Search results for 'Pragmatic' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). ‘Can Pragmatic Realists Argue Transcendentally?’. In John Shook (ed.), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism. Prometheus.score: 21.0
    Kant’s and Hegel’s transcendental argument for mental-content externalism breaks the deadlock between ‘internal’ and genuine realists. This argument shows that human beings can only be self-conscious in a world that provides a humanly recognizable regularity and variety among the things (or events) we sense. This feature of the world cannot result from human thought or language. Hence semantic arguments against realism can only be developed if realism about the world is true. Some of Putnam’s arguments for internal realism are taken (...)
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  2. Alessandro Capone (2011). Knowing How and Pragmatic Intrusion. Intercultural Pragmatics 8 (4):543-570.score: 19.0
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  3. Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2014). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.score: 18.0
    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to (...)
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  4. Hamid Vahid (2010). Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons. Synthese 176 (3):447 - 462.score: 18.0
    Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truthconducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by nonepistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as (...)
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  5. Timothy Chan (2010). Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox. Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.score: 18.0
    One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according (...)
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  6. Dorit Ganson (2008). Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.score: 18.0
    Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of (...)
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  7. Mark Schroeder (2012). Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.score: 18.0
    Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role (...)
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  8. Igal Kvart, Rational Assertibility, the Steering Role of Knowledge, and Pragmatic Encroachment.score: 18.0
    Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as pragmatic components in (...)
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  9. Aaron Rizzieri (2011). Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.score: 18.0
    It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S ’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p . I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required (...)
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  10. Anja Matschuck (2011). Non-Local Correlations in Therapeutic Settings? A Qualitative Study on the Basis of Weak Quantum Theory and the Model of Pragmatic Information. Axiomathes 21 (2):249-261.score: 18.0
    Weak Quantum Theory (WQT) and the Model of Pragmatic Information (MPI) are two psychophysical concepts developed on the basis of quantum physics. The present study contributes to their empirical examination. The issue of the study is whether WQT and MPI can not only explain ‘psi’-phenomena theoretically but also prove to be consistent with the empirical phenomenology of extrasensory perception (ESP). From the main statements of both models, 33 deductions for psychic readings are derived. Psychic readings are defined as settings, (...)
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  11. Newton C. A. Da Costa, Otávio Bueno & Steven French (1998). The Logic of Pragmatic Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (6):603-620.score: 18.0
    The mathematical concept of pragmatic truth, first introduced in Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui (1986), has received in the last few years several applications in logic and the philosophy of science. In this paper, we study the logic of pragmatic truth, and show that there are important connections between this logic, modal logic and, in particular, Jaskowski's discussive logic. In order to do so, two systems are put forward so that the notions of pragmatic validity and (...) truth can be accommodated. One of the main results of this paper is that the logic of pragmatic truth is paraconsistent. The philosophical import of this result, which justifies the application of pragmatic truth to inconsistent settings, is also discussed. (shrink)
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  12. Greg Bamford (1989). Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction. Analysis 49 (4):203 - 205..score: 18.0
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-Inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, Say, Counter-Corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-Corroborationist alternative is beside the point, However, As whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction (...)
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  13. Lisa Gannett (1999). What's in a Cause?: The Pragmatic Dimensions of Genetic Explanations. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 14 (3):349-373.score: 18.0
    The paper argues for a pragmatic account of genetic explanation. This is to say that when a disease or other trait is termed genetic, the reasons for singling out genes as causes over other, also necessary, genetic and nongenetic conditions are not wholly theoretical but include pragmatic dimensions. Whether the explanation is the presence of a trait in an individual or differences in a trait among individuals, genetic explanations are context-dependent in three ways: they are relative to a (...)
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  14. Bruce Russell (2005). Contextualism on a Pragmatic, Not a Skeptical, Footing. Acta Analytica 20 (2):26-37.score: 18.0
    Contextualism is supposed to explain why the following argument for skepticism seems plausible: (1) I don’t know that I am not a bodiless brain-in-a-vat (BIV); (2) If I know I have hands, then I know I am not a bodiless BIV; (3) Therefore, I do not know I have hands. Keith DeRose claims that (1) and (2) are “initially plausible.” I claim that (1) is initially plausible only because of an implicit argument that stands behind it; it is not intuitively (...)
