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Profile: Philip Robbins (University of Missouri, Columbia)
  1. Anthony Jack, Philip Robbins & and Andreas Roepstorff, The Genuine Problem of Consciousness.
    Those who are optimistic about the prospects of a science of consciousness, and those who believe that it lies beyond the reach of standard scientific methods, have something in common: both groups view consciousness as posing a special challenge for science. In this paper, we take a close look at the nature of this challenge. We show that popular conceptions of the problem of consciousness, epitomized by David Chalmers’ formulation of the ‘hard problem’, can be best explained as a cognitive (...)
     
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  2. Philip Robbins (2013). Modularity and Mental Architecture. WIREs Cognitive Science 4 (6):641-648.
     
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  3. Wesley Buckwalter, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, Chris Weigel & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2012). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online (1):81-92.
    Bibliography of works in experimental philosophy.
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  4. Anthony I. Jack & Philip Robbins (2012). The Phenomenal Stance Revisited. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):383-403.
    In this article, we present evidence of a bidirectional coupling between moral concern and the attribution of properties and states that are associated with experience (e.g., conscious awareness, feelings). This coupling is also shown to be stronger with experience than for the attribution of properties and states more closely associated with agency (e.g., free will, thoughts). We report the results of four studies. In the first two studies, we vary the description of the mental capacities of a creature, and assess (...)
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  5. Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, Tamler Sommers & Shaun Nichols (2012). Experimental Philosophy. Annual Review of Psychology 63 (50):72-73.
    Experimental philosophy is a new interdisciplinary field that uses methods normally associated with psychology to investigate questions normally associated with philosophy. The present review focuses on research in experimental philosophy on four central questions. First, why is it that people's moral judgments appear to influence their intuitions about seemingly nonmoral questions? Second, do people think that moral questions have objective answers, or do they see morality as fundamentally relative? Third, do people believe in free will, and do they see free (...)
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  6. Philip Robbins (2009). Guilt by Dissociation: Why Mindreading May Not Be Prior to Metacognition After All. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):159-160.
    Carruthers argues that there is no developmental or clinical evidence that metacognition is dissociable from mindreading, and hence there is no reason to think that metacognition is prior to mindreading. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that these conclusions are premature at best.
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  7. Philip Robbins, Modularity of Mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  8. Philip Robbins & Murat Aydede (2009). A Short Primer on Situated Cognition. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge. 3--10.
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  9. Philip Robbins (2008). Consciousness and the Social Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2):15-23.
  10. Philip Robbins (2008). Minimalism and Modularity. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford University Press. 303--319.
  11. Philip Robbins (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Ins and Outs of Introspection. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1100-1102.
    Philosophical interest in introspection has a long and storied history, but only recently – with the 'scientific turn' in philosophy of mind – have philosophers sought to ground their accounts of introspection in psychological data. In particular, there is growing awareness of how evidence from clinical and developmental psychology might be brought to bear on long-standing debates about the architecture of introspection, especially in the form of apparent dissociations between introspection and third-person mental-state attribution. It is less often noticed that (...)
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  12. Philip Robbins (2006). The Ins and Outs of Introspection. Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.
  13. Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2006). An Unconstrained Mind: Explaining Belief in the Afterlife. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):484-484.
    Bering contends that belief in the afterlife is explained by the simulation constraint hypothesis: the claim that we cannot imagine what it is like to be dead. This explanation suffers from some difficulties. First, it implies the existence of a corresponding belief in the “beforelife.” Second, a simpler explanation will suffice. Rather than appeal to constraints on our thoughts about death, we suggest that belief in the afterlife can be better explained by the lack of such constraints.
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  14. Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2006). The Phenomenal Stance. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85.
    Cognitive science is shamelessly materialistic. It maintains that human beings are nothing more than complex physical systems, ultimately and completely explicable in mechanistic terms. But this conception of humanity does not ?t well with common sense. To think of the creatures we spend much of our day loving, hating, admiring, resenting, comparing ourselves to, trying to understand, blaming, and thanking -- to think of them as mere mechanisms seems at best counterintuitive and unhelpful. More often it may strike us as (...)
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  15. Pascal Boyer, Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2005). Varieties of Self-Systems Worth Having. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.
  16. Philip Robbins (2005). Systematicity. In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. 12--440.
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  17. Philip Robbins (2005). The Myth of Reverse Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 125 (2):251 - 275.
    In the context of debates about what form a theory of meaning should take, it is sometimes claimed that one cannot understand an intersective modifier-head construction (e.g., ‘pet fish’) without understanding its lexical parts. Neo-Russellians like Fodor and Lepore contend that non-denotationalist theories of meaning, such as prototype theory and theory theory, cannot explain why this is so, because they cannot provide for the ‘reverse compositional’ character of meaning. I argue that reverse compositionality is a red herring in these debates. (...)
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  18. Anthony I. Jack & Philip Robbins (2004). The Illusory Triumph of Machine Over Mind: Wegner's Eliminativism and the Real Promise of Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):665-666.
    Wegner's thesis that the experience of will is an illusion is not just wrong, it is an impediment to progress in psychology. We discuss two readings of Wegner's thesis and find that neither can motivate his larger conclusion. Wegner thinks science requires us to dismiss our experiences. Its real promise is to help us to make better sense of them.
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  19. Philip Robbins (2004). Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection. In Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (eds.), Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume 2. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 129-143.
  20. Philip Robbins (2004). To Structure, or Not to Structure? Synthese 139 (1):55-80.
    Some accounts of mental content represent the objects of belief as structured, using entities that formally resemble the sentences used to express and report attitudes in natural language; others adopt a relatively unstructured approach, typically using sets or functions. Currently popular variants of the latter include classical and neo-classical propositionalism, which represent belief contents as sets of possible worlds and sets of centered possible worlds, respectively; and property self-ascriptionism, which employs sets of possible individuals. I argue against their contemporary proponents (...)
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  21. Philip Robbins (2002). How to Blunt the Sword of Compositionality. Noûs 36 (2):313-334.
  22. Philip Robbins (2001). What Compositionality Still Can Do. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):328-336.
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  23. Philip Robbins (1998). Will the Real Philosopher Behind the Last Logicist Please Stand Up? Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):265-287.
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  24. Michael Banner Philip Clayton, Wentzel van Huyssteen, Philip Clayton J. Wesley Robbins & Nancey Murphy Wentzel van Huyssteen (1992). Religion and Science Vol. 27, No. 2, June 1992. Zygon 27:129.
     
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