Search results for 'Physical Object' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ned Markosian, Physical Object.score: 180.0
    Physical objects are the most familiar of all objects, and yet the concept of a physical object remains elusive. Any six-year-old can give you a dozen examples of physical objects, and most people with at least one undergraduate course in philosophy can also give examples of non-physical objects. But if asked to produce a definition of ‘physical object’ that adequately captures the distinction between the physical and the nonphysical, the average person can (...)
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  2. Eli Hirsch (2005). Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):67–97.score: 164.0
    Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and another community that makes Lewis's (...)
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  3. Irving Block (1960). Aristotle and the Physical Object. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (1):93-101.score: 164.0
    HOW WE BECOME AWARE OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS OVER AND ABOVE THE PERCEPTUAL ACTS OF SEEING COLOR, SHAPES AND HEARING SOUNDS, ETC., IS A QUESTION THAT HAS OCCUPIED MANY CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS OF SENSE-PERCEPTION. DID ARISTOTLE EVER FACE THIS PROBLEM, AND IF HE DID, HOW DID HE DEAL WITH IT? THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THIS QUESTION AND CONCLUDES THAT THE ANSWER TO IT CAN BE FOUND "DE INSOMNIAS" IN ARISTOTLE'S DISCUSSION OF DREAMS AND ILLUSIONS. THERE IS AN ACT AFFIRMATION ("PHESIN") CARRIED OUT (...)
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  4. Michael Ayers (1997). Is Physical Object a Sortal Concept? A Reply to Xu. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):393–405.score: 150.0
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  5. Fei Xu (1997). From Lot's Wife to a Pillar of Salt: Evidence That Physical Object is a Sortal Concept. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):365–392.score: 150.0
  6. David L. Miller (1947). The Nature of the Physical Object. Journal of Philosophy 44 (13):352-359.score: 150.0
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  7. Daniel Cory (1934). The Origin in Experience of the Notion of a Physical Object. Analysis 1 (4):61 - 64.score: 150.0
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  8. G. A. Johnston (1928). Sensations, Sense-Data, Physical Object and Reality. The Monist 38 (3):350-372.score: 150.0
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  9. François Dagognet (2009). Pharmacology as a Physical Object. In A. Brenner & J. Gayon (eds.), French Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Research in France. Springer. 276--189.score: 150.0
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  10. Richard Glauser (2007). The Problem of the Unity of a Physical Object in Berkeley. In Stephen H. Daniel (ed.), Reexamining Berkeley's Philosophy.score: 150.0
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  11. Arkadiy Lipkin (2008). "Object Theoretic-Operational" View of Physical Knowledge. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:109-116.score: 150.0
    The "object theoretic operational view" suggests a new structure of physical knowledge. This view takes branches of physics as basic units. Its main concepts are primary (PIO) and secondary (SIO) ideal objects with the explicit definition of SIO through PIO and the implicit definition of PIOs within appropriate systems of statements, called a "nucleus of a branch of physics" (NBP). Within an NBP (which has a definite structure) the focus shifts from discovering "laws of nature" to definition of (...)
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  12. E. E. Dawson (1961). Sense Experience and Physical Objects. Theoria 27 (2):49-57.score: 130.0
  13. G. N. Mathrani (1942). Do We Perceive Physical Objects? Philosophical Quarterly (India) 18 (October):175-182.score: 130.0
     
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  14. Susumu Sugiyama (2009). What is the Object of Physical Education in the Higher Education? Journal of the Philosophy of Sport and Physical Education 31 (2):87-93.score: 126.0
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  15. Yves R. Simon (1992). Some Remarks on the Object of Physical Knowledge. International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (3):275-283.score: 120.0
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  16. Don Locke (1976). Zombies, Schizophrenics, and Purely Physical Objects. Mind 83 (January):97-99.score: 118.0
  17. John L. Roberts (1947). Human Minds and Physical Objects. Journal of Philosophy 44 (July):434-441.score: 118.0
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  18. Timothy L. S. Sprigge (1966). The Common‐Sense View of Physical Objects. Inquiry 9 (1-4):339-373.score: 100.0
    When I perceive a physical object I am directly aware of something. This something may be called a sense?datum, leaving the question open whether it is indeed the physical object itself. Still, this question must be asked. It seems impossible that the sense?datum can be identical with the physical object for we do not always say we have different physical objects when we say we have different sense?data. On the other hand, the plain (...)
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  19. Mark Heller (1990). The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter. Cambridge University Press.score: 96.0
    This provocative new book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time. It seeks to answer such questions as "How is it that an object can survive change?" and "How much change can an object undergo without being destroyed?" To answer these questions Professor Heller presents a completely new theory about the nature of physical objects and about the relationship between our language and the physical world. According to his theory, the only actually existing (...) entities are what the author calls "hunks," four dimensional objects extending across time and space. This is a major new contribution to ontological debate and will be essential reading for all philosophers concerned with metaphysics. (shrink)
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  20. Emmett L. Holman (1979). Is the Physical World Colourless? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (December):295-304.score: 90.0
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  21. Herb Yarvin (1978). Criteria of the Physical. Metaphilosophy 9 (April):122-132.score: 90.0
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  22. Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.score: 84.0
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token (...)
