Search results for 'Principal Principle' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Richard Pettigrew (2012). Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle. Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.score: 180.0
    In ‘A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Jim Joyce attempts to ‘depragmatize’ de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our partial beliefs ought to satisfy the axioms of probability calculus. In this paper, I adapt Joyce’s argument to give a non-pragmatic vindication of various versions of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, such as the version based on Isaac Levi's account of admissibility, Michael Thau and Ned Hall's New Principle, and Jenann Ismael's Generalized Principal Principle. Joyce enumerates (...)
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  2. Milan M. Ćirković (2006). Is Quantum Suicide Painless? On an Apparent Violation of the Principal Principle. Foundations of Science 11 (3):287-296.score: 180.0
    The experimental setup of the self-referential quantum measurement, jovially known as the ‘quantum suicide’ or the ‘quantum Russian roulette’ is analyzed from the point of view of the Principal Principle of David Lewis. It is shown that the apparent violation of this principle – relating objective probabilities and subjective chance – in this type of thought experiment is just an illusion due to the usage of some terms and concepts ill-defined in the quantum context. We conclude that (...)
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  3. Milan Cirkovic (2006). Is Quantum Suicide Painless? On an Apparent Violation of the Principal Principle. Foundations of Science 11 (3):287-296.score: 180.0
    The experimental setup of the self-referential quantum measurement, jovially known as the ‘quantum suicide’ or the ‘quantum Russian roulette’ is analyzed from the point of view of the Principal Principle of David Lewis. It is shown that the apparent violation of this principle – relating objective probabilities and subjective chance – in this type of thought experiment is just an illusion due to the usage of some terms and concepts ill-defined in the quantum context. We conclude that (...)
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  4. Barry Ward (2005). Projecting Chances: A Humean Vindication and Justification of the Principal Principle. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):241-261.score: 180.0
    Faced with the paradox of undermining futures, Humeans have resigned themselves to accounts of chance that severely conflict with our intuitions. However, such resignation is premature: The problem is Humean supervenience (HS), not Humeanism. This paper develops a projectivist Humeanism on which chance claims are understood as normative, rather than fact stating. Rationality constraints on the cotenability of norms and factual claims ground a factual-normative worlds semantics that, in addition to solving the Frege-Geach problem, delivers the intuitive set of possibilia (...)
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  5. Cam Caldwell, Ranjan Karri & Pamela Vollmar (2006). Principal Theory and Principle Theory: Ethical Governance From the Follower's Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 66 (2/3):207 - 223.score: 144.0
    Organizational governance has historically focused around the perspective of principals and managers and has traditionally pursued the goal of maximizing owner wealth. This paper suggests that organizational governance can profitably be viewed from the ethical perspective of organizational followers - employees of the organization to whom important ethical duties are also owed. We present two perspectives of organizational governance: Principal Theory that suggests that organizational owners and managers can often be ethically opportunistic and take advantage of employees who serve (...)
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  6. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431.score: 120.0
    This paper examines two mistakes regarding David Lewis’ Principal Principle that have appeared in the recent literature. These particular mistakes are worth looking at for several reasons: The thoughts that lead to these mistakes are natural ones, the principles that result from these mistakes are untenable, and these mistakes have led to significant misconceptions regarding the role of admissibility and time. After correcting these mistakes, the paper discusses the correct roles of time and admissibility. With these results in (...)
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  7. Robert Black (1998). Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.score: 120.0
    Any adequate theory of chance must accommodate some version of David Lewis's ‘Principal Principle’, and Lewis has argued forcibly that believers in primitive propensities have a problem in explaining what makes the Principle true. But Lewis can only derive (a revised version of) the Principle from his own Humean theory by putting constraints on inductive rationality which cannot be given a Humean rationale.
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  8. Richard Pettigrew (2013). A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle. Episteme 10 (1):19-35.score: 120.0
    Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce’s argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument (...)
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  9. Peter B. M. Vranas (2004). Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368–382.score: 120.0
    David Lewis (1980) proposed the Principal Principle (PP) and a “reformulation” which later on he called ‘OP’ (Old Principle). Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis (1994) concluded that they should be replaced with the New Principle (NP). This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is “quite messy”, whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is “the key to our concept (...)