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  15. Eveline T. Feteris (2002). A Pragma-Dialectical Approach of the Analysis and Evaluation of Pragmatic Argumentation in a Legal Context. Argumentation 16 (3):349-367.score: 18.0
    This paper answers the question how pragmatic argumentation which occurs in a legal context, can be analyzed and evaluated adequately. First, the author surveys various ideas taken from argumentation theory and legal theory on the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation. Then, on the basis of these ideas, she develops a pragma-dialectical instrument for analyzing and evaluating pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. Finally she demonstrates how this instrument can be used by giving an exemplary analysis and (...)
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  16. Holly L. Wilson (2006). Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance. State University of New York Press.score: 18.0
    Kant's theory of human nature is explicated in detail. First book with systematic interpretation of Kant's pragmatic anthropology.
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  17. María Caamaño Alegre (2013). Pragmatic Norms in Science: Making Them Explicit. Synthese 190 (15):3227-3246.score: 18.0
    The present work constitutes an attempt to make explicit those pragmatic norms successfully operating in empirical science. I will first comment on the initial presuppositions of the discussion, in particular, on those concerning the instrumental character of scientific practice and the nature of scientific goals. Then I will depict the moderately naturalistic frame in which, from this approach, the pragmatic norms make sense. Third, I will focus on the specificity of the pragmatic norms, making special emphasis on (...)
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  18. Orlin Vakarelov (2013). From Interface to Correspondence: Recovering Classical Representations in a Pragmatic Theory of Semantic Information. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines:1-25.score: 18.0
    One major fault line in foundational theories of cognition is between the so-called “representational” and “non-representational” theories. Is it possible to formulate an intermediate approach for a foundational theory of cognition by defining a conception of representation that may bridge the fault line? Such an account of representation, as well as an account of correspondence semantics, is offered here. The account extends previously developed agent-based pragmatic theories of semantic information, where meaning of an information state is defined by its (...)
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  19. Hamid Vahid (2014). Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment. Acta Analytica 29 (1):25-41.score: 18.0
    According to a recent view, known as the 'pragmatic encroachment' thesis, an agent’s non-truth-related factors are relevant to the epistemic status of her beliefs. In particular, in addition to truth-related factors, practical factors are said to be relevant to the question whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Despite the intuitive appeal of the thesis, however, it is puzzling how practical factors can impact the truth-related factors that ground the epistemic status of one's beliefs. In this paper, I (...)
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  20. Morten Severinsen (2001). Principles Behind Definitions of Diseases – a Criticism of the Principle of Disease Mechanism and the Development of a Pragmatic Alternative. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (4):319-336.score: 18.0
    Many philosophers and medical scientists assume thatdisease categories or entities used to classify concrete cases ofdisease, are often defined by disease mechanisms or causalprocesses. Others suggest that diseases should always be definedin this manner. This paper discusses these standpoints criticallyand concludes that they are untenable, not only when `diseasemechanism' refers to an objective mechanism, but also when`mechanism' refers to a pragmatically demarcated part of thetotal ``objective'' causal structure of diseases. As an alternativeto principles that use the concept of disease mechanism (...)
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  21. Matt Lutz (2013). The Pragmatics of Pragmatic Encroachment. Synthese:1-24.score: 18.0
    The goal of this paper is to defend Simple Modest Invariantism (SMI) about knowledge from the threat presented by pragmatic encroachment. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that practical circumstances are relevant in some way to the truth of knowledge ascriptions—and if this is true, it would entail the falsity of SMI. Drawing on Ross and Schroeder’s recent Reasoning Disposition account of belief, I argue that the Reasoning Disposition account, together with Grice’s Maxims, gives us an attractive pragmatic (...)
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  22. Peter Verdée (2013). Non-Monotonic Set Theory as a Pragmatic Foundation of Mathematics. Foundations of Science 18 (4):655-680.score: 18.0
    In this paper I propose a new approach to the foundation of mathematics: non-monotonic set theory. I present two completely different methods to develop set theories based on adaptive logics. For both theories there is a finitistic non-triviality proof and both theories contain (a subtle version of) the comprehension axiom schema. The first theory contains only a maximal selection of instances of the comprehension schema that do not lead to inconsistencies. The second allows for all the instances, also the inconsistent (...)
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  23. Johnny Hartz Søraker (2006). The Role of Pragmatic Arguments in Computer Ethics. Ethics and Information Technology 8 (3):121-130.score: 18.0
    The purpose of this paper is to stress the importance of pragmatic arguments if we are to reach overlapping consensuses across cultural and disciplinary borders. An analytical distinction is made between, on the one hand, arguments based on socio-political or philosophical presuppositions, and on the other hand, pragmatic arguments. The latter are (as far as possible) detached from culture-specific or disciplinary presuppositions. I will mainly focus on the issue of regulation and surveillance on the Internet, and (...)
