Search results for 'Possible World' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  44
    Gerhard Schurz & Paul Weingartner (2010). Zwart and Franssen's Impossibility Theorem Holds for Possible-World-Accounts but Not for Consequence-Accounts to Verisimilitude. Synthese 172 (3):415 - 436.
    Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts , content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not (...)
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  2. Robert Stalnaker (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (75):141-156.
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of (...)
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  3.  99
    Martin Pickup (2014). Leibniz and the Necessity of the Best Possible World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):507-523.
    (2014). Leibniz and the Necessity of the Best Possible World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 92, No. 3, pp. 507-523. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.889724.
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  4. Christopher Menzel (1990). Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Semantics. Synthese 85 (3):355 - 389.
    Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it for (...)
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  5.  41
    Daniel Cohen (2009). Creating the Best Possible World: Some Problems From Parfit. Sophia 48 (2):143-150.
    It is sometimes argued that if God were to exist, then the actual world would be the best possible world. However, given that the actual world is clearly not the best possible world, then God doesn’t exist. In response, some have argued that the world could always be improved with the creation of new people and that there is thus no best possible world. I argue that this reasoning gives rise to (...)
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  6.  20
    Bruce R. Reichenbach (1979). Must God Create the Best Possible World? International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):203-212.
    I ARGUE THAT THE NOTION OF THE BEST POSSIBLE WORLD IS MEANINGLESS AND THEREFORE A CHIMERA, BECAUSE FOR ANY WORLD WHICH MIGHT BE SO DESIGNATED, THERE COULD ALWAYS BE ANOTHER WHICH WAS BETTER, EITHER IN BEING POPULATED BY BEINGS WITH BETTER OR A GREATER QUANTITY OF GOOD CHARACTERISTICS, OR ELSE BY BEING MORE OPTIMIFIC.
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  7.  7
    Bruce Reichenbach (1980). Basinger on Reichenbach and the Best Possible World. International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (3):343-345.
    I reply to David Basinger who, in an article printed in the same issue, develops objections to my original argument (IPQ XIX, 203-212) that it makes no sense to inquire whether God could create the best possible world since the concept of a best possible world is a meaningless notion. I argue that if the number of possible worlds is infinite, there cannot be an upper limit to this order, and without an upper limit, there (...)
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  8. Lee Walters (2015). Possible World Semantics and True‐True Counterfactuals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1).
    The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be (...)
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  9. R. Bradley (2012). Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals. Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, (...)
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  10.  42
    Douglas Erlandson & Charles Sayward (1981). Is Heaven a Possible World? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1):55 - 58.
    The goal of theodicy is to show how God could create our world with all its evil. This paper argues that the theodicist can achieve her goal only if she gives up one of these three propositions: (1) evil does not exist in heaven; (2) heaven is better than the present world; (3) heaven is a possible world. Second, it is argued that the theodicist can reject (3) without giving up her belief that heaven exists, so (...)
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  11. Michael J. Shaffer & Jeremy Morris (2010). The Epistemic Inadequacy of Ersatzer Possible World Semantics. Logique Et Analyse 53:61-76.
    In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of linguistic ersatzism, the ontologically deflationary view that possible worlds are maximal and consistent sets of sentences, and possible world semantics, the view that the meaning of a sentence is the set of possible worlds at which it is true, implies that no actual speaker can effectively use virtually any language to successfully communicate information. This result is based on complexity issues that relate to our finite computational (...)
     
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  12. John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Does Possible World Semantics Turn All Propositions Into Necessary Ones? Journal of Pragmatics 39 (5):972-916.
    "Jim would still be alive if he hadn't jumped" means that Jim's death was a consequence of his jumping. "x wouldn't be a triangle if it didn't have three sides" means that x's having a three sides is a consequence its being a triangle. Lewis takes the first sentence to mean that Jim is still alive in some alternative universe where he didn't jump, and he takes the second to mean that x is a non-triangle in every alternative universe where (...)
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  13. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics. Erkenntnis 72 (3):295 - 314.
    Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the interpretation (...)
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  14.  40
    Thomas Baldwin (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):157–174.
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of (...)
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  15.  25
    Anders Kraal (2013). Is the Existence of the Best Possible World Logically Impossible? International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):37-46.
    Since the 1960s an increasing number of philosophers have endorsed the thesis that there can be no such thing as “the best possible world.” In this paper I examine the main arguments for this thesis as put forth by George Schlesinger, Alvin Plantinga, Bruce Reichenbach, Peter Forrest, and Richard Swinburne. I argue that none of these arguments succeed in establishing the thesis and that the logical possibility of the best possible world is as yet an open (...)
