Search results for 'Possible World' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christopher Menzel (1990). Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible World Semantics. Synthese 85 (3):355 - 389.score: 180.0
    Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it for (...)
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  2. Robert Stalnaker (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (75):141-156.score: 180.0
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of (...)
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  3. Gerhard Schurz & Paul Weingartner (2010). Zwart and Franssen's Impossibility Theorem Holds for Possible-World-Accounts but Not for Consequence-Accounts to Verisimilitude. Synthese 172 (3):415 - 436.score: 180.0
    Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts , content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not (...)
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  4. Daniel Cohen (2009). Creating the Best Possible World: Some Problems From Parfit. Sophia 48 (2):143-150.score: 180.0
    It is sometimes argued that if God were to exist, then the actual world would be the best possible world. However, given that the actual world is clearly not the best possible world, then God doesn’t exist. In response, some have argued that the world could always be improved with the creation of new people and that there is thus no best possible world. I argue that this reasoning gives rise to (...)
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  5. Martin Pickup (2014). Leibniz and the Necessity of the Best Possible World. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):507-523.score: 150.0
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  6. Douglas Erlandson & Charles Sayward (1981). Is Heaven a Possible World? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1):55 - 58.score: 148.0
    The goal of theodicy is to show how God could create our world with all its evil. This paper argues that the theodicist can achieve her goal only if she gives up one of these three propositions: (1) evil does not exist in heaven; (2) heaven is better than the present world; (3) heaven is a possible world. Second, it is argued that the theodicist can reject (3) without giving up her belief that heaven exists, so (...)
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  7. Michael J. Shaffer & Jeremy Morris (2010). The Epistemic Inadequacy of Ersatzer Possible World Semantics. Logique et Analyse 53:61-76.score: 148.0
    In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of linguistic ersatzism, the ontologically deflationary view that possible worlds are maximal and consistent sets of sentences, and possible world semantics, the view that the meaning of a sentence is the set of possible worlds at which it is true, implies that no actual speaker can effectively use virtually any language to successfully communicate information. This result is based on complexity issues that relate to our finite computational (...)
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  8. John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Does Possible World Semantics Turn All Propositions Into Necessary Ones? Journal of Pragmatics 39 (5):972-916.score: 144.0
    "Jim would still be alive if he hadn't jumped" means that Jim's death was a consequence of his jumping. "x wouldn't be a triangle if it didn't have three sides" means that x's having a three sides is a consequence its being a triangle. Lewis takes the first sentence to mean that Jim is still alive in some alternative universe where he didn't jump, and he takes the second to mean that x is a non-triangle in every alternative universe where (...)
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  9. Jesse R. Steinberg (2007). Leibniz, Creation and the Best of All Possible Worlds. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62 (3):123 - 133.score: 132.0
    Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not our creator.
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  10. Michael J. Shaffer & Jeremy Morris (2006). A Paradox for Possible World Semantics. Logique et Analyse 49 (195):307-317.score: 132.0
    The development of possible worlds semantics for modal claims has led to a more general application of that theory as a complete semantics for various formal and natural languages, and this view is widely held to be an adequate (philosophical) interpretation of the model theory for such languages. We argue here that this view generates a self-referential inconsistency that indicates either the falsity or the incompleteness of PWS.
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  11. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics. Erkenntnis 72 (3):295 - 314.score: 120.0
    Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the interpretation (...)
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  12. Keith Chrzan (1987). The Irrelevance of the No Best Possible World Defense. Philosophia 17 (2):161-167.score: 120.0
    Certainly NBPW can justify metaphysical evil, which is all Leibniz intended it to do. Probably, as suggested by Bruce Reichenbach, NBPW can rebut an atheistic argument from the non-existence of the best possible world. It could even augment a GGD by defending against a divine obligation to have created a “larger” world. But NBPW by itself cannot serve to derail the logical problem of evil in any way whatsoever; theists must find refuge in a GGD if they (...)
