Search results for 'Principle of Alternative Responsibility' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.
    The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities has taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that PAP is false, (...)
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  2. Harry Frankfurt (1969). ``Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities&Quot. Journal of Philosophy 66:829--839.
  3. Eleonore Stump (1999). Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 3 (4):299-324.
    Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one''s-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and (...)
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  4. Kevin Timpe (2004). Event-Individuation and the Implications for the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Dissertation, Saint Louis University
    Compatibilists believe that moral responsibility and causal determinism are compatible. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, believe that if causal determinism is true, then no agent is morally responsible for her actions. The principle of alternative possibilities, or PAP, claims that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done other than the action in question. In a landmark article, Harry Frankfurt attempts to advance the compatibilist's position by arguing that the principle (...)
     
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  5. Gerald Harrison (2004). Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Avoidable Blame. Ethic@ 3:37-46.
    Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities . But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame . My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is (...)
     
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  6.  19
    Phillip D. Gosselin (1987). The Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (March):91-104.
    In 1969 harry frankfurt attacked the principle of alternate possibilities, I.E., The principle that one is morally responsible for what one has done only if one could have done otherwise. The first two parts of this paper offer a supplement to and clarification of that principle; the third part defends the supplemented version of it against three frankfurt arguments; and the fourth comments on a recent discussion of it by michael zimmerman.
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  7. Joseph Keim Campbell (2008). New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):193 - 201.
    This is the introduction to a volume of new essays in the metaphysics of moral responsibility by John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, Ishtiyaque Haji, Alfred R. Mele, Derk Pereboom, Paul Russell, and Peter van Inwagen. I provide some background for the essays, cover the main debates in the metaphysics of moral responsibility, and emphasize some of the authors' contributions to this area of philosophy.
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  8.  12
    David Widerker (2003). Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 53--73.
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  9. Richard M. Glatz (2008). The Necessity of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257-272.
    Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an (...)
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  10. David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
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  11.  18
    Stewart Goetz (2001). Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101.
    Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility (...)
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  12.  6
    Stewart Goetz (2001). Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101.
    Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility (...)
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  13.  51
    Margery Bedford Naylor (1984). Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 46 (September):249-58.
    Harry g frankfurt gave what has been taken to be a counter-Example to the principle that, "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise." I argue that in his case the agent cannot be morally responsible for what he did, Because it was not within his power not to be compelled to do it. So frankfurt's case is not a counter-Example to this principle.
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  14.  53
    Robert Heinaman (1986). Incompatibilism Without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):266-76.
  15.  6
    Ken Levy (forthcoming). Blocking Blockage. Philosophia:1-18.
    The Blockage Argument is designed to improve upon Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by removing the counterfactual intervener altogether. If the argument worked, then it would prove in a way that Frankfurt’s argument does not that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, not even the weakest “flicker of freedom”. Some philosophers have rejected the Blockage Argument solely on the basis of their intuition that the inability to do otherwise (...)
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  16.  37
    David Palmer (2014). Deterministic Frankfurt Cases. Synthese 191 (16):3847-3864.
    According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), people are morally responsible for what they do only if they could have done otherwise. Over the last few decades, this principle has dominated discussions of free will and moral responsibility. One important strand of this discussion concerns the Frankfurt-type cases or Frankfurt cases, originally developed by Frankfurt (J Philos 66:829–839, 1969), which are alleged counterexamples to PAP. One way in which proponents of PAP have responded to these (...)
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  17. Eleonore Stump & Libertarian Freedom (1997). The Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In Charles Harry Manekin & Menachem Marc Kellner (eds.), Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives. University Press of Maryland
     
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  18.  31
    Yishai Cohen (2016). Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt‐Style Cases. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1).
    The new dispositionalists defend the position that an agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case has the ability to do otherwise, where that ability is the one at issue in the principle of alternative possibilities. Focusing specifically on Kadri Vihvelin's proposal, I argue against this position by showing that it is incompatible with the existence of structurally similar cases to FSCs in which a preemptive intervener bestows an agent with an ability.
