Search results for 'Practical Reasoning' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Practical Reasoning (1998). Title:• To Explain the Expressive Role That Distinguishes Specifically Normative Vocabulary. That is, to Say What It is the Job of Such Vocabulary to Make Explicit. Doing This is Saying What'ought'means.• To Introduce a Non-Humean Way of Thinking About Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW] Philosophical Perspectives 12:127.score: 1740.0
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  2. Rachel McKinnon (2011). Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231.score: 240.0
    This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne gainst the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing (...)
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  3. Mikkel Gerken (2014). Same, Same but Different: The Epistemic Norms of Assertion, Action and Practical Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):725-744.score: 240.0
    What is the relationship between the epistemic norms of assertion and the epistemic norms of action/practical reasoning? Brown argues that the epistemic standards for practical reasoning and assertion are distinct (Brown in Philos Phenomenol Res 84(1):123–157, 2012). In contrast, Montminy argues that practical reasoning and assertion must be governed by the same epistemic norm (Montminy in Pac Philos Quart 93(4):57–68, 2012). Likewise, McKinnon has articulated an argument for a unified account from cases of isolated (...)
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  4. Christian Miller (2007). The Structure of Instrumental Practical Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):1-40.score: 240.0
    The view to be defended in this paper is intended to be a novel and compelling model of instrumental practical reasoning, reasoning aimed at determining how to act in order to achieve a given end in a certain set of circumstances. On standard views of instrumental reasoning, the end in question is the object of a particular desire that the agent has, a desire which, when combined with the agent’s beliefs about what means are available to (...)
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  5. Kenneth Boyd (forthcoming). Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Epistemic Separabilism. Philosophical Studies:1-21.score: 240.0
    I argue here for a view I call epistemic separabilism (ES), which states that there are two different ways we can be evaluated epistemically when we assert a proposition or treat a proposition as a reason for acting: one in terms of whether we have adhered to or violated the relevant epistemic norm, and another in terms of how epistemically well-positioned we are towards the fact that we have either adhered to or violated said norm. ES has been appealed to (...)
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  6. Georg Spielthenner (2007). A Logic of Practical Reasoning. Acta Analytica 22 (2):139-153.score: 240.0
    In this paper my primary aim is to present a logical system of practical reasoning that can be used to assess the validity of practical arguments, that is, arguments with a practical judgment as conclusion. I begin with a critical evaluation of other approaches to this issue and argue that they are inadequate. On the basis of these considerations, I explain in Sect. 2 the informal conception of practical validity and introduce in Sect. 3 the (...)
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  7. Katie Atkinson & Trevor Bench-Capon (2005). Legal Case-Based Reasoning as Practical Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 13 (1):93-131.score: 240.0
    In this paper we apply a general account of practical reasoning to arguing about legal cases. In particular, we provide a reconstruction of the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions for a particular well-known case from property law. This is done through the use of Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents to replicate the contrasting views involved in the actual decision. This reconstruction suggests that the reasoning involved can be separated into three distinct levels: factual and normative levels (...)
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  8. Rachel McKinnon (2012). What I Learned in the Lunch Room About Assertion and Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 3 (4):565-569.score: 240.0
    It is increasingly argued that there is a single unified constitutive norm of both assertion and practical reasoning. The most common suggestion is that knowledge is this norm. If this is correct, then we would expect that a diagnosis of problematic assertions should manifest as problematic reasons for acting. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that assertions epistemically grounded in isolated second-hand knowledge (ISHK) are unwarranted. I argue that decisions epistemically grounded in premises based on ISHK also seem inappropriate. (...)
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  9. Julian Fink (2013). What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning? Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482.score: 240.0
    This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations (...)
