Search results for 'Preference' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Simon Cushing (2003). Against "Humanism&Quot;: Speciesism, Personhood, and Preference. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (4):556–571.score: 8.0
    Article responds to the criticism of speciesism that it is somehow less immoral than other -isms by showing that this is a mistake resting on an inadequate taxonomy of the various -isms. Criticizes argument by Bonnie Steinbock that preference to your own species is not immoral by comparison with racism of comparable level.
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  2. Lisa L. Fuller (2011). Knowing Their Own Good: Preferences & Liberty in Global Ethics. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave MacMillan. 210--230.score: 8.0
    Citizens of liberal, affluent societies are regularly encouraged to support reforms meant to improve conditions for badly-off people in the developing world. Our economic and political support is solicited for causes such as: banning child labor, implementing universal primary education, closing down sweatshops and brothels, etc. But what if the relevant populations or individuals in the developing world do not support these particular reforms or aid programs? What if they would strongly prefer other reforms and programs, or would rank the (...)
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  3. Donald W. Bruckner (2009). In Defense of Adaptive Preferences. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):307 - 324.score: 8.0
    An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent’s set of feasible options. The fabled fox in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy (...)
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  4. Duncan MacIntosh (1992). Preference-Revision and the Paradoxes of Instrumental Rationality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):503-529.score: 8.0
    To the normal reasons that we think can justify one in preferring something, x (namely, that x has objectively preferable properties, or has properties that one prefers things to have, or that x's obtaining would advance one's preferences), I argue that it can be a justifying reason to prefer x that one's very preferring of x would advance one's preferences. Here, one prefers x not because of the properties of x, but because of the properties of one's having the (...) for x. So-revising one's preferences is rational in paradoxical choice situations like Kavka's Deterrence Paradox. I then try to meet the following objections: that this is stoicist, incoherent, bad faith; that it conflates instrumental and intrinsic value, gives wrong solutions to the problems presented by paradoxical choice situations, entails vicious regresses of value justification, falsifies value realism, makes valuing x unresponsive to x's properties, causes value conflict, conflicts with other standards of rationality, violates decision theory, counsels immorality, makes moral paradox, treats value change as voluntary, conflates first- and second-order values, is psychologically unrealistic, and wrongly presumes that paradoxical choice situations can even occur. (shrink)
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  5. Duncan MacIntosh (2010). Intransitive Preferences, Vagueness, and the Structure of Procrastination. In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford University Press.score: 8.0
    Chrisoula Andreou says procrastination qua imprudent delay is modeled by Warren Quinn’s self-torturer, who supposedly has intransitive preferences that rank each indulgence in something that delays his global goals over working toward those goals and who finds it vague where best to stop indulging. His pair-wise choices to indulge result in his failing the goals, which he then regrets. This chapter argues, contra the money-pump argument, that it is not irrational to have or choose from intransitive preferences; so the agent’s (...)
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  6. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality. Dialogue 30 (1991):3-32.score: 8.0
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...)
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  7. Keith Lehrer (1997). Freedom, Preference and Autonomy. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):3-25.score: 8.0
    Philosophers have advocated different kinds of freedom, but each has value and none should be neglected in a complete theory of freedom and responsibility. There are three kinds of freedom of preference and action that should be distinguished. A person S may fully prefer to do A at every level, and that is one kind of freedom. A person S may autonomously prefer to do A when S has the preference structure concerning doing A because S prefers to (...)
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  8. Julia Tanner (2007). Can Animals Have Preference-Interests? Ethic@ 6 (1).score: 8.0
    It has been argued that only moral agents can have preference-interests and this therefore excludes animals. I will present two objections to this argument. The first will show that moral agency is not necessary to have preference-interests. The second will assert that the argument that animals cannot have preference-interests has unwelcome consequences.
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  9. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Bertil Strömberg (1996). What If I Were in His Shoes? On Hare's Argument for Preference Utilitarianism. Theoria 62 (1-2):95-123.score: 8.0
    This paper discusses the argument for preference utilitarianism proposed by Richard Hare in Moral Thinking(Hare, 1981). G. F. Schueler (1984) and Ingmar Persson (1989) identified a serious gap in Hare’s reasoning, which might be called the No-Conflict Problem. The paper first tries to fill the gap. Then, however, starting with an idea of Zeno Vendler, the question is raised whether the gap is there to begin with. Unfortunately, this Vendlerian move does not save Hare from criticism. Paradoxically, it instead (...)
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  10. Jonathan Aldred (2007). Intransitivity and Vague Preferences. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):377 - 403.score: 8.0
    This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but (...)