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  13. Thomas Baldwin (2001). On Considering a Possible World as Actual. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):157–174.score: 120.0
    [Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of (...)
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  14. R. Bradley (2012). Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals. Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.score: 120.0
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, (...)
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  15. Cheng-Chih Tsai (2012). The Genesis of Hi-Worlds: Towards a Principle-Based Possible World Semantics. Erkenntnis 76 (1):101-114.score: 120.0
    A Leibnizian semantics proposed by Becker in 1952 for the modal operators has recently been reviewed in Copeland’s paper The Genesis of Possible World Semantics (Copeland in J Philos Logic 31:99–137, 2002 ), with a remark that “neither the binary relation nor the idea of proving completeness was present in Becker’s work”. In light of Frege’s celebrated Sense-Determines-Reference principle, we find, however, that it is Becker’s semantics, rather than Kripke’s semantics, that has captured the true spirit of Frege’s (...)
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  16. Nobu-Yuki Suzuki (1997). Kripke Frame with Graded Accessibility and Fuzzy Possible World Semantics. Studia Logica 59 (2):249-269.score: 120.0
    A possible world structure consist of a set W of possible worlds and an accessibility relation R. We take a partial function r(·,·) to the unit interval [0, 1] instead of R and obtain a Kripke frame with graded accessibility r Intuitively, r(x, y) can be regarded as the reliability factor of y from x We deal with multimodal logics corresponding to Kripke frames with graded accessibility in a fairly general setting. This setting provides us with a (...)
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  17. Anders Kraal (2013). Is the Existence of the Best Possible World Logically Impossible? International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):37-46.score: 120.0
    Since the 1960s an increasing number of philosophers have endorsed the thesis that there can be no such thing as “the best possible world.” In this paper I examine the main arguments for this thesis as put forth by George Schlesinger, Alvin Plantinga, Bruce Reichenbach, Peter Forrest, and Richard Swinburne. I argue that none of these arguments succeed in establishing the thesis and that the logical possibility of the best possible world is as yet an open (...)
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  18. John F. Williams (2009). Hating Perfection: A Subtle Search for the Best Possible World. Humanity Books.score: 120.0
    Whiskey Lao -- Fair warning -- Randomness at large -- We the addicted -- The best possible world -- The importance of being doomed -- Moral responsibility -- The upper limit to the value of possible worlds.
     
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  19. Stephen Grover (2003). This World, ‘Adams Worlds’, and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Religious Studies 39 (2):145-163.score: 108.0
    ‘Adams worlds’ are possible worlds that contain no creature whose life is not worth living or whose life is overall worse than in any other possible world in which it would have existed. Creating an Adams world involves no wrongdoing or unkindness towards creatures on the part of the creator. I argue that the notion of an Adams world is of little value in theodicy. Theists are not only committed to thinking that this world (...)
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  20. David Kyle Johnson (forthcoming). The Failure of the Multiverse Hypothesis as a Solution to the Problem of No Best World. Sophia:1-19.score: 108.0
    The multiverse hypothesis is growing in popularity among theistic philosophers because some view it as the preferable way to solve certain difficulties presented by theistic belief. In this paper, I am concerned specifically with its application to Rowe’s problem of no best world, which suggests that God’s existence is impossible given the fact that the world God actualizes must be unsurpassable, yet for any given possible world, there is one greater. I will argue that, as a (...)
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  21. Klaas J. Kraay (2011). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and God's Choice of a World. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (2):91 - 102.score: 104.0
    Anselmian theism holds that there necessarily exists a being, God, who is essentially unsurpassable in power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom. This being is also understood to be the creator and sustainer of all that is. In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, this role is generally understood as follows: God surveys the array of possible worlds, and in his wisdom selects exactly one for actualization, based on its axiological properties. In this paper, I discuss an under-appreciated challenge for this account (...)