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  24. Ariel Caticha (2014). Towards an Informational Pragmatic Realism. Minds and Machines 24 (1):37-70.score: 18.0
    I discuss the design of the method of entropic inference as a general framework for reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. The main contribution of this discussion is to emphasize the pragmatic elements in the derivation. More specifically: (1) Probability theory is designed as the uniquely natural tool for representing states of incomplete information. (2) An epistemic notion of information is defined in terms of its relation to the Bayesian beliefs of ideally rational agents. (3) The method of updating from (...)
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  25. Brigitte Falkenburg (2012). Pragmatic Unification, Observation and Realism in Astroparticle Physics. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (2):327-345.score: 18.0
    Astroparticle physics is a recent sub-discipline of physics that emerged from early cosmic ray studies, astrophysics, and particle physics. Its theoretical foundations range from quantum field theory to general relativity, but the underlying “standard models” of cosmology and particle physics are far from being unified. The paper explores the pragmatic strategies employed in astroparticle physics in order to unify a disunified research field, the concept of observation involved in these strategies, and their relations to scientific realism.
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  26. Jacques Moeschler (1989). Pragmatic Connectives, Argumentative Coherence and Relevance. Argumentation 3 (3):321-339.score: 18.0
    This article is concerned with pragmatic connectives and their uses in discursive argumentation. Three approaches to pragmatic connectives will be presented: (1) argumentation theory, which implies a conception of pragmatics integrated within semantics, and a specific type of argumentative rules, called ‘topoi’; (2) discourse structure theory, which associates a function in the structuring of discourse sequences to pragmatic connectives; (3) relevance theory, which constitutes a cognitive pragmatic theory, in which no specific principle is associated to linguistic (...)
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  27. Peter Pagin (2014). Pragmatic Enrichment as Coherence Raising. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):59-100.score: 18.0
    This paper concerns the phenomenon of pragmatic enrichment, and has a proposal for predicting the occurrence of such enrichments. The idea is that an enrichment of an expressed content c occurs as a means of strengthening the coherence between c and a salient given content c’ of the context, whether c’ is given in discourse, as sentence parts, or through perception. After enrichment, a stronger coherence relation is instantiated than before enrichment. An idea of a strength scale of types (...)
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  28. Ming Xiang, Julian Grove & Anastasia Giannakidou (2013). Dependency-Dependent Interference: NPI Interference, Agreement Attraction, and Global Pragmatic Inferences. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 18.0
    Previous psycholinguistics studies have shown that when forming a long distance dependency in online processing, the parser sometimes accepts a sentence even though the required grammatical constraints are only partially met. A mechanistic account of how such errors arise sheds light on both the underlying linguistic representations involved and the processing mechanisms that put such representations together. In the current study, we contrast the NPI (negative polarity items) interference effect, as shown by the acceptance of an ungrammatical sentence like “The (...)
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  29. María Caamaño Alegre (2013). Pragmatic Norms in Science: Making Them Explicit. Synthese 190 (15):3227-3246.score: 18.0
    The present work constitutes an attempt to make explicit those pragmatic norms successfully operating in empirical science. I will first comment on the initial presuppositions of the discussion, in particular, on those concerning the instrumental character of scientific practice and the nature of scientific goals. Then I will depict the moderately naturalistic frame in which, from this approach, the pragmatic norms make sense. Third, I will focus on the specificity of the pragmatic norms, making special emphasis on (...)
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  30. Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra (2008). Models and the Semantic and Pragmatic Views of Theories. Principia 12 (1):73-86.score: 18.0
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p73 This paper aims at discussing from the point of view of a pragmatic stance the concept of model as an abstract replica. According to this view, scientific models are abstract structures different from set-theoretic models. The view of models argued for here stems from the conceptions of some important philosophers of science who elaborated on the notion of model, such as Suppe, Cartwright, Hempel, and Nagel. Differently from all those authors, however, the conception of model argued for here (...)
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  31. Roberto Frega (2013). Rehabilitating Warranted Assertibility: Moral Inquiry and the Pragmatic Basis of Objectivity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):1-23.score: 18.0
    This article defends a pragmatic conception of objectivity for the moral domain. I begin by contextualizing pragmatic approaches to objectivity and discuss at some length one of the most interesting proposals in this area, Cheryl Misak's conception of pragmatic objectivity. My general argument is that in order to defend a pragmatic approach to objectivity, the pragmatic stance should be interpreted in more radical terms than most contemporary proposals do. I suggest in particular that we should (...)
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  32. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 3:239-259.score: 18.0
    Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. (...)
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  33. Stefano Siccardi (2011). Spontaneous Anomalystic Phenomena, Pragmatic Information and Formal Representations of Uncertainty. Axiomathes 21 (2):287-301.score: 18.0
    I discuss the application of the Model of Pragmatic Information to the study of spontaneous anomalystic mental phenomena like telepathy, precognition, etc. In these phenomena the most important effects are related to anomalous information gain by the subjects. I consider the basic ideas of the Model, as they have been applied to experimental anomalystic phenomena and to spontaneous phenomena that have strong physical effects, like poltergeist cases, highlighting analogies and differences. Moreover, I point out that in such cases we (...)
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  34. Kenneth R. Westphal (1997). ‘Frederick L. Will’s Pragmatic Realism: An Introduction’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism. Rowman & Littlefield.score: 18.0
    This critical editorial introduction summarizes and explicates Frederick Will’s pragmatic realism and his account of the nature, assessment, and revision of cognitive and practical norms in connection with: the development of Will’s pragmatic realism, Hume’s problem of induction, the oscillations between foundationalism and coherentism, the nature of philosophical reflection, Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’, the open texture of empirical concepts, the correspondence conception of truth, Putnam’s ‘internal realism’, the redundancy theory of truth, sociology of knowledge, the governance of practice (...)
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  35. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Towards a Radically Pragmatic Theory of If-Conditionals. In K. P. Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic (CRiSPI, Vol. 24). Emerald.score: 17.0
    It is generally agreed that constructions of the form “if P, Q” are capable of conveying a number of different relations between antecedent and consequent, with pragmatics playing a central role in determining these relations. Controversy concerns what the conventional contribution of the if-clause is, how it constrains the pragmatic processes, and what those processes are. In this essay, I begin to argue that the conventional contribution of if-clauses to semantics is exhausted by the fact that these clauses introduce (...)
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  36. Alessandro Capone (2008). Belief Reports and Pragmatic Intrusion: The Case of Null Appositives. Journal of Pragmatics 40:2019-2040.score: 16.0
  37. Jan Albert van Laar (2007). Pragmatic Inconsistency and Credibility. Argumentation 21 (3):317-334.score: 16.0
    A critic may attack an arguer personally by pointing out that the arguer’s position is pragmatically inconsistent: the arguer does not practice what he preaches. A number of authors hold that such attacks can be part of a good argumentative discussion. However, there is a difficulty in accepting this kind of contribution as potentially legitimate, for the reason that there is nothing wrong for a protagonist to have an inconsistent position, in the sense of committing himself to mutually inconsistent propositions. (...)
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  38. Anne Baril (2013). Pragmatic Encroachment in Accounts of Epistemic Excellence. Synthese 190 (17):3929-3952.score: 15.0
    Recently a number of philosophers have argued for a kind of encroachment of the practical into the epistemic. Fantl and McGrath, for example, argue that if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. (Fantl and McGrath 2007) In this paper I make a preliminary case for what we might call encroachment in, not knowledge or justification, but epistemic excellence, recent accounts of which include those of Roberts and Wood (2007), Bishop and Trout (2005), (...)
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  39. Roberto Frega (2011). Symposia on R. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010. [REVIEW] European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (2):218-247.score: 15.0
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  40. Craig Duncan (2013). Religion and Secular Utility: Happiness, Truth, and Pragmatic Arguments for Theistic Belief. Philosophy Compass 8 (4):381-399.score: 15.0
  41. Samuel Fillenbaum (1974). Pragmatic Normalization: Further Results for Some Conjunctive and Disjunctive Sentences. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (4):574.score: 15.0
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  42. Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). ‘Transcendental Reflections on Pragmatic Realism’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason, & Norms: A Realistic Assessment. Fordham UP. 17--58.score: 15.0
    By deepening Austin’s reflections on the ‘open texture’ of empirical concepts, Frederick L. Will defends an ‘externalist’ account of mental content: as human beings we could not think, were we not in fact cognizant of a natural world structured by events and objects with identifiable and repeatable similarities and differences. I explicate and defend Will’s insight by developing a parallel critique of Kant’s and Carnap’s rejections of realism, both of whom cannot account properly for the content of experience. This critique (...)