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  10. Peter B. M. Vranas (2002). Who's Afraid of Undermining? Why the Principal Principle Might Not Contradict Humean Supervenience. Erkenntnis 57 (2):151 - 174.score: 120.0
    The Principal Principle (PP) says that, for any proposition A, given any admissible evidence and the proposition that the chance of A is x%, one's conditional credence in A should be x%. Humean Supervenience (HS) claims that, among possible worlds like ours, no two differ without differing in the spacetime-point-by-spacetime-point arrangement of local properties. David Lewis (1986b, 1994a) has argued that PP contradicts HS, and the validity of his argument has been endorsed by Bigelow et al. (1993), Thau (...)
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  11. Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2013). Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams's Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs039.score: 120.0
    I show that David Lewis’s principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis’s reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams’s thesis applies also to his own principal principle. 1 Introduction2 Adams’s Thesis, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and the Principal Principle3 Jeffrey Conditionalization4 The Principal Principles Not Preserved under Jeffrey Conditionalization5 Inadmissible Experiences.
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  12. Peter B. M. Vranas, The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New.score: 96.0
    [1] You have a crystal ball. Unfortunately, it’s defective. Rather than predicting the future, it gives you the chances of future events. Is it then of any use? It certainly seems so. You may not know for sure whether the stock market will crash next week; but if you know for sure that it has an 80% chance of crashing, then you should be 80% confident that it will—and you should plan accordingly. More generally, given that the chance of a (...)
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  13. Peter J. Lewis (2010). Credence and Self-Location. Synthese 175 (3):369-382.score: 90.0
    All parties to the Sleeping Beauty debate agree that it shows that some cherished principle of rationality has to go. Thirders think that it is Conditionalization and Reflection that must be given up or modified; halfers think that it is the Principal Principle. I offer an analysis of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle that allows us to retain all three principles. In brief, I argue that Sleeping Beauty’s credence in the uncentered proposition that the coin came up heads (...)
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  14. Richard Pettigrew (2013). What Chance‐Credence Norms Should Not Be. Noûs 47 (3).score: 90.0
    A chance-credence norm states how an agent's credences in propositions concerning objective chances ought to relate to her credences in other propositions. The most famous such norm is the Principal Principle (PP), due to David Lewis. However, Lewis noticed that PP is too strong when combined with many accounts of chance that attempt to reduce chance facts to non-modal facts. Those who defend such accounts of chance have offered two alternative chance-credence norms: the first is Hall's and Thau's (...)
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  15. Joshua Haddock (2011). The Principal Principle and Theories of Chance: Another Bug? Philosophy of Science 78 (5):854-863.score: 90.0
  16. Kevin Nelson (2009). On Background: Using Two-Argument Chance. Synthese 166 (1):165 - 186.score: 90.0
    I follow Hájek (Synthese 137:273–323, 2003c) by taking objective probability to be a function of two propositional arguments—that is, I take conditional probability as primitive. Writing the objective probability of q given r as P(q, r), I argue that r may be chosen to provide less than a complete and exact description of the world’s history or of its state at any time. It follows that nontrivial objective probabilities are possible in deterministic worlds and about the past. A very simple (...)
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  17. Ittay Nissan Rozen (2013). Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis and Adams׳ Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.score: 90.0
  18. Rudiger Schack (2010). The Principal Principle and Probability in the Many-Worlds Interpretation. In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, & Reality. Oup Oxford.score: 90.0
     
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  19. Roald Hoffmann, Vladimir I. Minkin & Barry K. Carpenter (1997). Ockham's Razor and Chemistry. Hyle 3 (1):3 - 28.score: 72.0
    We begin by presenting William of Ockham's various formulations of his principle of parsimony, Ockham's Razor. We then define a reaction mechanism and tell a personal story of how Ockham's Razor entered the study of one such mechanism. A small history of methodologies related to Ockham's Razor, least action and least motion, follows. This is all done in the context of the chemical (and scientific) community's almost unthinking acceptance of the principle as heuristically valuable. Which is not matched, (...)
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  20. Alan Hájek & Michael Smithson (2012). Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 187 (1):33-48.score: 60.0
    We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required . Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with our (...)
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  21. Christopher J. G. Meacham (forthcoming). Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem. In Toby Handfield & Alastair Wilson (eds.), Asymmetries in Chance and Time. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    In recent work, Callender and Cohen (2009) and Hoefer (2007) have proposed variants of the account of chance proposed by Lewis (1994). One of the ways in which these accounts diverge from Lewis’s is that they allow special sciences and the macroscopic realm to have chances that are autonomous from those of physics and the microscopic realm. A worry for these proposals is that autonomous chances may place incompatible constraints on rational belief. I examine this worry, and attempt to determine (...)
