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  1. Piers H. G. Stephens (2014). Review ofPragmatic Environmentalism: Towards a Rhetoric of Eco-Justiceby Shane J. Ralston. Ethics and the Environment 19 (1):123-131.
    But no word could protect the doctrine from critics so blind to the nature of the enquiry that, when Dr. Schiller speaks of ideas ‘working’ well, the only thing they think of is their immediate workings in the physical environment, their enabling us to make money, or gain some similar ‘practical’ advantage. Ideas do work thus, of course, immediately or remotely; but they work indefinitely inside the mental world also.Thus wrote an exasperated William James in The Meaning of Truth in (...)
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  2. Piers H. G. Stephens (2013). Ben A. Minteer. Refounding Environmental Ethics: Pragmatism, Principle, and Practice. Environmental Ethics 35 (3):371-374.
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  3. Piers H. G. Stephens (2009). Plumwood, Property, Selfhood and Sustainability. Ethics and the Environment 14 (2):pp. 57-73.
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  4. Piers H. G. Stephens (2009). Toward a Jamesian Environmental Philosophy. Environmental Ethics 31 (3):227-244.
    William James’s radical empiricism and pragmatism constitutes a philosophy that can reconcile the split between intrinsic value theorists, who stress the development and relevance of theoretical axiology, and pragmatists who have favored a more direct emphasis on environmental policy and application. By distinguishing James’s emphasis on direct personal experience from John Dewey’s more socialized approach, James’s distinctive emphasis on the transformative possibilities of pure experience and his links to romantic sensibility enable us to articulate and validate the noninstrumental aspects of (...)
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  5. Piers H. G. Stephens (2000). Nature, Purity, Ontology. Environmental Values 9 (3):267 - 294.
    Standard defences of preservationism, and of the intrinsic value of nature more generally, are vulnerable to at least three objections. The first of these comes from social constructivism, the second from the claim that it is incoherent to argue that nature is both 'other' and something with which we can feel unity, whilst the third links defences of nature to authoritarian objectivism and dangerously misanthropic normative dichotomies which set pure nature against impure humanity. I argue that all these objections may (...)
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