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  11. Duncan MacIntosh (1998). Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality. In Peter Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution; Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, Volume 7. Oxford.score: 8.0
    David Gauthier suggested that all genuine moral problems are Prisoners Dilemmas (PDs), and that the morally and rationally required solution to a PD is to co-operate. I say there are four other forms of moral problem, each a different way of agents failing to be in PDs because of the agents’ preferences. This occurs when agents have preferences that are malevolent, self-enslaving, stingy, or bullying. I then analyze preferences as reasons for action, claiming that this means they must not target (...)
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  12. Kaoru Noguchi (2003). The Relationship Between Visual Illusion and Aesthetic Preference – an Attempt to Unify Experimental Phenomenology and Empirical Aesthetics. Axiomathes 13 (3-4):261-281.score: 8.0
    Experimental phenomenology has demonstrated that perception is much richer than stimulus. As is seen in color perception, one and the same stimulus provides more than several modes of appearance or perceptual dimensions. Similarly, there are various perceptual dimensions in form perception. Even a simple geometrical figure inducing visual illusion gives not only perceptual impressions of size, shape, slant, depth, and orientation, but also affective or aesthetic impressions. The present study reviews our experimental phenomenological work on visual illusion and experimental aesthetics, (...)
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  13. Natasha Alechina, Mark Jago & Brian Logan (2008). Preference-Based Belief Revision for Rule-Based Agents. Synthese 165 (2):159-177.score: 8.0
    Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief (...)
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  14. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). Where Do Preferences Come From? International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.score: 8.0
    Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Preferences are usually assumed to be fixed and exogenously given. Building on related work on reasons and rational choice, we describe a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent's preferences are based on certain "motivationally salient" properties of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Preferences may change (...)
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  15. Donald Bruckner (2011). Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality. Acta Analytica 26 (4):367-385.score: 8.0
    A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences. I establish these claims by examining and rejecting the view that (...)
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  16. Fenrong Liu (2010). Von Wright's “the Logic of Preference” Revisited. Synthese 175 (1):69 - 88.score: 8.0
    Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study the foundational (...)
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  17. Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.) (2001). Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press.score: 8.0
    What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this new collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers currently working in this field explore the controversies (...)
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  18. Nate Charlow (2013). Conditional Preferences and Practical Conditionals. Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):463-511.score: 8.0
    I argue that taking the Practical Conditionals Thesis (PCT) seriously demands a new understanding of the semantics of such conditionals. Practical Conditionals Thesis: A practical conditional [if A][ought(B)] expresses B’s conditional preferability given A Paul Weirich has argued that the conditional utility of a state of affairs B on A is to be identified as the degree to which it is desired under indicative supposition that A. Similarly, exploiting the PCT, I will argue that the proper analysis of indicative practical (...)
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  19. Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu (1998). On Preference and Freedom. Theory and Decision 44 (2):173-198.score: 8.0
    We consider the role of preferences in the assessment of an agent's freedom, visualized as the opportunity for choice. After discussing several possible intuitive approaches to the problem, we explore an approach based on the notion of preference orderings that a reasonable person may possibly have. Using different sets of axioms, we characterize the rules for ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom. We also show that certain axioms for ranking opportunity sets are incompatible.
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  20. Tomoyuki Yamada (2008). Logical Dynamics of Some Speech Acts That Affect Obligations and Preferences. Synthese 165 (2):295 - 315.score: 8.0
    In this paper, illocutionary acts of commanding will be differentiated from perlocutionary acts that affect preferences of addressees in a new dynamic logic which combines the preference upgrade introduced in DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) by van Benthem and Liu with the deontic update introduced in ECL II (eliminative command logic II) by Yamada. The resulting logic will incorporate J. L. Austin’s distinction between illocutionary acts as acts having mere conventional effects and perlocutionary acts as acts having real effects (...)
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  21. Mark Alfano (2012). Wilde Heuristics and Rum Tum Tuggers: Preference Indeterminacy and Instability. Synthese 189 (S1):5-15.score: 8.0
    Models in decision theory and game theory assume that preferences are determinate: for any pair of possible outcomes, a and b, an agent either prefers a to b, prefers b to a, or is indifferent as between a and b. Preferences are also assumed to be stable: provided the agent is fully informed, trivial situational influences will not shift the order of her preferences. Research by behavioral economists suggests, however, that economic and hedonic preferences are to some degree indeterminate and (...)
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  22. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2011). A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change. Journal of Theoretical Politics 23 (2):145-164.score: 8.0
    According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose (...)