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  22. Michael G. Titelbaum (2012). An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers. Thought 1 (2):146-151.score: 60.0
    “Double-halfers” think that throughout the Sleeping Beauty Problem, Beauty should keep her credence that a fair coin flip came up heads equal to 1/2. I introduce a new wrinkle to the problem that shows even double-halfers can't keep Beauty's credences equal to the objective chances for all coin-flip propositions. This leaves no way to deny that self-locating information generates an unexpected kind of inadmissible evidence.
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  23. Michael Strevens (1995). A Closer Look at the 'New' Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):545-561.score: 48.0
    David Lewis, Michael Thau, and Ned Hall have recently argued that the Principal Principle—an inferential rule underlying much of our reasoning about probability—is inadequate in certain respects, and that something called the ‘New Principle’ ought to take its place. This paper argues that the Principle Principal need not be discarded. On the contrary, Lewis et al. can get everything they need—including the New Principle—from the intuitions and inferential habits that inspire the Principal (...) itself, while avoiding the problems that originally caused them to abandon that principle. (shrink)
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  24. R. Black (1998). Chance, Credence, and the Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.score: 48.0
    Any adequate theory of chance must accommodate some version of David Lewis's ‘Principal Principle’, and Lewis has argued forcibly that believers in primitive propensities have a problem in explaining what makes the Principle true. But Lewis can only derive (a revised version of) the Principle from his own Humean theory by putting constraints on inductive rationality which cannot be given a Humean rationale.
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  25. Daniel Attas (2008). The Difference Principle and Time. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):209-232.score: 42.0
    Rawls's difference principle contains a certain normative ambiguity, so that opposing views, including strong inegalitarian ones, might find a home under it. The element that introduces this indeterminacy is the absence of an explicit reference to time . Thus, a society that agrees on the difference principle as the proper justification of basic political-economic institutions, might nevertheless disagree on whether their specific institutions are justified by that principle. Such disagreement would most often centre on issues of fact: (...)
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  26. G. W. Gibbons (2002). The Maximum Tension Principle in General Relativity. Foundations of Physics 32 (12):1891-1901.score: 42.0
    I suggest that classical General Relativity in four spacetime dimensions incorporates a Principal of Maximal Tension and give arguments to show that the value of the maximal tension is $\frac{{c^4 }}{{4G}}$ . The relation of this principle to other, possibly deeper, maximal principles is discussed, in particular the relation to the tension in string theory. In that case it leads to a purely classical relation between G and the classical string coupling constant α′ and the velocity of light (...)
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  27. Vere Chappell, Hoffman on Principal Attributes.score: 42.0
    In Principles I. 53, Descartes states what appears to be an important metaphysical principle: P1: Each substance has one principal property, which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210).1 Marleen Rozemond calls this Descartes's "Attributes Premise", and it leads directly, as she points out, to Cartesian Dualism, the doctrine that a human mind and a human body, even when they belong to the same human being, (...)
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  28. F. C. White (1992). On Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. E.J. Brill.score: 42.0
    This book is a philosophical commentary on Schopenhauer's "Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason," dealing with each of Schopenhauer's principal ...
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  29. J. Gruszczak, M. Heller & P. Multarzynski (1989). Physics with and Without the Equivalence Principle. Foundations of Physics 19 (5):607-618.score: 42.0
    A differential manifold (d-manifold, for short) can be defined as a pair (M, C), where M is any set and C is a family of real functions on M which is (i) closed with respect to localization and (ii) closed with respect to superposition with smooth Euclidean functions; one also assumes that (iii) M is locally diffeomorphic to Rn. These axioms have a straightforward physical interpretation. Axioms (i) and (ii) formalize certain “compatibility conditions” which usually are supposed to be assumed (...)
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  30. Khalid Bouzoubaâ Fennane (2003). Reflections on the Principle of Continuity on the Basis of Ibn Al-Haytham's Commentary on Proposition I.7 of Euclid's Elements. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 13 (1):101-136.score: 42.0
    After his refutation of the doubts concerning Proposition I.7 (in the Book of solving doubts), Ibn al-Haytham mentions three possible ways in which circles may intersect, submitting them to the following “intuitive” argument: one part of one of the two circles is situated inside of the other circle, and its other part is situated outside of it. One is therefore tempted to believe that the commentator accepts the principle of continuity in the case of circles, since his argument has (...)