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  23. Nicholas Maxwell (1966). Physics and Common Sense. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311.score: 82.0
    In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal (...)
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  24. John Campbell (1993). The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking. In Naomi M. Eilan, R. McCarthy & M. W. Brewer (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation. Blackwell.score: 82.0
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  25. Justin C. B. Gosling (1965). Emotion and Object. Philosophical Review 74 (October):486-503.score: 78.0
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  26. J. R. S. Wilson (1972). Emotion and Object. Cambridge University Press.score: 78.0
  27. Katherine Hawley (1998). Why Temporary Properties Are Not Relations Between Physical Objects and Times. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):211–216.score: 76.0
    Take this banana. It is now yellow, and when I bought it yesterday it was green. How can a single object be both green all over and yellow all over without contradiction? It is, of course, the passage of time which dissolves the contradiction, but how is this possible? How can a banana ripen? These questions raise the problem of change. The problem is sometimes called the problem of temporary intrinsics, but, as I shall explain below, this emphasis on (...)
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  28. Margaret Atherton (2008). 'The Books Are in the Study as Before': Berkeley's Claims About Real Physical Objects. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):85 – 100.score: 72.0
    (2008). ‘The books are in the study as before’: Berkeley's claims about real physical objects. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 85-100.
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  29. Thomas Hofweber (2005). Supervenience and Object-Dependent Properties. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):5-32.score: 72.0
    I argue that the semantic thesis of direct reference and the meta- physical thesis of the supervenience of the non-physical on the physical cannot both be true. The argument first develops a necessary condition for supervenience, a so-called conditional locality requirement, which is then shown to be incompatible with some physical object having object dependent properties, which in turn is required for the thesis of direct reference to be true. We apply this argument to (...)
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  30. Ben Caplan & Bob Bright (2005). Fusions and Ordinary Physical Objects. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):61-83.score: 72.0
    In “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects”, Kris McDaniel argues that ordinary physical objects are fusions of monadic and polyadic tropes. McDaniel calls his view “TOPO”—for “Theory of Ordinary Physical Objects”. He argues that we should accept TOPO because of the philosophical work that it allows us to do. Among other things, TOPO is supposed to allow endurantists to reply to Mark Heller’s argument for <span class='Hi'>perdurantism</span>. But, we argue in this paper, TOPO does not help endurantists do (...)
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  31. László E. Szabó (2003). Formal Systems as Physical Objects: A Physicalist Account of Mathematical Truth. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):117 – 125.score: 72.0
    This article is a brief formulation of a radical thesis. We start with the formalist doctrine that mathematical objects have no meanings; we have marks and rules governing how these marks can be combined. That's all. Then I go further by arguing that the signs of a formal system of mathematics should be considered as physical objects, and the formal operations as physical processes. The rules of the formal operations are or can be expressed in terms of the (...)
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  32. Kenneth R. Westphal (2006). How Does Kant Prove That We Perceive, and Not Merely Imagine, Physical Objects? Review of Metaphysics 59 (4):781 - 806.score: 72.0
    This paper details the key steps in Kant’s transcendental proof that we perceive, not merely imagine, physical objects. These steps begin with Kant’s method (§II) and highlight the spatio-temporal character of our representational capacities (§III), Kant’s two transcendental proofs of mental content externalism (§IV), his proof that we can only make causal judgments about spatial substances (§§V, VI), the transcendental conditions of our self-ascription of experiences (§VII), Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§VIII), perceptual synthesis (§IX), Kant’s justificatory fallibilism (...)
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  33. La´Szlo´ E. Szabo´ (2003). Formal Systems as Physical Objects: A Physicalist Account of Mathematical Truth. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):117-125.score: 72.0
    This article is a brief formulation of a radical thesis. We start with the formalist doctrine that mathematical objects have no meanings; we have marks and rules governing how these marks can be combined. That's all. Then I go further by arguing that the signs of a formal system of mathematics should be considered as physical objects, and the formal operations as physical processes. The rules of the formal operations are or can be expressed in terms of the (...)
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  34. Massimo Pauri & Michele Vallisneri, Ephemeral Point-Events: Is There a Last Remnant of Physical Objectivity ?score: 72.0
    For the past two decades, Einstein's Hole Argument (which deals with the apparent indeterminateness of general relativity due to the general covariance of the field equations) and its resolution in terms of "Leibniz equivalence" (the statement that pseudo-Riemannian geometries related by active diffeomorphisms represent the same physical solution) have been the starting point for a lively philosophical debate on the objectivity of the point-events of space-time. It seems that Leibniz equivalence makes it impossible to consider the points of the (...)
     
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  35. Sara Bernal (2005). Object Lessons: Spelke Principles and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312.score: 68.0
    There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal (...)