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  23. Sven Ove Hansson (2009). Preference-Based Choice Functions: A Generalized Approach. Synthese 171 (2):257 - 269.score: 8.0
    Although choice and preference are distinct categories, it may in some contexts be a useful idealization to treat choices as fully determined by preferences. In order to construct a general model of such preference-based choice, a method to derive choices from preferences is needed that yields reasonable outcomes for all preference relations, even those that are incomplete and contain cycles. A generalized choice function is introduced for this purpose. It is axiomatically characterized and is shown to compare (...)
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  24. Donald F. Gustafson (2000). Our Choice Between Actual and Remembered Pain and Our Flawed Preferences. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):111-119.score: 8.0
    In Stephanie Beardman's discussion of the empirical results of Kahneman and Tversky and Kahneman, et al. on pain preference and rational utility decision she argues that an interpretation of these results does not require that false memory for pain episodes yields irrational preferences for future pain events. I concur with her conclusion and suggest that there are reasons from within the pain sciences for agreeing with Beardman's reinterpretation of the Kahneman, et al. data. I cite some of these theoretical (...)
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  25. William Glod (2010). Conditional Preferences and Refusal of Treatment. HEC Forum 22 (4):299-309.score: 8.0
    In this essay, I will use a minimalist standard of decision-making capacity (DMC) to ascertain two cases in the medical ethics literature: the 1978 case of Mary C. Northern and a more recent case involving a paranoid war veteran (call him Jack). In both cases the patients refuse medical treatment out of denial that they are genuinely ill. I believe these cases illustrate two matters: (1) the need of holding oneself to a minimal DMC standard so as to make as (...)
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  26. Umberto Grandi & Ulle Endriss (2013). First-Order Logic Formalisation of Impossibility Theorems in Preference Aggregation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):595-618.score: 8.0
    In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggregation procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we give a complete (...)
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  27. Johan E. Gustafsson (2013). Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476–491.score: 8.0
    Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis (...)
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  28. James Dreier (1996). Rational Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality. Theory and Decision 40 (3):249-276.score: 8.0
    In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pursuit (...)
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  29. Patrick Van Kenhove, Iris Vermeir & Steven Verniers (2001). An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Between Ethical Beliefs, Ethical Ideology, Political Preference and Need for Closure. Journal of Business Ethics 32 (4):347-361.score: 8.0
    An analysis is presented of the relationships between consumers ethical beliefs, ethical ideology, Machiavellianism, political preference and the individual difference variable "need for closure". It is based on a representative survey of 286 Belgian respondents. Standard measurement tools of proven reliability and robustness are used to measure ethical beliefs (consumer ethics scale), ethical ideology (ethical positioning), Machiavellianism (Mach IV scale) and need for closure. The analysis finds the following. First, individuals with a high need for closure tend to have (...)
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  30. Tim Holmes & Johannes M. Zanker (2013). Investigating Preferences for Colour-Shape Combinations with Gaze Driven Optimization Method Based on Evolutionary Algorithms. Frontiers in Psychology 4:926.score: 8.0
    Studying aesthetic preference is notoriously difficult because it targets individual experience. Eye movements provide a rich source of behavioural measures that directly reflect subjective choice. To determine individual preferences for simple composition rules we here use fixation duration as the fitness measure in a Gaze Driven Evolutionary Algorithm (GDEA), which has been used as a tool to identify aesthetic preferences (Holmes & Zanker, 2012). In the present study, the GDEA was used to investigate the preferred combination of colour and (...)
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  31. Mauro Cardoso Simões (2013). Hare's Preference Utilitarianism: An Overview and Critique. Trans/Form/Ação 36 (2):123-134.score: 8.0
    My purpose in this paper is to summarize some aspects of utilitarianism and to provide a general overview of Hare's preference utilitarianism, followed by a critique of Hare's preference theory.
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  32. Robert van Rooij (2011). Revealed Preference and Satisficing Behavior. Synthese 179 (1):1-12.score: 8.0
    A much discussed topic in the theory of choice is how a preference order among options can be derived from the assumption that the notion of ‘choice’ is primitive. Assuming a choice function that selects elements from each finite set of options, Arrow (Economica 26:121–127, 1959) already showed how we can generate a weak ordering by putting constraints on the behavior of such a function such that it reflects utility maximization. Arrow proposed that rational agents can be modeled by (...)
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  33. Jelle de Boer (2012). A Strawson–Lewis Defence of Social Preferences. Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):291-310.score: 8.0
    This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude (Strawson 1974). Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's (...)
