Is it possible to combine different logics into a coherent system with the goal of applying it to specific problems so that it sheds some light on foundational aspects of those logics? These are two of the most basic issues of combining logics. Paranormal modal logic is a combination of paraconsistent logic and modal logic. In this paper, I propose two further combinatory developments, focusing on each one of these two issues. On the foundational side, I combine paranormal modal logic (...) with normal modal logic, resulting into a paraconsistent and paracomplete multimodal logic dealing with the notions of plausibility and certainty. On the application side, I combine this logic with Reiter’s default logic, resulting into an inductive and consequently nonmonotonic paraconsistent and paracomplete logic able to represent some key inductive principles. (shrink)

One of the elements of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions not only confused his readers but even Kuhn himself, namely, his talk about world change. In my earlier work, I have tackled the question of Kuhn’s metaphysics from a viewpoint that was informed by Kant’s critical theoretical philosophy. Useful as this may be, in this chapter I will try a different approach. I will focus on the fact that Kuhn acted mainly as a reflective historian when he wrote Structure. Thus, (...) he reflected on what sort of image of science the appropriately pursued historiography of science would present to him. In this chapter, I try to reconstruct the experiences of the historian of science, who is somehow driven to talk about world change as something correlated with scientific revolutions, and want to find out whether Kuhn’s world change talk can be made plausible. (shrink)

How is it that a speaker S can at once make it obvious to an audience A that she intends to communicate some proposition p, and yet at the same time retain plausible deniability with respect to this intention? The answer is that S can bring it about that A has a high justified credence that ‘S intended p’ without putting A in a position to know that ‘S intended p’. In order to achieve this S has to exploit a (...) sense in which communication can be lottery-like. After defending this view of deniability I argue that it compares favorably to a rival account recently developed by Dinges and Zakkou (2023). (shrink)

The multiplication of centers -- The horizon line -- The spatial urge -- The invention of place -- The measured mastery of the world.

The national-level scenarios project NanoFutures focuses on the social, political, economic, and ethical implications of nanotechnology, and is initiated by the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (CNS-ASU). The project involves novel methods for the development of plausible visions of nanotechnology-enabled futures, elucidates public preferences for various alternatives, and, using such preferences, helps refine future visions for research and outreach. In doing so, the NanoFutures project aims to address a central question: how to deliberate the social implications (...) of an emergent technology whose outcomes are not known. The solution pursued by the NanoFutures project is twofold. First, NanoFutures limits speculation about the technology to plausible visions. This ambition introduces a host of concerns about the limits of prediction, the nature of plausibility, and how to establish plausibility. Second, it subjects these visions to democratic assessment by a range of stakeholders, thus raising methodological questions as to who are relevant stakeholders and how to activate different communities so as to engage the far future. This article makes the dilemmas posed by decisions about such methodological issues transparent and therefore articulates the role of plausibility in anticipatory governance. (shrink)

Counterfactual thinking involves imagining hypothetical alternatives to reality. Philosopher David Lewis argued that people estimate the subjective plausibility that a counterfactual event might have occurred by comparing an imagined possible world in which the counterfactual statement is true against the current, actual world in which the counterfactual statement is false. Accordingly, counterfactuals considered to be true in possible worlds comparatively more similar to ours are judged as more plausible than counterfactuals deemed true in possible worlds comparatively less similar. Although (...) Lewis did not originally develop his notion of comparative similarity to be investigated as a psychological construct, this study builds upon his idea to empirically investigate comparative similarity as a possible psychological strategy for evaluating the perceived plausibility of counterfactual events. More specifically, we evaluate judgments of comparative similarity between episodic memories and episodic counterfactual events as a factor influencing people's judgments of plausibility in counterfactual simulations, and we also compare it against other factors thought to influence judgments of counterfactual plausibility, such as ease of simulation and prior simulation. Our results suggest that the greater the perceived similarity between the original memory and the episodic counterfactual event, the greater the perceived plausibility that the counterfactual event might have occurred. While similarity between actual and counterfactual events, ease of imagining, and prior simulation of the counterfactual event were all significantly related to counterfactual plausibility, comparative similarity best captured the variance in ratings of counterfactual plausibility. Implications for existing theories on the determinants of counterfactual plausibility are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives (...) about the actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver's continuum of ?how-possibly,? to ?how-plausibly,? to ?how-actually? models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism's activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models. (shrink)

