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  1. Pierre le Morvan, QUERIES: Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, I defend the thesis that selfishness and altruism can be intrapersonal. In doing so, I argue that the notions of intrapersonal altruism and selfishness usefully pick out behavioural patterns and have predictive..
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  2. Pierre Le Morvan, Uncorrected Proof.
    In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it’s implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.
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  3. Pierre Le Morvan (2013). Why the Standard View of Ignorance Prevails. Philosophia 41 (1):239-256.
    Rik Peels has forcefully argued that, contrary to what is widely held, ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he has argued against the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and argued for what he calls “the New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. In this paper, I defend the Standard View against Peels’s latest case for the New View.
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  4. Pierre Le Morvan (2012). On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View. Philosophia 40 (2):379-393.
    Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.
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  5. Pierre le Morvan (2011). Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief. Theoria 77 (1):32-41.
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  6. Pierre Le Morvan (2011). On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels. Philosophia 39 (2):335-344.
    Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge.
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  7. Pierre Le Morvan (2010). Intentionality. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.
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  8. Pierre Le Morvan (2009). Selfishness, Altruism, and Our Future Selves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):409 – 424.
    In this article, I defend the thesis that selfishness and altruism can be intrapersonal . In doing so, I argue that the notions of intrapersonal altruism and selfishness usefully pick out behavioural patterns and have predictive value. I also argue that my thesis helps enrich our understanding of the prudential, and can subsume some interesting work in economic and psychological theory.
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  9. Pierre Le Morvan (2008). Epistemic Means and Ends: A Reply to Hofmann. Synthese 162 (2):251-264.
    How is epistemic justification related to knowledge? Is it, as widely thought, constitutive of knowledge? Is it merely a means to knowledge, or merely a means to something else, such as truth? In a recent article in this journal, Hofmann (2005, Synthese, 146(3), 357–369) addresses these questions in attempting to defend an important argument articulated by Sartwell (1992, The Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 167–180) and reconstructed and criticized by Le Morvan (2002, Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 56(2), 151–168). (...)
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  10. Pierre Le Morvan (2008). Sensory Experience and Intentionalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.
    Increasingly prominent in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception, Intentionalism holds that sensory experience is inherently intentional, where to be intentional is to be about, or directed on, something. This article explores Intentionalism's prospects as a viable ontological and epistemological alternative to the traditional trinity of theories of sensory experience: the Sense-Datum Theory, the Adverbial Theory, and the Theory of Appearing.
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  11. Pierre Le Morvan (2005). Goldman on Knowledge as True Belief. Erkenntnis 62 (2):145-155.
    Alvin Goldman contends that, in addition to the familiar sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge is at least true justified belief, there is a weaker yet strict sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge amounts to nothing more than information-possession or mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that Goldman has failed to show that there is such a weaker sense, and that, even if he had shown this, he has (...)
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  12. Pierre le Morvan (2005). Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.
    Exploring intentionality from an externalist per- spective, I distinguish three kinds of intentionality in the case of seeing, which I call transparent, translucent, and opaque respec- tively. I then extend the distinction from seeing to knowing, and then to believing. Having explicated the three-fold distinction, I then critically explore some important consequences that follow from granting that (i) there are transparent and translucent in- tentional states and (ii) these intentional states are mental states. These consequences include: ?rst, that existential opacity (...)
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  13. Pierre le Morvan (2005). A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):688-707.
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  14. Pierre le Morvan (2005). Medical Learning Curves and the Kantian Ideal. Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (9):513-518.
    A hitherto unexamined problem for the ‘‘Kantian ideal’’ that one should always treat patients as ends in themselves, and never only as a means to other ends, is explored in this paper. The problem consists of a prima facie conflict between this Kantian ideal and the reality of medical practice. This conflict arises because, at least presently, medical practitioners can only acquire certain skills and abilities by practising on live, human patients, and given the inevitability and ubiquity of learning curves, (...)
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  15. Pierre le Morvan (2004). Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):221-234.
    Since the demise of the Sense-Datum independent objects or events to be objects Theory and Phenomenalism in the last cenof perception; however, unlike Direct Retury, Direct Realism in the philosophy of alists, Indirect Realists take this percepperception has enjoyed a resurgence of tion to be indirect by involving a prior popularity.1 Curiously, however, although awareness of some tertium quid between there have been attempts in the literature the mind and external objects or events.3 to refute some of the arguments against (...)
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  16. Pierre Le Morvan (2004). Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):705 – 718.
    It is widely held, to the point of being the received interpretation, that Frank Ramsey was the first to defend the so-called Redundancy Theory of Truth in his landmark article ‘Facts and Propositions’ (hereafter ‘FP’) of 1927.1 For instance, A.J. Ayer2 cited this article in the context of arguing that saying that p is true is simply a way of asserting p and that truth is not a real quality or relation. Other holders of the received interpretation, such as George (...)
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  17. Pierre Le Morvan (2003). Notes and Comments. Heythrop Journal 44 (3):345-351.
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  18. Pierre le Morvan & Dana Radcliffe (2003). Notes and Comments. Plantinga on Warranted Christian Belief. Heythrop Journal 44 (3):345-351.
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  19. Pierre Le Morvan (2002). Is Mere True Belief Knowledge? Erkenntnis 56 (2):151-168.
    Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  20. Pierre Le Morvan (1999). The Converse Consequence Condition and Hempelian Qualitative Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):448-454.
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