Search results for 'Preference' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  32
    Johan E. Gustafsson (2013). Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476–491.
    Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis (...)
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  2.  16
    Patrick Van Kenhove, Iris Vermeir & Steven Verniers (2001). An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Ethical Beliefs, Ethical Ideology, Political Preference and Need for Closure. Journal of Business Ethics 32 (4):347-361.
    An analysis is presented of the relationships between consumers ethical beliefs, ethical ideology, Machiavellianism, political preference and the individual difference variable "need for closure". It is based on a representative survey of 286 Belgian respondents. Standard measurement tools of proven reliability and robustness are used to measure ethical beliefs (consumer ethics scale), ethical ideology (ethical positioning), Machiavellianism (Mach IV scale) and need for closure. The analysis finds the following. First, individuals with a high need for closure tend to have (...)
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  3. Simon Cushing (2003). Against "Humanism": Speciesism, Personhood, and Preference. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (4):556–571.
    Article responds to the criticism of speciesism that it is somehow less immoral than other -isms by showing that this is a mistake resting on an inadequate taxonomy of the various -isms. Criticizes argument by Bonnie Steinbock that preference to your own species is not immoral by comparison with racism of comparable level.
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  4.  27
    Caspar Oesterheld (forthcoming). Formalizing Preference Utilitarianism in Physical World Models. Synthese:1-13.
    Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and can lead to misunderstandings in ethical discussion. In this paper, we use Bayesian inference to introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism in physical world models, specifically cellular automata. Even though our formalization is not immediately applicable, it is a first step in providing ethics and ultimately the question of how to “make the world better” with a (...)
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  5.  53
    James Dreier (1996). Rational Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality. Theory and Decision 40 (3):249-276.
    In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pursuit (...)
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  6.  5
    Fenrong Liu (2011). A Two-Level Perspective on Preference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):421 - 439.
    This paper proposes a two-level modeling perspective which combines intrinsic 'betterness' and reason-based extrinsic preference, and develops its static and dynamic logic in tandem. Our technical results extend, integrate, and re-interpret earlier theorems on preference representation and update in the literature on preference change.
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  7.  22
    D. Wade Hands (2013). Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory. Erkenntnis 78 (5):1081-1108.
    This paper examines methodological issues raised by revealed preference theory in economics: particularly contemporary revealed preference theory. The paper has three goals. First, to make the case that revealed preference theory is a broad research program in choice theory—not a single theory—and understanding this diversity is essential to any methodological analysis of the program. Second, to explore some of the existing criticisms of revealed preference theory in a way that emphasizes how the effectiveness of the critique (...)
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  8.  4
    Keith Lehrer (2016). Freedom of Preference: A Defense of Compatiblism. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):35-46.
    Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a case of a counterfactual intervener CI with knowledge and power to control an agent so he will do A. He concludes that if the agent prefers to do A and there is no intervention by CI, the agent has acted of his own free will and is morally responsible for doing A, though he lacked an alternative possibility. I consider the consequences for freedom and moral responsibility of CI having a complete plan P for (...)
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  9. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality. Dialogue 30 (1991):3-32.
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...)
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  10.  76
    Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2011). A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change. Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2):145-164.
    According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose (...)
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  11.  2
    Joseph Heath (forthcoming). Climate Ethics: Justifying a Positive Social Time Preference. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 28 Recent debates over climate change policy have made it clear that the choice of a social discount rate has enormous consequences for the amount of mitigation that will be recommended. The social discount rate determines how future costs are to be compared to present costs. Philosophers, however, have been almost unanimous in endorsing the view that the only acceptable social rate of time preference is zero, a view that, taken literally, has either absurd or (...)
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  12.  20
    Elisabeth Schulte (2010). Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees. Theory and Decision 69 (1):97-118.
    This paper is concerned with the efficiency of information aggregation in a committee whose members have heterogeneous preferences over a binary decision variable. We study a voting game with a pre-vote communication stage and identify conditions under which full information aggregation is possible. In particular, if preferences are common knowledge and each committee member is endowed with information, full information aggregation is possible despite preference heterogeneity.