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  22. Myron Arthur Penner (2014). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Rational World-Choice. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):13-25.score: 104.0
    Klaas J. Kraay argues that the rational choice model for divine creation—according to which God chooses to actualize one world among possible alternatives based on its axiological properties—cannot succeed given failures of comparability across possible worlds. I argue that failure of comparability across worlds would not undermine the rationality of choosing one world to create among possible alternatives.
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  23. J. Y. Béziau (2010). What is a Possible World. In Guido Imaguire & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Possible Worlds: Logic, Semantics and Ontology. Philosophia. 25--37.score: 104.0
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  24. David Liggins (2008). Modal Fictionalism and Possible-Worlds Discourse. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):151-60.score: 102.0
    The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen’s ‘Modal Fictionalism’. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension—and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen (...)
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  25. L. Wiesenthal (1983). Visual Space From the Perspective of Possible-Worlds Semantics, I. Synthese 56 (August):199-238.score: 102.0
  26. Michael Zimmerman (1981). 'Can', Compatibilism, and Possible Worlds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):679-692.score: 102.0
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  27. Louis deRosset (2012). Possible Worlds for Modal Primitivists. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-23.score: 100.0
    Among the most remarkable developments in metaphysics since the 1950’s is the explosion of philosophical interest in possible worlds. This paper proposes an explanation of what possible worlds are, and argues that this proposal, the interpreted models conception, should be attractive to anyone who thinks that modal facts are primitive, and so not to be explained in terms of some non-modal notion of “possible world.” I articulate three constraints on any acceptable primitivist explanation of the nature (...)
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  28. Tapio Korte, Ari Maunu & Tuomo Aho (2009). Modal Logic From Kant to Possible Worlds Semantics. In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press.score: 100.0
    This chapter begins with a discussion of Kant's theory of judgment-forms. It argues that it is not true in Kant's logic that assertoric or apodeictic judgments imply problematic ones, in the manner in which necessity and truth imply possibility in even the weakest systems of modern modal logic. The chapter then discusses theories of judgment-form after Kant, the theory of quantification, Frege's Begriffsschrift, C. I. Lewis and the beginnings of modern modal logic, the proof-theoretic approach to modal logic, possible (...)
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  29. Phillip Bricker (1996). Isolation and Unification: The Realist Analysis of Possible Worlds. Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):225 - 238.score: 100.0
    If realism about possible worlds is to succeed in eliminating primitive modality, it must provide an 'analysis' of possible world: nonmodal criteria for demarcating one world from another. This David Lewis has done. Lewis holds, roughly, that worlds are maximal unified regions of logical space. So far, so good. But what Lewis means by 'unification' is too narrow, I think, in two different ways. First, for Lewis, all worlds are (almost) 'globally' unified: at any world, (...)
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  30. Andrzej Indrzejczak (2011). Possible Worlds in Use. Studia Logica 99 (1-3):229-248.score: 100.0
    The paper is a brief survey of the most important semantic constructions founded on the concept of possible world. It is impossible to capture in one short paper the whole variety of the problems connected with manifold applications of possible worlds. Hence, after a brief explanation of some philosophical matters I take a look at possible worlds from rather technical standpoint of logic and focus on the applications in formal semantics. In particular, I would like to (...)
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  31. Christopher Menzel, Possible Worlds. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 100.0
    This article includes a basic overview of possible world semantics and a relatively comprehensive overview of three central philosophical conceptions of possible worlds: Concretism (represented chiefly by Lewis), Abstractionism (represented chiefly by Plantinga), and Combinatorialism (represented chiefly by Armstrong).
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  32. Philip Percival (2013). Branching of Possible Worlds. Synthese 190 (18):4261-4291.score: 100.0
    The question as to whether some objects are possible worlds that have an initial segment in common, i.e. so that their fusion is a temporal tree whose branches are possible worlds, arises both for those who hold that our universe has the structure of a temporal tree and for those who hold that what there is includes concrete universes of every possible variety. The notion of “possible world” employed in the question is seen to be (...)