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  10. Alan Thomas (2007). Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance: A Reply to McKeever and Ridge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):77-84.score: 240.0
    A putative problem for the moral particularist is that he or she fails to capture the normative relevance of certain considerations that they carry on their face, or the intuitive irrelevance of other considerations. It is argued in response that mastery of certain topic-specific truisms about a subject matter is what it is for a reasonable interlocutor to be engaged in a moral discussion, but the relevance of these truisms has nothing to do with the particularist/generalist dispute. Given that (...) reasoning is plausibly a form of abductive reasoning, and is therefore non-monotonic, any arbitrary addition of information can change the degree of support evidence offers for a conclusion. Given this arbitrariness, it is no objection to the particularist if he or she represents the ‘normative landscape as flat’ in a way that does not display the ‘obvious’ relevance of certain considerations. The normative landscape is flat and our best account of practical reasoning represents it precisely as such. Appealing to a distinction between practical reasoning and moral reasoning does not help to resurrect this pseudoproblem for particularism. Key Words: abductive inference • default reasons • moral particularism • practical reasoning. (shrink)
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  11. Katie Atkinson (2009). Did He Jump or Was He Pushed? Abductive Practical Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (2):79-99.score: 240.0
    In this paper, we present a particular role for abductive reasoning in law by applying it in the context of an argumentation scheme for practical reasoning. We present a particular scheme, based on an established scheme for practical reasoning, that can be used to reason abductively about how an agent might have acted to reach a particular scenario, and the motivations for doing so. Plausibility here depends on a satisfactory explanation of why this particular agent (...)
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  12. Georg Spielthenner (2013). On Normative Practical Reasoning. Abstracta 7 (1).score: 240.0
    This article offers an analysis of normative practical reasoning. Reasoning of this type includes at least one normative belief and it has a practical conclusion (roughly, a conclusion about what to do). The principal question I am interested in is whether this type of practical reasoning can be logically conclusive. This issue has received remarkably little philosophical discussion despite the central role this reasoning plays in our everyday discourse about action and in the (...)
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  13. Christian Kock (2007). Is Practical Reasoning Presumptive? Informal Logic 27 (1):91-108.score: 240.0
    Douglas Walton has done extensive and valuable work on the concepts of presumption and practical reasoning. However, Walton’s attempt to model practical reasoning as presumptive is misguided. The notions of “inference” and of the burden of proof shifting back and forth between proponent and respondent are misleading and lead to counterintuitive consequences. Because the issue in practical reasoning is a proposal, not a proposition, there are, in the standard case, several perfectly good reasons on (...)
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  14. Hanti Lin (2013). Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.score: 240.0
    “Since today is Saturday, the grocery store is open today and will be closed tomorrow; so let’s go today”. That is an example of everyday practical reasoningreasoning directly with the propositions that one believes but may not be fully certain of. Everyday practical reasoning is one of our most familiar kinds of decisions but, unfortunately, some foundational questions about it are largely ignored in the standard decision theory: (Q1) What are the decision rules in everyday (...)
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  15. David Hitchcock (2001). Pollock on Practical Reasoning. Informal Logic 22 (3).score: 240.0
    The epistemologist John Pollock has implemented computationally an architecture for a rational agent which he calls OSCAR. OSCAR models both practical and theoretical (or epistemic) reasoning. I argue that Pollock's model of practical reasoning, which has seven components, is superior not only to the two-component belief-desire model stemming from Aristotle, but also to the three-component belief-desire-intention model developed especially by Michael Bratman. Despite its advantages, Pollock's model of practical reasoning is incomplete in at least (...)
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  16. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 3:239-259.score: 240.0
    Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and (...) reasoning. So, defenders of both of these views endorse the view that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This thesis has recently come under heavy fire and a number of weaker proposals have been defended. In this paper counter-examples to the knowledge norm of reasoning will be presented and it will be argued that this viewand a number of related but weaker viewscannot be sustained in the face of these counter-examples. The paper concludes with a novel proposal concerning the norm of practical reasoning that is immune to the counter-examples introduced here. (shrink)
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  17. Robert Audi (1989). Practical Reasoning. Routledge.score: 232.0
    Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision presents an account of practical reasoning as a process that can explain action, connect reasoning with intention, ...
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  18. Peter Carruthers (2004). Practical Reasoning in a Modular Mind. Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278.score: 232.0
    This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that (...)
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  19. Dieter Misgeld (1980). Ultimate Self-Responsibility, Practical Reasoning, and Practical Action: Habermas, Husserl, and Ethnomethodology on Discourse and Action. [REVIEW] Human Studies 3 (1):255 - 278.score: 222.0
    A particular notion of reason has pervaded studies of practical action throughout the whole tradition of western philosophy up to Wittgenstein and Heidegger. This notion has been centrally located in contexts other than the specific study of practical action itself.This essay examines the relation of reason and practical action by reviewing Habermas' and Husserl's theories of the relation between discourse and action (I), and then proposing Garfinkel's ethnomethodological studies of practical action as an alternative to Husserl's (...)
