Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and Peircean abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the traditional philosophical problem of deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. Each method implies a correspondingly different view of the generation of the variations from which knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter differences, and to distinguish the different sorts of variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a distinction between extensive, intensive, and abductive-intensive variation is introduced. The link between philosophical method and the generation (...) of variation is used to illuminate different philosophical conceptions of nature and nature's relation to meaning and sense. (shrink)

Debate between the A- and B-theories has rested on the supposition that there is a clear difference between A- and B-time. I argue that this supposition is mistaken for two reasons. We cannot distinguish the two conceptions of time by means of Bergsonian intuition. Unless we can do so, we cannot distinguish them at all. I defend by imagining various ways to intuit the two kinds of time, and maintaining that none of them works. I defend by showing that (...) the issue is an experiential one, unlike metaphysical issues that are less connected to experience. My conclusion is that no progress will be made in the debate between the two theories until it becomes clear what the difference is between the two kinds of time. (shrink)

This paper provides a Bergsonian response to J.M.E. McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time. McTaggart’s argument has been used as the primary framework for analytic discussions about time for over a hundred years. McTaggart argued that all events in time can be categorised in two ways: either using the A-series (whereby all events are ‘past,’ ‘present,’ or ‘future’) or the B-series (whereby two events are linked by the relation of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’). He argued that the A-series is (...) contradictory and that the B-series does not capture the nature of time. So he famously concluded that time is unreal. I demonstrate that McTaggart’s argument does not pay sufficient attention to the time of consciousness captured by Bergson’s durée. I show that two distinct temporal realms can be extracted from Bergson’s philosophy: (i) la durée and (ii) a mathematical time-ordering generally classified by analytic philosophers as the B-series. The A-series is shown to be an attempt to ‘have it all’ – to retain the features that apply only to the mathematical ordering (e.g., divisibility into distinct segments), but that also somehow contain only those features that apply to subjective temporal experience (e.g., the ‘flow’ of time). (shrink)

Henri Bergson is widely regarded as one of the most original and important philosophers of the twentieth century. His work explored a rich panoply of subjects, including time, memory, free will and humor and we owe the popular term élan vital to a fundamental insight of Bergson's. His books provoked responses from some of the leading thinkers and philosophers of his time, including Einstein, William James and Bertrand Russell, and he is acknowledged as a fundamental influence on Marcel Proust. The (...) Bergsonian Mind is an outstanding, wide-ranging volume covering the major aspects of Bergson's thought, from his early influences to his continued relevance and legacy. 36 chapters by an international team of leading Bergson scholars are divided into five clear parts: Sources and Scene Mind and World Ethics and Politics Reception Bergson and Contemporary Thought. In these sections fundamental topics are examined, including time, freedom and determinism, memory, perception, evolutionary theory, pragmatism and art and aesthetics. Bergson's impact beyond philosophy is also explored in chapters on Bergson and spiritualism, modernism, Proust and post-colonial thought. An indispensable resource for anyone in Philosophy studying and researching Bergson's work, The Bergsonian Mind will also interest those in related disciplines such as Literature, Religion, Sociology and French studies. (shrink)

In this paper I explore a “variation” on the “theme” of intuition in the evolution of modern metaphysics. My aim is not to criticize A. W. Moore’s account of intuition as one of two ways by which Bergson makes sense of things (the other way is analysis). Instead I will suggest the significance in extending Bergson’s metaphysics to mystical life as “the ‘very life of things’ into which intuition installs itself.” When the metaphysical drama, in The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, (...) reaches chapter 16, “Bergson: Metaphysics as Pure Creativity,” Moore expresses astonishment that Bergson could have thought philosophers have ever agreed on aligning “analysis” in science with the impossibility of non-perspectival sense-making and “intuition” in metaphysics with the possibility of absolute (non-perspectival) knowledge. Using a method of intuition, not of analysis, as non-perspectival sense-making is the opposite of what Moore himself finds in other philosophical contributions to modern metaphysics as “a most general attempt to make sense of things.” He takes an influential example: Bernard Williams associates analysis, not intuition, with the possibility of non-perspectival sense-making and absolute knowledge. My response defends Bergsonian intuition in giving it a positive—and, why not, non-perspectival?—role in metaphysics as mystical; that is, as unique and inexpressible life. Moore describes intuition in Bergson as both the faculty and the method for the evolution of new concepts and new ways of making sense of things. I will stress that Bergsonian intuition is “an effort to place oneself into a movement, such as that of philosophy itself,” expressing “what is ‘living in philosophers’ rather than what is ‘fixed and dead in theses.’ ” This mystical life pushes out the limits set up by Kant for metaphysics (and science) by allowing intuition (with analysis) to reach for absolute, non-perspectival knowledge. (shrink)