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  33. Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.score: 96.0
    The standard view about counterfactuals is that a counterfactual (A > C) is true if and only if the A-worlds most similar to the actual world @ are C-worlds. I argue that the worlds conception of counterfactuals is wrong. I assume that counterfactuals have non-trivial truth-values under physical determinism. I show that the possible-worlds approach cannot explain many embeddings of the form (P > (Q > R)), which intuitively are perfectly assertable, and which must be true if the (...)
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  34. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.score: 96.0
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are (...)
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  35. Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch (2003). Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.score: 96.0
    If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates (...)
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  36. Mark L. Thomas (1996). Robert Adams and the Best Possible World. Faith and Philosophy 13 (2):252-259.score: 96.0
    Robert Merrihew Adams argues that it is permissible for a perfectly good moral agent to create a world less good than the best one she could create. He argues that God would exhibit the important virtue of grace in creating less than the best and that this virtue is incompatible with the merit considerations required by the standard of creating the best. In this paper I give three arguments for the compatibility of merit consideration and graciousness of God toward (...)
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  37. Martin Smith (2007). Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):97 - 121.score: 90.0
    Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals - that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or 'other things being equal' clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals (...)
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  38. David Lewis (1977). Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics: A Rejoinder. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):359-363.score: 90.0
  39. Alessandro Torza (2013). How to Lewis a Kripke-Hintikka. Synthese 190 (4):743-779.score: 90.0
    It has been argued that a combination of game-theoretic semantics and independence-friendly (IF) languages can provide a novel approach to the conceptual foundations of mathematics and the sciences. I introduce and motivate an IF first-order modal language endowed with a game-theoretic semantics of perfect information. The resulting interpretive independence-friendly logic (IIF) allows to formulate some basic model-theoretic notions that are inexpressible in the ordinary quantified modal logic. Moreover, I argue that some key concepts of Kripke’s new theory of reference are (...)
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  40. Brian Ellis, Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1977). An Objection to Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):355 - 357.score: 90.0
  41. Roberta Ballarin (2005). Validity and Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (3):275 - 303.score: 90.0
    In this paper I argue against the commonly received view that Kripke's formal Possible World Semantics (PWS) reflects the adoption of a metaphysical interpretation of the modal operators. I consider in detail Kripke's three main innovations vis-à-vis Carnap's PWS: a new view of the worlds, variable domains of quantification, and the adoption of a notion of universal validity. I argue that all these changes are driven by the natural technical development of the model theory and its related notion (...)
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  42. David Blumenfeld (1975). Is the Best Possible World Possible? Philosophical Review 84 (2):163-177.score: 90.0
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  43. Gary Ebbs (2001). Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent? Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.score: 90.0
    In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences would (...)
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  44. Melvin Fitting, Possible World Semantics for First Order Lp.score: 90.0
    First we have individual variables, as usual in first-order logics. (We do not have individual constants, but this is a minor point.) The propositional logic LP has justification constants, but in FOLP these are generalized to allow individual variables as arguments. Thus we have as justification constants c, c(x), c(x, y), . . . . Similarly LP has justification variables, but in FOLP these can be parametrized with individual variables p, p(x), p(x, y), . . . . To keep terminology (...)
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  45. Lawrence Resnick (1973). God and the Best Possible World. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (4):313 - 317.score: 90.0
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  46. Laurence Carlin (2002). Reward and Punishment in the Best Possible World: Leibniz's Theory of Natural Retribution. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):139-160.score: 90.0
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  47. Bruce R. Reichenbach (1979). Must God Create the Best Possible World? International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):203-212.score: 90.0
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  48. L. Wiesenthal (1985). Visual Space From the Perspective of Possible World Semantics II. Synthese 64 (2):241 - 270.score: 90.0
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  49. David Basinger (1980). Must God Create the Best Possible World? International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (3):339-341.score: 90.0
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  50. G. W. R. (1982). The Logic of Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Semantics and Ontology. Review of Metaphysics 35 (3):627-629.score: 90.0
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