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Profile: Philip Percival (Nottingham University)
  1. Philip Percival (2013). Branching of Possible Worlds. Synthese 190 (18):4261-4291.
    The question as to whether some objects are possible worlds that have an initial segment in common, i.e. so that their fusion is a temporal tree whose branches are possible worlds, arises both for those who hold that our universe has the structure of a temporal tree and for those who hold that what there is includes concrete universes of every possible variety. The notion of “possible world” employed in the question is seen to be the notion of an object (...)
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  2. Philip Percival (2011). Predicate Abstraction, the Limits of Quantification, and the Modality of Existence. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):389-416.
    For various reasons several authors have enriched classical first order syntax by adding a predicate abstraction operator. “Conservatives” have done so without disturbing the syntax of the formal quantifiers but “revisionists” have argued that predicate abstraction motivates the universal quantifier’s re-classification from an expression that combines with a variable to yield a sentence from a sentence, to an expression that combines with a one-place predicate to yield a sentence. My main aim is to advance the cause of predicate abstraction while (...)
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  3. Philip Percival (2007). An Empiricist Critique of Constructive Empiricism : The Aim of Science. In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen. Oxford University Press.
  4. Philip Percival (2007). Review of Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
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  5. Philip Percival (2006). On Realism About Chance. In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. 74--105.
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  6. Philip Percival (2005). Comic Normativity and the Ethics of Humour. The Monist 88 (1):93-120.
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  7. Philip Percival (2003). The Pursuit of Epistemic Good. Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):29-47.
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  8. Philip Percival (2003). ``The Pursuit of Epistemic Good&Quot. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):29-47.
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  9. Philip Percival (2002). A Presentist's Refutation of Mellor's McTaggart. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:91-.
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  10. Philip Percival (2002). Epistemic Consequentialism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):121–151.
    [Philip Percival] I aim to illuminate foundational epistemological issues by reflecting on 'epistemic consequentialism'-the epistemic analogue of ethical consequentialism. Epistemic consequentialism employs a concept of cognitive value playing a role in epistemic norms governing belief-like states that is analogous to the role goodness plays in act-governing moral norms. A distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' versions of epistemic consequentialism is held to be as important as the familiar ethical distinction on which it is based. These versions are illustrated, respectively, by cognitive (...)
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  11. Philip Percival (2002). Is Constructivism Floored? Reply to Stecker. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (1):82–86.
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  12. Philip Percival (2000). Lewis's Dilemma of Explanation Under Indeterminism Exposed and Resolved. Mind 109 (433):39-66.
    In a brief passage, David Lewis derives from quantum-theory a dilemma regarding the explanation of chance events which he tries to solve by first distinguishing plain from contrastive why-questions have answers. His brevity warrants elaboration and critique. I endorse his derivation, but I make a structural objection to his solution. Once a further distinction is drawn between different kinds of contrastive why-question, his solution can be modified and refined so as to go some way to meeting this objection. However, it (...)
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  13. Philip Percival (2000). Stecker's Dilemma: A Constructive Response. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58 (1):51-60.
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  14. Philip Percival (1999). A Note on Lewis on Counterfactual Dependence in a Chancy World. Analysis 59 (3):165–173.
    In a Postscript, David Lewis tries to extend results obtained in his "Time's Arrow and Counterfactual Dependence" from the deterministic case to the indeterministic one. In particular, he claims that under the supposition that the actual world is indeterministic, the truth of the counterfactual 'If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust' is reconciled with his truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals by a certain refinement of his earlier treatment. Sections II and III explain why his (...)
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  15. Philip Percival (1999). The Explanation of Chance Events. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:105-122.
    Quantum mechanics gives us reason to think both that the world is indeterministic, and that there are irreducibly statistical laws governing objectively chancy processes. Lewis notes that this raises a two-horned dilemma between two options deemed unacceptable: severely curtail our explanatory practices with respect to macro events, or revise our conception of the essence of chance. He maintains, however, that we can escape this dilemma by making a distinction between ‘plain’ why-questions of the simple form ‘Why did D occur?’ and (...)
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  16. Philip Percival (1994). Absolute Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:189 - 213.
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  17. Kai Nielsen, Michael Pendlebury, Philip Percival, Mark Sainsbury, David Sapire, Charles Sayward, Philip Hugly, Mark Timmons & Terence Horgan (1992). MILLER, Seumas Joint Action. Philosophical Papers 1 (259):65.
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  18. Philip Percival (1992). Thank Goodness That's Non-Actual. Philosophical Papers 21 (3):191-213.
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  19. Philip Percival (1991). Knowability, Actuality, and the Metaphysics of Context-Dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):82 – 97.
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  20. Philip Percival (1990). ``Fitch and Intuitionistic Knowability&Quot. Analysis 50 (3):182-187.
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  21. Philip Percival (1990). Indices of Truth and Intensional Operators. Theoria 56 (3):148-172.
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  22. Philip Percival (1989). Indices of Truth and Temporal Propositions. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (155):190-199.
    This paper is in three sections. In the first I describe and illustrate three uses of indices of truth in semantics. The way I illustrate this classification is not completely uncontroversial, but I expect that my intuitions on this matter are generally shared. In the second section I broach a question which is central to the metaphysics of time, namely: how should certain temporal indices of truth - times - be fitted within this classificatory scheme? I sketch three proposals as (...)
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