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  16.  43
    Keith Chrzan (1987). The Irrelevance of the No Best Possible World Defense. Philosophia 17 (2):161-167.
    Certainly NBPW can justify metaphysical evil, which is all Leibniz intended it to do. Probably, as suggested by Bruce Reichenbach, NBPW can rebut an atheistic argument from the non-existence of the best possible world. It could even augment a GGD by defending against a divine obligation to have created a “larger” world. But NBPW by itself cannot serve to derail the logical problem of evil in any way whatsoever; theists must find refuge in a GGD if they (...)
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  17.  23
    Cheng-Chih Tsai (2012). The Genesis of Hi-Worlds: Towards a Principle-Based Possible World Semantics. Erkenntnis 76 (1):101-114.
    A Leibnizian semantics proposed by Becker in 1952 for the modal operators has recently been reviewed in Copeland’s paper The Genesis of Possible World Semantics (Copeland in J Philos Logic 31:99–137, 2002 ), with a remark that “neither the binary relation nor the idea of proving completeness was present in Becker’s work”. In light of Frege’s celebrated Sense-Determines-Reference principle, we find, however, that it is Becker’s semantics, rather than Kripke’s semantics, that has captured the true spirit of Frege’s (...)
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  18.  8
    Melvin Fitting (2014). Possible World Semantics for First-Order Logic of Proofs. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):225-240.
    In the tech report Artemov and Yavorskaya [4] an elegant formulation of the first-order logic of proofs was given, FOLP. This logic plays a fundamental role in providing an arithmetic semantics for first-order intuitionistic logic, as was shown. In particular, the tech report proved an arithmetic completeness theorem, and a realization theorem for FOLP. In this paper we provide a possible-world semantics for FOLP, based on the propositional semantics of Fitting [5]. We also give an Mkrtychev semantics. Motivation (...)
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  19.  15
    Nobu-Yuki Suzuki (1997). Kripke Frame with Graded Accessibility and Fuzzy Possible World Semantics. Studia Logica 59 (2):249-269.
    A possible world structure consist of a set W of possible worlds and an accessibility relation R. We take a partial function r(·,·) to the unit interval [0, 1] instead of R and obtain a Kripke frame with graded accessibility r Intuitively, r(x, y) can be regarded as the reliability factor of y from x We deal with multimodal logics corresponding to Kripke frames with graded accessibility in a fairly general setting. This setting provides us with a (...)
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  20. John F. Williams (2009). Hating Perfection: A Subtle Search for the Best Possible World. Humanity Books.
    Whiskey Lao -- Fair warning -- Randomness at large -- We the addicted -- The best possible world -- The importance of being doomed -- Moral responsibility -- The upper limit to the value of possible worlds.
     
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  21.  28
    Dale Jacquette (2014). Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence. Metaphysica 15 (1).
    The thesis that entities exist in, at, or in relation to logically possible worlds is criticized. The suggestion that actually nonexistent fictional characters might nevertheless exist in nonactual merely logically possible worlds runs afoul of the most general transworld identity requirements. An influential philosophical argument for the concept of world-relativized existence is examined in Alvin Plantinga’s formal development and explanation of modal semantic relations. Despite proposing an attractive unified semantics of alethic modality, Plantinga’s argument is rejected on (...)
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  22. Michael J. Shaffer & Jeremy Morris (2006). A Paradox for Possible World Semantics. Logique Et Analyse 49 (195):307-317.
    The development of possible worlds semantics for modal claims has led to a more general application of that theory as a complete semantics for various formal and natural languages, and this view is widely held to be an adequate (philosophical) interpretation of the model theory for such languages. We argue here that this view generates a self-referential inconsistency that indicates either the falsity or the incompleteness of PWS.
     
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  23. Jeffrey Sanford Russell (2015). Possible Worlds and the Objective World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):389-422.
    David Lewis holds that a single possible world can provide more than one way things could be. But what are possible worlds good for if they come apart from ways things could be? We can make sense of this if we go in for a metaphysical understanding of what the world is. The world does not include everything that is the case—only the genuine facts. Understood this way, Lewis's “cheap haecceitism” amounts to a kind of (...)
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  24.  16
    Mark L. Thomas (1996). Robert Adams and the Best Possible World. Faith and Philosophy 13 (2):252-259.
    Robert Merrihew Adams argues that it is permissible for a perfectly good moral agent to create a world less good than the best one she could create. He argues that God would exhibit the important virtue of grace in creating less than the best and that this virtue is incompatible with the merit considerations required by the standard of creating the best. In this paper I give three arguments for the compatibility of merit consideration and graciousness of God toward (...)
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  25. J. Y. Béziau (2010). What is a Possible World. In Guido Imaguire & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Possible Worlds: Logic, Semantics and Ontology. Philosophia 25--37.