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  13.  11
    Brad Armendt (1988). Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility. In William Harper & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics. Kluwer Academic Publishers 3-24.
    Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.
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  14.  76
    Wlodek Rabinowicz & Bertil Strömberg (1996). What If I Were in His Shoes? On Hare's Argument for Preference Utilitarianism. Theoria 62 (1-2):95-123.
    This paper discusses the argument for preference utilitarianism proposed by Richard Hare in Moral Thinking(Hare, 1981). G. F. Schueler (1984) and Ingmar Persson (1989) identified a serious gap in Hare’s reasoning, which might be called the No-Conflict Problem. The paper first tries to fill the gap. Then, however, starting with an idea of Zeno Vendler, the question is raised whether the gap is there to begin with. Unfortunately, this Vendlerian move does not save Hare from criticism. Paradoxically, it instead (...)
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  15.  52
    Fenrong Liu (2010). Von Wright's “the Logic of Preference” Revisited. Synthese 175 (1):69 - 88.
    Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study the foundational (...)
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  16.  73
    Keith Lehrer (1997). Freedom, Preference and Autonomy. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):3-25.
    Philosophers have advocated different kinds of freedom, but each has value and none should be neglected in a complete theory of freedom and responsibility. There are three kinds of freedom of preference and action that should be distinguished. A person S may fully prefer to do A at every level, and that is one kind of freedom. A person S may autonomously prefer to do A when S has the preference structure concerning doing A because S prefers to (...)
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  17.  23
    Till Grüne-Yanoff (2013). Preference Change and Conservatism: Comparing the Bayesian and the AGM Models of Preference Revision. Synthese 190 (14):2623-2641.
    Richard Bradley’s Bayesian model of preference kinematics is compared with Sven Ove Hansson’s AGM-style model of preference revision. Both seek to model the revision of preference orders as a consequence of retaining consistency when some preferences change. Both models are often interpreted normatively, as giving advice on how an agent should revise her preferences. I raise four criticisms of the Bayesian model: it is unrealistic; it neglects an important change mechanism; it disregards endogenous information relevant to (...) change, in particular about similarity and incompleteness; and its representational framework, when expanded with similarity comparisons, may give misleading advice. These criticisms are based on a principle of conservatism, and on two proposals of similarity metrics for the Bayesian model. The performance of the Bayesian model, with and without the similarity metrics, is then tested in three different cases of preference change, and compared to the performance of the AGM model. (shrink)
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  18.  1
    Joseph Heath (forthcoming). Climate Ethics: Justifying a Positive Social Time Preference. New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    _ Source: _Page Count 28 Recent debates over climate change policy have made it clear that the choice of a social discount rate has enormous consequences for the amount of mitigation that will be recommended. The social discount rate determines how future costs are to be compared to present costs. Philosophers, however, have been almost unanimous in endorsing the view that the only acceptable social rate of time preference is zero, a view that, taken literally, has either absurd or (...)
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  19.  8
    Ryo Oda (2001). Sexually Dimorphic Mate Preference in Japan. Human Nature 12 (3):191-206.
    Lonely hearts advertisements (LHA) published in Japan were examined in a comparative study on sexually dimorphic mate preference. I analyzed 944 LHA written by Japanese (730 by males and 214 by females) seeking short-term relationships and 780 LHA (577 by males and 203 by females) seeking long-term relationships. Some universal patterns of mate preference were confirmed and others were not. Female advertisers in both categories sought more traits than they offered; they also sought more traits than male advertisers. (...)
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  20. Julia Tanner (2007). Can Animals have preference-interests? Ethic@ 6 (1):35-40.
    It has been argued that only moral agents can have preference-interests and this therefore excludes animals. I will present two objections to this argument. The first will show that moral agency is not necessary to have preference-interests. The second will assert that the argument that animals cannot have preference-interests has unwelcome consequences.
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  21.  3
    Douglas S. Bridges (2008). Uniform Continuity Properties of Preference Relations. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (1):97-106.