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  19.  49
    Seth Shabo (2007). Flickers of Freedom and Modes of Action: A Reply to Timpe. Philosophia 35 (1):63-74.
    In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper, I argue (...)
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  20.  5
    Anne Myhr & Bjørn Myskja (2011). Precaution or Integrated Responsibility Approach to Nanovaccines in Fish Farming? A Critical Appraisal of the UNESCO Precautionary Principle. NanoEthics 5 (1):73-86.
    Nanoparticles have multifaceted advantages in drug administration as vaccine delivery and hence hold promises for improving protection of farmed fish against diseases caused by pathogens. However, there are concerns that the benefits associated with distribution of nanoparticles may also be accompanied with risks to the environment and health. The complexity of the natural and social systems involved implies that the information acquired in quantified risk assessments may be inadequate for evidence-based decisions. One controversial strategy for dealing with this kind of (...)
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  21.  82
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Everyone Thinks That an Ability to Do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.
    Seemingly one of the most prominent issues that divide theorists about free will and moral responsibility concerns whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. I defend two claims in this paper. First, that this appearance is illusory: everyone thinks an ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility. The central issue is not whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for freedom and responsibility but which abilities to do (...)
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  22. David Copp (1997). Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility. Noûs 31 (4):441-456.
    According to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. PAP underlies a familiar argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility with determinism. I argue that Harry Frankfurt's famous argument against PAP is unsuccessful if PAP is interpreted as a principle about blameworthiness. My argument turns on the maxim that "ought implies can" as well as a "finely-nuanced" view of the object of blame. To (...)
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  23.  51
    C. P. Ragland (2006). Descartes on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):377-394.
    : The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) says that doing something freely implies being able to do otherwise. I show that Descartes consistently believed not only in PAP, but also in clear and distinct determinism (CDD), which claims that we sometimes cannot but judge true what we clearly perceive. Because Descartes thinks judgment is always a free act, PAP and CDD seem contradictory, but Descartes consistently resolved this apparent contradiction by distinguishing between two senses of 'could have done (...)
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  24.  3
    Garry Young (forthcoming). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but Not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A Way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example. Philosophia:1-9.
    The aim of this paper is to present a version of the principle of alternate possibilities which is not susceptible to the Frankfurt-style counter-example. I argue that PAP does not need to be endorsed as a necessary condition for moral responsibility and, in fact, presenting PAP as a sufficient condition maintains its usefulness as a maxim for moral accountability whilst avoiding Frankfurt-style counter-examples. In addition, I provide a further sufficient condition for moral responsibility – the twin world (...)
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  25.  52
    Sam Black & Jon Tweedale (2002). Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: The Use and Abuse of Examples. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 6 (3):281-303.
    The philosophical debate over the compatibility between causaldeterminism and moral responsibility relies heavily on ourreactions to examples. Although we believe that there is noalternative to this methodology in this area of philosophy, someexamples that feature prominently in the literature are positivelymisleading. In this vein, we criticize the use that incompatibilistsmake of the phenomenon of ``brainwashing,'''' as well as the Frankfurt-styleexamples favored by compatibilists. We provide an instance of thekind of thought experiment that is needed to genuinely test thehypothesis that (...)
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  26.  33
    Stewart Goetz (2002). Alternative Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):131–147.
    In this paper, I assume that if we have libertarian freedom, it is located in the power to choose and its exercise. Given this assumption, I then further assume a version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities which states that an agent is morally responsible for his choice only if he could have chosen otherwise. With these assumptions in place, I examine three recent attempts to construct Frankfurt‐style counterexamples to PAP. I argue that all fail to undermine the (...)
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  27.  14
    Ishtiyaque Haji (1994). Doing the Best One Can and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):113-127.
    I defend the view that if one ought (morally) always to do the best one can, there cannot be a wrong action one cannot avoid performing for which one is morally responsible. I also argue that there cannot be a wrong action to which there are no alternative possibilities for which an agent is morally responsible if the thesis that ought' implies can' is true. My argument against a fully general principle of alternative possibilities does have implications, (...)
