Arguments about distributive justice often take place around two ideas. One is that good should be distributed equally. The other is that how people fare in life should depend on what they are responsible for. The author asks what draws us to these two ideas and examines recent attempts by egalitarian thinkers to bring them together in a single distributive ideal. Underlying this ideal is the egalitarian intuition - the intuition that it is objectionable for some to be worse off (...) than others through no fault of their own. in a wide-ranging discussion, Lake tests that intuition from a variety of perspectives and points to the gaps in our current thinking about quality and individual responsibility. (shrink)
This article is a response to some of Philip Stratton-Lake’s criticisms of an earlier paper of mine in this journal, on the so-called ‘buck-passing’ account of goodness. Some elucidation is offered of the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem and of T. M. Scanlon’s view, and the question is raised of the role of goodness in the view outlined by Stratton-Lake.
Fear of public disclosure that will add to the humiliation of rape or other sexual assault is real for victims. In discussing this issue, cases for concealment and for disclosure are examined and suggestions are made for determining whether to publish names of victims.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE\nPROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS. THE METHOD USED INVOLVES\nINTRODUCING THREE NEW TERMS, EACH OF WHICH IN SOME WAYS\nRESEMBLES IN MEANING, AND IN SOME WAYS DIFFERS FROM IN\nMEANING, THE ORDINARY TERM "EXISTS." WHEN THE PROBLEM OF\nOTHER MINDS IS RESTATED WITH THESE NEW TERMS, THERE IS A\nPRONOUNCED INCREASE IN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE DISCUSSION,\nBUT THERE IS ALSO A PRONOUNCED DECREASE IN THE VAGUENESS OF\nTHE DISCUSSION. A COMPLETE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF OTHER\nMINDS IS (...) OFFERED. A VERSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE\nRELATIVITY OF TIME, WHICH IS EVEN MORE DRASTIC THAN\nEINSTEIN'S VERSION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RELATIVITY OF\nTIME, IS NEEDED IN THE SOLUTION. (shrink)
Principle monists believe that our moral duties, such as fidelity and non-maleficence, can be justified in terms of one basic moral principle. Principle pluralists disagree, some suggesting that only an excessive taste for simplicity or a desire to mimic natural science could lead one to endorse monism. In Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000), Brad Hooker defends a monist theory, employing the method of reflective equilibrium to unify the moral duties under a version of rule consequentialism. Hooker's arguments have drawn (...) powerful criticisms from pluralists such as Alan Thomas, Phillip Montague and Philip Stratton-Lake. Against these critics, I argue that Hooker's monism enjoys certain practical advantages associated with the simplicity of a single basic principle. These advantages are often overlooked because they appear primarily in cases of second-order deliberation, in which one must decide whether our basic moral duties support a certain derivative duty. I argue that these advantages of monism over pluralism are analogous to the advantages that generalists claim over moral particularism. Because pluralists are generalists, I conclude that they are in an awkward dialectical position to dismiss Hooker's monism for the reasons they usually offer. (shrink)
Ethical Intuitionism was the dominant moral theory in Britain for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century. However, during the middle decades of the twentieth century ethical intuitionism came to be regarded as utterly untenable. It was thought to be either empty, or metaphysically and epistemologically extravagant, or both. This hostility led to a neglect of the central intuitionist texts, and encouraged the growth of a caricature of intuitionism that could easily be rejected (...) before moving on to 'more serious' philosophical theories. More recently, however, this hostility towards ethical intuitionism has subsided. A wide range of moral philosophers, from Aristotelians, to rule-consequentialists, to expressivists, Kantians, and deontologists, are beginning to look to the ethical intuitionists' work as a positive resource. It is, therefore, a good time to get clear on what it was that intuitionists said, and re-evaluate their contribution to our understanding of morality. This volume is the first serious engagement with ethical intuitionism in the light of more recent developments in ethical theory. It contains essays by eminent moral philosophers working in very different traditions whose aim is to clarify and assess ethical intuitionism. Issues addressed include whether the plurality of basic principles intuitionists adhere to can be grounded in some more fundamental principle; the autonomy of ethics and self-evidence; moral realism and internalism; and the open question argument and naturalism. (shrink)
