Search results for 'Practical' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Matthew S. Bedke (2008). Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85 - 111.score: 25.0
    There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new (...)
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  2. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2012). The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.score: 25.0
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper will defend (...)
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  3. David Phillips (2007). Mackie on Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):457 - 468.score: 25.0
    I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism, the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism by invoking an instrumentalist theory (...)
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  4. Jennifer Baker (2013). Who's Afraid of a Final End? The Role of Practical Rationality in Contemporary Accounts of Virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):85-98.score: 25.0
    In this paper I argue that excising a final end from accounts of virtue does them more harm than good. I attempt to establish that the justification of contemporary virtue ethics suffers if moved this one step too far from the resources in traditional accounts. This is because virtue, as we tend to describe it, rests on an account of practical rationality wherein the role of the final end is integral. I highlight the puzzles that are generated by the (...)
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  5. Hallvard Lillehammer (1999). Analytical Dispositionalism and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):117-133.score: 25.0
    The paper examines the plausibility of analytical dispositionalism about practical reason, according to which the following claims are conceptual truths about common sense ethical discourse: i) Ethics: agents have reasons to act in some ways rather than others, and ii) Metaphysical Modesty: there is no such thing as a response independent normative reality. By elucidating two uncontroversial assumptions which are fundamental to the common sense commitment to ethics, I argue that common sense ethical discourse is most plausibly construed as (...)
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  6. Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Freedom and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):169 - 179.score: 25.0
    Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's (...)
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  7. Christian Miller (2008). Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):551 - 561.score: 25.0
    The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
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  8. Valerie Tiberius (2002). Practical Reason and the Stability Standard. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):339-354.score: 25.0
    Practical reasoning, reasoning about what to do, is a very familiar activity. When we think about whether to cook or to go out for dinner, to buy a house or rent, or to study law or business, we are engaged in practical reasoning. If the kind of reasoning we engage in is truly a rational process, there must be some norms or standards that govern it; the process cannot be arbitrary or random. In this paper I argue that (...)
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  9. Timothy Chappell (2003). Practical Rationality for Pluralists About the Good. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):161-177.score: 25.0
    I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the (...)
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  10. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Might Intentions Be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):311 - 325.score: 25.0
    I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of (...)
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  11. Dino Alfier (2011). Critical Practical Analogy: A Research Tool for Reflecting and Making. Journal of Research Practice 7 (1):Article P3.score: 25.0
    What contribution can visual art practice bring to interdisciplinary research? And how to give an account of practice-led research that acknowledges the need for interdisciplinary intelligibility? I consider these two questions by reflecting on the methodology--which I call "critical practical analogy" (CPA)--that I have developed while investigating the metaethical implications of French philosopher Simone Weil's notion of attention, during my practice-led PhD. In order to address the first question, I consider as a case study a research art project that (...)
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  12. Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.score: 24.0
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. (...)
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  13. Pauline Kleingeld (1998). Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.score: 24.0
    In his critical works of the 1780's, Kant claims, seemingly inconsistently, that (1) theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, applied differently, (2) that he still needs to show that they are, and (3) that theoretical and practical reason are united. I first argue that current interpretations of Kant's doctrine of the unity of reason are insufficient. But rather than concluding that Kant’s doctrine becomes coherent only in the Critique of Judgment, I show that the (...)
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  14. Onora O'Neill (2007). Normativity and Practical Judgement. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):393-405.score: 24.0
    Norms are apt for reasoning because they have propositional structure and content; they are practical because they aim to guide action, rather than to describe aspects of the world. These two features hold equally of norms construed sociologically as the norms of specific social groups, and of norms conceived abstractly as principles of action. On either view, norms are indeterminate while acts are particular and determinate. Consequently norms cannot fully specify which particular act is to be done. Are they (...)
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  15. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). Practical Reasoning and Emotion. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    The category of emotions covers a disputed territory, but clear examples include fear, anger, joy, pride, sadness, disgust, shame, contempt and the like. Such states are commonly thought of as antithetical to reason, disorienting and distorting practical thought. However, there is also a sense in which emotions are factors in practical reasoning, understood broadly as reasoning that issues in action. At the very least emotions can function as "enabling" causes of rational decision-making (despite the many cases in which (...)
