Search results for 'Physical Object' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ned Markosian, Physical Object.
    Physical objects are the most familiar of all objects, and yet the concept of a physical object remains elusive. Any six-year-old can give you a dozen examples of physical objects, and most people with at least one undergraduate course in philosophy can also give examples of non-physical objects. But if asked to produce a definition of ‘physical object’ that adequately captures the distinction between the physical and the nonphysical, the average person can (...)
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  2. Eli Hirsch (2005). Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):67–97.
    Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and another community that makes Lewis's (...)
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  3.  40
    Irving Block (1960). Aristotle and the Physical Object. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (1):93-101.
    HOW WE BECOME AWARE OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS OVER AND ABOVE THE PERCEPTUAL ACTS OF SEEING COLOR, SHAPES AND HEARING SOUNDS, ETC., IS A QUESTION THAT HAS OCCUPIED MANY CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. DID ARISTOTLE EVER FACE THIS PROBLEM, AND IF HE DID, HOW DID HE DEAL WITH IT? THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THIS QUESTION AND CONCLUDES THAT THE ANSWER TO IT CAN BE FOUND "DE INSOMNIAS" IN ARISTOTLE'S DISCUSSION OF DREAMS AND ILLUSIONS. THERE IS AN ACT AFFIRMATION ("PHESIN") CARRIED OUT (...)
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  4.  7
    Artur Rojszczak (1999). Why Should a Physical Object Take on the Role of Truth-Bearer? Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 6:115-125.
    The topic of this paper I would like to divide into two other questions than that of its title. The first question is the historical one and sounds like this: Why had Tarski chosen physical objects as truth-bearers in his original work from 1933 about truth in formalized languages?1 This historical problem may be still of importance not only from a historical point of view. Tarski’s truth-definition is still seen as one of undeniable importance for any contemporary philosophical analysis (...)
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  5.  58
    Fei Xu (1997). From Lot's Wife to a Pillar of Salt: Evidence That Physical Object is a Sortal Concept. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):365–392.
  6.  63
    Michael Ayers (1997). Is Physical Object a Sortal Concept? A Reply to Xu. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):393–405.
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  7.  29
    G. A. Johnston (1928). Sensations, Sense-Data, Physical Object and Reality. The Monist 38 (3):350-372.
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  8.  20
    Daniel Cory (1934). The Origin in Experience of the Notion of a Physical Object. Analysis 1 (4):61 - 64.
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  9.  25
    David L. Miller (1947). The Nature of the Physical Object. Journal of Philosophy 44 (13):352-359.
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  10.  5
    Arkadiy Lipkin (2008). "Object Theoretic-Operational" View of Physical Knowledge. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:109-116.
    The "object theoretic operational view" suggests a new structure of physical knowledge. This view takes branches of physics as basic units. Its main concepts are primary (PIO) and secondary (SIO) ideal objects with the explicit definition of SIO through PIO and the implicit definition of PIOs within appropriate systems of statements, called a "nucleus of a branch of physics" (NBP). Within an NBP (which has a definite structure) the focus shifts from discovering "laws of nature" to definition of (...)
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  11.  2
    Fei Xu (1997). From Lot's Wife to a Pillar of Salt: Evidence That Physical Object is a Sortal Concept. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):365-392.
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  12.  1
    Thomas W. Smythe, Spatio-Temporal Continuity and Physical Object Identity.
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  13. D. Cory (1933). Origin in Experience of the Notion of a Physical Object. Analysis 1:61.
     
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  14. François Dagognet (2009). Pharmacology as a Physical Object. In A. Brenner & J. Gayon (eds.), French Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Research in France. Springer 276--189.
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  15. Richard Glauser (2007). The Problem of the Unity of a Physical Object in Berkeley. In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), Reexamining Berkeley's Philosophy.
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  16.  1
    Susumu Sugiyama (2009). What is the Object of Physical Education in the Higher Education? Journal of the Philosophy of Sport and Physical Education 31 (2):87-93.
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  17.  4
    Yves R. Simon (1992). Some Remarks on the Object of Physical Knowledge. International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (3):275-283.
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  18.  36
    Emmett L. Holman (1979). Is the Physical World Colourless? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (December):295-304.
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  19.  44
    E. E. Dawson (1961). Sense Experience and Physical Objects. Theoria 27 (2):49-57.
  20.  15
    Herb Yarvin (1978). Criteria of the Physical. Metaphilosophy 9 (April):122-132.
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  21. G. N. Mathrani (1942). Do We Perceive Physical Objects? Philosophical Quarterly (India) 18 (October):175-182.
     
