For the political naturalist, skepticism about political obligations only arises because of a basic confusion about the necessity of the state for human well-being. From this perspective, human beings are naturally political animals and cannot flourish outside of political relationships. In this paper, I suggest that this idea can be developed in two basic ways. For the thick naturalist, political institutions are constitutive of the best life. For the thin naturalist, they secure the basic background (...) conditions of peace and stability that are necessary for any minimally decent human life. Both approaches, however, are problematic, and while political institutions might have a special kind of value for human well-being, it is difficult to convert this claim into a justification for political obligations. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on republicanism often looks back to Aristotle as the Greco-Roman epitome of the history of republican theory. This article contends that Aristotle offers a poor model in compari...

Aristotle's assertion inPolitics1.2 that there is a natural impulse to form political communities is immediately contraposed with the claim that the person responsible for their foundation is the cause (αἴτιος) of the greatest of goods (Pol. 1253a33). The attribution of an essential role to the legislator as an efficient cause appears to clash, however, with Aristotle's political naturalism. If thepolisexists by nature and humans are by nature political animals (1253a1–2), then the question arises as to why (...) active intervention by the legislator is necessary for apolis. Conversely, if thepolisis an artefact of practical reason, then Aristotle's distinction between products of the intellect and natural entities seems to preclude the status of thepolisas natural. In light of this apparent tension between different aspects of Aristotle's account of the origins of political communities, the current paper seeks to demonstrate their reconcilability. Section 1 considers the role of the Aristotelian legislator in light of broader Greek assumptions regarding law-making. Section 2 then considers the status of law-making expertise (νομοθετική) as part of political science (πολιτική) and examines the mode of practical reason that is exercised by the legislative founder. Finally, in section 3, and building on recent interpretations which have emphasized that Aristotle operates with an extended teleological conception of nature, I argue that acts of legislative founding and nature can consistently serve as joint causes of thepolis, because the ‘products’ of the practical rationality of the architectonic legislator are themselves an expression of distinctly human nature. (shrink)

What are human rights? According to one longstanding account, the Naturalistic Conception of human rights, human rights are those that we have simply in virtue of being human. In recent years, however, a new and purportedly alternative conception of human rights has become increasingly popular. This is the so-called Political Conception of human rights, the proponents of which include John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. In this paper we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that Naturalistic Conceptions (...) of human rights can accommodate two of the most salient concerns that proponents of the Political Conception have raised about them. Second, we argue that the theoretical distance between Naturalistic and Political Conceptions is not as great as it has been made out to be. Finally, we argue that a Political Conception of human rights, on its own, lacks the resources necessary to determine the substantive content of human rights. If we are right, not only should the Naturalistic Conception not be rejected, the Political Conception is in fact incomplete without the theoretical resources that a Naturalistic Conception characteristically provides. These three claims, in tandem, provide a fresh and largely conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between proponents of Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights. (shrink)

Many political realists reject the idea that the first task for political philosophy is to justify the existence of coercive political institutions. Instead, they say, we should begin with the factual existence of CPIs, and ask how they ought to be structured. In holding this view, they adopt a form of political naturalism that is broadly Aristotelian in character. In this article, I distinguish between two forms that this political naturalism might take - (...) what I call a ‘strong’ form, and a ‘weak’ form - and argue that both ought to be rejected. (shrink)

_Naturalism and Democracy_, first published in German in 2014, presents a long-awaited commentary on Spinoza’s _Political Treatise _. It gives a detailed analysis of Spinoza’s latest theory of State and Law, with special attention to his democratic approach.

Naturalism and Democracy, first published in German in 2014, presents a long-awaited commentary on Spinoza’s Political Treatise (Tractatus politicus). It gives a detailed analysis of Spinoza’s latest theory of State and Law, with special attention to his democratic approach.