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  34. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2000). Preference Stability and Substitution of Indifferents: A Rejoinder to Seidenfeld. Theory and Decision 48 (4):311-318.score: 8.0
    Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In reply to (...)
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  35. Manel Baucells & Antonio Villasís (2010). Stability of Risk Preferences and the Reflection Effect of Prospect Theory. Theory and Decision 68 (1-2):193-211.score: 8.0
    Are risk preferences stable over time? To address this question we elicit risk preferences from the same pool of subjects at two different moments in time. To interpret the results, we use a Fechner stochastic choice model in which the revealed preference of individuals is governed by some underlying preference, together with a random error. We take cumulative prospect theory as the underlying preference model (Kahneman and Tversky, Econometrica 47:263–292, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, Journal of Risk and (...)
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  36. Jean-François Bonnefon, Vittorio Girotto & Paolo Legrenzi (2012). The Psychology of Reasoning About Preferences and Unconsequential Decisions. Synthese 185 (S1):27-41.score: 8.0
    People can reason about the preferences of other agents, and predict their behavior based on these preferences. Surprisingly, the psychology of reasoning has long neglected this fact, and focused instead on disinterested inferences, of which preferences are neither an input nor an output. This exclusive focus is untenable, though, as there is mounting evidence that reasoners take into account the preferences of others, at the expense of logic when logic and preferences point to different conclusions. This article summarizes the most (...)
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  37. T. K. Das (2005). How Strong Are the Ethical Preferences of Senior Business Executives? Journal of Business Ethics 56 (1):69 - 80.score: 8.0
    How do senior business executives rank their preferences for various ethical principles? And how strongly do the executives believe in these principles? Also, how do these preference rankings relate to the way the executives see the future (wherein business decisions play out)? Research on these questions may provide us with an appreciation of the complexities of ethical behavior in management beyond the traditional issues concerning ethical decision-making in business. Based on a survey of 585 vice presidents of U.S. businesses (...)
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  38. Jacinto González-Pachón & Sixto Ríos-Insua (1999). Mixture of Maximal Quasi Orders: A New Approach to Preference Modelling. Theory and Decision 47 (1):73-88.score: 8.0
    Normative theories suggest that inconsistencies be pointed out to the Decision Maker who is thus given the chance to modify his/her judgments. In this paper, we suggest that the inconsistencies problem be transferred from the Decision Maker to the Analyst. With the Mixture of Maximal Quasi Orders, rather than pointing out incoherences for the Decision Maker to change, these inconsistencies may be used as new source of information to model his/her preferences.
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  39. Yutaka Nakamura (1997). Lexicographic Additivity for Multi-Attribute Preferences on Finite Sets. Theory and Decision 42 (1):1-19.score: 8.0
    This paper explores lexicographically additive representations of multi-attribute preferences on finite sets. Lexicographic additivity combines a lexicographic feature with local value tradeoffs. Tradeoff structures are governed by either transitive or nontransitive additive conjoint measurement. Alternatives are locally traded off when they are close enough within threshold associated with a dominant subset of attributes.
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  40. Gustav Tinghög (2012). Discounting, Preferences, and Paternalism in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. Health Care Analysis 20 (3):297-318.score: 8.0
    When assessing the cost effectiveness of health care programmes, health economists typically presume that distant events should be given less weight than present events. This article examines the moral reasonableness of arguments advanced for positive discounting in cost-effectiveness analysis both from an intergenerational and an intrapersonal perspective and assesses if arguments are equally applicable to health and monetary outcomes. The article concludes that behavioral effects related to time preferences give little or no reason for why society at large should favour (...)
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  41. Alexander Vostroknutov (2013). Preferences Over Consumption and Status. Theory and Decision 74 (4):509-537.score: 8.0
    Experimental evidence suggests that individual consumption has not only personal value but also enters the social part of the utility. Existing models of social preferences make ad hoc parametric assumptions about the nature of this duality. This creates a problem of experimental identification of preferences since without such assumptions it is impossible to distinguish whether consumption or social concerns are driving the behavior. Given observed choice, the Axiomatic model of preferences in this article makes it possible to unambiguously determine personal (...)
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  42. Andrea Capotorti, Giulianella Coletti & Barbara Vantaggi (2008). Preferences Representable by a Lower Expectation: Some Characterizations. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):119-146.score: 8.0
    We propose two different characterizations for preference relations representable by lower (upper) expectations with the aim of removing either fair price or completeness requirements. Moreover, we give an explicit characterization for comparative degrees of belief on a finite algebra of events representable by lower probabilities.