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  16. Candace A. Vogler (2001). Anscombe on Practical Inference. In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press. 437--464.score: 24.0
  17. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;Practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock&Quot;. In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Press.score: 24.0
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to (...)
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  18. Christine M. Korsgaard (2008). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology ...
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  19. Kimberley Brownlee (2009). Normative Principles and Practical Ethics: A Response to O'Neill. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (3):231-237.score: 24.0
    abstract This article briefly examines Onora O'Neill's account of the relation between normative principles and practical ethical problems with an eye to suggesting that philosophers of practical ethics have reason to adopt fairly high moral ambitions to be edifying and instructive both as educators and as advisors on public policy debates.
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  20. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Constitutivism About Practical Reasons. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford.score: 24.0
    This paper introduces constitutivism about practical reason, which is the view that we can justify certain normative claims by showing that agents become committed to these claims simply in virtue of acting. According to this view, action has a certain structural feature – a constitutive aim, principle, or standard – that both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. We can use this standard of assessment to derive normative claims. In short, the authority of (...)
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  21. Roman Altshuler (2013). Practical Necessity and the Constitution of Character. In Alexandra Perry & Chris Herrera (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.score: 24.0
    Deliberation issues in decision, and so might be taken as a paradigmatic volitional activity. Character, on the other hand, may appear pre-volitional: the dispositions that constitute it provide the background against which decisions are made. Bernard Williams offers an intriguing picture of how the two may be connected via the concept of practical necessities, which are at once constitutive of character and deliverances of deliberation. Necessities are thus the glue binding character and the will, allowing us to take responsibility (...)
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  22. Rob van Someren Greve (2014). The Value of Practical Usefulness. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):167-177.score: 24.0
    Some moral theories, such as objective forms of consequentialism, seem to fail to be practically useful: they are of little to no help in trying to decide what to do. Even if we do not think this constitutes a fatal flaw in such theories, we may nonetheless agree that being practically useful does make a moral theory a better theory, or so some have suggested. In this paper, I assess whether the uncontroversial respect in which a moral theory can be (...)
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  23. Jason Swartwood (2013). Cultivating Practical Wisdom. Dissertation, University of Minnesotascore: 24.0
    Practical wisdom (hereafter simply “wisdom”) is the intellectual virtue that enables a person to make reliably good decisions about how, all-things-considered, to live and conduct herself. Because wisdom is such an important and high-level achievement, we should wonder: what is the nature of wisdom? What kinds of skills, habits and capacities does it involve? Can real people actually develop it? If so, how? I argue that we can answer these questions by modeling wisdom on expert decision-making skill in complex (...)
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  24. Ariela Tubert (2011). Korsgaard's Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):343-362.score: 24.0
    Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements may be established (...)
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  25. John Brunero (2009). Against Cognitivism About Practical Rationality. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311 - 325.score: 24.0
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the (apparent) requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions (or they show how these apparently practical requirements are actually theoretical requirements). This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions (...)
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  26. R. Jay Wallace (ed.) (2006). Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these topics are (...)
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  27. Alison Hills (2007). Practical Reason, Value and Action. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):375-392.score: 24.0
    How should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to link theories of practical reason with theories of action instead. I try to show that it can be illuminating to think of practical reason in terms of the success (...)
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  28. Philip A. Quadrio (2009). Kant and Rousseau on the Critique of Philosophical Theology: The Primacy of Practical Reason. Sophia 48 (2):179-193.score: 24.0
    This paper explores the Rousseauian background to Kant’s critique of metaphysics and philosophical theology. The core idea is that the rejection of metaphysics and philosophical theology is part of a turn from theoretical to practical reason influential on European philosophy of religion, a turn we associate with Kant but that is prefigured by Rousseau. Rousseau is not, however, a thinker normally associated with the notion of metaphysical criticism, nor the notion of the primacy of practical reason. The paper (...)
