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Search results for 'Philosophers Attitudes' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Peter Ehlen (1972). The New Sovietphilosophical Encyclopedia. I New Attitudes of Soviet Philosophers Toward Theology. Studies in East European Thought 12 (4):381-390.score: 72.0
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  2. Julia Ching & Willard Gurdon Oxtoby (eds.) (1992). Discovering China: European Interpretations in the Enlightenment. University of Rochester Press.score: 60.0
  3. Ellen Kennedy & Susan Mendus (eds.) (1987). Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche. St. Martin's Press.score: 60.0
  4. Christopher Wise (2009). Derrida, Africa, and the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 60.0
    Saying "yes" to Africa -- Deconstruction of the veil -- Arab-Jew -- Deconstruction and Zionism -- The figure of Jerusalem -- Conjuration -- The secular trace -- The double gesture -- Realism without realism -- The wordless "yes" -- Deconstruction and the African trace.
     
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  5. Jacques Rancière (2012). The Intellectual and His People. Verso.score: 50.0
    The people's theatre : a long drawn-out affair -- The cultural historic compromise -- The philosopher's tale : intellectuals and the trajectory of Gauchisme -- Joan of Arc in the Gulag -- The inconceivable revolution -- Factory nostalgia (notes on an article and various books) -- The ethics of sociology.
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  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Cambridge University Press.score: 46.0
    Explaining Attitudes offers a timely and important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of (...)
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  7. Walter Ott (2002). Propositional Attitudes in Modern Philosophy. Dialogue 41 (03):551-.score: 42.0
    Philosophers of the modern period are often presented as having made an elementary error: that of confounding the atttitude one adopts toward a proposition with its content. By examining the works of Locke and the Port-Royalians, I show that this accusation is ill-founded and that Locke, in particular, has the resources to construct a theory of propositional attitudes.
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  8. Arthur B. Cody (1997). Consciousness: Of David Chalmers and Other Philosophers of Mind. Inquiry 40 (4):379 – 405.score: 42.0
    On reading David Chalmers's book, The Conscious Mind (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), one is struck by the author's efforts to meet the difficulties and obscurities in understanding the human mind, as indeed most other philosophers have, by hazarding theories. Such undertakings rest on two broad, usually unexamined, assumptions. One is that we have direct access to our conscious minds such that pronouncements about it and its contents are descriptive. The other is that our actions have causal explanations (...)
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  9. Nina E. Cohen, Frans W. A. Brom & Elsbeth N. Stassen (2009). Fundamental Moral Attitudes to Animals and Their Role in Judgment: An Empirical Model to Describe Fundamental Moral Attitudes to Animals and Their Role in Judgment on the Culling of Healthy Animals During an Animal Disease Epidemic. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (4):341-359.score: 42.0
    In this paper, we present and defend the theoretical framework of an empirical model to describe people’s fundamental moral attitudes (FMAs) to animals, the stratification of FMAs in society and the role of FMAs in judgment on the culling of healthy animals in an animal disease epidemic. We used philosophical animal ethics theories to understand the moral basis of FMA convictions. Moreover, these theories provide us with a moral language for communication between animal ethics, FMAs, and public debates. We (...)
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  10. Jeffrey C. King (2013). On Fineness of Grain. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):763-781.score: 38.0
    A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose. Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated. An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objections to the effect (...)
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  11. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1988). How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.score: 38.0
    Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps (...)
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  12. Mark Schroeder (2010). Value and the Right Kind of Reason. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.score: 36.0
    Fitting Attitudes accounts of value analogize or equate being good with being desirable, on the premise that ‘desirable’ means not, ‘able to be desired’, as Mill has been accused of mistakenly assuming, but ‘ought to be desired’, or something similar. The appeal of this idea is visible in the critical reaction to Mill, which generally goes along with his equation of ‘good’ with ‘desirable’ and only balks at the second step, and it crosses broad boundaries in terms of (...)’ other commitments. For example, Fitting Attitudes accounts play a central role both in T.M. Scanlon’s [1998] case against teleology, and in Michael Smith [2003], [unpublished] and Doug Portmore’s [2007] cases for it. And of course they have a long and distinguished history. (shrink)
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  13. Mark Alfano (2009). A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3).score: 36.0
    In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” and (...)