    The anti-Specker property, a constructive version of sequential compactness, is used to prove constructively that a pointwise continuous, order-dense preference relation on a compact metric space is uniformly sequentially continuous. It is then shown that Ishihara's principle BD-ℕ implies that a uniformly sequentially continuous, order-dense preference relation on a separable metric space is uniformly continuous. Converses of these two theorems are also proved.
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  22.  30
    Umberto Grandi & Ulle Endriss (2013). First-Order Logic Formalisation of Impossibility Theorems in Preference Aggregation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):595-618.
    In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggregation procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we give a complete (...)
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  23.  6
    Anaïs Cadilhac, Nicholas Asher, Alex Lascarides & Farah Benamara (2015). Preference Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 24 (3):267-288.
    Most models of rational action assume that all possible states and actions are pre-defined and that preferences change only when beliefs do. But several decision and game problems lack these features, calling for a dynamic model of preferences: preferences can change when unforeseen possibilities come to light or when there is no specifiable or measurable change in belief. We propose a formally precise dynamic model of preferences that extends an existing static model. Our axioms for updating preferences preserve consistency while (...)
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  24.  49
    Kaoru Noguchi (2003). The Relationship Between Visual Illusion and Aesthetic Preference – an Attempt to Unify Experimental Phenomenology and Empirical Aesthetics. Axiomathes 13 (3-4):261-281.
    Experimental phenomenology has demonstrated that perception is much richer than stimulus. As is seen in color perception, one and the same stimulus provides more than several modes of appearance or perceptual dimensions. Similarly, there are various perceptual dimensions in form perception. Even a simple geometrical figure inducing visual illusion gives not only perceptual impressions of size, shape, slant, depth, and orientation, but also affective or aesthetic impressions. The present study reviews our experimental phenomenological work on visual illusion and experimental aesthetics, (...)
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  25.  19
    Wlodek Rabinowicz (2000). Preference Stability and Substitution of Indifferents: A Rejoinder to Seidenfeld. Theory and Decision 48 (4):311-318.
    Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In reply to (...)
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  26.  6
    Jan Heufer (2014). A Geometric Approach to Revealed Preference Via Hamiltonian Cycles. Theory and Decision 76 (3):329-341.
    It is shown that a fundamental question of revealed preference theory, namely whether the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) implies the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP), can be reduced to a Hamiltonian cycle problem: A set of bundles allows a preference cycle of irreducible length if and only if the convex monotonic hull of these bundles admits a Hamiltonian cycle. This leads to a new proof to show that preference cycles can be of (...)
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  27.  26
    Robert van Rooij (2011). Revealed Preference and Satisficing Behavior. Synthese 179 (1):1-12.
    A much discussed topic in the theory of choice is how a preference order among options can be derived from the assumption that the notion of ‘choice’ is primitive. Assuming a choice function that selects elements from each finite set of options, Arrow (Economica 26:121–127, 1959) already showed how we can generate a weak ordering by putting constraints on the behavior of such a function such that it reflects utility maximization. Arrow proposed that rational agents can be modeled by (...)
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  28.  28
    Sven Ove Hansson (2009). Preference-Based Choice Functions: A Generalized Approach. Synthese 171 (2):257 - 269.
    Although choice and preference are distinct categories, it may in some contexts be a useful idealization to treat choices as fully determined by preferences. In order to construct a general model of such preference-based choice, a method to derive choices from preferences is needed that yields reasonable outcomes for all preference relations, even those that are incomplete and contain cycles. A generalized choice function is introduced for this purpose. It is axiomatically characterized and is shown to compare (...)
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  29.  8
    Per Hjertstrand & James L. Swofford (2012). Revealed Preference Tests for Consistency with Weakly Separable Indirect Utility. Theory and Decision 72 (2):245-256.
    Since Varian (Econometrica 50:945–973, 1982; Review of Economic Studies 50:90–110, 1983) made checking for consistency with revealed preference conditions more accessible to empirical researchers; researchers have often used revealed preference procedures to test their maintained hypotheses and narrow the scope of their demand studies. The tests developed by Varian are for the direct utility function, while researchers estimating demand systems often find it convenient to model consumer behavior with an indirect utility function. Unfortunately structure revealed in the direct (...)