Lefort's ‘Outline of the Genesis of Ideology in Modern Societies’ constitutes an important attempt to reinvigorate the notion of ideology through a critique of the Marxist use of the term while retaining the basic features of Marx's own understanding. In particular, Lefort attempts to understand the transformations through which ideology goes in non-bourgeois social forms. He achieves this primarily through a critique of the naturalism inherent in Marx's understanding of society and ideology. In this article, I argue that Lefort's (...) understanding of ideology and his critique of Marx belong squarely within the phenomenological tradition, despite the fact that Lefort does not make this explicit. More importantly, I argue that there is a strong continuity between Lefort's understanding of ideology and Husserl of the ‘Vienna Lecture’. The article ends with a short application of these thoughts to ideology in the age of globalization. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is, first, that ecological thinking—which takes its point of departure from specifically located, multifaceted analyses of knowledge production and circulation in diverse demographic and geographic locations—can generate more responsible knowings than the reductivism of the positivist post-Enlightenment legacy allows; and second, that ecological thinking can spark a revolution comparable to Kant’s Copernican revolution, which recentered western thought by moving “man” to the center of the philosophical-conceptual universe. Kantian philosophy was parochial in the conception of “man” (...) on which it turned: a recognition central to feminist, Marxist, post-colonial and critical race theory. It promoted a picture of a physical and human world centered on and subservient to a small class and race of men who were uniformly capable of achieving a narrowly-conceived standard of reason, citizenship, and morality. As humanism vied with theism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so ecological thinking vies with capitalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Here I outline its promise. (shrink)

Hoy seeks to establish a basis for a naturalistic political theory as a continuity from Aristotle through the Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment contributions ...

There has been a resurgence of Darwinian naturalism in political theory, as manifested in the recent work of political scientists such as Roger D. Masters, Robert J. McShea, and James Q. Wilson. They belong to an intellectual tradition that includes not only Charles Darwin but also Aristotle and David Hume. Although most political scientists believe Darwinian social theory has been refuted, their objections rest on three false dichotomies: facts versus values, nature versus freedom, and nature versus (...) nurture. Rejecting these dichotomies would allow the social sciences to be linked to the natural sciences through Darwinian biology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Supernatural vs. Naturalistic Prophecy: Historical and Philosophical Precedents Prophecy in Maimonides' Halakhic Works Prophecy in the Guide On Miracles: Natural or Supernatural? Conclusion further reading.

Today the ethical and normative concerns of everyday citizens are all too often sidelined from the study of political and social issues, driven out by an effort to create a more "scientific" study. This book offers a way for social scientists and political theorists to reintegrate the empirical and the normative, proposing a way out of the scientism that clouds our age. In Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and the Demise of Naturalism: Reunifying Political Theory and Social (...) Science, Jason Blakely argues that the resources for overcoming this divide are found in the respective intellectual developments of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre. Blakely examines their often parallel intellectual journeys, which led them to critically engage the British New Left, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, continental hermeneutics, and modern social science. Although MacIntyre and Taylor are not sui generis, Blakely claims they each present a new, revived humanism, one that insists on the creative agency of the human person against reductive, instrumental, technocratic, and scientistic ways of thinking. The recovery of certain key themes in these philosophers' works generates a new political philosophy with which to face certain unprecedented problems of our age. Taylor's and MacIntyre's philosophies give social scientists working in all disciplines (from economics and sociology to political science and psychology) an alternative theoretical framework for conducting research. "This book does an excellent job in identifying a real problem in mainstream political theory--its overly normative character and its separation from social science. It contains many original contributions to the field. I particularly liked the way in which the problems of naturalism are presented as institutional, cultural, and political as well as philosophical. The historical background to these problems is also interesting and sheds fresh light on the issues." --Nicholas Smith, Macquarie University. (shrink)

