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  1. Pierre Vermersch (2011). Husserl the Great Unrecognized Psychologist! Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):20-23.
  2. Pierre Vermersch (2011). No Competition Between DES and EI. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):79-89.
  3. Pierre Vermersch (2009). Describing the Practice of Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    The main objective of this article is to capitalise on many years of research, and of practice, relating to the use of introspection in a research context, and thus to provide an initial outline description of introspection, while developing an introspection of introspection. After a description of the context of this research, I define the institutional conditions which would enable the renewal of introspection as a research methodology. Then I describe three aspects of introspective practice: 1) introspection as a process (...)
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  4. Pierre Vermersch (2004). Attention Between Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology. Continental Philosophy Review 37 (1):45-81.
    It is possible to consider attention as the modulating dimension of consciousness. Understood in this sense, attention can be a privileged theme for relating the first person point of view (conceived as a psycho-phenomenology inspired by the work of Husserl) to the experimental sciences (e.g. psychology, neuropsychology, etc.), which have done a great deal of work on attention. This article will take up in succession some different points of view regarding the status of attention and its structure (e.g. static aspects). (...)
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  5. Natalie Depraz, F. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.
    Searches for the sources and means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience.
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  6. Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.) (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. Advances in Consciousness Research.
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  7. Natalie Depraz, Francisco Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). The Basic Cycle. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins. 15-63.
     
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  8. F. J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). The Point of View of the Researcher. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins. 115-154.
  9. Natalie Depraz, F. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2000). The Gesture of Awareness: An Account of its Structural Dynamics. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins. 13--121.
  10. Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2000). La réduction a l'épreuve de l'expérience. Études Phénoménologiques 16 (31-32):165-184.
  11. Pierre Vermersch (1999). Introspection as Practice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):17-42.
    In this article I am not going to try and define introspection. I am going to try to state as precisely as possible how the practice of introspection can be improved, starting from the principle that there exists a disjunction between the logic of action and of conceptualization and the practice of introspection does not require that one should already be in possession of an exhaustive scientific knowledge bearing upon it. . To make matters worse, innumerable commentators upon what passes (...)
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  12. Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (1998). Fully Embodying the Personal Level. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):777-778.
    The target article concludes that it is essential to introduce the personal level in cognitive science. We propose to take this conclusion one step further. The personal level should consist of first-person accounts of specific, contextualized experiences, not abstract or imagined cases. Exploring first-person accounts at their own level of detail calls for the refinements of method that can link up with neural accounts.
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