Search results for 'Pragmatic Encroachment' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  87
    Kenneth Boyd (forthcoming). Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemically Responsible Action. Synthese:1-25.
    One prominent argument for pragmatic encroachment (PE) is that PE is entailed by a combination of a principle that states that knowledge warrants proper practical reasoning, and judgments that it is more difficult to reason well when the stakes go up. I argue here that this argument is unsuccessful. One problem is that empirical tests concerning knowledge judgments in high-stakes situations only sometimes exhibit the result predicted by PE. I argue here that those judgments that appear (...)
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  2. Mark Schroeder (2012). Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.
    Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a (...)
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  3.  11
    Dustin Locke (forthcoming). Implicature and Non-Local Pragmatic Encroachment. Synthese:1-24.
    This paper offers a novel conversational implicature account of the pragmatic sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Developing an account I first suggested elsewhere and independently proposed by Lutz, this paper explores the idea that the relevant implicatures are generated by a constitutive relationship between believing a proposition and a disposition to treat that proposition as true in practical deliberation. I argue that while this view has a certain advantage over standard implicature accounts of pragmatic sensitivity, it comes (...)
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  4.  62
    Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance (2015). Evidence Against Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3135-3143.
    We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that p only if one’s epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we (...)
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  5.  83
    Joseph Shin (2014). Time Constraints and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. Episteme 11 (2):157-180.
    Citing some recent experimental findings, I argue for the surprising claim that in some cases the less time you have the more you know. More specifically, I present some evidence to suggest that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions are sometimes sensitive to facts about an epistemic subject's truth-irrelevant time constraints such that less (time) is more (knowledge). If knowledge ascriptions are sensitive in this manner, then this is some evidence of pragmatic encroachment. Along the way, I consider comments made (...)
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  6.  35
    Matt Lutz (2013). The Pragmatics of Pragmatic Encroachment. Synthese 191 (8):1-24.
    The goal of this paper is to defend Simple Modest Invariantism (SMI) about knowledge from the threat presented by pragmatic encroachment. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that practical circumstances are relevant in some way to the truth of knowledge ascriptions—and if this is true, it would entail the falsity of SMI. Drawing on Ross and Schroeder’s recent Reasoning Disposition account of belief, I argue that the Reasoning Disposition account, together with Grice’s Maxims, gives us an attractive (...)
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  7.  17
    Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value. Synthese:1-10.
    I discuss Engel’s critique of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology and his related discussion of epistemic value. While I am sympathetic to Engel’s remarks on the former, I think he makes a crucial misstep when he relates this discussion to the latter topic. The goal of this paper is to offer a better articulation of the relationship between these two epistemological issues, with the ultimate goal of lending further support to Engel’s scepticism about pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. (...)
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  8.  64
    Aaron Rizzieri (2011). Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
    It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S ’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p . I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that (...)
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  9.  54
    Hamid Vahid (2014). Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment. Acta Analytica 29 (1):25-41.
    According to a recent view, known as the 'pragmatic encroachment' thesis, an agent’s non-truth-related factors are relevant to the epistemic status of her beliefs. In particular, in addition to truth-related factors, practical factors are said to be relevant to the question whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Despite the intuitive appeal of the thesis, however, it is puzzling how practical factors can impact the truth-related factors that ground the epistemic status of one's beliefs. In this paper, (...)
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  10. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 3:239-259.
    Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmatic encroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical (...)
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  11.  2
    Adam Zweber (forthcoming). Fallibilism, Closure, and Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the “knowledge-action principle” are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.
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  12.  46
    Anne Baril (2013). Pragmatic Encroachment in Accounts of Epistemic Excellence. Synthese 190 (17):3929-3952.
    Recently a number of philosophers have argued for a kind of encroachment of the practical into the epistemic. Fantl and McGrath, for example, argue that if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. (Fantl and McGrath 2007) In this paper I make a preliminary case for what we might call encroachment in, not knowledge or justification, but epistemic excellence, recent accounts of which include those of Roberts and Wood (2007), Bishop and (...)
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  13. Igal Kvart, Rational Assertibility, the Steering Role of Knowledge, and Pragmatic Encroachment.
    Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as (...)
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  14.  26
    Aaron Rizzieri (2013). Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice. Palgrave MacMillan.
    Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice engages several recent and important discussions in the mainstream epistemological literature surrounding 'pragmatic encroachment'. It has been argued that what is at stake for a person in regards to acting as if a proposition is true can raise the levels of epistemic support required to know that proposition. Do the high stakes involved in accepting or rejecting religious beliefs raise the standards for knowledge that 'God exists', 'Jesus rose from the (...)
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  15. Boaz Miller (2014). Science, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):253-270.
    Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject’s interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed “Pragmatic Encroachment” has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of (...)
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  16.  44
    Anastasia Philippa Scrutton (forthcoming). Why Not Believe in an Evil God? Pragmatic Encroachment and Some Implications for Philosophy of Religion. Religious Studies:1-16.
    Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good, and the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent but all-evil, the evil-God challenge raises the question of why theists should prefer one over the other. I respond to this challenge by drawing on a recent theory in epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, which asserts that practical considerations can alter the epistemic status of beliefs. I then explore some of the implications of my argument for how we (...)
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  17.  20
    Katherine Rubin (2015). Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):12-38.
    This article explores the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and epistemic permissiveness. If the suggestion that all epistemic notions are interest-relative is viable , then it seems that a certain species of epistemic permissivism must be viable as well. For, if all epistemic notions are interest relative then, sometimes, parties in paradigmatic cases of shared evidence can be maximally rational in forming competing basic doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition. However, I argue that this total pragmatic encroachment (...)
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  18.  84
    McGrath & Jeremy Fantl (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment: It's Not Just About Knowledge. Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
    There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition (...)
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  19.  52
    Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.
    We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
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  20. Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment, Methods and Contextualism. Analysis 72 (3):526-534.
    Defence of conditions to withdraw an assertion that require evidence or epistemic reasons that the assertion is not true or warranted. (Adler, J. 2006. Withdrawal and contextualism. Analysis 66: 280–85) The defence replies to the claim that better methods justify withdrawal without meeting that requirement and without pragmatic encroachment.
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  21.  46
    Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Contextualism and Fallibility: Pragmatic Encroachment, Possibility, and Strength of Epistemic Position. Synthese 188 (2):247-272.
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (...)
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  22. Daniel Eaton & Timothy Pickavance (forthcoming). Wagering on Pragmatic Encroachment. In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford
    Lately, there has been an explosion of literature exploring the the relationship between one’s practical situation and one’s knowledge. Some involved in this discussion have suggested that facts about a person’s practical situation might affect whether or not a person knows in that situation, holding fixed all the things standardly associated with knowledge (like evidence, the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties, and so on). According to these “pragmatic encroachment” views, then, one’s practical situation encroaches on one’s knowledge. Though (...)
     
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  23. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558–589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by (...)
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  24.  98
    Brian Weatherson (2005). Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.
    I consider the problem of how to derive what an agent believes from their credence function and utility function. I argue the best solution of this problem is pragmatic, i.e. it is sensitive to the kinds of choices actually facing the agent. I further argue that this explains why our notion of justified belief appears to be pragmatic, as is argued e.g. by Fantl and McGrath. The notion of epistemic justification is not really a pragmatic notion, but (...)
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  25.  70
    B. Armour-Garb (2011). Contextualism Without Pragmatic Encroachment. Analysis 71 (4):667-676.
    In ‘Withdrawal and contextualism’, Jonathan Adler (2006) provides an argument which, if successful, undermines what contextualists take to be prime support for their view. Given the popularity of contextualist (and related) positions in epistemology, together with the fact that, thus far, no one has challenged Adler's argument, a critical assessment therefore presses. In this article, after briefly reviewing Adler's argument, I show that it fails. My reason for taking his argument to fail will then provide novel (...)
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  26.  58
    Matthew McGrath (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by (...)
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  27. Matthew Mcgrath Jeremy Fantl (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors . We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a principled (...)
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  28.  53
    Nathan Ballantyne (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  29. Pascal Engel (2009). Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. OUP Oxford
     
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  30.  9
    Michael Scott (2015). Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice By Aaron Rizzieri. Analysis 75 (3):530-532.
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  31. Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2014). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an (...)
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  32. Michael Pace (2011). The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'. Noûs 45 (2):239-268.
    A moral-pragmatic argument for a proposition is an argument intended to establish that believing the proposition would be morally beneficial. Since such arguments do not adduce epistemic reasons, i.e., reasons that support the truth of a proposition, they can seem at best to be irrelevant epistemically. At worst, believing on the basis of such reasoning can seem to involve wishful thinking and intellectual dishonesty of a sort that that precludes such beliefs from being epistemically unjustified. Inspired by an argument (...)
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  33. Matthew A. Benton (2014). Knowledge Norms. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:nn-nn.
    Encyclopedia entry covering the growing literature on the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (and its rivals), the Knowledge Norm of Action (and pragmatic encroachment), the Knowledge Norm of Belief, and the Knowledge Norm of Disagreement.
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  34.  27
    Mikkel Gerken (2015). How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
    I discuss Lawlor’s Austinian account of knowledge ascriptions and argue that it is a brand of pragmatic encroachment. I then criticize the motivation for pragmatic encroachment theories that derives from assumptions about the functional role of knowledge ascriptions. I argue that this criticism also apply to contextualist followers of Craig. Finally, I suggest that the central lesson from reflection on the communicative functions of knowledge ascriptions is that they, upon reflection, motivate traditional invariantism.