Published in 1913 as _La Philosophie Bergsonienne_, this incisive critique of the thought of Henri Bergson was Jacques Maritain's first book. In it he shows himself already to have an authoritative grasp of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and an uncanny ability to demonstrate its relevance to alternative philosophical systems such as that of Henri Bergson. Volume 1 in the series _The Collected Works of Jacques Maritain_, this edition faithfully reproduces the 1955 translation published by the Philosophical Library. It (...) would be difficult to overestimate Bergson’s role in extricating French philosophy from the deadening materialism that dominated the Sorbonne. It was that cultural milieu that brought Maritain and his wife Raïssa to the brink of suicide. They drew back for two major reasons. First were the lectures of Henri Bergson at the Collège de France, in which the Maritains found a defense of metaphysics, of the transcendent beyond the material, within which they could find meaning in life. The second reason was their conversion to Catholicism, a move they and many of their contemporaries made after being introduced to Bergson’s work. Soon after his conversion, Jacques Maritain immersed himself in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and was struck by the comparative weaknesses of Bergson. This book is Maritain’s relentless criticism of the philosophy of the man whose lectures had meant so much to him. Its ferocity marks it as a young man’s book, written in part to exorcize the defects of Bergson’s philosophy as they were understood by one now schooled in Thomism. Twenty-five years later, Maritain, while not retracting his criticisms, regretted their intemperance and, as a result, moderated his assessment of Bergson in a long preface to the second edition. In it, we find a philosopher who mastered his craft and a critic of rare perception and refinement. (shrink)

From around the year 1900, the ideal of the equivalence of art (form) and nature (animated matter) was challenged when two concurring principles—homogeneous duration and heterogeneous moments—started to manifest themselves in the discrete attempts of artists to integrate being into art. As creative approaches to the perception and representation of nature, these diametrically opposed configurations find expression in the writings of the French philosopher Henri Bergson, mainly between 1889 and 1907. The notion of living forms in permanent transition, informed by (...) evolutionary theory, found its social expression in a growing urban dynamism. Subsequently, the obsolete epistemological Apollonian principle of a central perspective in painting, based on a timeless, static Newtonian space, gave way to the Dionysian ontological principle—radically questioning the unity of being and form in the creative process. Initially, this change was particularly evident in the paintings of Claude Monet and Paul Cézanne. While Monet envisions a homogeneous space of instantaneous time (the separate moment), Cézanne's distinctive Post-Impressionist dynamic representations of continuous becoming can be read as contemporary pictorial counterparts of the Bergsonian concepts of duration, memory, and vital force. Thus, Bergson's psycho-physiological principle of endurance, in which perceptions and memories of distinct physical phenomena interpenetrate multitudinously, gradually becomes a dominant feature in the works of numerous artists who inherit Monet's and, especially, Cézanne's aesthetic notions. (shrink)

Rather than a return to Bergson, the ‘Kyoto manifesto’ argues for a renewed, expanded Bergsonism: a philosophical inquiry that lives up to the methodological standards set by Bergson, even if this implies prolonging some of his intuitions in different directions—possibly against himself. Several aspects of this endeavour are examined in turn: the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the prospects of speculative empiricism, the ontological scope of scientific theories, emergentism and the virtual, the relevance of space-time for duration, the place of metaphysical (...) imagination and its capacity to probe the utopian potential of a truly open science. (shrink)

This critique of Henri Bergson is Jacques Maritain's first book. In it he shows he has a grasp of the thought of St Thomas Aquinas and an ability to show its relevance to other systems such as that of Bergson. This text presents Jacques Maritain's as a philosopher, a Thomist and a critic.