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  26.  6
    Robert Brandom & N. Rescher (1979). The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Nonstandard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly, Library of Philosophy 5 (1):233-236.
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  27. David Blumenfeld (1975). Is the Best Possible World Possible? Philosophical Review 84 (2):163-177.
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  28.  29
    Stephen Grover (2003). This World, ‘Adams Worlds’, and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Religious Studies 39 (2):145-163.
    ‘Adams worlds’ are possible worlds that contain no creature whose life is not worth living or whose life is overall worse than in any other possible world in which it would have existed. Creating an Adams world involves no wrongdoing or unkindness towards creatures on the part of the creator. I argue that the notion of an Adams world is of little value in theodicy. Theists are not only committed to thinking that this world (...)
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  29. David Lewis (1977). Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics: A Rejoinder. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):359-363.
  30.  25
    C. Anthony Anderson (2009). The Lesson of Kaplan's Paradox About Possible World Semantics. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press 85.
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  31.  61
    Brian Ellis, Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1977). An Objection to Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):355 - 357.
  32.  10
    David Blumenfeld (1995). 11 Perfection and Happiness in the Best Possible World. In Nicholas Jolley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz. Cambridge University Press 382.
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  33.  25
    Lawrence Resnick (1973). God and the Best Possible World. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (4):313 - 317.
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  34.  5
    Michael J. Coughlan (1987). Must God Create Only the Best Possible World? Sophia 26 (2):15-19.
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  35.  13
    David Basinger (1980). Must God Create the Best Possible World? International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (3):339-341.
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  36.  12
    Steffen Borge (2000). A Call for a Possible World Argument in Ethics. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):105-117.
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  37.  42
    Melvin Fitting, Possible World Semantics for First Order Lp.
    First we have individual variables, as usual in first-order logics. (We do not have individual constants, but this is a minor point.) The propositional logic LP has justification constants, but in FOLP these are generalized to allow individual variables as arguments. Thus we have as justification constants c, c(x), c(x, y), . . . . Similarly LP has justification variables, but in FOLP these can be parametrized with individual variables p, p(x), p(x, y), . . . . To keep terminology (...)
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  38.  1
    Leszek Nowak (1991). Thoughts Are Facts in Possible Worlds, Truths Are Facts of a Given World. Dialectica 45 (4):273-288.
    Mentalism preserves the triad: brain's state — thought — state of affairs whereas phy‐sicalism identifies the former two elements of it. Both stands meet the famous difficulties. But these presuppose ontological actualism. On the ground of ontological possibilism, claiming the existence of all possible worlds, one may identify a thought with the corresponding state of affairs in a possible world. Yet, possibilism turns out to be too narrow to carry such an identification and requires a significant generalization.
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  39.  3
    James T. Cushing (1985). Is There Just One Possible World? Contingency Vs the Bootstrap. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (1):31-48.
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  40.  21
    Laurence Carlin (2002). Reward and Punishment in the Best Possible World: Leibniz's Theory of Natural Retribution. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):139-160.
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  41.  8
    Charles G. Morgan (1979). Note on a Strong Liberated Modal Logic and its Relevance to Possible World Skepticism. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (4):718-722.
  42.  3
    Rabinowicz Wlodek (2006). Analyticity-An Unfinished Business in Possible World Semantics. In Henrik Lagerlund, Sten Lindström & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 53 345--358.
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  43.  5
    Wlodek Rabinowicz, Analyticity: An Unfinished Business in Possible-World Semantics.
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  44.  9
    G. W. R. (1982). The Logic of Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. Review of Metaphysics 35 (3):627-629.
  45.  3
    Dale Jacquette (2005). Nonstandard Semantics for Modal Logic and the Concept of a Logically Possible World. Philosophia Scientiae 9 (2):239-258.
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  46.  11
    L. Wiesenthal (1985). Visual Space From the Perspective of Possible World Semantics II. Synthese 64 (2):241 - 270.
  47.  5
    J. F. Ross (1962). Did God Create the Only Possible World? Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):14 - 25.
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  48.  2
    Jean-Pascal Alcantara (2012). Leibniz, Modal Logic and Possible World Semantics: The Apulean Square as a Procrustean Bed for His Modal Metaphysics. In J.-Y. Beziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Birkhäuser 53--71.
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  49. David Makinson (1982). Review: Nicholas Rescher, Robert Brandom, The Logic of Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (1):233-236.
     
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  50.  1
    Ruth Ronen (2001). Possible World and Representation. In Ananta Charana Sukla (ed.), Art and Representation: Contributions to Contemporary Aesthetics. Praeger 101.
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