Two countervailing trends mark the intellectual tenor of our age the spread of naturalistic worldviews and religious orthodoxies. Advances in biogenetics, brain research, and robotics are clearing the way for the penetration of an objective scientific self-understanding of persons into everyday life. For philosophy, this trend is associated with the challenge of scientific naturalism. At the same time, we are witnessing an unexpected revitalization of religious traditions and the politicization of religious communities across the world. From a philosophical perspective, (...) this revival of religious energies poses the challenge of a fundamentalist critique of the principles underlying the modern Wests postmetaphysical understanding of itself. The tension between naturalism and religion is the central theme of this major new book by Jrgen Habermas. On the one hand he argues for an appropriate naturalistic understanding of cultural evolution that does justice to the normative character of the human mind. On the other hand, he calls for an appropriate interpretation of the secularizing effects of a process of social and cultural rationalization increasingly denounced by the champions of religious orthodoxies as a historical development peculiar to the West. These reflections on the enduring importance of religion and the limits of secularism under conditions of postmetaphysical reason set the scene for an extended treatment the political significance of religious tolerance and for a fresh contribution to current debates on cosmopolitanism and a constitution for international society. (shrink)

Naturalistic Hermeneutics proposes the position of the unity of the scientific method and defends it against the claim to autonomy of the human sciences. Mantzavinos shows how materials that are 'meaningful', more specifically human actions and texts, can be adequately dealt with by the hypothetico-deductive method, the standard method used in the natural sciences. The hermeneutic method is not an alternative method aimed at the understanding and the interpretation of human actions and texts, but it is the same as the (...) hypothetico-deductive method applied to meaningful materials. The central thesis advocated by Mantzavinos is, thus, that there is no fundamental methodological difference between natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Advanced students and professionals across philosophy, social and political theory, and the humanities will find this a compelling and controversial book. (shrink)

This paper explores how João de Andrade Corvo and José Vicente Barbosa du Bocage, two nineteenth-century Portuguese naturalists, were able to reach prominent political positions in their country by means of their work in, respectively, botany and agriculture, and zoology. The authority they derived from their scientific activities and the knowledge they acquired in the process, favored by their proximity to particular political quarters, elevated them to important governmental offices, in the context of which they implemented policies that (...) reinforced Portugal’s identity as an imperial nation. The colonial policies and agreements signed by Corvo and Bocage aimed at securing Portuguese colonial territories, which, aside from their economic relevance, constituted a symbol of power that reinforced the sovereignty of a small nation in a Europe dominated by the rule of increasingly vaster and stronger states. In spite of their different scientific careers and personal interests, both naturalists played key roles in Portuguese foreign affairs and colonial negotiations of the late nineteenth century, especially during the Scramble for Africa. (shrink)

This is a forthcoming section for the book "Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy", edited by Graham Oppy, Gregory Dawes, Evan Fales, Joseph Koterski, Mashhad Al-Allaf, Robert Fastiggi, and David Shatz. I was asked to write a brief essay on whether naturalism or theism can successfully explain the distribution of suffering in our world. Wheras another section covers the possibility that suffering is evidence against theism, my essay is concerned only with the ability for either naturalism or (...) theism to explain suffering. I argue that, for naturalists, suffering is not to be explained by either philosophers of religion or theologians. Instead, naturalists believe that suffering should be explained by the cognitive and social sciences, perhaps in conjunction with political philosophy and philosophy of mind. Moreover, naturalists may take suffering to be an important reason for action. In a world without a transcendent, supernatural being to watch over us, we can only depend upon each other to ameliorate existing conditions, to the extent that they can be ameliorated. On the other hand, theistic explanations of the distibution of suffering slip very easily into problematic theologies when they try to offer explicit explanations for suffering. For example, the world's most vulnerable people are often those who suffer the most, whereas oppressors are often able to prosper. That is, theistic explanations of our world's suffering easily slip into, e.g., the just world fallacy, racist ideology (i.e., that God favors some race(s) of people over others), or patriarchal ideology. Instead of offering an explicit explanation, theists should instead be skeptical theists -- i.e., they should argue that an explanation for our world's suffering is beyond our ken. While skeptical theism avoids the aforementioned problematic implications, if skeptical theism is true, then our world's suffering cannot be fully explained. (shrink)

Does Derrida's radicalization of the science-respecting Enlightenment tradition redefine it in such a way that the concept of nature is no longer relevant? But where is the tradition of Copernicus, Darwin, Nietzsche, Marx, without nature? Must there not be a post-deconstructive sense of nature that preserves the connection with the ethico-political project of naturalism? Derrida consistently defines deconstruction in naturalistic terms, specifically in terms of a commitment to the concept of materiality, and this commitment is essential to the (...) ethico-political project of naturalism, which is continually eroded by ‘weak’ naturalisms that at certain point collapse back into supernaturalism. A prime case in point in contemporary analytic philosophy is the attempt made by Nagel, Chalmers, and others to assign a special metaphysical status to ‘consciousness’ or ‘experience.’ When the project of deconstruction is seen as a form of naturalism, Daniel Dennett looms as an important potential ally against the forms of covert ‘spiritism’ represented by Nagel and Chalmers. (shrink)

This volume considers in depth and carefully a cluster of issues central to contemporary philosophical and social scientific investigation while utilising methods and conceptualisations at the very cutting edge of philosophy.

Pragmatism’s naturalism is inconsistent with the phenomenological tradition’s anti-naturalism. This poses a problem for the methodological consistency of phenomenological work in the pragmatist tradition. Solutions such as phenomenologizing naturalism or naturalizing phenomenology have been proposed, but they fail. As a consequence, pragmatists and other naturalists must answer the phenomenological tradition’s criticisms of naturalism.

The Critical Naturalism Manifesto is a common platform put forward as a basis for broad discussions around the problems faced by critical theory today. We are living in a time, e.g. a pandemic time, when present-day challenges exert immense pressure on social critique. This means that models of social critique should not be discussed from the point of view of their normative justification or political effects alone, but also with reference to their ability to tackle contemporary problematic issues (...) (like the dismantlement of the welfare state, the environmental catastrophe, and the sanitary crisis). With this manifesto, we invite varying practices of philosophical, artistic and scientific social critique to take seriously the enormous challenges our societies face with regard to inner and outer nature. We first identity eleven theses of critical naturalism which contemporary critical theory should take into consideration. We then identify the historical crises and catastrophes that critical naturalism seeks to respond to, dispelling the prejudices against naturalism in contemporary critical thought, and considering alternative answers to these questions such as social constructivism, accelerationism, xenofeminism, flat ontologism, and monist world ecology. By sketching the notions of nature and naturalism, we anchor critical naturalism in the history of materialism and critical theory, understood initially as that of the Frankfurt School, but expanded and enriched by other approaches to social critique. Finally, we sketch models and projects of critical naturalism, which are exemplary fragments of varying ways to practice naturalist social critique. (shrink)

After a time dominated by nature-phobia, a naturalistic turn is emerging within feminist theory. Welcoming this new theoretical embrace of nature and sympathising with its insistence that nature is not feminism’s enemy, this article nevertheless points to some problematic features of this turn. Focusing on Elizabeth Grosz’s postmodernist readings of Charles Darwin, I suggest that their emphasis of nature’s dynamic, indeterminate and enabling qualities both implies a politically unmotivated glorification of the dynamic and unruly, and as such obscures the important (...) fact that nature also works as a constraining factor on societies. I demonstrate, from the point of view of a Marxist-realist perspective, why an acknowledgement of nature’s limiting force is crucial for the coherence of any theoretical account of the workings of social systems. The article also addresses the feminist imperative to transcend the dualism between nature and culture, and shows how the concept of emergence offers a solution to dilemmas that tend to appear in connection to such efforts of transcendence. (shrink)

Spinoza’s naturalism is unique. It explains conscious mind, physical behavior, and scientific, cultural, social and political phenomena by recourse to the deductive relation of causes to effects as expressed by Nature itself. This book provides an innovative and original interpretation of the way in which Spinoza achieved this unique vision.

Naturalism is a worldview that rejects supernatural events and affirms that a complete account of reality can be given by entities and processes that occur in the natural world. It has a political, moral and spiritual dimension compatible with the Humanist Manifesto. In this paper, I present a description of naturalism based on recent developments in physics and biology. In my view, naturalism is based on scientific realism and accepts indeterminism as postulated by quantum mechanics. Because (...) I cannot prove that only physical entities populate the world, I embrace methodological rather than ontological naturalism. I believe that complex systems exhibit behaviors such as emergence and chaos that can only be explained by non-reductive physicalism. We do not know the origin of life or the universe but there are many plausible theories under investigation. The theory of evolution is the best explanation we have for the amazing variety and complexity in the living world. It is unclear how brain events cause mind events; I suspect that mind is an emergent property of neural circuits in the brain. Religious beliefs have a socialevolutionary origin; I am an agnostic who rejects positive atheism and agrees that science may be compatible with Deism, pantheism and some liberal religions. (shrink)

Terry Pinkard draws on Hegel's central works as well as his lectures on aesthetics, the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of history in this deeply informed and original exploration of Hegel's naturalism.

The article proves that modern political philosophy is based on the concept of "individual" and on the abstract principle of "equality of individuals". But this abstract principle does not provide for "content expansion" in all possible directions without exception. Therefore, inattention to gender equality or cultural equality does not prevent, for example, Locke from recognizing the natural equality of all people. This circumstance can be considered an ideological source of the "modern paradox": the recognition of the natural equality of (...) all people does not guarantee the automatic granting of political rights to women or providing them equal opportunities for professional and career growth with men. (shrink)

In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about moral terms, (...) in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is: our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth. (shrink)

References to human dignity abound in contemporary political, legal, and ethical documents and practices, including a widening representation in bioethical contexts. Appeals to dignity characteristically involve some notion of equality and the idea that there is some range of actions which ought never to be directed at persons . However, much of this contemporary use of dignity leaves the concept itself under-developed or poorly grounded. This sometimes conduces to a broadly skeptical view that dignity has any determinate content, or (...) that it can be grounded independently of either religion or rationalism. I argue that dignity has substantial connections to modern biological views of human beings, and that the biological matrix for dignity should be explored to help remedy these shortcomings. I propose three major biological contexts for understanding dignity in a naturalistic fashion: reciprocity and punishment, in so far as both are implicated in the promotion of pro-social cooperative behavior among humans, and dignity as a communicative signal that also has power to promote cooperation. Each of these three components is explored in some detail by reference to a wide range of contemporary scientific literature. Finally, I make suggestions for how it might be possible to study dignity in a fully scientific way, by adapting methods and techniques already well-established in biological, physiological, and neuroscientific study of human cooperation. (shrink)

Wei-Jin period is characterized by neo-Daoism ( xuanxue 玄學), and J I Kang lived in the midst of this philosophical exploration. Adopting the naturalism of the Zhuangzi , J i Kang expressed his socio-political concerns through the medium of music, which was previously regarded as having moral bearing and rectitude. Denying such rectitude became central for J i Kang, who claimed that music was incapable of possessing human emotion, releasing it from the chains of Confucian ritualism. His investigation (...) into the name and reality of musical expression gave music an “aesthetic turn” lacking in Qin and early Han thought, and by making use of concepts such as natural harmony and spontaneity, J i Kang was able to turn away from the negative aesthetics of earlier thinkers such as H e Yan and W ang Bi to one cherishing the naturalism espoused by Zhuangzi. (shrink)

