The distinctions among facts, propositions, and events are supported by linguistic analyses segregating factive, propositional, and eventive predicates. The concepts of fact, proposition, and event may be basic categories of human understanding, as well as being ontologically significant. FPE theory was developed in part to reject the identification of facts with true propositions. The degree of ‘fineness’ of individuations within each category results from how closely event-, fact-, or proposition-individuation mirrors linguistic semantic structure. Event structure is not reflected in many (...) event phrases. Fact- and proposition-structure typically does reflect semantic structures of factive and propositional clauses. The relevant properties for event individuation are all expressible by eventive predicates. Fact and proposition individuation is not as straightforward, because so many factives and propositionals do not express properties relevant to the Leibnizian principle. The intractability of proposition individuation may be overcome through an explanation of fact cognition. (shrink)
Consider syllogisms in which fraction (percentage) quantifiers are permitted in addition to universal and particular quantifiers, and then include further quantifiers which are modifications of such fractions (such as almost 1/2 the S are P and Much more than 1/2 the S are P). Could a syllogistic system containing such additional categorical forms be coherent? Thompson's attempt (1986) to give rules for determining validity of such syllogisms has failed; cf. Carnes & Peterson (forthcoming) for proofs of the unsoundness and (...) incompleteness of Thompson's rules. Building on Peterson (1985), the coherence of such a syllogistic can, however, be demonstrated with an algebra which provides its semantics; e.g., almost 1/2 the S are P is represented as –(3(SP)SP). (shrink)
My recently developed Fact-Proposition-Event (FPE) Theory can help to begin the clarification of D.A. Armstrong's account of natural laws-that laws are relationships among certain universals. FPE Theory makes careful description of laws possible, distinguishing them from law propositions (or statements), law facts, and states-of-affairs with which they might be confused. Initial inspection of Armstrong's proposal forces a choice between taking a law to be a certain kind of state (an event- or state-kind) and taking it to be a determinate kind (...) of relation (a relation-kind instantiated by ordered pairs of concrete events and/or states). On both alternatives, new kinds of events and states arise (abstract ones and event-pairs, among others). (shrink)
Some critics believe Quine's semantic indeterminacy (indeterminacy of radical translation at home as well as abroad) thesis is true, but innocent, since it is just scientific underdetermination in linguistics. The Quinean reply is that in scientific underdetermination cases there are facts of the matter making claims true or false (whether knowable or not), whereas in semantic indeterminacy cases there simply are not. The critics' rejoinder that there are such facts, studied in linguistics, is met by the final reply that linguistics (...) either on the whole or in part is riddled with appeals to "meanings" and is, thereby, as suspect as analyticity and radical translation. I recommend "saving"(?) linguistics by holding that it is permanently entangled in epistemology. Finally, the argument the critics should have made concerns paralleling semantic indeterminacy to indeterminacies in current quantum mechanics. (shrink)