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  30.  3
    Søren Holm (2011). Can “Giving Preference to My Patients” Be Explained as a Role Related Duty in Public Health Care Systems? Health Care Analysis 19 (1):89-97.
    Most of us have two strong intuitions (or sets of intuitions) in relation to fairness in health care systems that are funded by public money, whether through taxation or compulsory insurance. The first intuition is that such a system has to treat patients (and other users) fairly, equitably, impartially, justly and without discrimination. The second intuition is that doctors, nurses and other health care professionals are allowed to, and may even in some cases be obligated to give preference to (...)
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  31.  3
    Bernadette Klopp & Linda Mealey (1998). Experimental Mood Manipulation Does Not Induce Change in Preference for Natural Landscapes. Human Nature 9 (4):391-399.
    According to evolutionary theory, emotions are psychological mechanisms that have evolved to enhance fitness in specific situations by motivating appropriate (adaptive) behavior. Taking this perspective, a previous study examined the relationship between mood and preference for natural environments. It reported that participants’ anxiety level was associated with a preference for landscapes offering what Appleton called "refuge," while participants’ anger and cheerfulness were both associated with a preference for landscapes offering what Appleton called "prospect." We attempted to replicate (...)
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  32. Brian Kim (2014). The Locality and Globality of Instrumental Rationality: The Normative Significance of Preference Reversals. Synthese 191 (18):4353-4376.
    When we ask a decision maker to express her preferences, it is typically assumed that we are eliciting a pre-existing set of preferences. However, empirical research has suggested that our preferences are often constructed on the fly for the decision problem at hand. This paper explores the ramifications of this empirical research for our understanding of instrumental rationality. First, I argue that these results pose serious challenges for the traditional decision-theoretic view of instrumental rationality, which demands global coherence amongst all (...)
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  33.  4
    Charles C. Perkins Jr, Richard G. Seymann, Donald J. Levis & H. Randolph Spencer Jr (1966). Factors Affecting Preference for Signal-Shock Over Shock-Signal. Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (2):190.
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  34.  18
    Johan E. Gustafsson (2011). Preference and Choice. Dissertation, Royal Institute of Technology
  35.  22
    D. Wade Hands (2008). Introspection, Revealed Preference and Neoclassical Economics: A Critical Response to Don Ross on the Robbins-Samuelson Argument Pattern. Journal of the History of Economic Thought 30:1-26.
    Abstract: Don Ross’ Economic Theory and Cognitive Science (2005) provides an elaborate philosophical defense of neoclassical economics. He argues that the central features of neoclassical theory are associated with what he calls the Robbins-Samuelson argument pattern and that it can be reconciled with recent developments in experimental and behavioral economics, as well as contemporary cognitive science. This paper argues that Ross’ Robbins-Samuelson argument pattern is not in the work of either Robbins or Samuelson and in many ways is in conflict (...)
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  36.  9
    Laurel Fogarty & Marcus W. Feldman (2011). The Cultural and Demographic Evolution of Son Preference and Marriage Type in Contemporary China. Biological Theory 6 (3):272-282.
  37.  36
    Mark Alfano (2012). Wilde Heuristics and Rum Tum Tuggers: Preference Indeterminacy and Instability. Synthese 189 (S1):5-15.
    Models in decision theory and game theory assume that preferences are determinate: for any pair of possible outcomes, a and b, an agent either prefers a to b, prefers b to a, or is indifferent as between a and b. Preferences are also assumed to be stable: provided the agent is fully informed, trivial situational influences will not shift the order of her preferences. Research by behavioral economists suggests, however, that economic and hedonic preferences are to some degree indeterminate and (...)
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  38.  6
    Özgür Kıbrıs (2012). A Revealed Preference Analysis of Solutions to Simple Allocation Problems. Theory and Decision 72 (4):509-523.
    We interpret solution rules on a class of simple allocation problems as data on the choices of a policy maker. We analyze conditions under which the policy maker’s choices are (i) rational (ii) transitive-rational, and (iii) representable; that is, they coincide with maximization of a (i) binary relation, (ii) transitive binary relation, and (iii) numerical function on the allocation space. Our main results are as follows: (i) a well-known property, contraction independence (a.k.a. IIA) is equivalent to rationality; (ii) every contraction (...)