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  14. Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.) (forthcoming). Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.score: 36.0
    Ever since Frege, propositions have played a central role in philosophy of language. Propositions are generally conceived as abstract objects that have truth conditions essentially and fulfill both the role of the meaning of sentences and of the objects or content of propositional attitudes. More recently, the abstract conception of propositions has given rise to serious dissatisfaction among a number of philosophers, who have instead proposed a conception of propositional content based on cognitive acts (Hanks, Moltmann, Soames). This (...)
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  15. Paul Hurley (2007). Desire, Judgment, and Reason: Exploring the Path Not Taken. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 11 (4):437 - 463.score: 36.0
    At the outset of The Possibility of Altruism Thomas Nagel charts two paths out of the fundamental dilemma confronting metaethics. The first path rejects the claim that a persuasive account of the motivational backing of ethical judgments must involve an agent’s desires. But it is the second path, a path that Nagel charts but does not himself take, that is the focus of this essay. This path retains the standard account, upon which all motivation involves desire, but denies that desires (...)
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  16. Michelle Ciurria (2014). Moral Responsibility: Justifying Strawson and the Excuse of Peculiarly Unfortunate Formative Circumstances. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):545-557.score: 36.0
    P.F. Strawson’s theory of moral responsibility remains eminently influential. However, moral philosophers such as G. Watson and T.M. Scanlon have called into question it explanatory basis, which grounds moral responsibility in human nature and interpersonal relationships. They demand a deeper normative explanation for when it is appropriate to modify or mollify the reactive attitudes. In this paper, following A. Sneddon, I argue that the best interpretation of Strawson is an externalistic one which construes moral responsibility as an interpersonal (...)
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  17. Michael Morreau & Sarit Kraus (1998). Syntactical Treatments of Propositional Attitudes. Artificial Intelligence 106 (1):161-177.score: 36.0
    Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes are attractive to artificial intelligence researchers. But results of Montague (1974) and Thomason (1980) seem to show that syntactical treatments are not viable. They show that if representation languages are sufficiently expressive, then axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief give rise to paradox. Des Rivières and Levesque (1988) characterize a class of sentences within which these schemes can safely be instantiated. These sentences do not quantify over the propositional objects of knowledge and belief. We (...)
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  18. Benjamin Vilhauer (2013). The People Problem. In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books. 141.score: 36.0
    One reason that many philosophers are reluctant to seriously contemplate the possibility that we lack free will seems to be the view that we must believe we have free will if we are to regard each other as persons in the morally deep sense—the sense that involves deontological notions such as human rights. In the contemporary literature, this view is often informed by P.F. Strawson's view that to treat human beings as having free will is to respond to them (...)
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  19. Arthur E. Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.score: 34.0
    This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
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  20. Joshua Rust & Eric Schwitzgebel (2013). Ethicists' and Nonethicists' Responsiveness to Student E‐Mails: Relationships Among Expressed Normative Attitude, Self‐Described Behavior, and Empirically Observed Behavior. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):350-371.score: 34.0
    Do professional ethicists behave any morally better than other professors do? Do they show any greater consistency between their normative attitudes and their behavior? In response to a survey question, a large majority of professors (83 percent of ethicists, 83 percent of nonethicist philosophers, and 85 percent of nonphilosophers) expressed the view that “not consistently responding to student e-mails” is morally bad. A similarly large majority of professors claimed to respond to at least 95 percent of student e-mails. (...)
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  21. Tamler Sommers (2007). The Objective Attitude. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):321–341.score: 32.0
    I aim to alleviate the pessimism with which some philosophers regard the 'objective attitude', thereby removing a particular obstacle which P.F. Strawson and others have placed in the way of more widespread scepticism about moral responsibility. First, I describe what I consider the objective attitude to be, and then address concerns about this raised by Susan Wolf. Next, I argue that aspects of certain attitudes commonly thought to be opposed to the objective attitude are in fact compatible with (...)
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  22. Thomas Kelly (2002). The Rationality of Belief and Other Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.score: 32.0
    In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we (...)
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  23. Eric Schwitzgebel & Joshua Rust (2013). The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: Relationships Among Self-Reported Behavior, Expressed Normative Attitude, and Directly Observed Behavior. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-35.score: 32.0
    Do philosophy professors specializing in ethics behave, on average, any morally better than do other professors? If not, do they at least behave more consistently with their expressed values? These questions have never been systematically studied. We examine the self-reported moral attitudes and moral behavior of 198 ethics professors, 208 non-ethicist philosophers, and 167 professors in departments other than philosophy on eight moral issues: academic society membership, voting, staying in touch with one's mother, vegetarianism, organ and blood donation, (...)