In this chapter I defend a methodological view about how we should conduct substantive ethical inquiries in the fields of normative and practical ethics. I maintain that the direct plausibility and implausibility of general ethical principles – once fully clarified and understood – should be foundational in our substantive ethical reasoning. I argue that, in order to expose our ethical intuitions about particular cases to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether they can be justified by directly plausible principles. (...) To expose apparently plausible principles to maximal critical scrutiny, we must determine whether their direct plausibility can survive careful clarification of what they are really saying. This means that intuitions about cases are useful only in (a) suggesting principles that must stand on their own two feet, and (b) illustrating or otherwise helping us clarify what a principle is really saying. We should not reject principles that seem most directly plausible after we have fully clarified their content simply because they conflict with our intuitions about cases, because to do so is to side with uncritical prejudices over the teachings of critical scrutiny. (shrink)

Abstract. Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis holds that “a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of proposi- tions”. The opposing position, permissivism, allows distinct rational agents to adopt differing attitudes towards a proposition given the same body of evidence. We assess various motivations that have been offered for Uniqueness, including: concerns about achieving consensus, a strong form of evidentialism, worries about epistemically arbitrary influences on belief, a focus on truth-conduciveness, and consequences for peer disagreement. (...) We argue that each of these motivations either misunderstands the commitments of permissivism or is question-begging. Better understanding permissivism makes it a much more plausible position. (shrink)

Several approaches to implementing symbol-like representations in neurally plausible models have been proposed. These approaches include binding through synchrony, “mesh” binding, and conjunctive binding. Recent theoretical work has suggested that most of these methods will not scale well, that is, that they cannot encode structured representations using any of the tens of thousands of terms in the adult lexicon without making implausible resource assumptions. Here, we empirically demonstrate that the biologically plausible structured representations employed in the Semantic Pointer Architecture approach (...) to modeling cognition do scale appropriately. Specifically, we construct a spiking neural network of about 2.5 million neurons that employs semantic pointers to successfully encode and decode the main lexical relations in WordNet, which has over 100,000 terms. In addition, we show that the same representations can be employed to construct recursively structured sentences consisting of arbitrary WordNet concepts, while preserving the original lexical structure. We argue that these results suggest that semantic pointers are uniquely well-suited to providing a biologically plausible account of the structured representations that underwrite human cognition. (shrink)

We construct a Hilbert style system RPL for the notion of plausibility measure introduced by Halpern J, and we prove the soundness and completeness with respect to a neighborhood style semantics. Using the language of RPL, we demonstrate that it can define well-studied notions of necessity, conditionals and propositional identity.

Why should we decolonise knowledge? One popular rationale is that colonialism has set up a single perspective as epistemically authoritative over many equally legitimate ones, and this is a form of...

This book provides a practical and accessible way of evaluating good and bad arguments used in everyday conversations by applying normative models of dialectical (interactive) argumentation, where two parties reason together in an orderly and cooperative way. Using case studies, the author analyzes correct and incorrect uses of argumentation on controversial issues that engage the reader's interest while illustrating points in a practical way. Walton gives clear explanations of the most common errors and tricky deceptions -- traditionally called "fallacies" -- (...) that can trip up an unwary arguer. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown how plausible reasoning of the kind illustrated in the ancient Greek example of the weak and strong man can be analyzed and evaluated using a procedure in which the pro evidence is weighed against the con evidence using formal, computational argumentation tools. It is shown by means of this famous example how plausible reasoning is based on an audience’s recognition of situations of a type they are familiar with as normal and comprehensible in their (...) shared common knowledge. The paper extends previous work on this example by using three new multiagent argumentation schemes closely related to the scheme for argument from negative consequences. (shrink)

