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  1. Pierre Cruse (2007). Van Fraassen on the Nature of Empiricism. Metaphilosophy 38 (4):489-508.
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  2. Pierre Cruse (2005). Ramsey Sentences, Structural Realism and Trivial Realization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (3):557-576.
    Several recent authors identify structural realism about scientific theories with the claim that the content of a scientific theory is expressible using its Ramsey sentence. Many of these authors have also argued that so understood, the view collapses into empiricist anti-realism, since an argument originally proposed by Max Newman in a review of Bertrand Russell’s The analysis of matter demonstrates that Ramsey sentences are trivially satisfied, and cannot make any significant claims about unobservables. In this paper I argue against both (...)
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  3. Pierre Cruse (2004). Mary Midgley, The Myths We Live By (London: Routledge, 2003). Think 2 (6):95-102.
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  4. Pierre Cruse (2004). Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
    It is often thought that questions of reference are crucial in assessing scientific realism, construed as the view that successful theories are at least approximately true descriptions of the unobservable; realism is justified only if terms in empirically successful theories generally refer to genuinely existing entities or properties. In this paper this view is questioned. First, it is argued that there are good reasons to think that questions of realism are largely decided by convention and carry no epistemic significance. An (...)
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  5. D. Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.) (2004). Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    For thousands of years, many Western thinkers have assumed that emotions are, at best, harmless luxuries, and at worst outright obstacles to intelligent action. In the past decade, however, scientists and philosophers have begun to challenge this 'negative view of emotion'. Neuroscientists, psychologists and researchers in artificial intelligence now agree that emotions are vital to intelligent action. Evolutionary considerations have played a vital role in this shift to a more positive view of emotion. -/- This book brings together some of (...)
     
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  6. Pierre Cruse & David Papineau (2002). Scientific Realism Without Reference. In Michele Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism. Ashgate. 174--189.
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