The disenchantment of 1848 -- The pessimistic view -- Science, the new god -- The bourgeois world -- The realism of Flaubert -- Optimistic realism -- Russian realism -- Social realism -- Social realism and socialist realism -- The continuing march of science -- The book of despair -- Life in the raw -- The natural history of morality -- Naturalism and moralism -- Painting: the impressionists -- A critique of naturalism -- Human nature in politics -- The (...) natural history of the soul -- The poet as seer -- The mystery of poetry -- A critique of symbolism -- Against the Grain -- The aesthetic ideal -- The decadence -- Some Wilde epigrams -- The influence of Richard Wagner -- Just before the war. (shrink)

The concept of the Anthropocene draws attention to human activity's impact on the planet at the geological scale. It is tempting to reason that like evolution, a heliocentric solar system or quantum mechanics, climate science compels us to accept as real a radical new ontology, the 'anthroposphere', with far-reaching social and political consequences. I wish to argue that this temptation should be resisted. The Anthropocene cannot be understood entirely as a natural scientific phenomenon, although it can be treated as (...) such for certain purposes. It is also an irreducibly social phenomenon. This is not to say that it is a socially constructed concept like nationhood, but that it is constituted by natural causal processes that are irreducibly entangled with social causal processes. Adopting the Anthropocene as a working concept therefore requires that we understand the causal processes involved in bringing it about as social causal processes, while also viewing these processes as objectual, open to public scrutiny and capable of compelling public assent. Social causes are not, however, easily subjected to such a naturalistic treatment. I conclude that the Anthropocene is not currently a suitable candidate for inclusion in a naturalist ontology. (shrink)

This paper rereads David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as dramatising a distinctive, naturalistic account of toleration. I have two purposes in mind: first, to complete and ground Hume's fragmentary explicit discussion of toleration; second, to unearth a potentially attractive alternative to more recent, Rawlsian approaches to toleration. To make my case, I connect Dialogues and the problem of toleration to the wider themes of naturalism, scepticism and their relation in Hume's thought, before developing a new interpretation of Dialogues (...) part 12 as political drama. Finally, I develop the Humean theory of toleration I have discovered by comparison between Rawls's and Hume's strategies for justification of a tolerant political regime. (shrink)

The ‘value-free ideal’ has been called into question for several reasons. It does not include “epistemic values”—viewed as characteristic of ‘good science’—and rejects the so-called ‘contextual’, ‘non-cognitive’ or ‘non-epistemic’ values—all of them personal, moral, or political values. This paper analyzes a possible complementary argument about the dubitable validity of the value-free ideal, specifically focusing on social sciences, with a two-fold strategy. First, it will consider that values are natural facts in a broad or ‘liberal naturalist’ sense and, thus, a (...) legitimate part of those sciences. Second, the paper will not reject the value-free ideal; rather, it will construe this ideal in a special way, not casting values aside in sciences, but bringing them to the table and rationally discussing them. Today’s predominant naturalistic view has tended to ‘naturalize’ values by looking for physicalist explanations for them—a move resisted by defenders of normativism in social sciences. At the same time, a contending ‘liberal naturalist’ stream has emerged, claiming that not all natural entities can be explained by the methods and concepts of physical sciences, and favors a non-materialist naturalism which includes mind, consciousness, meaning and value as fundamental parts of nature that cannot be reduced to matter. Hence, it may be posited that non-epistemic values could be ‘naturally’ included in the field of human sciences. (shrink)