Presents essays to reflect the influence of Henri Bergson in the fields of philosophy, theology and literature. Also details papers from the Bergson Centennial which took place took place in Paris in 1959.

The eleven papers comprising this book were read at two Bergson Centennial celebrations in 1959--at Hollins College and in Paris. From Pelikan's discussion of Bergson's place in theology to Merleau-Ponty's account of his view of history, the contributions lay bare many more enigmas in Bergson's relation to subsequent thought than they solve. Starkie's paper on the literary merits and impact of the work of Bergson makes such a compelling case for its kinship to Symbolism and Proust that one is tempted (...) to accept the thesis that the Bergsonian Heritage is most alive in those who are not philosophers. Contains a bibliography of books and articles by and on Bergson.--W. H. C. (shrink)

Maritain's first book, published in France in 1913, and now translated into English for the first time. It marks, historically, one of the earliest expressions of that revived Thomism which has played such a large part in the intellectual life of contemporary France; and it represents, systematically, one of the most detailed and persistent "intellectualist" answers to the Bergsonian critique of "intellectualist" philosophies. The translators have done about as good a job as is possible in rendering what Maritain himself (...) calls the book's "turgidity, the uncompromising bombast of its style."--V. C. C. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show how the Bergsonian method works in philosophy on a concrete problem: how is it possible to measure sensations? Bergson explains that a sensation is not a psychological object, since what it is depends on what is, is doing to us. Then it is not only represented. It is lived. All sensation measuring is adding a new feeling to what is measured This specific feeling is in connection with nothing but duration. The first aim is (...) to show that this old epistemological problem is still attractive today. We don’t know exactly how to measure sensations neither with additive nor with ordinal measuring. But we want to explain also how the metaphysical intuition is working in the first Bergson’s book. It is not coming first. It is always coming after the examination of a specific scientific problem, since the philosophical insight is always emerging in an indirect way. It is impossible then to assert with Bergson that science is not thinking. It is just important to observe that science is not thinking alone. It needs the critical action of philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay, Perraudin sets out to contrast the competing philosophies of time and imagination of two major French thinkers of the twentieth century: Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962). Despite Bachelard’s polemical approach vis-à-vis philosophical tradition in his works on epistemology and poetics, his accounts of time and imagination have been shown by several critics to be significantly influenced and inspired by his predecessor. Perraudin nonetheless argues that Bachelard’s critique of Bergson’s theory of continuous temporality opens the way—through (...) the subtle dialectics of his “philosophy of no”—to more prolific, and as yet untapped, therapeutic possibilities in our understanding of time and imagination than Bergson’s accounts of continuum of the élan vital had managed to reveal. (shrink)

Pamela Sue Anderson urges feminist philosophers to embrace Michèle Le Doeuff’s revaluation of women in philosophy through according “fair value” to intuition as an intellectual faculty, a view of intuition articulated by Henri Bergson. She asks whether women who follow Bergson could be given fair value along with intuition. She turns from Le Doeuff’s writings on intuition to writings by Bergson and by Beauvoir, but periodically returns to Le Doeuff herself. In the end, a picture of freedom, friendship and feminism (...) emerges from readings of all three. This is a portrait of confident and capable interactions in creativity and dynamic projects, which transform our becoming within life, on the assumption that the love of friendship is between like-minded, embodied and interrelated selves. She explores whether we transform our lives in freedom and in love between friends. Although attracted to the human – and humane – solidarity in freedom of “great souls,” as in Beauvoir’s women of action, she instead aligns herself with Le Doeuff’s critical caution against naturalizing a timelessly abstract female soul for contemporary feminist philosophers. She concludes her proposed orientation with a Le Doeuffian feminist image of living life freely for and with friends. (shrink)

La Philosophie Bergsonienne was Maritain’s earliest work. It has now been translated into English for the first time. Already, when the book was written, Maritain was a follower of St. Thomas; in his foreword to the present edition he modestly describes it as “probably a fair to middling account of basic Thomistic Philosophy”. As the title of the book suggests, Bergson’s thought, at least in its basic doctrines, is given not for its own sake but rather to enable us to (...) see how Thomistic thought can face up to the problems Bergson sought to answer. (shrink)