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  43. Arvid Båve (2008). A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289.score: 14.0
    A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, (...)
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  44. Michael Scott & Philip Brown (2012). Pragmatic Antirealism: A New Antirealist Strategy. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):349-366.score: 14.0
    In everyday speech we seem to refer to such things as abstract objects, moral properties, or propositional attitudes that have been the target of metaphysical and/or epistemological objections. Many philosophers, while endorsing scepticism about some of these entities, have not wished to charge ordinary speakers with fundamental error, or recommend that the discourse be revised or eliminated. To this end a number of non-revisionary antirealist strategies have been employed, including expressivism, reductionism and hermeneutic fictionalism. But each of these theories faces (...)
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  45. Kepa Korta & John Perry (2008). The Pragmatic Circle. Synthese 165 (3):347 - 357.score: 14.0
    Classical Gricean pragmatics is usually conceived as dealing with far-side pragmatics, aimed at computing implicatures. It involves reasoning about why what was said, was said. Near-side pragmatics, on the other hand, is pragmatics in the service of determining, together with the semantical properties of the words used, what was said. But this raises the specter of ‘the pragmatic circle.’ If Gricean pragmatics seeks explanations for why someone said what they did, how can there be Gricean pragmatics on the near-side? (...)
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  46. Philip Atkins (2013). A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.score: 14.0
    Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with (...)
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  47. Andrea Onofri (2013). On Non-Pragmatic Millianism. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.score: 14.0
    Speakers often judge the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman flies” to be true and the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies” to be false. If Millianism is true, however, these sentences express the very same proposition and must therefore have same truth value. “Pragmatic” Millians like Salmon and Soames have tried to explain speakers’ “anti-substitution intuitions” by claiming that the two sentences are routinely used to pragmatically convey different propositions which do have different truth values. “Non- (...)” Millians like Braun, on the other hand, have argued that the Millian should not appeal to pragmatics and opt instead for a purely psychological explanation. I will present two objections against Non-Pragmatic Millianism. The first one is that the view cannot account for the intuitions of speakers who accept the identity sentence “Superman is Clark Kent”: applying a psychological account in this case, I will argue, would yield wrong predictions about speakers who resist substitution with simple sentences. I will then consider a possible response from the non-pragmatic Millian and show that the response would in fact require an appeal to pragmatics. My conclusion will be that Braun’s psychological explanation of anti-substitution intuitions is untenable, and that the Millian is therefore forced to adopt a pragmatic account. My second objection is that Non-Pragmatic Millianism cannot account for the role that certain commonsense intentional generalizations play in the explanation of behavior. I will consider a reply offered by Braun and argue that it still leaves out a large class of important generalizations. My conclusion will be that Braun’s non-pragmatic strategy fails, and that the Millian will again be forced to adopt a pragmatic account of intentional generalizations if he wants to respond to the objection. In light of my two objections, my general conclusion will be that non-pragmatic versions of Millianism should be rejected. This has an important consequence: if Millianism is true, then some pragmatic Millian account must be correct. It follows that, if standard objections against pragmatic accounts succeed, then Millianism must be rejected altogether. (shrink)
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  48. Raymond W. Gibbs & Guy van Orden (2012). Pragmatic Choice in Conversation. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):7-20.score: 14.0
    How do people decide what to say in context? Many theories of pragmatics assume that people have specialized knowledge that drives them to utter certain words in different situations. But these theories are mostly unable to explain both the regularity and variability in people’s speech behaviors. Our purpose in this article is to advance a view of pragmatics based on complexity theory, which specifically explains the pragmatic choices speakers make in conversations. The concept of self-organized criticality sheds light on (...)
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  49. Livio Robaldo & Jakub Szymanik, Pragmatic Identification of the Witness Sets. Proceeding of the 8th Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation.score: 14.0
    Among the readings available for NL sentences, those where two or more sets of entities are independent of one another are particularly challenging from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Those readings are termed here as ‘Independent Set (IS) readings'. Standard examples of such readings are the well-known Collective and Cumulative Readings. (Robaldo, 2011) proposes a logical framework that can properly represent the meaning of IS readings in terms of a set-Skolemization of the witness sets. One of (...)
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  50. Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Contextualism and Fallibility: Pragmatic Encroachment, Possibility, and Strength of Epistemic Position. Synthese 188 (2):247-272.score: 14.0
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while (...)
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