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  20. Matthew Wilks Keefer (1996). Distinguishing Practical and Theoretical Reasoning: A Critique of Deanna Kuhn's Theory of Informal Argument. Informal Logic 18 (1).score: 210.0
    Deanna Kuhn's theory of informal argumentation (1991) evaluates arguments according to a theory/evidence model where subjects first articulate a theory and then must provide critical testing of alternatives on the basis of evidence. Using this model, Kuhn reports that many subjects fail to supply adequate evidence for their 'theories' and are often unable or unwilling to generate alternatives. In this paper an account of practical reasoning is provided that suggests an alternate interpretation for Kuhn's subjects' poor perfonnance. It (...)
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  21. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). Practical Reasoning and Emotion. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.score: 208.0
    The category of emotions covers a disputed territory, but clear examples include fear, anger, joy, pride, sadness, disgust, shame, contempt and the like. Such states are commonly thought of as antithetical to reason, disorienting and distorting practical thought. However, there is also a sense in which emotions are factors in practical reasoning, understood broadly as reasoning that issues in action. At the very least emotions can function as "enabling" causes of rational decision-making (despite the many cases (...)
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  22. Robert Audi (2006). Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision. Routledge.score: 208.0
    What role does reason play in our actions? How do we know whether what we do is right? Can practical reasoning guide ethical judgment? Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision presents an account of practical reasoning as a process that can explain action, connect reasoning with intention, justify practical judgments, and provide a basis for ethical decisions. The first part of the book is a detailed critical overview of the influential theories of (...) reasoning found in Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. The second part examines practical reasoning in the light of important topics in moral psychology-weakness of will, self-deception, rationalization, and others. In the third part, Audi describes the role of moral principles in practical reasoning and clarifies the way practical reasoning underlies ethical decisions. He formulates a comprehensive set of concrete ethical principles, explains how they apply to reasoning about what to do, and shows how practical reasoning guides moral conduct. Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision provides the most comprehensive account of the topic in the current literature and is essential reading for anyone interested in the role of reason in ethics or the nature of human action. (shrink)
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  23. Richard Brian Miller (1996). Casuistry and Modern Ethics: A Poetics of Practical Reasoning. University of Chicago Press.score: 208.0
    Did the Gulf War defend moral principle or Western oil interests? Is violent pornography an act of free speech or an act of violence against women? In Casuistry and Modern Ethics , Richard B. Miller sheds new light on the potential of casuistry--case-based reasoning--for resolving these and other questions of conscience raised by the practical quandaries of modern life. Rejecting the packaging of moral experience within simple descriptions and inflexible principles, Miller argues instead for identifying and making sense (...)
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  24. Elijah Millgram (2005). Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory. Cambridge University Press.score: 208.0
    Ethics Done Right examines how practical reasoning can be put into the service of ethical and moral theory. Elijah Millgram shows that the key to thinking about ethics is to understand generally how to make decisions. The papers in this volume support a methodological approach and trace the connections between two kinds of theory in utilitarianism, in Kantian ethics, in virtue ethics, in Hume's moral philosophy, and in moral particularism. Unlike other studies of ethics, Ethics Done Right does (...)
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  25. Oren Ben-Dor (2013). The Gravity of Steering, the Grace of Gliding and the Primordiality of Presencing Place: Reflections on Truthfulness, Worlding, Seeing, Saying and Showing in Practical Reasoning and Law. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 26 (2):341-390.score: 208.0
    This article reflects on the received view of the rupture which constitutes the beginning of a critical, ethical, political and legal opening, the understanding of which inhabits the cry of, and response to, injustice. It takes the very critique that feeds into, and is distorted by, practical reasoning, as its point of departure. Grasping this rupture as the complementary relation between deconstruction and radical alterity, would entail unreflectively accepting a certain kind of truthfulness—truthfulness as [in]correctness, manifesting in a (...)