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  29. Ursula Coope (2012). Why Does Aristotle Think That Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom? Phronesis 57 (2):142-163.score: 24.0
    Abstract In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this still leaves (...)
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  30. Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.) (1997). Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    These thirteen new, specially written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. Issues covered include: the connection between reason and motivation; the source of moral reasons and their relation to reasons of self-interest; the relation of practical reason to value, to freedom, to (...)
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  31. Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (2007). Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishing.score: 24.0
    Many important thinkers in the philosophical tradition, like Aristotle or Hume, have used an explicit theory of action as the basis of their respective normative theories of practical rationality and morality. The idea behind this architecture of theories is that action theory can inform us about the origin, bonds, reach and limits of practical reason. The aim of this book is to revive this direct connection between action theory and practical philosophy, in particular to provide systematic action-theoretical (...)
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  32. Daniel Westberg (1994). Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    This book is a study of the role of intellect in human action as described by Thomas Aquinas. One of its primary aims is to compare the interpretation of Aristotle by Aquinas with the lines of interpretation offered in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. The book seeks to clarify the problems involved in the appropriation of Aristotle's theory by a Christian theologian, including such topics as the practical syllogism and the problems of akrasia. Westberg argues that Aquinas was much closer to (...)
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  33. Michael Hannon (2013). The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism. Erkenntnis 78 (4):899-919.score: 24.0
    This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I also answer some (...)
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  34. Allan Bäck (2009). Mistakes of Reason: Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident. Phronesis 54 (2):101-135.score: 24.0
    For Aristotle the fallacy of accident arises from mistakes about being per accidens and not from accidental predication. Mistakes in perceiving per accidens come from our judgements about being per accidens and so commit that fallacy. Practical syllogisms have the same formal structure as being and perceiving per accidens . Moreover perceiving per accidens typically provides the minor premise for the practical syllogism as it makes it possible for us to know singular propositions, especially those about substances. Thus (...)
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  35. Robert Audi (1989). Practical Reasoning. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision presents an account of practical reasoning as a process that can explain action, connect reasoning with intention, ...
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  36. Francesco Orsi (2008). The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses. Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics 10 (2):19-41.score: 24.0
    Sidgwick’s dualism of the practical reason is the idea that since egoism and utilitarianism aim both to have rational supremacy in our practical decisions, whenever they conflict there is no stronger reason to follow the dictates of either view. The dualism leaves us with a practical problem: in conflict cases, we cannot be guided by practical reason to decide what all things considered we ought to do. There is an epistemic problem as well: the conflict of (...)
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  37. Rachel McKinnon (2011). Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231.score: 24.0
    This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne gainst the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, (...)
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  38. Mikkel Gerken (2014). Same, Same but Different: The Epistemic Norms of Assertion, Action and Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):725-744.score: 24.0
    What is the relationship between the epistemic norms of assertion and the epistemic norms of action/practical reasoning? Brown argues that the epistemic standards for practical reasoning and assertion are distinct (Brown in Philos Phenomenol Res 84(1):123–157, 2012). In contrast, Montminy argues that practical reasoning and assertion must be governed by the same epistemic norm (Montminy in Pac Philos Quart 93(4):57–68, 2012). Likewise, McKinnon has articulated an argument for a unified account from cases of isolated second-hand knowledge (McKinnon (...)
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  39. Peter Carruthers (2004). Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind. Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278.score: 24.0
    This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that requires (...)
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  40. Vrinda Dalmiya (2009). The Metaphysics of Ethical Love: Comparing Practical Vedanta and Feminist Ethics. Sophia 48 (3):221-235.score: 24.0
    In this paper I compare two very different deployments of love in ethics. Swami Vivekananda's concept of ethical love ties into the project of constructing an alternative masculinity for a colonized people; while feminist care ethics uses love to escape the perceived masculinity of traditional ethical theory. Using Kenneth Goodpaster's distinction between ‘framework questions’ and ‘application questions,’ I try to show that love in Practical Vedanta addresses the former while feminist care ethics concerns itself with the latter. Even though (...)