The plausible reasoning class (called the JSM-reasoning in honour of John Stuart Mill) is described. It implements interaction of three forms of non-deductive procedures  induction, analogy and abduction. Empirical induction in the JSM-reasoning is the basis for generation of hypotheses on causal relations (determinants of social behaviour). Inference by analogy means that predictions about previously unknown properties of objects (individual’s behaviour) are inferred from causal relations. Abductive inference is performed to check on the explanatory adequacy of generated hypotheses. To (...) recognize rationality of respondents’ opinion deductive inference is used. Plausible reasoning, semantics of argumentation logic and deductive recognition of opinion rationality represent logical tool for cognitive sociology problems. (shrink)

Events that violate the laws of nature are, by definition, impossible, but recent research suggests that people view some violations as “more impossible” than others. When evaluating the difficulty of magic spells, American adults are influenced by causal considerations that should be irrelevant given the spell’s primary causal violation, judging, for instance, that it would be more difficult to levitate a bowling ball than a basketball even though weight should no longer be a consideration if contact is no longer necessary (...) for support. In the present study, we sought to test the generalizability of these effects in a non-Western context – China – where magical events are represented differently in popular fiction and where reasoning styles are often more holistic than analytic. Across several studies, Chinese adults showed the same tendency as American adults to honor implicit causal constraints when evaluating the plausibility of magical events. These findings suggest that graded notions of impossibility are shared across cultures, possibly because they are a byproduct of causal knowledge. (shrink)

There seems to be something wrong with passing moralistic judgments on others’ moral character. Immanuel Kant’s ethics provides insight into an underexplored way in which moralistic judgments are problematic, namely, that they are both a sign of fundamentally poor character in the moralistic person herself and an obstacle to that person’s own moral self-improvement. Kant’s positions on these issues provide a basically compelling argument against moralistic judgment of others, an argument that can be detached from the most controversial elements of (...) Kantian ethics to stand as plausible and instructive in its own right. (shrink)

2014 Reprint of 1954 American Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. This two volume classic comprises two titles: "Patterns of Plausible Inference" and "Induction and Analogy in Mathematics." This is a guide to the practical art of plausible reasoning, particularly in mathematics, but also in every field of human activity. Using mathematics as the example par excellence, Polya shows how even the most rigorous deductive discipline is heavily dependent on techniques of guessing, inductive (...) reasoning, and reasoning by analogy. In solving a problem, the answer must be guessed at before a proof can be given, and guesses are usually made from a knowledge of facts, experience, and hunches. The truly creative mathematician must be a good guesser first and a good prover afterward; many important theorems have been guessed but no proved until much later. In the same way, solutions to problems can be guessed, and a god guesser is much more likely to find a correct solution. This work might have been called "How to Become a Good Guesser."-From the Dust Jacket. (shrink)

In this article, I present a defense of conceptual plausibility, understood as an epistemic way to qualify concepts that situates them between the merely possible and the actual. To show that there is such a thing as conceptual plausibility, I rely on what seems to lie at the heart of many uses of the phrase “plausible concept”: explanatory fruitfulness. To make an effective case for the claim that conceptual plausibility is of philosophical interest, I present an argument (...) based on the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. To show that conceptual plausibility is philosophically feasible, I first show that it cannot be reduced to propositional plausibility. Next, I offer a minimally precise characterization of conceptual plausibility; I approach this from a qualitative and comparative perspective as well. Finally, I show how these qualitative and comparative criteria of conceptual plausibility might be applied to the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. (shrink)

In this article, a qualitative notion of subjective plausibility and its revision based on a preorder relation are implemented in higher-order logic. This notion of plausibility is used for modeling pragmatic aspects of communication on top of traditional two-dimensional semantic representations.