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  24. Moira De Iaco (2013). Wittgenstein and the Liberating Word. Aesthetics Remarks about Philosophical Attitude. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (1):255-261.score: 32.0
    As philosophers we look-through a phenomenon and we see as it appears. The philosopher feels the sensation of dissatisfaction and lives in revolt against an instinctive dissatisfaction with the language. We see as the words are played, because they are source of confusion. He searches the liberating word, which liberates us from dissatisfaction or mental cramps: it subverts an idea, renews a thought, creates new knowledge and opens to the difference. The choice of words, based on the listening to (...)
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  25. Frank M. Oppenheim (2001). How Did William James and Josiah Royce Differ in Their Philosophical Temperaments and Styles? Journal of Philosophical Research 26:547-560.score: 32.0
    The present article examines the philosophical temperaments of James and Royce, as well as the kind and development of their philosophical styles. After surveying their stances toward the universe, attitudes toward the more, and their openness to other philosophers’ ideas and critiques, this article focuses on the streams of philosophical thought from which James and Royce chose to “drink”-British, German, Asian, and the work of logicians. Some evidence is drawn from their correspondence and places of study. Their philosophical (...)
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  26. Joshua Gert (2010). Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.score: 32.0
    Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even for secondary qualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such descriptive properties as (...)
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  27. Jeffrey Braithwaite, Mary T. Westbrook & Rick A. Iedema (2005). Giving Voice to Health Professionals' Attitudes About Their Clinical Service Structures in Theoretical Context. Health Care Analysis 13 (4):315-335.score: 32.0
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  28. Barbara Weber (2009). (Germany) Towards a Philosophical Attitude or How to Teach Intellectual Virtues: A Dialogue with Pierre Hadot's. In Eva Marsal, Takara Dobashi & Barbara Weber (eds.), Children Philosophize Worldwide: Theoretical and Practical Concepts. Peter Lang. 9--387.score: 32.0
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  29. Vida Pavesich (2008). Hans Blumenberg's Philosophical Anthropology: After Heidegger and Cassirer. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (3):pp. 421-448.score: 30.0
    In this paper, I situate Hans Blumenberg historically and conceptually in relation to a subtheme in the famous debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer at Davos, Switzerland in 1929. The subtheme concerns Heidegger’s and Cassirer’s divergent attitudes toward philosophical anthropology as it relates to the starting points and goals of philosophy. I then reconstruct Blumenberg’s anthropology, which involves reconceptualizing Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms in relation to Heidegger’s objections to the philosophical anthropology of his day (e.g., Max Scheler, (...)
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  30. Paul E. Griffiths (1989). The Degeneration of the Cognitive Theory of Emotions. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):297-313.score: 30.0
    The type of cognitive theory of emotion traditionally espoused by philosophers of mind makes two central claims. First, that the occurrence of propositional attitudes is essential to the occurrence of emotions. Second, that the identity of a particular emotional state depends upon the propositional attitudes that it involves. In this paper I try to show that there is little hope of developing a theory of emotion which makes these claims true. I examine the underlying defects of the (...)
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  31. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2012/2011). The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.score: 30.0
    The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds (...)
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  32. Steve Fuller, The Normative Turn - Counterfactuals and a Philosophical Historiography of Science.score: 30.0
    Counterfactual reasoning is broadly implicated in causal claims made by historians. However, this point is more generally recognized and accepted by economic historians than historians of science. A good site for examining alternative appeals to counterfactuals is to consider "what if" the Scientific Revolution had not occurred in seventeenth-century Europe. Two alternative interpretations are analyzed: that the revolution would eventually have happened somewhere else ("overdeterminism") or that the revolution would not have happened at all ("underdeterminism"). Broadly speaking, these two interpretations (...)
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  33. Mark Richard (2013). Context and the Attitudes. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    The collection addresses a range of topics in philosophical semantics and philosophy of mind, and is accompanied by a new Introduction which discusses attitudes realized by dispositions and other non-linguistic cognitive structures.
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  34. Brian D. Earp (2013). Criticising Religious Practices. The Philosophers' Magazine 63:15-17.score: 30.0
    In 2012, a German court ruled that religious circumcision of male minors constitutes criminal bodily assault. Muslim and Jewish groups responded with outrage, with some commentators pegging the ruling to Islamophobic and anti-Semitic motivations. In doing so, these commentators failed to engage with any of the legal and ethical arguments actually given by the court in its landmark decision. In this brief commentary, I argue that a firm distinction must be drawn between criticisms of religious practices that stem from irrational (...)