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  35. Stephen R. Grimm (Forthcoming). Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides. In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    Defenders of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology (or what I call practicalism) need to address two main problems. First, the view seems to imply, absurdly, that knowledge can come and go quite easily—in particular, that it might come and go along with our variable practical interests. We can call this the stability problem. Second, there seems to be no fully satisfying way of explaining whose practical interests matter. We can call this the “whose stakes?” problem. I argue that both (...)
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  36.  5
    Pascal Engel (2012). Intrusión pragmática y valor epistémico. Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (1):25-51.
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value”. Some philosopherswho defend “pragmatic encroachment” and “sensitive invariantism” argue thatchanges in the importance of being right and signiicant increases of the costsof error in given contexts can alter the standards of knowledge. If this view werecorrect, it could explain to some extent the practical value of knowledge. Thispaper argues that the pragmatic encroachment thesis is wrong. It discusses threepossible sources of encroachment on epistemic notions: on belief, on justiication,and (...)
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  37. John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a (...)
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  38.  53
    Brian Kim (forthcoming). In Defense of Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Episteme:1-19.
    Keith DeRose has argued that the two main problems facing subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) come from the appropriateness of certain third-person denials of knowledge and the inappropriateness of now you know it, now you don't claims. I argue that proponents of SSI can adequately address both problems. First, I argue that the debate between contextualism and SSI has failed to account for an important pragmatic feature of third-person denials of knowledge. Appealing to these pragmatic features, I show that straightforward (...)
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  39. Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley (2012). Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism. Episteme 9 (1):3-26.
    According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts of epistemic properties or relations, is in part determined by the practical costs of being wrong about p. Recent studies in experimental philosophy have tested the claims of IRI. After critically discussing prior studies, we present the results of our own experiments that provide strong support for IRI. We discuss our results in light of complementary findings by other theorists, and address the challenge posed by a (...)
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  40. Stephen R. Grimm (2011). On Intellectualism in Epistemology. Mind 120 (479):705-733.
    According to ‘orthodox’ epistemology, it has recently been said, whether or not a true belief amounts to knowledge depends exclusively on truth-related factors: for example, on whether the true belief was formed in a reliable way, or was supported by good evidence, and so on. Jason Stanley refers to this as the ‘intellectualist’ component of orthodox epistemology, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath describe it as orthodox epistemology’s commitment to a ‘purely epistemic’ account of knowledge — that is, an account (...)
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  41.  13
    David Coss (forthcoming). The Pitfalls of Interest-Relative Invariantism. Acta Analytica:1-9.
    In this paper, I present and extend Neta’s : 180–187 2007) counter-example against interest-relative invariantism. I first outline IRI, briefly explaining the content of the view and illustrating how it diverges from more classical approaches to epistemology. I then distinguish between two forms the view can take: a strong and a moderate formulation. After this, I argue that Neta’s counter-example only succeeds at undermining the strongest variant, leaving the weaker counterpart unscathed. After all of this is accomplished, I extend Neta-style (...)
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  42. Mark Phelan (2013). Evidence That Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence. Philosophical Psychology (4):1-25.
    Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.733363.
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  43. Kenneth Boyd (2010). Knowledge in an Uncertain World * by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. Analysis 71 (1):189-191.
    A review of Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath's "Knowledge in an Uncertain World.".
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  44.  46
    Dustin Locke (2015). Practical Certainty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):72-95.
    When we engage in practical deliberation, we sometimes engage in careful probabilistic reasoning. At other times, we simply make flat out assumptions about how the world is or will be. A question thus arises: when, if ever, is it rationally permissible to engage in the latter, less sophisticated kind of practical deliberation? Recently, a number of authors have argued that the answer concerns whether one knows that p. Others have argued that the answer concerns whether one is justified in believing (...)
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  45. Alex Worsnip (2015). Two Kinds of Stakes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324.
    I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether an agent believes the proposition. This poses a dilemma for those who claim that whether a proposition is known can depend on the stakes associated with it. Only the W-stakes reading of this view preserves intuitions about knowledge-attributions, but only the A-stakes (...)
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  46.  30
    E. J. Coffman (2011). Does Knowledge Secure Warrant to Assert? Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.
    This paper fortifies and defends the so called Sufficiency Argument (SA) against Classical Invariantism. In Sect. 2,I explain the version of the SA formulated but then rejected by Brown (2008a). In Sect. 3, I show how cases described by Hawthorne (2004), Brown (2008b), and Lackey (forthcoming) threaten to undermine one or the other of the SA's least secure premises. In Sect. 4,I buttress one of those premises and defend the reinforced SA from the objection developed in Sect. 3.
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  47.  11
    Brian Ball (2014). The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):552-574.
    In this paper I compare Timothy Williamson's knowledge rule of assertion with Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson's action rule. The paper is in two parts. In the first part I present and respond to Maitra and Weatherson's master argument against the knowledge rule. I argue that while its second premise, to the effect that an action X can be the thing to do though one is in no position to know that it is, is true, its first premise is not: (...)
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  48. Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.) (2011). Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
  49.  45
    Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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  50.  90
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
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