While the theory of relative plausibility is presented by Allen and Pardo as a descriptive theory of the proof process, this commentary discusses their theory as a possible starting point for a prescriptive theory of evidence assessment. Generally, naturalness and simplicity are necessary for the success of such a theory. The theory of relative plausibility is very promising in this respect, as its key concept is the straightforward and intuitive notion of explanation, according to which an explanation is (...) an answer to a “why” question. Still, both the explanatory and the comparative dimensions of relative plausibility are in need of elaboration if one wants to give advice on evidence assessment in terms of Allen and Pardo’s framework. For one thing, it is necessary to examine the epistemological status of the various explanatory criteria regarding their potential as guides to truth or likelihood. Only epistemic criteria should be included in recommendations to fact-finders. Moreover, given the author’s interpretation of the ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ standard, it is unclear what the comparative dimension amounts to in criminal trials. At least a comparison of the kind involved in the author's account of civil trials standards is absent in their interpretation of BARD. If the comparative dimension of relative plausibility is relevant at all in criminal trials, it must be clarified what is to be compared. (shrink)

Possibilities haunt history. The force of our explanations of events turns on the alternative possibilities these explanations suggest. It is these possible worlds which give us our understanding; and in human affairs we decide them by practical rather than theoretical judgement. In his widely acclaimed account of the role of counterfactuals in explanation, Geoffrey Hawthorn deploys extended examples from history and modern times to defend his argument. His conclusions cast doubt on existing assumptions about the nature and place of theory, (...) and indeed of the possibility of knowledge itself, in the human sciences. (shrink)

If a catalogue were made of terms commonly used to affirm the adequacy of critical interpretations of works of art, one word certain to be included would be “plausible.” Yet this term is one which has received precious little attention in the literature of aesthetics. This is odd, inasmuch as I find the notion of plausibility central to an understanding of the nature of criticism. “Plausible” is a perplexing term because it can have radically different meanings depending on the (...) circumstances of its employment. In the following discussion, I will make some observations about the logic of this concept in connection with its uses in two rather different contexts: the context of scientific inquiry on the one hand, and that of aesthetic interpretation on the other. In distinguishing separate senses of “plausible,” I shall provide reasons to resist the temptation to imagine that because logical aspects of two different types of inquiry, science and criticism, happen to be designated by the same term, they may to that extent be considered to have similar logical structures. (shrink)

Plausible Logic allows defeasible deduction with arbitrary propositions, and yet when sufficiently simplified it is very similar to the Defeasible Logics of Billington and Nute. This paper presents Plausible Logic, explains some of the ideas behind the definitions, applies Plausible Logic to an example, and proves a coherence result which indicates that Plausible Logic is well behaved. We also report the first complete implementation of propositional Plausible Logic. The implementation has a web interface which makes it available to researchers and (...) students everywhere. The implementation is evaluated experimentally, and is shown to be capable of handling tens of thousands of rules and sufficiently many disjunctions for realistic problems. (shrink)

Kant believed all and only the guilty should be punished. Other retributivists believed that only guilt should bring punishment down on a person. In neither way is the retributive theory sufficiently distinguished from utilitarianism for, on contingent grounds, the utilitarian may agree with either of these theses. The advantage of PRJ is that it brings out the difference between retributivism and utilitarianism more sharply while at the same time it manages to be a less stern and unyielding view than traditional (...) retributivism. The retributivist need not deny the core of good sense in utilitarianism, and he certainly need not deny the connection between morality and happiness. His view is that punishment does not have to produce good consequences in order to be justified. It suffices that it be deserved and that it not produce a set of clearly bad consequences. If it is true that punishment generally does have bad consequences which more than outweigh its good consequences then retributivists and utilitarians should join hands in their condemnation of punishment. The heart of the difference between the retributivist and the utilitarian is that the latter counts punishment itself as an evil but believes that, generally speaking, it is an evil which is instrumental in the production of enough good to out-weigh its intrinsic demerit. The retributivist does not regard punishment as an evil. The pain of punishment is not by itself a reason for not punishing (so long as it is not excessive). Insofar as utilitarianism is the view that no considerations but those of utility should justify punishment, it is only one side of that counterfeit coin the other side of which is Kant's dictum: “...Woe to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of it....” It is irrational for Kant to rule out concern for utility but it is also irrational for the utilitarian to rule out concern for retribution.I have tried to show in this paper that the two main aspects of a plausible theory of retribution - PRJ and that the punishment should fit the crime - can be vindicated in terms of acceptable beliefs one of which is incompatible with utilitarianism (PRJ), and one of which does not derive the respect we accord it from any connection with utilitarianism. I emphasize, however, what I previously stated, that the retributivist does not have to believe that retributive justice must prevail at all costs. What is asked for is the recognition that one purpose of punishment (and not the one purpose) can justifiably have nothing to do with utility. The sensible retributivist will concede, and gladly, that there are more things in heaven and earth than retribution. (shrink)