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  36. Matthias Warken Andreas R. Schwerdtfeger, Catalina Schmitz (2012). Using Text Messages to Bridge the Intention-Behavior Gap? A Pilot Study on the Use of Text Message Reminders to Increase Objectively Assessed Physical Activity in Daily Life. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 68.0
    Sedentarism is a serious health concern in industrialized countries throughout the world. We examined whether a text message-based intervention, targeted at increasing daily levels of physical activity, would be more effective than a standard psychoeducational intervention and a control condition. Sixty-three individuals (43 women) with a mean age of 23.7 years participated in the study. They were randomly assigned to a psychoeducational standard intervention; an augmented intervention with additional short text messages sent to the mobile phones to remind participants (...)
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  37. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo, Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.score: 66.0
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. (...)
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  38. H. H. Pattee (2013). Epistemic, Evolutionary, and Physical Conditions for Biological Information. Biosemiotics 6 (1):9-31.score: 66.0
    The necessary but not sufficient conditions for biological informational concepts like signs, symbols, memories, instructions, and messages are (1) an object or referent that the information is about, (2) a physical embodiment or vehicle that stands for what the information is about (the object), and (3) an interpreter or agent that separates the referent information from the vehicle’s material structure, and that establishes the stands-for relation. This separation is named the epistemic cut, and explaining clearly how the (...)
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  39. Shaun P. Vecera (2000). Toward a Biased Competition Account of Object-Based Segregation and Attention. Brain and Mind 1 (3):353-384.score: 66.0
    Because the visual system cannot process all of the objects, colors, and features present in a visual scene, visual attention allows some visual stimuli to be selected and processed over others. Most research on visual attention has focused on spatial or location-based attention, in which the locations occupied by stimuli are selected for further processing. Recent research, however, has demonstrated the importance of objects in organizing (or segregating) visual scenes and guiding attentional selection. Because of the long history of spatial (...)
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  40. Marni Bartlett James William Tanaka, Justin Kantner (2012). How Category Structure Influences the Perception of Object Similarity: The Atypicality Bias. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 66.0
    Why do some faces appear more similar than others? Beyond structural factors, we speculate that similarity is governed by the organization of faces located in a multi-dimensional face space. To test this hypothesis, we morphed a typical face with an atypical face. If similarity judgments are guided purely by their physical properties, the morph should be perceived to be equally similar to its typical parent as its atypical parent. However, contrary to the structural prediction, our results showed that the (...)
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  41. Matthew Ratcliffe (2002). Husserl and Nagel on Subjectivity and the Limits of Physical Objectivity. Continental Philosophy Review 35 (4):353-377.score: 64.0
    Thomas Nagel argues that the subjective character of mind inevitably eludes philosophical efforts to incorporate the mental into a single, complete, physically objective view of the world. Nagel sees contemporary philosophy as caught on the horns of a dilemma.
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  42. Martina Kanning (2012). Using Objective, Real-Time Measures to Investigate the Effect of Actual Physical Activity on Affective States in Everyday Life Differentiating the Contexts of Working and Leisure Time in a Sample with Students. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 62.0
    Multiple studies suggest that physical activity causes positive affective reactions and reduces depressive mood. However, studies and interventions focused mostly on structured activity programs, but rarely on actual physical activity (aPA) in daily life. Furthermore, they seldom account for the context in which the aPA occur (e.g. work, leisure). Using a prospective, real time assessment design (ambulatory assessment), we investigated the effects of aPA on affective states (valence, energetic arousal, calmness) in real time during everyday life while controlling (...)
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  43. Dick Bierman (2001). On the Nature of Anamalous Phenomena: Another Reality Between the World of Subjective Consciousness and the Objective World of Physics? In P. Loockvane (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins. 29--269.score: 62.0
  44. Wilfrid S. Sellars (1982). Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):83-114.score: 60.0
  45. Frank Jackson (1978). Perception. Philosophical Books 19 (May):49-56.score: 60.0
    Two Themes to the Course: a.) How are we to understand the contrast between direct and indirect or immediate and mediate perception? b.) Is there any cogent reason to think we don’t have sense experience of the world around us?
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  46. Georges Dicker (1980). Perceptual Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel.score: 60.0
    INTRODUCTION This book is a systematic study of the problem of perception and knowledge. I intend to analyze the problem, to expound and criticize the most ...
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  47. Max Deutscher (1963). David Armstrong and Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (May):80-88.score: 60.0
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  48. Ronald N. Giere, How Models Are Used to Represent Physical Reality.score: 60.0
    What are models that they may be used to represent reality? Here is a first pass. Models are objects that can be used to represent reality by exhibiting a designated similarity to physical objects. To be more specific, I need to indicate the kinds of objects models may be and how they may exhibit a designated similarity to real objects. My prototype for a model is a standard road map. This is a physical object (usually made of (...)
     
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  49. Winston H. F. Barnes (1945). The Myth of Sense-Data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:89-118.score: 60.0
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