4 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Philip Swenson (University of California, Riverside)
  1. Philip Swenson (forthcoming). A Challenge for Frankfurt-Style Compatibilists. Philosophical Studies:1-7.
    The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) tells us that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) provide an extremely influential challenge to the PAP (Frankfurt, J Philos 66:829–839, 1969). And Frankfurt-style compatibilists are motivated to accept compatibilism about responsibility and determinism in part due to FSCs. But there is a significant tension between our judgments about responsibility in FSCs and our judgments about responsibility in certain omissions cases. This tension (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. D. Justin Coates & Philip Swenson (2013). Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):629-645.
    Ordinarily, we take moral responsibility to come in degrees. Despite this commonplace, theories of moral responsibility have focused on the minimum threshold conditions under which agents are morally responsible. But this cannot account for our practices of holding agents to be more or less responsible. In this paper we remedy this omission. More specifically, we extend an account of reasons-responsiveness due to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza according to which an agent is morally responsible only if she is appropriately (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Brian Kierland & Philip Swenson (2013). Ability-Based Objections to No-Best-World Arguments. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):669-683.
    In the space of possible worlds, there might be a best possible world (a uniquely best world or a world tied for best with some other worlds). Or, instead, for every possible world, there might be a better possible world. Suppose that the latter is true, i.e., that there is no best world. Many have thought that there is then an argument against the existence of God, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being; we will call (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Justin P. Mcbrayer & Philip Swenson (2012). Scepticism About the Argument From Divine Hiddenness. Religious Studies 48 (2):129 - 150.
    Some philosophers have argued that the paucity of evidence for theism — along with basic assumptions about God's nature — is ipso facto evidence for atheism. The resulting argument has come to be known as the argument from divine hiddenness. Theists have challenged both the major and minor premises of the argument by offering defences. However, all of the major, contemporary defences are failures. What unites these failures is instructive: each is implausible given other commitments shared by everyone in the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation