Search results for 'Pleasure' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
See also:
Bibliography: Pleasure in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Aesthetic Pleasure in Aesthetics
Bibliography: Pleasure and Desire in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Pleasure and Pain in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Pleasure, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: The Value of Pleasure in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Sexual Pleasure in Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
Bibliography: History: Pleasure in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Aristotle: Pleasure in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Bibliography: Plato: Pleasure in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
...
Other categories were found but are not shown. Use more specific keywords to find others, or browse the categories.
  1. Murat Aydede (forthcoming). A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure. In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. Oxford University Press.score: 27.0
    [This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of an experiential-desire (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Irwin Goldstein (1989). Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.score: 24.0
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Irwin Goldstein (1980). Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.score: 24.0
    Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Irwin Goldstein (2003). Malicious Pleasure Evaluated: Is Pleasure an Unconditional Good? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):24–31.score: 24.0
    Pleasure is one of the strongest candidates for an occurrence that might be good, in some respect, unconditionally. Malicious pleasure is one of the most often cited alleged counter-examples to pleasure’s being an unconditional good. Correctly evaluating malicious pleasure is more complex than people realize. I defend pleasure’s unconditionally good status from critics of malicious pleasure.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Fred Feldman (1988). Two Questions About Pleasure. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 59--81.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I present my solutions to two closely related questions about pleasure. One of these questions is fairly well known. The second question seems to me to be at least as interesting as the first, but it apparently hasn't interested quite so many philosophers.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Chris Heathwood (2011). Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.score: 24.0
    One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one’s desires provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories about two other issues: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either pleasure (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Adam Shriver (forthcoming). The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and Pain To Animal Welfare (Penultimate Draft). Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.score: 24.0
    Utilitarianism, the ethical doctrine that holds in its most basic form that right actions are those that maximize pleasure and minimize pain, has been at the center of many of the ethical debates around animal welfare. The most well-known utilitarian of our time, Peter Singer, is widely credited with having sparked the animal welfare movement of the past 35+ years, using utilitarian reasoning to argue against using animals in invasive research that we aren’t willing to perform on humans. Yet (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.score: 24.0
    In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Aaron Smuts (2011). The Feels Good Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.score: 24.0
    Most philosophers since Sidgwick have thought that the various forms of pleasure differ so radically that one cannot find a common, distinctive feeling among them. This is known as the heterogeneity problem. To get around this problem, the motivational theory of pleasure suggests that what makes an experience one of pleasure is our reaction to it, not something internal to the experience. I argue that the motivational theory is wrong, and not only wrong, but backwards. The heterogeneity (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Attila Tanyi (2011). Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.score: 24.0
    The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, i.e. the likings and dislikings (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Clarendon Press.score: 24.0
    Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining the question about the Good Life. As he understands it, the question is not about the morally good life or about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the general features of the life that is good in itself for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Stuart Rachels (2004). Six Theses About Pleasure. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):247-267.score: 24.0
    I defend these claims: (1) 'Pleasure' has exactly one English antonym: 'unpleasure.' (2) Pleasure is the most convincing example of an organic unity. (3) The hedonic calculus is a joke. (4) An important type of pleasure is background pleasure. (5) Pleasures in bad company are still good. (6) Higher pleasures aren't pleasures (and if they were, they wouldn't be higher). Thesis (1) merely concerns terminology, but theses (2)-(6) are substantive, evaluative claims.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Bennett W. Helm (2002). Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.score: 24.0
    This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.score: 24.0
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Christopher Butler (2004). Pleasure and the Arts: Enjoying Literature, Painting, and Music. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    How do the arts give us pleasure? Covering a very wide range of artistic works, from Auden to David Lynch, Rembrandt to Edward Weston, and Richard Strauss to Keith Jarrett, Pleasure and the Arts offers us an explanation of our enjoyable emotional engagements with literature, music, and painting. The arts direct us to intimate and particularized relationships, with the people represented in the works, or with those we imagine produced them. When we listen to music, look at a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). How to Explain Pleasure: Some Critical Remarks About Davies. British Journal of Aesthetics.score: 24.0
    In these critical remarks about Stephen Davies' The Artful Species, I outline the evolved roles of (a) emotions/drives/appetites, and (b) "telic" pleasure, which results from getting something beneficial. I argue that, contrary to Davies, aesthetic appreciation does not fall into either of the above categories (as normally understood). That is, aesthetic appreciation can neither be a drive to possess its object, nor pleasure in possessing that object. Rather, it is pleasure in contemplating that object. Evolutionary accounts fail, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu (2007). Addiction is Not an Affliction: Addictive Desires Are Merely Pleasure-Oriented Desires. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):29 – 32.score: 24.0
    The author comments on the article “The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman presents that addiction is a brain disease or a moral condition. The authors present that addiction is a strong preference, similar to appetitive preferences. They state that addiction is merely a form of pleasure-seeking. The authors conclude that the problem of addiction is the problem of the management of pleasure, not treatment of a disease. Accession Number: 24077914; (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Chris Heathwood (2007). The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):23-44.score: 24.0
    One of the leading approaches to the nature of sensory pleasure reduces it to desire: roughly, a sensation qualifies as a sensation of pleasure just in case its subject wants to be feeling it. This approach is, in my view, correct, but it has never been formulated quite right; and it needs to be defended against some compelling arguments. Thus the purpose of this paper is to discover the most defensible formulation of this rough idea, and to defend (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. James Lenman (2011). Pleasure, Desire and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):143-149.score: 24.0
    This paper examines the role of stability in the constitution of pleasure and desire, its relevance to the intimate ways the two are related and to their role in the constitution of practical reason.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Samuel Clark (2012). Pleasure as Self-Discovery. Ratio 25 (3):260-276.score: 24.0
    This paper uses readings of two classic autobiographies, Edmund Gosse's Father & Son and John Stuart Mill's Autobiography, to develop a distinctive answer to an old and central question in value theory: What role is played by pleasure in the most successful human life? A first section defends my method. The main body of the paper then defines and rejects voluntarist, stoic, and developmental hedonist lessons to be taken from central crises in my two subjects' autobiographies, and argues for (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Shaoming Chen (2010). On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness From the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):179-195.score: 24.0
    This paper discusses the structural relationship between ideals on pleasure and pleasure as a human psychological phenomenon in Chinese thought. It describes the psychological phenomenon of pleasure, and compares different approaches by pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist scholars. It also analyzes its development in Song and Ming Confucianism. Finally, in the conclusion, the issue is transferred to a general understanding of happiness, so as to demonstrate the modern value of the classical ideological experience.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. J. C. B. Gosling & C. C. W. Taylor (1982). The Greeks on Pleasure. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Provides a critical and analytical history of ancient Greek theories on the nature of pleasure, and of its value and rolein human lfie, from the ealriest times down to the period of Epicurus and the early Stoics.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Irwin Goldstein (1988). The Rationality of Pleasure-Seeking Animals. In Sander Lee (ed.), Inquiries Into Value. Edwin Mellen Press.score: 24.0
    Reason guides pleasure-seeking animals in leading them to prefer pleasure to pain.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Robin Mackenzie (2011). The Neuroethics of Pleasure and Addiction in Public Health Strategies Moving Beyond Harm Reduction: Funding the Creation of Non-Addictive Drugs and Taxonomies of Pleasure. Neuroethics 4 (2):103-117.score: 24.0
    We are unlikely to stop seeking pleasure, as this would prejudice our health and well-being. Yet many psychoactive substances providing pleasure are outlawed as illicit recreational drugs, despite the fact that only some of them are addictive to some people. Efforts to redress their prohibition, or to reform legislation so that penalties are proportionate to harm have largely failed. Yet, if choices over seeking pleasure are ethical insofar as they avoid harm to oneself or others, public health (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. George Rudebusch (1999). Socrates, Pleasure, and Value. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, thus solving the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Daniel C. Russell (2005). Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Daniel Russell develops a fresh and original view of pleasure and its pivotal role in Plato's treatment of value, happiness, and human psychology. This is the first full-length discussion of the topic for fifty years, and Russell shows its relevance to contemporary debates in moral philosophy and philosophical psychology. Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life will make fascinating reading for ancient specialists and for a wide range of philosophers.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Timothy Schroeder (2010). Desire and Pleasure in John Pollock's Thinking About Acting. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 148 (3):447–454.score: 24.0
    The first third of John Pollock’s Thinking about Acting is on the topics of pleasure, desire, and preference, and these topics are the ones on which this paper focuses. I review Pollock’s position and argue that it has at least one substantial strength (it elegantly demonstrates that desires must be more fundamental than preferences, and embraces this conclusion wholeheartedly) and at least one substantial weakness (it holds to a form of psychological hedonism without convincingly answering the philosophical or empirical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Gerd van Riel (2000). Pleasure and the Good Life: Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists. Brill.score: 24.0
    This volume deals with the general theory of pleasure of Plato and his successors.The first part describes the two paradigms between which all theories of ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Thomas Blackson (2012). Extrinsic Attitudinal Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):277-291.score: 24.0
    I argue for an alternative interpretation of some of the examples Fred Feldman uses to establish his theory of happiness. According to Feldman, the examples show that certain utterances of the form S is pleased/glad that P and S is displeased/sad that P should be interpreted as expressions of extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and hence must be excluded from the aggregative sum of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure that constitutes happiness. I develop a new interpretation of Feldman’s examples. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Talbot Brewer (2003). Savoring Time: Desire, Pleasure and Wholehearted Activity. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):143-160.score: 24.0
    There is considerable appeal to the Aristotelian idea that taking pleasure in an activity is sometimes simply a matter of attending to it in such a way as to render it wholehearted. However, the proponents of this idea have not made adequately clear what kind of attention it is that can perform the surprising feat of transforming otherwise indifferent activities into pleasurable ones. I build upon Gilbert Ryle's suggestion that taking pleasure in an activity is tantamount to engaging (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. C. C. W. Taylor (2007/2008). Pleasure, Mind, and Soul: Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Pleasure, Mind, and Soul provides a fascinating survey of a range of important topics in the work of some of the greatest ancient philosophers, and which remain ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Olivier Massin (2014). Pleasure and Its Contraries. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):15-40.score: 24.0
    What is the contrary of pleasure? “Pain” is one common answer. This paper argues that pleasure instead has two natural contraries: unpleasure and hedonic indifference. This view is defended by drawing attention to two often-neglected concepts: the formal relation of polar opposition and the psychological state of hedonic indifference. The existence of mixed feelings, it is argued, does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Harvie Ferguson (1990). The Science of Pleasure: Cosmos and Psyche in the Bourgeois World View. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Examines the formation, structure and collapse of the bourgeois world view, exploring the concepts of fun, happiness, pleasure, and excitement.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Carolyn R. Morillo (1992). Reward Event Systems: Reconceptualizing the Explanatory Roles of Motivation, Desire and Pleasure. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):7-32.score: 24.0
    A developing neurobiological/psychological theory of positive motivation gives a key causal role to reward events in the brain which can be directly activated by electrical stimulation (ESB). In its strongest form, this Reward Event Theory (RET) claims that all positive motivation, primary and learned, is functionally dependent on these reward events. Some of the empirical evidence is reviewed which either supports or challenges RET. The paper examines the implications of RET for the concepts of 'motivation', 'desire' and 'reward' or ' (...)'. It is argued (1) that a 'causal base' as opposed to a functional' concept of motivation has theoretical advantages; (2) that a causal distinction between the focus' and the 'anchor' of desire suggests an ineliminable 'opacity' of desire; and (3) that some affective concept, such as 'pleasure', should play a key role in psychological explanation, distinct from that of motivational (or cognitive) concepts. A concept of 'reward' or 'pleasure' as intrinsically positive affect is defended, and contrasted with the more 'operational' definitions of 'reward' in some of the hypotheses of Roy Wise. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Panos Theodorou (forthcoming). Pain, Pleasure, and the Intentionality of Emotions as Experiences of Values: A New Phenomenological Perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.score: 24.0
    The article starts with a brief overview of the kinds of approaches that have been attempted for the presentation of Phenomenology’s view on the emotions. I then pass to Husserl’s unsatisfactory efforts to disclose the intentionality of emotions and their intentional correlation with values. Next, I outline the idea of a new, “normalized phenomenological” approach of emotions and values. Pleasure and pain, then, are first explored as affective feelings (reell lived-experiences). In the cases examined, it is shown that, primordially, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Murat Aydede (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.score: 24.0
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Wendy Steiner (1995). The Scandal of Pleasure: Art in an Age of Fundamentalism. University of Chicago Press.score: 24.0
    Surveying a wide range of cultural controversies, from the Mapplethorpe affair to Salman Rushdie's death sentence, from canon-revision in the academy to the scandals that have surrounded Anthony Blunt, Martin Heidegger, and Paul de Man, Wendy Steiner shows that the fear and outrage they inspired are the result of dangerous misunderstanding about the relationship between art and life. "Stimulating. . . . A splendid rebuttal of those on the left and right who think that the pleasures induced by art are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Bart Vandenabeele (2012). Beauty, Disinterested Pleasure, and Universal Communicability: Kant's Response to Burke. Kant-Studien 103 (2):207-233.score: 24.0
    Although Kant (wrongly) holds that the universal communicability of aesthetic judgments logically follows from the disinterested character of the pleasure upon which they are based, Kant's emphasis on the a priori validity of judgments of beauty can be viewed as a rebuttal of the kind of empiricist arguments that Burke offers to justify the social nature of the experience of beauty. I argue that the requirement of universal communicability is not a mere addition to the requirement of universal validity (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Kristin Zeiler (2010). A Phenomenological Analysis of Bodily Self-Awareness in the Experience of Pain and Pleasure: On Dys-Appearance and Eu-Appearance. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):333-342.score: 24.0
    The aim of this article is to explore nuances within the field of bodily self-awareness. My starting-point is phenomenological. I focus on how the subject experiences her or his body, i.e. how the body stands forth to the subject. I build on the phenomenologist Drew Leder’s distinction between bodily dis-appearance and dys-appearance. In bodily dis-appearance, I am only prereflectively aware of my body. My body is not a thematic object of my experience. Bodily dys-appearance takes place when the body appears (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Laura Desmond (2011). The Pleasure is Mine: The Changing Subject of Erotic Science. Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (1):15-39.score: 24.0
    Pleasure, the defining object of kāmaśāstric scholarship, is harmonious sensory experience, the product of a “good fit” between the self and the world. It comes about when one moves in a world of fitting sense objects, and one has made oneself fit to enter that world. The bulk of kāmaśāstric literature is devoted to developing, enhancing, and enacting specific bodily and sensory capabilities in order to maximize one’s ability to affect and be affected by the world. This article examines (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jean-Christophe Weber (2012). Pleasure in Medical Practice. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (2):153-164.score: 24.0
    It is time to challenge the issue of pleasure associated with the core of medical practice. Its importance is made clear through its opposite: unhappiness—something which affects doctors in a rather worrying way. The paper aims to provide a discussion on pleasure on reliable grounds. Plato’s conception of techne is a convenient model that offers insights into the unique practice of medicine, which embraces in a single purposive action several heterogeneous dimensions. In Aristotle’s Ethics, pleasure appears to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Devin Henry (2002). Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):255-270.score: 22.0
    The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem inherited from Socrates: How could a man fail to restrain himself when he believes that what he desires is wrong? In NE 7 Aristotle attempts to reconcile the Socratic denial of akrasia with the commonly held opinion that people act in ways they know to be bad, even when it is in their power to act otherwise. This project turns out to be largely successful, for what Aristotle shows us (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Daniel M. Haybron (2001). Happiness and Pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.score: 21.0
  44. Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.score: 21.0
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Murat Aydede (2000). An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.score: 21.0
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Scott Berman (1991). Socrates and Callicles on Pleasure. Phronesis 36 (2):117-140.score: 21.0
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Erik Wielenberg (2002). Pleasure, Pain, and Moral Character and Development. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):282-299.score: 21.0
  48. Gerald E. Myers (1957). Ryle on Pleasure. Journal of Philosophy 54 (March):181-187.score: 21.0
  49. Lisa Shapiro (2010). Instrumental or Immersed Experience: Pleasure, Pain and Object Perception in Locke. In CT Wolfe & O. Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science. Springer. 265--285.score: 21.0
  50. Karl Duncker (1941). On Pleasure, Emotion, and Striving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (June):391-430.score: 21.0
1 — 50 / 1000