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  31. Jonathan Schaffer (2003). Principled Chances. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):27-41.score: 36.0
    There are at least three core principles that define the chance role: (1) the Principal Principle, (2) the Basic Chance Principle, and (3) the Humean Principle. These principles seem mutually incompatible. At least, no extant account of chance meets more than one of them. I offer an account of chance which meets all three: L*-chance. So the good news is that L*-chance meets (1)–(3). The bad news is that L*-chance turns out unlawful and unstable.
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  32. Gabriella Pigozzi, On the Notion of Admissibility in Chance-Credence Principles: A Comment on Vranas.score: 36.0
    Lewis’ Principal Principle (PP) aims at clarifying the connection between chance (i.e. objective probability) and credence (i.e. subjective probability). It is generally assumed that the chance that an event will occur does not depend on our credence in the occurrence of that event. Nevertheless, chances constrain our credence, and Lewis’ PP is an attempt to capture this connection.
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  33. Jonathan SchaAer, Principled Chances.score: 36.0
    There are at least three core principles that define the chance role: ill the Principal Principle, l21 the Basic Chance Principle, and l31 the Humean Principle. These principles seem mutually incompatible. At least, no extant account of chance meets more than one of them. I ofier an account of chance which meets all three: L~-chance. So the good news is that L~-chance meets ill — l31. The bad news is that L~-chance turns out unlawful and unstable. (...)
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  34. Philippe Mongin (2002). Le Principe de Rationalite Et l'Unite des Sciences Sociales. (The Rationality Principle and the Unity of the Social Sciences. With English Summary.). [REVIEW] Revue Economique 53 (2):301-323.score: 34.0
    The paper revisits the rationality principle from the particular perspective of the unity of social sciences. It has been argued that the principle was the unique law of the social sciences and that accordingly there are no deep differences between them (Popper). It has also been argued that the rationality principle was specific to economics as opposed to the other social sciences, especially sociology (Pareto). The paper rejects these opposite views on the grounds that the rationality (...) is strictly metaphysical and does not have the logical force required to deliver interesting deductions. Explanation in the social sciences takes place at a level of specialization that is always higher than that of the principle itself. However, what is peculiar about economics is that it specializes the explanatory rational schemes to a degree unparalleled in history and sociology. As a consequence, there is a backward-and-forward move between specific and general formulations of rationality that takes place in economics and has no analogue in the other social sciences. (shrink)
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  35. William J. Donnelly (1994). From Principles to Principals: The New Direction in Medical Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 15 (2).score: 32.0
    Many alternatives or supplements to principalism seek to reconnect medical ethics with the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of the persons directly involved in ethically troublesome situations. This shift of attention, from deeds to doers, from principles to principals, acknowledges the importance of the moral agents involved in the situation — particular practitioners, patients, and families. Taking into account the subjective, lived experience of moral decision-making parallels recent efforts in the teaching of medicine to give the patient''s subjectivity — his or (...)
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  36. Lawrence M. Principe (2008). Wilhelm Homberg et la chimie de la lumière. Methodos 8.score: 32.0
    En 1705, Wilhem Homberg, le principal chimiste de l’Académie royale des sciences, proposa une nouvelle théorie chimique selon laquelle le Soufre principe des corps mixtes était identique à la lumière. Il affirma par la suite que cette lumière corporelle était la seule source d’activité et de changement dans les substances matérielles. Cet article montre comment la théorie de Homberg s’élabora progressivement pendant de nombreuses années sous l’influence de ses observations et des résultats de ses expériences de laboratoire, ce qui (...)
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  37. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2005). Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chance. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):281–307.score: 30.0
    I argue that the theory of chance proposed by David Lewis has three problems: (i) it is time asymmetric in a manner incompatible with some of the chance theories of physics, (ii) it is incompatible with statistical mechanical chances, and (iii) the content of Lewis's Principal Principle depends on how admissibility is cashed out, but there is no agreement as to what admissible evidence should be. I proposes two modifications of Lewis's theory which resolve these difficulties. I conclude (...)
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  38. Rachael Briggs (2009). The Big Bad Bug Bites Anti-Realists About Chance. Synthese 167 (1):81--92.score: 30.0
    David Lewis’s ‘Humean Supervenience’ (henceforth ‘HS’) combines realism about laws, chances, and dispositions with a sparse ontology according to which everything supervenes on the overall spatiotemporal distribution of non-dispositional properties (Lewis 1986a, Philosophical papers: Volume II, pp. ix–xvii, New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1994, Mind 103:473–490). HS faces a serious problem—a “big bad bug” (Lewis 1986a, p. xiv): it contradicts the Principal Principle, a seemingly obvious norm of rational credence. Two authors have tried to rescue Lewis’s ontology from (...)