I comment on two analyses of the Simonshaven case: one by Prakken (2019), based on arguments, and the other by van Koppen and Mackor (2019), based on scenarios (or stories, narratives). I argue that both analyses lack a clear account of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because they lack a clear account of the notion of plausibility. To illustrate this point, I focus on the defense argument during the appeal trial and show that both analyses face difficulties in modeling (...) key features of this argument. (shrink)

Cancer research is experiencing ‘paradigm instability’, since there are two rival theories of carcinogenesis which confront themselves, namely the somatic mutation theory and the tissue organization field theory. Despite this theoretical uncertainty, a huge quantity of data is available thanks to the improvement of genome sequencing techniques. Some authors think that the development of new statistical tools will be able to overcome the lack of a shared theoretical perspective on cancer by amalgamating as many data as possible. We think instead (...) that a deeper understanding of cancer can be achieved by means of more theoretical work, rather than by merely accumulating more data. To support our thesis, we introduce the analytic view of theory development, which rests on the concept of plausibility, and make clear in what sense plausibility and probability are distinct concepts. Then, the concept of plausibility is used to point out the ineliminable role played by the epistemic subject in the development of statistical tools and in the process of theory assessment. We then move to address a central issue in cancer research, namely the relevance of computational tools developed by bioinformaticists to detect driver mutations in the debate between the two main rival theories of carcinogenesis. Finally, we briefly extend our considerations on the role that plausibility plays in evidence amalgamation from cancer research to the more general issue of the divergences between frequentists and Bayesians in the philosophy of medicine and statistics. We argue that taking into account plausibility-based considerations can lead to clarify some epistemological shortcomings that afflict both these perspectives. (shrink)

This book systematically addresses the issue of assessing the normative nature of visions of emerging technologies in an epistemologically robust way. In the context of democratic governance of emerging technologies, not only it is important to reflect on technologies' moral significance, but also to address their emerging and future oriented character. The book proposes an original approach to deal with the issue of "plausible" ethical evaluation of new technologies. Taking its start from current debates about Technology Assessment, the proposed solution (...) emerges as a combination of theoretical and methodological insights from the fields of Philosophy of Technology, Science and Technology Studies and a normative justification based on pragmatist ethics. The book's main contribution is to engage a diverse and interdisciplinary audience (ethicists, philosophers, social scientists, technology assessment researchers and practitioners) in a reflection concerning the epistemological challenges that are associated to the endeavour of appraising the moral significance of emerging technologies in the attempt of democratically governing them. It brings together concepts and methodologies from different disciplines and shows their synergy in applying them to two specific case studies of emerging biomedical technologies. (shrink)

Current practice in logic increasingly accords recognition to abductive, presumptive or plausible arguments, in addition to deductive and inductive arguments. But there is uncertainty about what these terms exactly mean, what the differences between them are (if any), and how they relate. By examining some analyses ofthese terms and some of the history of the subject (including the views of Peirce and Cameades), this paper sets out considerations leading to a set of definitions, discusses the relationship of these three forms (...) of argument to argumentation schemes and sets out a new argumentation scheme for abductive argument. (shrink)

Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is not a fundamental thesis (...) within Quine’s philosophy, and (v) it does not carry with it the anti-realistic consequences often associated with the thesis in recent debates. The paper analyzes Quine’s views on the matter and the changes they underwent over the years. A conjecture is put forth about why Quine’s thesis has been so widely misrepresented: Quine’s writings up to 1975 tackled primarily the formulation and justification of the thesis, but afterwards were concerned mostly with the question whether empirically equivalent rivals to the theory we hold are to be considered true also. When this latter discussion is read without bearing in mind Quine’s earlier formulation and justification of the thesis, his thesis seems to have stronger epistemic consequences than it actually does. A careful reading of his later writings shows, however, that the formulation of the thesis remained unchanged after 1975, and that his mature and considered views supported only a very mitigated version of the thesis. (shrink)

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly is creating quite a stir. Suddenly gone is the famous loosey-goosey rule of Conley v. Gibson that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.Now a complaint must provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible (...) on its face. Only decided last May, Bell Atlantic has been cited in over 3,700 cases. Already being described as a landmark decision, Bell Atlantic nonetheless has lawyers and judges scratching their heads over the precise pleading standard to apply in its wake. As the Second Circuit (mildly) put it, Considerable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings has recently been created by the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Just what is a plausible showing that the pleader is entitled to relief under Rule 8(a)(2)?I believe an answer lies in the 26-year-old decision of the Former Fifth Circuit in In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation. Plywood Antitrust requires, at a minimum, that a complaint . . . contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Already used in more than half the circuits, this standard paraphrases advice found in the venerable WRIGHT & MILLER for nearly 40 years.Properly applied, this all . . . material elements standard satisfies Bell Atlantic's plausibility requirement in all respects. The Plywood Antitrust pleading standard works well after Bell Atlantic, first, because the Supreme Court referred to the standard, albeit parenthetically, with approval in Bell Atlantic. Second, it does much to harmonize the Federal Rules' goal of dispensing with pleading technicalities while still requiring enough general factual information about a pleader's claim to make the notice in notice pleading meaningful. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it gives lawyers, litigants, and courts a standard they can actually use when drafting, or assessing the sufficiency of, pleadings. (shrink)

In qualitative decision theory, a very natural way for defining preference relations over policies (acts) -functions from a set S of states to a set X of consequences- is by using the so called Dominance Plausible Rule. In this context we need a relation > over X and a relation ? over P(S) (the subsets of S). Then we define ≥ as follows: f ≥ g, ? [f > g] ? [g > f], where [f > g] denotes the set (...) {s ? S : f(s) > g(s)g}. In many cases > is a modular relation and ? is a total preorder. A quite rational and desirable property for the relation over policies is transitivity. In general, the relation ≥ defined by the Dominance Plausible Rule is not transitive in spite of the transitivity of ?. In this work we characterize the properties of the relation ? forcing the relation ≥ over policies to be transitive. All this under the hypothesis of modularity of the relation >. (shrink)

The analytic tradition of thought in the West started in the late nineteenth century with what is known as ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy. But as a methodological movement, it impacted other areas of knowledge as well. Feminist scholars react to the analytic tradition of thought in many various ways. Many of them critique and challenge the tradition. The present paper aims at a review of a feminist take on Sigmund Freud who imported analytical tradition in psychology at the beginning of (...) the twentieth century. Luce Irigaray questions the legitimacy of Freudian analysis and challenges the claim of neutrality of Freudian discourse by accusing that Freud works within a patriarchal-biased ideology. About the logical basis of Freudian discourse, Irigaray alleges that a logic of indifference is at work there. But how far has Irigaray, as a feminist, been successful in showing the biases and loopholes in Freudian discourse? This paper attempts to show that the Irigarayian line of argument and critique of Freud does not offer a stronger and plausible feminist stance. (shrink)

Recent work by Marchisella exposed a gap in the literature on causal non-monotonic reasoning: what is needed is an approach whose primary motivation is the formal representation of the way in which humans typically reason with cause and effect. We extend the work of Marchisella, and propose a new type of causal non-monotonic reasoning, _Plausible Causal Reasoning_, which fills the gap in the literature. We propose some new principles which help characterise Plausible Causal Reasoning, and suggest a family of non-monotonic (...) logics which provides a suitable starting point for its formalisation. (shrink)

Amyloid beta precursor protein (APP) and prion protein (PrP) are cell membrane elements implicated in neurodegenerative diseases. Both proteins undergo endoproteolysis. Evidence is adduced from the literature hinting that the process in the two proteins could be related, their functions may overlap and their distributions coincide. It is proposed that PrP catalyses its own cleavage, the C-terminal fragment functions as an α secretase and the N-terminal segment chaperones the active site; the α secretase releases anticoagulant and neurotrophic ectodomains from APP. (...) The proposals explain some features of spongiform encephalopathies. BioEssays 23:456–462, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper introduces the notion of plausibility as a decisive condition for the acceptance by groups in society of fundamental ideas concerning the nature of illness.Plausibility, it is argued, helps to explain both transition from one system of fundamental ideas to another in history, and coexistence of different such systems in a single civilization. Hence this paper challenges an interpretation of medicine prevalent, especially in medical anthropology, since the 1940s, when Erwin Ackerknecht introduced the idea of medicine (...) as an integrated aspect of a society's or community's culture.Because early research focused on small-scale communities where a majority, if not all, of the members adhered to one world view and experienced one and the same existential environment, medicine came to be identified as a cultural system representative of entire communities and, later, societies. Hence we speak of Chinese medicine as if there were one system of therapeutic ideas and practices representative of China as a whole. The fact is that even though medicine is indeed a cultural system, it is representative only of the culture developed by people sharing identical environments and experiences. That is, if within one civilization different groups coexist in different existential realities entailing different notions of what causes crisis and how to maintain harmony, then these groups will believe in different systems of ideas concerning the generation, treatment, and prevention of illness. Such systems of ideas are therefore always metaphorical reflections of a real social environment or ideas are therefore always metaphorical reflections of a real social environment or of one aspired to.It is not truth that leads to an acceptance of basic therapeutic ideas but plausibility. (shrink)

According to the instrumentalism of Friedman and Machlup it is irrelevant whether the explanatory principles or “assumptions” of a theory satisfy any criterion of “plausibility,” “realism,” “credibility,” or “soundness.” In this view the main or only criterion for selecting theories is whether a theory yields empirically testable implications that turn out to be consistent with observations. All we should require or expect from a theory is that it is a useful instrument for the purpose of prediction. Considerations of the (...) “efficiency” of a theory for the purpose of ordering our experiences are permitted, but considerations of “plausibility” are not. “Explanatory assumptions” are not really explanatory in the sense that they claim to represent underlying causal processes in reality; they only serve to generate, by deduction, implications that are in accordance with as many observations as possible. (shrink)

Although, when first introduced, Copernicus's theory considered as a whole was not superior to the Ptolemaic theory according to any of the usual criteria for comparing theories and determining their acceptability, it did have features which provided the early Copernicans with good reasons for entertaining it and trying to develop it further. These features are discussed and then three plausibility considerations which seem to be operative in this case are formulated.

The manipulation argument poses a significant challenge for any adequate compatibilist theory of agency. The argument maintains that there is no relevant difference between actions or pro‐attitudes that are induced by nefarious neurosurgeons, God, or (and this is the important point) natural causes. Therefore, if manipulation is thought to undermine moral responsibility, then so also ought causal determinism. In this paper, I will attempt to bolster the plausibility of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's semicompatibilist theory of moral responsibility (...) by demonstrating how their account provides a distinctive line of response to three important types of manipulation. (shrink)

Falk's hypothesis is attractive and seems to be supported by data from primatology and language acquisition literature. However, this etiological narrative presents a fairly low degree of plausibility, the result of two epistemological fallacies: an implicit reliance on a unilinear model of causality and the explicit belief that ontogeny is homologous to phylogeny. Although this attempt to retrace the early emergence of prelinguistic capacities in hominins falls short of producing a compelling argument, it does call attention to an aspect (...) of linguistic behavior which may indeed have evolved under the pressure of nurturing constraints. (shrink)

This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms.

Trust is a crucial component of the relationship between a professional and those whom the professional serves because those served often lack the past experience and specialized training necessary to adequately assess the reliability of the professional’s judgments on their behalf. This article is an attempt to enhance our understanding of the conditions under which client trust of a professional is plausible. Trust, I will explain, is an emotional attitude with a unique evaluative dimension that can lead the one who (...) trusts to anticipate that the one trusted will not betray her even when she cannot adequately assess evidence of the trusted’s reliability. It is, however, precisely because evaluating someone’s trustworthiness differs in important respects from assessing their reliability that substantive trust of a professional is implausible in cases where those served by a particular profession, for example, medicine or journalism, conceive of it as merely a commercial enterprise. (shrink)