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  35. W. R. Sorley (1910). The Philosophical Attitude. International Journal of Ethics 20 (2):152-168.score: 30.0
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  36. Christopher Hookway (1997). Logical Principles and Philosophical Attitudes: Peirce's Response to James's Pragmatism. In Ruth Anna Putnam (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to William James. Cambridge University Press. 145--65.score: 30.0
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  37. Fred Kersten (forthcoming). Remarks on the Philosophical Attitude in Gurwitsch's Philosophy. Social Research.score: 30.0
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  38. Zygmunt Pucko (2006). Black Humour as an Expression of Philosophical Attitude Towards Death in Philosophy of Medicine and the Art of Healing Perspective. Archeus. Studia Z Bioetyki I Antropologii Filozoficznej 7:69-80.score: 30.0
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  39. T. L. S. Sprigge (1997). Logical Principles and Philosophical Attitudes: Peirce's Response to James' Pragmatism. In Ruth Anna Putnam (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to William James. Cambridge University Press. 125--144.score: 30.0
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  40. Katie McShane (2013). Neosentimentalism and the Valence of Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):747-765.score: 28.0
    Neosentimentalist accounts of value need an explanation of which of the sentiments they discuss are pro-attitudes, which attitudes are con-attitudes, and why. I argue that this project has long been neglected in the philosophical literature, even by those who make extensive use of the distinction between pro- and con-attitudes. Using the attitudes of awe and respect as exemplars, I argue that it is not at all clear what if anything makes these attitudes pro-attitudes. (...)
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  41. Jonathan Webber (forthcoming). Instilling Virtue. In Alberto Masala & Jonathan Webber (eds.), From Personality to Virtue.score: 28.0
    Two debates in contemporary philosophical moral psychology have so far been conducted almost entirely in isolation from one another despite their structural similarity. One is the debate over the importance for virtue ethics of the results of situational manipulation experiments in social psychology. The other is the debate over the ethical implications of experiments that reveal gender and race biases in social cognition. In both cases, the ethical problem posed cannot be identified without first clarifying the cognitive structures underlying the (...)
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  42. Michael Moriarty (2006). Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves: Early Modern French Thought Ii. Oxford University Press.score: 28.0
    From the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, French writing is especially concerned with analyzing human nature. The ancient ethical vision of man's nature and goal (we achieve fulfillment by living our lives according to reason, the highest and noblest element of our nature) survives, even, to some extent, in Descartes. But it is put into question especially by the revival of St. Augustine's thought, which focuses on the contradictions and disorders of human desires and aspirations. Analyses of behavior (...)
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  43. Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). Advantages of Propositionalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 26.0
    Propositionalism is the view that the contents of intentional attitudes have a propositional structure. Objectualism opposes propositionalism in allowing the contents of these attitudes to be ordinary objects or properties. Philosophers including Talbot Brewer, Paul Thagard, Michelle Montague, and Alex Grzankowski attack propositionalism about such attitudes as desire, liking, and fearing. This paper defends propositionalism, mainly on grounds that it better supports psychological explanations.
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  44. Angela M. Smith (2008). Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.score: 26.0
    Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar as they attempt (...)
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  45. Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.score: 26.0
    Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that (...)
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  46. Sean Crawford (2014). Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes? Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.score: 26.0
    Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as (...)
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  47. Nathan Hanna (2009). The Passions of Punishment. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):232-250.score: 26.0
    I criticize an increasingly popular set of arguments for the justifiability of punishment. Some philosophers try to justify punishment by appealing to what Peter Strawson calls the reactive attitudes – emotions like resentment, indignation, remorse and guilt. These arguments fail. The view that these emotions commit us to punishment rests on unsophisticated views of punishment and of these emotions and their associated behaviors. I offer more sophisticated accounts of punishment, of these emotions and of their associated behaviors that (...)
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  48. Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.score: 26.0
    Abstract: Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or 'psychopathic,' agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents can (...)
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  49. Richard Double (1997). Misdirection on the Free Will Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.score: 26.0
    The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that (...) are correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question. (shrink)
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  50. Shaun Nichols (2007). After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):405-428.score: 26.0
    From the first time I encountered the problem of free will in college, it struck me that a clear-eyed view of free will and moral responsibility demanded some form of nihilism. Libertarianism seemed delusional, and compatibilism seemed in bad faith. Hence I threw my lot in with philosophers like Paul d’Holbach, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom who conclude that no one is truly moral responsible. But after two decades of self- identifying as a nihilist, it occurred to me that (...)
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