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  39. David Wallace (2006). Epistemology Quantized: Circumstances in Which We Should Come to Believe in the Everett Interpretation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):655-689.score: 30.0
    I consider exactly what is involved in a solution to the probability problem of the Everett interpretation, in the light of recent work on applying considerations from decision theory to that problem. I suggest an overall framework for understanding probability in a physical theory, and conclude that this framework, when applied to the Everett interpretation, yields the result that that interpretation satisfactorily solves the measurement problem. Introduction What is probability? 2.1 Objective probability and the Principal Principle 2.2 Three (...)
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  40. Ned Hall (2004). Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.score: 30.0
    David Lewis's influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle--the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability--in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival non-reductionist position (...)
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  41. Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall (2003). On What We Know About Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.score: 30.0
    The ‘Principal Principle’ states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued (i) that this principle provides the defining role for chance; (ii) that it conflicts with his reductionist thesis of Humean supervenience, and so must be replaced by an amended version that avoids the conflict; hence (iii) that nothing perfectly deserves the name ‘chance’, although something can come close enough (...)
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  42. Carl Hoefer (2007). The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance. Mind 116 (463):549-596.score: 30.0
    The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or 'theory' of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The account is 'Humean' in claiming that objective chances supervene on the totality of actual events, but does not imply or presuppose a Humean approach to other metaphysical issues such as laws or causation. Like Lewis (1994) I take the Principal (...)
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  43. Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer (2007). Probability in GRW Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):371-389.score: 30.0
    GRW Theory postulates a stochastic mechanism assuring that every so often the wave function of a quantum system is `hit', which leaves it in a localised state. How are we to interpret the probabilities built into this mechanism? GRW theory is a firmly realist proposal and it is therefore clear that these probabilities are objective probabilities (i.e. chances). A discussion of the major theories of chance leads us to the conclusion that GRW probabilities can be understood only as either single (...)
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  44. Alastair Wilson (2005). Modal Metaphysics and the Everett Interpretation (BA Thesis). Dissertation, Oxfordscore: 30.0
    Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the ‘subjective uncertainty’ principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination (...)
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  45. Moritz Schulz (2011). Chance and Actuality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):105-129.score: 30.0
    The relation between chance and actuality gives rise to a puzzle. On the one hand, it may be a chancy matter what will actually happen. On the other hand, the standard semantics for ‘actually’ implies that sentences beginning with ‘actually’ are never contingent. To elucidate the puzzle, I defend a kind of objective semantic indeterminacy: in a chancy world, it may be a chancy matter which proposition is expressed by sentences containing ‘actually’. I bring this thesis to bear on certain (...)
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  46. Michael Strevens (1999). Objective Probability as a Guide to the World. Philosophical Studies 95 (3):243-275.score: 30.0
    According to principles of probability coordination, such as Miller's Principle or Lewis's Principal Principle, you ought to set your subjective probability for an event equal to what you take to be the objective probability of the event. For example, you should expect events with a very high probability to occur and those with a very low probability not to occur. This paper examines the grounds of such principles. It is argued that any attempt to justify a (...) of probability coordination encounters the same difficulties as attempts to justify induction. As a result, no justification can be found. (shrink)
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  47. Sherrilyn Roush (2009). Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual. Episteme 6 (3):251-268.score: 30.0
    I develop a general framework with a rationality constraint that shows how coherently to represent and deal with second-order information about one's own judgmental reliability. It is a rejection of and generalization away from the typical Bayesian requirements of unconditional judgmental self-respect and perfect knowledge of one's own beliefs, and is defended by appeal to the Principal Principle. This yields consequences about maintaining unity of the self, about symmetries and asymmetries between the first- and third-person, and a principled (...)
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  48. Huw Price, The Lion, the 'Which?' And the Wardrobe -- Reading Lewis as a Closet One-Boxer.score: 30.0
    Newcomb problems turn on a tension between two principles of choice: roughly, a principle sensitive to the causal features of the relevant situation, and a principle sensitive only to evidential factors. Two-boxers give priority to causal beliefs, and one-boxers to evidential beliefs. A similar issue can arise when the modality in question is chance, rather than causation. In this case, the conflict is between decision rules based on credences guided solely by chances, and rules based on credences guided (...)
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