.  9
    Daniel Attala Pochon (1997). Dos Escepticismos Y Desafío Escéptico En the Advancement of Science, de Philip Kitcher (Two Skepticism and Skeptic Challenge in Philip Kitcher's the Advancement of Science). Theoria 12 (2):317-335.
    En este artículo me propongo analizar el punto de partida epistemológico de un reciente libro de Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) a través de su discusión con las concepciónes ‘escépticas’. Podemos distinguir entre dos tipos de escepticismo en Ia trama deI libro de Kitcher: uno débil y otro radical. Intentamos difinir el tipo de realismo que Kitcher defiende, para finalmente mostrar que tal tipo de realismo es posible para Kitcher en Ia medida que no toma en cuenta el (...)
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  43. Mark Couch & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.) (2016). The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher contains eleven chapters on the work of noted philosopher Philip Kitcher, whose work is known for its broad range and insightfulness. Topics covered include philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of religion. Each of the chapters is followed by a reply from Kitcher himself. This first significant edited volume devoted to examining Kitcher's work is an essential reference for anyone interested in understanding this important philosopher.
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  44.  10
    Gary G. Tibbetts (2013). How the Great Scientists Reasoned: The Scientific Method in Action. Elsevier.
    1. Introduction : humanity's urge to understand -- 2. Elements of scientific thinking : skepticism, careful reasoning, and exhaustive evaluation are all vital. Science Is universal -- Maintaining a critical attitude. Reasonable skepticism -- Respect for the truth -- Reasoning. Deduction -- Induction -- Paradigm shifts -- Evaluating scientific hypotheses. Ockham's razor -- Quantitative evaluation -- Verification by others -- Statistics : correlation and causation -- Statistics : the indeterminacy of the small -- Careful definition -- Science (...)
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  45. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Peter Machamer (eds.) (2012). Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press.
    One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, (...)
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  46. Athanassios Raftopoulos & Peter Machamer (eds.) (2014). Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press.
    One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, (...)
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  47.  71
    Jamin Asay (forthcoming). Going Local: A Defense of Methodological Localism About Scientific Realism. Synthese:1-23.
    Scientific realism and anti-realism are most frequently discussed as global theses: theses that apply equally well across the board to all the various sciences. Against this status quo I defend the localist alternative, a methodological stance on scientific realism that approaches debates on realism at the level of individual sciences, rather than at science itself. After identifying the localist view, I provide a number of arguments in its defense, drawing on the diversity and disunity found in the sciences, (...)
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  48.  73
    Valeriano Iranzo (2012). Inductivist Strategies for Scientific Realism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):241-268.
    Philip Kitcher has developed a sort of inductivist-reliabilist justification for scientific realism. After distinguishing his argument from a well-known abductivist one (the "no-miracles" argument), I will argue that Kitcher's proposal cannot adequately meet the antirealist challenge. Firstly, it begs the question against the antirealists; secondly, it can hardly support a plausible - piecemeal - scientific realism. I will explore an alternative inductivist approach that exploits correlations between theoretical properties and empirical success. On my view, its prospects for (...)
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  49. Greg Frost-Arnold (2014). Can the Pessimistic Induction Be Saved From Semantic Anti-Realism About Scientific Theory? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):521-548.
    Scientific anti-realists who appeal to the pessimistic induction (PI) claim that the theoretical terms of past scientific theories often fail to refer to anything. But on standard views in philosophy of language, such reference failures prima facie lead to certain sentences being neither true nor false. Thus, if these standard views are correct, then the conclusion of the PI should be that significant chunks of current theories are truth-valueless. But that is semantic anti-realism about scientific discourse—a position (...)
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  50.  67
    William A. Rottschaefer (2004). Naturalizing or Demythologizing Scientific Inquiry: Kitcher's: Science, Truth and Democracy. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3):408-422.
    , Philip Kitcher has argued that science ought to meet both the epistemic goals of significant truth and the nonepistemic goals of serving the interests of a democratic society. He opposes this science as servant model to both the theology of science as source of salvific truth and the theology of science as anti-Christ. In a recent critical comment, Paul A. Roth argues that Kitcher remains entangled in the theology of salvific truth, not realizing that its goal is either (...)
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