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Philip L. Peterson [40]Philip Leslie Peterson [1]
  1. Philip L. Peterson (2000). Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:29-36.
    The distinctions among facts, propositions, and events are supported by linguistic analyses segregating factive, propositional, and eventive predicates. The concepts of fact, proposition, and event may be basic categories of human understanding, as well as being ontologically significant. FPE theory was developed in part to reject the identification of facts with true propositions. The degree of ‘fineness’ of individuations within each category results from how closely event-, fact-, or proposition-individuation mirrors linguistic semantic structure. Event structure is not reflected in many (...)
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  2. Philip L. Peterson (2000). Intermediate Quantities [I.E. Quantifiers] Logic, Linguistics, and Aristotelian Semantics. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  3. Philip L. Peterson (2000). Mark Crimmins, Talk About Beliefs, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, XI + 214 Pp., $25.00 (Cloth), ISBN 0-262-03185-X. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 10 (2):296-301.
  4. Philip L. Peterson (1999). The Meanings of Natural Kind Terms. Philosophia 27 (1-2):137-176.
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  5. Philip L. Peterson (1997). Fact Proposition Event.
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  6. Philip L. Peterson (1997). John Bacon, Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 17 (4):231-236.
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  7. Philip L. Peterson (1997). Kripke on Reference and Mind. Cogito 11 (3):183-191.
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  8. Barbara Abbott, Annette Herskovits, Philip L. Peterson, Alfred R. Mele, David J. Cole, Daniel Crevier, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Istvan S. N. Berkeley, Brendan J. Kitts, Mike Brown & George Paliouras (1996). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 6 (2):239-285.
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  9. Philip L. Peterson (1996). Do Significant Cultural Universals Exist? American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (2):183 - 196.
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  10. Philip L. Peterson (1996). Mark Richard, Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. Minds and Machines 6:249-253.
  11. Philip L. Peterson (1996). Sun-Joo Shin, The Logical Status of Diagrams Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 16 (3):208-210.
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  12. Philip L. Peterson (1995). Attitudinal Opacity. Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (2):159 - 220.
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  13. Philip L. Peterson (1995). Are Some Propositions Empirically Necessary? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):251-277.
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  14. Philip L. Peterson (1995). Distribution and Proportion. Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (2):193 - 225.
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  15. Philip L. Peterson (1995). Contraries and the Cubes and Disks of Opposition. Metaphilosophy 26 (1-2):107-137.
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  16. Philip L. Peterson (1994). Attitudinal Opacity. Linguistics and Philosophy 17 (2):159 - 220.
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  17. Philip L. Peterson (1994). Facts, Events, and Semantic Emphasis in Causal Statements. The Monist 77 (2):217-238.
  18. Philip L. Peterson (1994). Which Universals Are Laws? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):492 – 496.
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  19. Philip L. Peterson (1992). Intermediate Quantifiers for Finch's Proportions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (1):140-149.
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  20. Robert D. Carnes & Philip L. Peterson (1991). Intermediate Quantifiers Versus Percentages. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32 (2):294-306.
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  21. Philip L. Peterson (1991). Complexly Fractionated Syllogistic Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (3):287 - 313.
    Consider syllogisms in which fraction (percentage) quantifiers are permitted in addition to universal and particular quantificrs, and then include further quantifiers which are modifications of such fractions (such as "almost ½ the S are P" and "Much more than ½ the S are P"). Could a syllogistic system containing such additional categorical forms be coherent? Thompson's attempt (1986) to give rules for determining validity of such syllogisms has failed; cf. Carnes & Peterson (forthcoming) for proofs of the unsoundness and incompleteness (...)
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  22. Philip L. Peterson (1991). What is Empirical in Mathematics? Philosophia Mathematica (1):91-110.
  23. Philip L. Peterson (1990). "An Essay on Facts" by Kenneth Russell Olson. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):610.
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  24. Philip L. Peterson (1989). Complex Events. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):19-41.
     
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  25. Philip L. Peterson (1989). Logic Knowledge. The Monist 72 (1):78-116.
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  26. Philip L. Peterson (1988). Which Universal? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:24 - 30.
    My recently developed Fact-Proposition-Event (FPE) Theory can help to begin the clarification of D.A. Armstrong's account of natural laws-that laws are relationships among certain universals. FPE Theory makes careful description of laws possible, distinguishing them from law propositions (or statements), law facts, and states-of-affairs with which they might be confused. Initial inspection of Armstrong's proposal forces a choice between taking a law to be a certain kind of state (an event- or state-kind) and taking it to be a determinate kind (...)
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  27. Philip L. Peterson (1986). Revealing Designators and Acquaintance with Universals. Noûs 20 (3):291-311.
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  28. Philip L. Peterson (1986). Real Logic in Philosophy. The Monist 69 (2):235-263.
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  29. Philip L. Peterson (1986). Real Logic in Philosophy in Logic and Philosophy. The Monist 69 (2):235-263.
  30. Philip L. Peterson (1985). Six Grammatical Hypotheses on Actions, Causes, and "Causes". Indiana University Linguistics Club.
     
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  31. Philip L. Peterson (1985). Higher Quantity Syllogisms. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 26 (4):348-360.
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  32. Philip L. Peterson (1984). Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Underdetermination. Philosophy of Science 51 (3):464-487.
    Some critics believe Quine's semantic indeterminacy (indeterminacy of radical translation at home as well as abroad) thesis is true, but innocent, since it is just scientific underdetermination in linguistics. The Quinean reply is that in scientific underdetermination cases there are facts of the matter making claims true or false (whether knowable or not), whereas in semantic indeterminacy cases there simply are not. The critics' rejoinder that there are such facts, studied in linguistics, is met by the final reply that linguistics (...)
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  33. Philip L. Peterson (1983). On Lehrer's Proof That Knowledge Entails Belief. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):271-279.
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  34. Philip L. Peterson (1982). Anaphoric Reference to Facts, Propositions, and Events. Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (2):235 - 276.
    Factive predicates (like ‘-matters’, ‘discover-’, ‘realizes-’) take NPs that refer to facts, propositional predicates (like ‘-seems’, ‘believes-’, ‘-likely’) take NPs that refer to propositions, and eventive predicates (like ‘-occurs’, ‘-take place’, ‘-causes-’) take NPs that refer to events (broadly speaking, including states, processes, conditions, ect.). Logically speaking at least two out of the three categories (facts, propositions, and events) can be eliminated. So, if all three kinds of referents turn out to be required for natural language semantics, their postulation is (...)
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  35. Philip L. Peterson (1982). Linguistic Representation. Philosophia 12 (1-2):159-202.
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  36. Philip L. Peterson (1981). What Causes Effects? Philosophical Studies 39 (2):107 - 139.
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  37. Philip L. Peterson (1979). On the Logic of ``Few'', ``Many'', and ``Most''. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (1):155-179.
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  38. Philip L. Peterson (1977). How to Infer Belief From Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 32 (2):203 - 209.
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  39. Philip L. Peterson (1976). An Abuse of Terminology: Donnellan's Distinction in Recent Grammar. Foundations of Language 14 (2):239-242.
     
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  40. Philip L. Peterson (1968). Translation and Synonymy: Rosenberg on Quine. Inquiry 11:410.
     
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