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  26. Susan T. Gardner (2009). Thinking Your Way to Freedom: A Guide to Owning Your Own Practical Reasoning. Temple University Press.score: 202.0
    A Teacher's Manual for this book will be available online at www.temple.edu/tempress.
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  27. Thomas Gil (2002). Practical Reasoning. Berlin Verlag, Arno Spitz.score: 202.0
     
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  28. Julián Fernando Trujillo Amaya & Ximena Vallejo Álvarez (2011). Formation of character and practical reasoning. [Spanish]. Eidos 8:10-65.score: 198.0
    En este artículo se sostiene que existe una primacía de la práctica y la acción sobre el conocimiento intelectual y la contemplación. Si esta tesis fuese falsa, no resulta comprensible por qué la prudencia y el hombre prudente son la virtud suprema y el modelo de la vida buena en Aristóteles. La cuestión inicial es 1) ¿Cómo entender la racionalidad del deseo o qué significa deseo razonado?, y esto implica dos cuestiones adicionales: 2) ¿Qué es el silogismo práctico y qué (...)
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  29. John L. Pollock (1992). New Foundations for Practical Reasoning. Minds and Machines 2 (2):113-144.score: 192.0
    Practical reasoning aims at deciding what actions to perform in light of the goals a rational agent possesses. This has been a topic of interest in both philosophy and artificial intelligence, but these two disciplines have produced very different models of practical reasoning. The purpose of this paper is to examine each model in light of the other and produce a unified model adequate for the purposes of both disciplines and superior to the standard models employed (...)
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  30. Tone Kvernbekk (2014). Evidence-Based Practice: On the Function of Evidence in Practical Reasoning. Studier I Pædagogisk Filosofi 2 (2):19-33.score: 192.0
    There is a vast literature on evidence-based practice (EBP) in education. What function does evidence have in practical deliberations toward decisions about what to do? Most writers on EBP seem to think of evidence largely as quantitative data, serving as a foundation from which practice could and should be directly derived. In this paper I argue that we are better served by according a different and more indirect function to evidence in practical reasoning. To establish this claim (...)
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  31. Allan Bäck (2009). Mistakes of Reason: Practical Reasoning and the Fallacy of Accident. Phronesis 54 (2):101-135.score: 186.0
    For Aristotle the fallacy of accident arises from mistakes about being per accidens and not from accidental predication. Mistakes in perceiving per accidens come from our judgements about being per accidens and so commit that fallacy. Practical syllogisms have the same formal structure as being and perceiving per accidens . Moreover perceiving per accidens typically provides the minor premise for the practical syllogism as it makes it possible for us to know singular propositions, especially those about substances. Thus (...)
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  32. Onora O'Neill (1996). Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.score: 184.0
    Towards Justice and Virtue challenges the rivalry between those who advocate only abstract, universal principles of justice and those who commend only the particularities of virtuous lives. Onora O'Neill traces this impasse to defects in underlying conceptions of reasoning about action. She proposes and vindicates a modest account of ethical reasoning and a reasoned way of answering the question 'who counts?', then uses these to construct linked accounts of principles by which we can move towards just institutions and (...)
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  33. Maria Alvarez (2010). Reasons for Action and Practical Reasoning. Ratio 23 (4):355-373.score: 180.0
    This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks (...)
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  34. Michael Bratman (1979). Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will. Noûs 13 (2):153-171.score: 180.0
    In a case of weak-willed action the agent acts-freely, deliberately, and for a reason-in a way contrary to his best judgment, even though he thinks he could act in accordance with his best judgment. The possibility of such actions has posed one problem in moral philosophy, the exact nature of the problem it poses another. In this essay I offer an answer to the latter problem: an explanation of why a plausible account of free, deliberate and purposive action seems to (...)
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  35. John Broome (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.score: 180.0
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and (...)
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  36. Bart Streumer (2010). Practical Reasoning. In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 180.0
    To be able to say what practical reasoning is, we first need to say what reasoning is and what the conclusion of a process of reasoning is. I shall do this in sections 1 and 2. We can then make a distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. There are three main ways to do this, which I shall survey in sections 3 to 5. I shall end by suggesting that there are different kinds of (...)
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  37. Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin (1998). Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning. Synthese 117 (2):207-227.score: 180.0
    Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e., in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances (...)