Tomada desde Artaud por Deleuze ya desde la redacción de Lógica del sentido (1969), la expresión de cuerpo sin órganos (CsO) no deja de causar al menos perplejidad. En su enunciación se traman puntos cruciales de la filosofía de Deleuze desde su teoría del acontecimiento y de la diferencia, pasando por una definición y una analítica del deseo, hasta una determinada noción de vida que articularía el proceso de su generación. Sin desestimar lo anterior y los profusos usos y determinaciones (...) actuales que ha cobrado esta noción, nuestro propósito es vincular al CsO con la concepción de vida,que según nuestra lectura, se halla en la base de su formulación. Esto permanece en el texto como subyacente, y nuestra propuesta se inscribe en determinar el grado de influjo que posee el vitalismo de Bergson en la concepción de esta fórmula: desde este punto de vista es plausible sostener que el CsO es una operación que se funda de modo crucial en una lectura atenta al élan vital de bergsoniano. En suma, si el CsO es una involución creadora por definición de su proceso, no es sino porque supuesta en marcha significa y se efectúa en una constante y radical lucha que implica cada vez el desmontaje o desmembramiento de la idea de organismo. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo intenciona mostrar como o método filosófico desenvolvido e aplicado por Bergson, a intuição, articula distintos níveis de nossa experiência. Para isso, buscaremos extrair algumas lições de um momento especial da aplicação desse método, no qual o mergulho na interioridade psicológica se relaciona com a visão objetiva da exterioridade. Trata-se aqui de retomar o bloco central da obra A Evolução Criadora, núcleo metafísico da filosofia bergsoniana, no qual encontramos a reinterpretação dos dados da biologia que deriva na cosmologia. (...) Mais precisamente, se a cosmologia elaborada nesse livro pode ser apontada como a performance mais paradigmática da intuição, nossa atenção se dirigirá a um passo metodológico anterior: a leitura dos dados da biologia evolutiva que dá contornos e subsídios à tese de que a consciência é coextensiva à vida.: This paper intends to explain how the philosophical method developed and applied by Bergson - intuition - articulates different levels of our experience. To this end, we will try to extract some lessons from a special moment in the application of this method, in which the dive into psychological interiority is related to the objective vision of exteriority. Our analysis will focus on the central part of Creative Evolution, the metaphysical nucleus of Bergsonian philosophy, in which we find a reinterpretation of the evolutionary biology of the 19th century. This reinterpretation has as a consequence the most important of Bergson's cosmological theses. More precisely, though the cosmology developed in this book can be regarded as the most paradigmatic performance of intuition, our attention will be directed to an earlier methodological step, the philosophical interpretation of the data of evolutionary biology that underlies the essential statement that consciousness is coextensive with life. (shrink)

In the long line of French Sade studies, Deleuze's essay Coldness and Cruelty marks out a special place. By discussing Masoch both in addition to and in contrast to Sade, Deleuze reveals the stakes of his book: he wants to unmask the concept of sadomasochism as a clinical nonentity. In their paper, the authors explain the arguments supporting this project and show their relation to Deleuze's reading of Bergson. They then argue that there is a second, similarly Bergsonian criticism (...) of Freudian psychoanalysis operating in the background of Coldness and Cruelty. This more wide-ranging criticism takes Freud to task for conceiving perversion, like neurosis, in Oedipal terms. This conception, Deleuze holds, forgets that perversion and neurosis represent two different worlds that essentially have nothing to do with each other despite crossing in clinical experience. (shrink)

The concept of care has occupied a central place in nursing philosophy and scholarship since the modern formation of the profession. Perhaps the defining character of the scholarship has been the recognition not only of the complexity of the concept of care, its elusiveness and ambiguity, but also the lack of consensus or agreement regarding its meaning and value. I will make two interconnected arguments: first, I will argue that disputes around care are not an accidental feature or an unfortunate (...) condition of its applicability. Rather, care is an example of what I will call, following W.B. Gallie (1956), an “essentially contested” concept. Secondly, I will employ insights from the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859‐1941) to explore the concept of care and argue that the essentially contested processual nature of care is the source of its meaning and value. (shrink)