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  39.  1
    Deborah E. Schechter & Cyrilla M. Francis (2010). A Life History Approach to Understanding Youth Time Preference. Human Nature 21 (2):140-164.
    Following from life history and attachment theory, individuals are predicted to be sensitive to variation in environmental conditions such that risk and uncertainty are internalized by cognitive, affective, and psychobiological mechanisms. In turn, internalizing of environmental uncertainty is expected to be associated with attitudes toward risk behaviors and investments in education. Native American youth aged 10–19 years (n = 89) from reservation communities participated in a study examining this pathway. Measures included family environmental risk and uncertainty, present and future time (...)
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  40.  19
    Jan Heufer (2011). Stochastic Revealed Preference and Rationalizability. Theory and Decision 71 (4):575-592.
    This article explores rationalizability issues for finite sets of observations of stochastic choice in the framework introduced by Bandyopadhyay et al. (Journal of Economic Theory, 84(1), 95–110, 1999). It is argued that a useful approach is to consider indirect preferences on budgets instead of direct preferences on commodity bundles. A new rationalizability condition for stochastic choices, “rationalizable in terms of stochastic orderings on the normalized price space” (rsop), is defined. rsop is satisfied if and only if there exists a solution (...)
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  41.  13
    Stephen A. Clark (1993). Revealed Preference and Linear Utility. Theory and Decision 34 (1):21-45.
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  42.  53
    E. Wesley & F. Peterson (1993). Time Preference, the Environment and the Interests of Future Generations. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 6 (2):107-126.
    The behavior of individuals currently living will generally have long-term consequences that affect the well-being of those who will come to live in the future. Intergenerational interdependencies of this nature raise difficult moral issues because only the current generation is in a position to decide on actions that will determine the nature of the world in which future generations will live. Although most are willing to attach some weight to the interests of future generations, many would argue that it is (...)
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  43.  17
    Gosta Ekman, Jan Hosman & Brita Lindstrom (1965). Roughness, Smoothness, and Preference: A Study of Quantitative Relations in Individual Subjects. Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (1):18.
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  44.  10
    Michelle C. St Clair, Padraic Monaghan & Michael Ramscar (2009). Relationships Between Language Structure and Language Learning: The Suffixing Preference and Grammatical Categorization. Cognitive Science 33 (7):1317-1329.
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  45.  4
    Shiro Imai & W. R. Garner (1965). Discriminability and Preference for Attributes in Free and Constrained Classification. Journal of Experimental Psychology 69 (6):596.
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  46.  15
    Jelle de Boer (2014). Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 30:99-103.
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  47.  11
    Katherine L. Waller, Anthony Volk & Vernon L. Quinsey (2004). The Effect of Infant Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Facial Features on Adoption Preference. Human Nature 15 (1):101-117.
    Infant facial characteristics may affect discriminative parental solicitude because they convey information about the health of the offspring. We examined the effect of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) infant facial characteristics on hypothetical adoption preferences, ratings of attractiveness, and ratings of health. As expected, potential parents were more likely to adopt “normal” infants, and they rated the FAS infants as less attractive and less healthy. Cuteness/attractiveness was the best predictor of adoption likelihood.
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  48.  6
    Moncef Abbas (1995). Any Complete Preference Structure Without Circuit Admits an Interval Representation. Theory and Decision 39 (2):115-126.
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  49.  7
    Clyde H. Coombs & Lily Huang (1970). Tests of a Portfolio Theory of Risk Preference. Journal of Experimental Psychology 85 (1):23.
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  50.  30
    Stephen A. Clark (2000). Revealed Preference and Expected Utility. Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
    This essay gives necessary and sufficient conditions for recovering expected utility from choice behavior in several popular models of uncertainty. In particular, these techniques handle a finite state model; a model for which the choice space consists of probability densities and the expected utility representation requires bounded, measurable utility; and a model for which the choice space consists of Borel probability measures and the expected utility representation requires bounded, continuous utility. The key result is the identification of the continuity condition (...)
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