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  38. Jessica Brown (2013). Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem. Noûs 47 (1):179-192.score: 180.0
    I consider but reject one broad strategy for answering the threshold problem for fallibilist accounts of knowledge, namely what fixes the degree of probability required for one to know? According to the impurist strategy to be considered, the required degree of probability is fixed by one's practical reasoning situation. I distinguish two different ways to implement the suggested impurist strategy. According to the Relevance Approach, the threshold for a subject to know a proposition at a time is determined (...)
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  39. Robin McKenna (2013). Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Are Possibly Not Governed by the Same Epistemic Norm. Logos and Episteme 4 (4):457-464.score: 180.0
    This paper focuses on Martin Montminy’s recent attempt to show that assertion and practical reasoning are necessarily governed by the same epistemic norm (“Why assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly [2013]). I show that the attempt fails. I finish by considering the upshot for the recent debate concerning the connection between the epistemic norms of assertion and practical reasoning.
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  40. Christian Piller (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.score: 180.0
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and (...)
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  41. Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning.score: 180.0
    Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e. in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances (...)
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  42. Bruce Aune (1986). Formal Logic and Practical Reasoning. Theory and Decision 20 (3):301-320.score: 180.0
    In the past couple of decades several different accounts of the logic of practical reasoning have been proposed.1 The account I have recommended on a number of occasions is clearly the simplest, because it requires no special logical principles, holding that, in respect of deduction, practical reasoning is adequately understood as involving only standard assertoric principles. My account has recently encountered various objections, the most dismissive of which is that it is too simple to deal with (...)
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  43. Bruno Verbeek & Nicholas Southwood (2009). Introduction: Practical Reasoning and Normativity. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):223-225.score: 180.0
    This volume brings together previously unpublished papers by leading scholars that deal with the theme of practical reasoning and normativity. The volume includes contributions by Michael Bratman, Donald Bruckner, David Enoch, Elijah Millgram, Andrew Reisner, François and Laura Schroeter, Mark Schroeder, and William White.
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  44. Elijah Millgram (ed.) (2001). Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press.score: 180.0
    This book covers a broad spectrum of positions on practical reasoning—from the nihilist view that there are no legitimate forms of practical inference, and ...
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  45. Henry S. Richardson (1994). Practical Reasoning About Final Ends. Cambridge University Press.score: 180.0
    Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work of (...)
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  46. Ralph Wedgwood (1998). The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):189 – 209.score: 180.0
    The fundamental principle of practical reasoning (if there is such a thing) must be a rule which we ought to follow in all our practical reasoning, and which cannot lead to irrational decisions. It must be a rule that it is possible for us to follow directly - that is, without having to follow any other rule of practical reasoning in order to do so. And it must be a basic principle, in the sense (...)
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  47. Peter Pagin (1998). Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning. Synthese 117 (2):207 - 227.score: 180.0
    Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e., in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances (...)
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  48. Martin Montminy (2013). Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must Be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):57-68.score: 180.0
    I argue that assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm. This is because the epistemic rule governing assertion derives from the epistemic rule governing practical reasoning, together with a plausible rule regarding assertion, according to which assertion must manifest belief.
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  49. Elijah Millgram (2011). Practical Reasoning for Serial Hyperspecializers. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):261-278.score: 180.0
    Some species are weedy: they move from one ecological niche to another. Other species are specialized: they are exquisitely adapted to exploit a particular niche. Human beings are the design solution in which a species is simultaneously weedy and specialized - the trick being to manage the exquisite niche-specific adaptations in software rather than in the hardware. We are built to reprogram ourselves on the fly, to select new goals, new priorities and new guidelines appropriate to novel niches. Understanding ourselves (...)
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  50. Katie Atkinson & Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon (2007). Practical Reasoning as Presumptive Argumentation Using Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. Artificial Intelligence 171 (10-15):855-874.score: 180.0
    In this paper we describe an approach to practical reasoning, reasoning about what it is best for a particular agent to do in a given situation, based on presumptive justifications of action through the instantiation of an argument scheme, which is then subject to examination through a series of critical questions. We identify three particular aspects of practical reasoning which distinguish it from theoretical reasoning. We next provide an argument scheme and an associated set (...)
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