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  22. Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token (...)
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  23.  7
    J. R. S. Wilson (1972). Emotion and Object. Cambridge University Press.
    A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural (...)
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  24.  36
    Justin C. B. Gosling (1965). Emotion and Object. Philosophical Review 74 (October):486-503.
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  25.  41
    Don Locke (1976). Zombies, Schizophrenics, and Purely Physical Objects. Mind 83 (January):97-99.
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  26.  11
    John L. Roberts (1947). Human Minds and Physical Objects. Journal of Philosophy 44 (July):434-441.
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  27.  68
    Thomas Hofweber (2005). Supervenience and Object-Dependent Properties. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):5-32.
    I argue that the semantic thesis of direct reference and the meta- physical thesis of the supervenience of the non-physical on the physical cannot both be true. The argument first develops a necessary condition for supervenience, a so-called conditional locality requirement, which is then shown to be incompatible with some physical object having object dependent properties, which in turn is required for the thesis of direct reference to be true. We apply this argument to (...)
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  28. Daniel Stoljar (2001). Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-81.
    The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; a priori physicalism is false; if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false; on the object-based conception, it is plausible that (...)
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  29. Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
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  30. Nicholas Maxwell (1966). Physics and Common Sense. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311.
    In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...)
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  31. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo, Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. (...)
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  32. Chris Daly & David Liggins (2010). Do Object-Dependent Properties Threaten Physicalism? Journal of Philosophy 107 (11):610-614.
    Thomas Hofweber argues that the thesis of direct reference is incompatible with physicalism, the claim that the nonphysical supervenes on the physical. According to Hofweber, direct reference implies that some physical objects have object-dependent properties, such as being Jones’s brother, which depend on particular objects for their existence and identity. Hofweber contends that if some physical objects have object-dependent properties, then Local-Local Supervenience (the physicalist doctrine on which he concentrates) fails. In this note, we argue (...)
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  33.  43
    Shaun P. Vecera (2000). Toward a Biased Competition Account of Object-Based Segregation and Attention. Brain and Mind 1 (3):353-384.
    Because the visual system cannot process all of the objects, colors, and features present in a visual scene, visual attention allows some visual stimuli to be selected and processed over others. Most research on visual attention has focused on spatial or location-based attention, in which the locations occupied by stimuli are selected for further processing. Recent research, however, has demonstrated the importance of objects in organizing (or segregating) visual scenes and guiding attentional selection. Because of the long history of spatial (...)
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  34.  28
    H. H. Pattee (2013). Epistemic, Evolutionary, and Physical Conditions for Biological Information. Biosemiotics 6 (1):9-31.
    The necessary but not sufficient conditions for biological informational concepts like signs, symbols, memories, instructions, and messages are (1) an object or referent that the information is about, (2) a physical embodiment or vehicle that stands for what the information is about (the object), and (3) an interpreter or agent that separates the referent information from the vehicle’s material structure, and that establishes the stands-for relation. This separation is named the epistemic cut, and explaining clearly how the (...)
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  35. Nicholas Maxwell (1966). Physics and Common Sense. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311.
    In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...)
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  36.  62
    Sara Bernal (2005). Object Lessons: Spelke Principles and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312.
    There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal (...)
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  37. Ned Markosian (2000). What Are Physical Objects? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):375-395.
    The concept of a physical object has figured prominently in the history of philosophy, and is probably more important now than it has ever been before. Yet the question What are physical objects?, i.e., What is the correct analysis of the concept of a physical object?, has received surprisingly little attention. The purpose of this paper is to address this question. I consider several attempts at answering the question, and give my reasons for preferring one (...)
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  38. Vladimir Kuznetsov (2004). Representing Relations Between Physical Concepts. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2004 (37):105-135.
    The paper has three objectives: to expound a set-theoretical triplet model of concepts; to introduce some triplet relations (symbolic, logical, and mathematical formalization; equivalence, intersection, disjointness) between object concepts, and to instantiate them by relations between certain physical object concepts.
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  39. Wilfrid S. Sellars (1982). Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):83-114.
  40.  33
    Sajahan Miah (2006). Russell's Theory of Perception 1905-1919. New York: Continuum.
    This book focuses on Russell's work from 1905 to 1919, during which period Russell attempted a reductionist analysis of empirical knowledge.
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  41.  32
    J. R. Smythies (1956). Analysis Of Perception. London,: Routledge &Amp; K Paul,.
    Routledge is now re-issuing this prestigious series of 204 volumes originally published between 1910 and 1965.
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  42.  91
    Frank Jackson (1978). Perception. Philosophical Books 19 (May):49-56.
    Two Themes to the Course: a.) How are we to understand the contrast between direct and indirect or immediate and mediate perception? b.) Is there any cogent reason to think we don’t have sense experience of the world around us?
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  43.  75
    Winston H. F. Barnes (1945). The Myth of Sense-Data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45 (1):89-118.
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  44.  85
    J. R. Smythies (1962). On Space and Sense-Data: A Reply to Lord Brain. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (August):161-164.
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  45.  48
    Georges Dicker (1980). Perceptual Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel.
    INTRODUCTION This book is a systematic study of the problem of perception and knowledge. I intend to analyze the problem, to expound and criticize the most ...
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  46.  69
    Max Deutscher (1963). David Armstrong and Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):80-88.
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  47.  64
    A. C. Lloyd (1950). Empiricism, Sense Data and Scientific Languages. Mind 59 (January):57-70.
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  48. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1971). Perception. Anchor Books.
     
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  49.  34
    Martin Eshleman (1966). Aesthetic Experience, The Aesthetic Object and Criticism. The Monist 50 (2):281-298.
    The aesthetic experience, In husserl's language, Brackets or suspends the natural standpoint. Consciousness perceives the work of art not as an object of the factual world, But as a man-Made artifact to be enjoyed just for certain immediately experienced qualities. The work of art is neither a real physical entity nor a real psychical entity, But a purely intentional object, For which the physical object serves as a substratum. The critic must recreate the purely intentional (...)
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  50.  3
    Nicolas J. Bullot, The Direct Relational Model of Object Perception.
    This text aims at presenting a general characterization of the act of perceiving a particular object, in a framework in which perception is conceived of as a mental and cognitive faculty having specific functions that other faculties such as imagination and memory do not possess. I introduce the problem of determining the occurrence of singular perception of a physical object, as opposed to the occurrence of other mental states or attitudes. I propose that clarifying this occurrence problem (...)
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