Kant, Duty and Moral Worth tackles the debate over whether or not Kant said moral actions have worth only if they are carried out from duty or whether actions carried out from mixed motives can be good. Stratton-Lake offers a unique account of acting from duty which utilizes the distinction between primary and secondary motives. He maintains that moral law should not be understood as normative moral reason but as playing a transcendental role. Thus, a Kantian account of moral (...) worth is one where the virtuous agent is one who is responsive to concrete particular considerations while preserving an essential role for universal moral priniciples. (shrink)
The Council for Education in World Citizenship has been working with Kingston University and the UK National Commission for UNESCO, taking advantage of global information technology developments in order to build new programmes for global citizenship education. The paper reports on practical experience, inviting new network partners. The IST-Africa 2007 conference provided an opportunity to build on these foundations, with initiatives in primary, secondary, further, adult and higher education, and continuing professional development for teachers.
Psychoanalysis has long cited poetry as the expressive vehicle for unconscious production. This article addresses the sexual politics of psychoanalysis's conjoining of poetry and the "feminine." The argument of this text is that the coupling of the "feminine" and the poetic in Lacanian discourse is a metaphorical double cross which most often leaves "woman" at a loss for words.
This paper provides a case study of an unique initiative in corporate (SME) social responsibility which is too often overlooked in the academic study of “socialresponsibility of business in society” This case focuses on three specific points, 1) the role of an SME in social responsibility, 2) the role of a non-business trained entrepreneur and 3) the adaptation of social responsibility to a new and different socio-economic culture. This case presents the hypothesis that “a good socially responsible initiative provides an (...) excellent insurance policy for the health of a business venture in a new culture internationally. (shrink)
The greatest change, once it is accomplished, is simply the outcome of a vast series of adaptations and responsive accommodations, each to its own particular situation.”1It is in no way controversial to say that the U.S. health care system is failing to serve many of its citizens satisfactorily. While it is certainly true that most U.S. citizens are dissatisfied with our current health care system, creating agreement through open dialogue on what, more precisely, is wrong with the system, as well (...) as on what we should do to fix the system, seems to many to be impossibly optimistic. Leonard Fleck, professor of philosophy and medical ethics at Michigan State University and author of Just Caring: The Ethical .. (shrink)
This piece, framed by sight and sound, is an (un)written essay on repetition, memory, rhythm, and marks made by the passage of time. The authorship condenses at once in the music, the initial creation, and then in the movement of the image, created with the memory of music spooling out in the silence of a train through the Rhône-Alpes. The result, an attempt— une tentative —a temptation, marks moments of feeling kept aloft through seeing what was once heard and marking (...) the passage of thought through memory's repetition. Do we remember what we listened to when we see what we saw when we listened? What remains calls back. Are you still there? Responding to thoughts, memories arise with rhythmic pulses in a mute endeavor. The voice we answer evaporates as we turn to greet it. We can replay but not repeat. We repeat without reporting, calling up a memory— une histoire —repeatedly, searching the scene. Each time new evidence, new non-evidence, new absence. Sight and sound. A parting with no meeting. Tentatively embracing the past, a passing memory in the present, big with its future. Its flowing rhythm that we take apart and keep a part of imparts a reminiscence which shapes as it passes, always departing. We think directly as the activity of memory marks the tempo. Interrupting our thoughts in their repetition, memory ignites with the slightest sound, smell, touch. A synaptic explosion which reshapes our memory of how we once thought, if we thought. Perhaps we only felt, but reflection impresses it upon present thought. Once, we have thought—or at least that is how I remember it, how you told me about it. (shrink)