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  43. Keith Graham (2000). Are All Preferences Nosy? Res Publica 6 (2):133-154.score: 8.0
    The significance which any human action carries for normative reasoning is held to include its causal preconditions as well as its causal consequences. That claim is defended against a series of natural objections. The point is then extended from actions to preferences via discussion of Barry and Dworkin. The grounds for excluding nosy preferences from aggregation must involve appeal not just to rights and intention but also to the consequences of acting on them. But then some of the features in (...)
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  44. Per Hjertstrand & James L. Swofford (2012). Revealed Preference Tests for Consistency with Weakly Separable Indirect Utility. Theory and Decision 72 (2):245-256.score: 8.0
    Since Varian (Econometrica 50:945–973, 1982; Review of Economic Studies 50:90–110, 1983) made checking for consistency with revealed preference conditions more accessible to empirical researchers; researchers have often used revealed preference procedures to test their maintained hypotheses and narrow the scope of their demand studies. The tests developed by Varian are for the direct utility function, while researchers estimating demand systems often find it convenient to model consumer behavior with an indirect utility function. Unfortunately structure revealed in the direct (...)
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  45. Bernadette Klopp & Linda Mealey (1998). Experimental Mood Manipulation Does Not Induce Change in Preference for Natural Landscapes. Human Nature 9 (4):391-399.score: 8.0
    According to evolutionary theory, emotions are psychological mechanisms that have evolved to enhance fitness in specific situations by motivating appropriate (adaptive) behavior. Taking this perspective, a previous study examined the relationship between mood and preference for natural environments. It reported that participants’ anxiety level was associated with a preference for landscapes offering what Appleton called "refuge," while participants’ anger and cheerfulness were both associated with a preference for landscapes offering what Appleton called "prospect." We attempted to replicate (...)
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  46. Christine E. Stanik & Phoebe C. Ellsworth (2010). Who Cares About Marrying a Rich Man? Intelligence and Variation in Women's Mate Preferences. Human Nature 21 (2):203-217.score: 8.0
    Although robust sex differences are abundant in men and women’s mating psychology, there is a considerable degree of overlap between the two as well. In an effort to understand where and when this overlap exists, the current study provides an exploration of within-sex variation in women’s mate preferences. We hypothesized that women’s intelligence, given an environment where women can use that intelligence to attain educational and career opportunities, would be: (1) positively related to their willingness to engage in short-term sexual (...)
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  47. Haiyan Xu, Keith W. Hipel, D. Marc Kilgour & Ye Chen (2010). Combining Strength and Uncertainty for Preferences in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Multiple Decision Makers. Theory and Decision 69 (4):497-521.score: 8.0
    A hybrid preference framework is proposed for strategic conflict analysis to integrate preference strength and preference uncertainty into the paradigm of the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) under multiple decision makers. This structure offers decision makers a more flexible mechanism for preference expression, which can include strong or mild preference of one state or scenario over another, as well as equal preference. In addition, preference between two states can be uncertain. The result (...)
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  48. Stefan Zeisberger, Dennis Vrecko & Thomas Langer (2012). Measuring the Time Stability of Prospect Theory Preferences. Theory and Decision 72 (3):359-386.score: 8.0
    Prospect Theory (PT) is widely regarded as the most promising descriptive model for decision making under uncertainty. Various tests have corroborated the validity of the characteristic fourfold pattern of risk attitudes implied by the combination of probability weighting and value transformation. But is it also safe to assume stable PT preferences at the individual level? This is not only an empirical but also a conceptual question. Measuring the stability of preferences in a multi-parameter decision model such as PT is far (...)
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  49. Antoine Billot (2002). The Deep Side of Preference Theory. Theory and Decision 53 (3):243-270.score: 8.0
    An individual is said to have a taste for a particular menu, i.e. a subset of available commodities, if he is indifferent between all commodity bundles that contain the same quantity for each commodity which actually is in the menu, whatever the rest of the bundle. Then, a taste is directly defined as a deep property of preferences. As a first result, it is shown that a complete and transitive preference relation over the commodity bundles is equivalent to regular (...)
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  50. Douglas S. Bridges (2008). Uniform Continuity Properties of Preference Relations. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (1):97-106.score: 8.0
    The anti-Specker property, a constructive version of sequential compactness, is used to prove constructively that a pointwise continuous, order-dense preference relation on a compact metric space is uniformly sequentially continuous. It is then shown that Ishihara's principle BD-ℕ implies that a uniformly sequentially continuous, order-dense preference relation on a separable metric space is uniformly continuous. Converses of these two theorems are also proved.
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