This article addresses whether Nietzsche’s naturalism is best understood as exemplifying the principles of scientific method and the spirit of Enlightenment. It does so from a standpoint inspired by Eugen Fink’s contention that Nietzsche’s endorsements of “naturalism” are best read as hyperbole. The discussion engages with Enlightenment-orientated readings (by Walter Kaufmann, Maudemarie Clark, and Brian Leiter), which hold Nietzsche’s naturalism to endorse of the spirit of empirical science, and an alternative view (provided by Richard Schacht and Wolfgang (...) Müller-Lauter), which holds Nietzsche’s “extended naturalism” to be an informing ethos of historically aware thought rather than a mere “method.” The ensuing discussion endorses the latter approach in terms that seek to take more seriously the implications of Fink’s point about the hyperbolic and figural aspects of Nietzsche’s naturalism. I argue that Nietzsche’s naturalism is indeed often hyperbolic and figural but that this exaggerated form of naturalizing thought allows insights that invite explicit theorization. Turning to an approach suggested by Adorno and Horkheimer, I argue that Nietzsche’s exaggeratedly “naturalistic” take on morality is best appreciated as a form of disturbing and disruptive political intervention in the dominant discourse of modernity in which it overtly situates itself, namely, the instrumentalizing, methodologically fixated liberal discourse of scientific Enlightenment. If we approach his thinking in this way, Nietzsche’s naturalism serves as a valuable resource for critical reflection on the hegemony of contemporary scientific culture. The context for such critical reflection is provided by Giorgio Agamben’s work on sovereign power and modernity. Nietzsche’s naturalism, I argue, is foremost biopolitical in its implications. These implications invite critical reflection on aspects of Agamben’s work; they also, following Agamben’s lead, suggest that we must step beyond the fundamental concepts of liberalism. (shrink)

Philosophy as a discipline is facing new challenges that will determine its future. The challenges include the historic ones relating to economic conditions and administrative leadership that focuses on preparation for employment in a way that lessens the intellectual development of students. But the new challenges occur in a worldwide democratic recession and in political leadership that seems to be moving toward greater censorship and less academic freedom. In America, this is also occurring with a decline in student enrollment (...) that negatively impacts the liberal arts and particularly philosophy. This article examines the way two forms of American naturalism may respond. John Dewey’s cultural naturalism and George Santayana’s thorough, non-reductive naturalism provide an array of alternatives. I explore alternatives open to philosophers that include abandoning philosophy by leaving the university or becoming an administrator as well as alternatives available if one remains in the university. Finally, I offer four criteria for judging the viability of choosing any of the alternatives. (shrink)

I discuss the limits of Ingarden’s phenomenology of perception from a naturalistic perspective. Ingarden did not propose any proper method of the realization of the applied theory of perception (critics of perception). This situation enables to apply empirical data from cognitive neurosciences. The applied procedure shows that basic components of the phenomenology of perception are not valid.

Naturalism is normally taken to be an ideology, censuring non-naturalistic alternatives. But as many critics have pointed out, this ideological stance looks internally incoherent, since it is not obviously endorsed by naturalistic methods. Naturalists who have addressed this problem universally foreswear the normative component of naturalism by, in effect, giving up science’s exclusive claim to legitimacy. This option makes naturalism into an empty expression of personal preference that can carry no weight in the philosophical or political (...) spheres. In response to this dilemma, I argue that on a popular (but largely unarticulated) construal of naturalism as a commitment to inference to the best explanation, methodological naturalism can be both normative and internally coherent. (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge an influential understanding of naturalization according to which work on traditional problems in the philosophy of law should be replaced with sociological or psychological explanations of how judges decide cases. W.V. Quine famously proposed the ‘naturalization of epistemology’. In a prominent series of papers and a book, Brian Leiter has raised the intriguing idea that Quine’s naturalization of epistemology is a useful model for philosophy of law. I examine Quine’s naturalization of epistemology and Leiter’s suggested (...) parallel and argue that the parallel does not hold up. Even granting Leiter’s substantive assumption that the law is indeterminate, there is no philosophical confusion or overreaching in the legal case that is parallel to the philosophical overreaching of Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology. Moreover, if we take seriously Leiter’s analogy, the upshot is almost the opposite of what Leiter suggests. The closest parallel in the legal case to Quine’s position would be the rejection of the philosophical positions that lead to the indeterminacy thesis. (shrink)