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  41. Immanuel Kant (1909/2004). Critique of Practical Reason. Dover Publications.score: 24.0
    The second of Kant’s three critiques, Critique of Practical Reason forms the center of Kantian philosophy. Kant establishes his role as a vindicator of the truth of Christianity in this work, published in 1788, and he approaches his proof by presenting positive affirmations of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. The philosopher offers an argument concerning the summum bonum of life: people should not simply search after happiness, but follow the moral law and seek to (...)
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  42. Michael Byron (ed.) (2004). Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.score: 24.0
    This collection of essays explores two competing views of practical rationality. How do we think about what we plan to do? One dominant answer is that we select the best possible option available. However, a growing number of philosophers would offer a different reply. Since we are not equipped to maximize, we must often choose the next best alternative--one that is no more than satisfactory. This strategy choice is called "satisficing" (a term coined by the economist Herb Simon).
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  43. Danny Frederick, Theoretical and Practical Reason: A Critical Rationalist View.score: 24.0
    If the task of theoretical reason is to discover truth or reasons for belief, then theoretical reason is impossible. Attempts to circumvent this by appeal to probabilities are self-defeating. If the task of practical reason is to discover what we ought to do or what actions are desirable or valuable, then practical reason is impossible. Appeal to the subjective ought is self-defeating and often gives either a wrong answer or a self-contradictory one. I argue that the task of (...)
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  44. Christian Miller (2007). The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1-40.score: 24.0
    The view to be defended in this paper is intended to be a novel and compelling model of instrumental practical reasoning, reasoning aimed at determining how to act in order to achieve a given end in a certain set of circumstances. On standard views of instrumental reasoning, the end in question is the object of a particular desire that the agent has, a desire which, when combined with the agent’s beliefs about what means are available to him or her (...)
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  45. Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 3: The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons.score: 24.0
    This is Chapter 3 of my Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. In this chapter, I defend the teleological conception of practical reasons, which holds that the reasons there are for and against performing a given act are wholly determined by the reasons there are for and against preferring its outcome to those of its available alternatives, such that, if S has most reason to perform x, all things considered, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about, (...)
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  46. Anthony Skelton (2006). Henry Sidgwick's Practical Ethics: A Defense. Utilitas 18 (3):199-217.score: 24.0
    Henry Sidgwick's Practical Ethics offers a novel approach to practical moral issues. In this article, I defend Sidgwick's approach against recent objections advanced by Sissela Bok, Karen Hanson, Michael S. Pritchard, and Michael Davis. In the first section, I provide some context within which to situate Sidgwick's view. In the second, I outline the main features of Sidgwick's methodology and the powerful rationale that lies behind it. I emphasize elements of the view that help to defend it, noting (...)
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  47. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Standards, Advice, and Practical Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):57-67.score: 24.0
    Is there a mode of sincere advice in which the standards of the adviser are put aside in favor of the standards of the advisee? I consider two sorts of cases that appear to be such that the adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee’s system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own; and I argue that these cases are best interpreted in ways that dissolve this appearance. I then argue that the nature of sincere advice (...)
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  48. Robert Audi (2006). Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision. Routledge.score: 24.0
    What role does reason play in our actions? How do we know whether what we do is right? Can practical reasoning guide ethical judgment? Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision presents an account of practical reasoning as a process that can explain action, connect reasoning with intention, justify practical judgments, and provide a basis for ethical decisions. The first part of the book is a detailed critical overview of the influential theories of practical reasoning found in (...)
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  49. John Lemos (2006). Morality, Self-Interest, and Two Kinds of Prudential Practical Rationality. Philosophia 34 (1):85-93.score: 24.0
    : In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It (...)
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  50. Rein Vihalemm (2013). Practical Realism: Against Standard Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism. Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2):7-22.score: 24.0
    In this paper, the elaboration of the concept of practical realist philosophy of science which began in the author's previous papers is continued. It is argued that practical realism is opposed to standard scientific realism, on the one hand, and antirealism, on the other. Standard scientific realism is challengeable due to its abstract character, as being isolated from practice. It is based on a metaphysical-ontological presupposition which raises the problem of the God's Eye point of view (as it (...)
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