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  28.  33
    John M. Etheredge (1999). The Perceived Role of Ethics and Social Responsibility: An Alternative Scale Structure. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 18 (1):51 - 64.
    The Perceived Role of Ethics and Social Responsibility (PRESOR) instrument was developed in the United States by Singhapakdi et al. (1996b) as a reliable and valid scale to measure the perceived role of ethics and social responsibility in achieving organizational effectiveness. This study was carried out to confirm the factorial structure of the instrument and to assess its reliability and validity for use in Hong Kong, the finance and service heart of the Asia-Pacific region and a culture with (...)
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  29.  40
    Peter A. French (1984). The Principle of Responsive Adjustment in Corporate Moral Responsibility: The Crash on Mount Erebus. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 3 (2):101 - 111.
    The tragic crash of Air New Zealand's flight TE-901 into Mt. Erebus in Antarctica provides a fascinating case for the exploration of the notion of corporate moral responsibility. A principle of accountability that has Aristotelian roots and is significantly different from the usual strict intentional action principles is examined and defined. That principle maintains that a person can be held morally accountable for previous non-intentional behavior that has harmful effects if the person does not take corrective measures (...)
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  30.  42
    David Palmer (2013). Capes on the W-Defense. Philosophia 41 (2):555-566.
    According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Widerker (Philosophical Perspectives 14: 181-201, 2000) offers an intriguing argument for PAP as it applies to moral blameworthiness. His argument is known as the “What-should-he-have-done defense” of PAP or the “W-defense” for short. In a recent article, Capes (Philosophical Studies 150: 61-77, 2010) attacks Widerker’s argument by rejecting the central premise on which it (...)
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  31. Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
    In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those (...)
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  32.  89
    Stephen John (2010). In Defence of Bad Science and Irrational Policies: An Alternative Account of the Precautionary Principle. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):3 - 18.
    In the first part of the paper, three objections to the precautionary principle are outlined: the principle requires some account of how to balance risks of significant harms; the principle focuses on action and ignores the costs of inaction; and the principle threatens epistemic anarchy. I argue that these objections may overlook two distinctive features of precautionary thought: a suspicion of the value of “full scientific certainty”; and a desire to distinguish environmental doings from allowings. In (...)
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  33. Daniel James Speak (2002). Moral Responsibility and the Relevance of Alternative Possibilities. Dissertation, University of California, Riverside
    My dissertation is a systematic defense of the moral relevance of alternative possibilities. As such, it constitutes an attack on semi-compatibilism. ;To begin, then, I defend alternative possibilities against three related but independent lines of criticism. The most prominent of these is Harry Frankfurt's now famous counterexample strategy in which cases are constructed that purport to show that a person can, in fact, be responsible even when he cannot do otherwise. Another line of criticism is John Fischer's (...)
     
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  34.  80
    David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.) (2003). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.
    This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility.
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  35.  3
    E. Grab-Schmidt (2005). Freedom in Responsibility: On the Relevance of “Sin” As a Hermeneutic Guiding Principle in Bioethical Decision Making. Christian Bioethics 11 (2):147-165.
    (2005). Freedom in Responsibility: On the Relevance of “Sin” As a Hermeneutic Guiding Principle in Bioethical Decision Making. Christian Bioethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 147-165.
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  36. Seth Shabo (2011). Agency Without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt's Counterexample Strategy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.
    In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so (...)
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  37.  10
    Gerald K. Harrison (2004). The Principle of Avoidable Blame. Ethic@ 3 (1):37-46.
    Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that (...)
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  38.  24
    Morten Severinsen (2001). Principles Behind Definitions of Diseases – a Criticism of the Principle of Disease Mechanism and the Development of a Pragmatic Alternative. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (4):319-336.
    Many philosophers and medical scientists assume thatdisease categories or entities used to classify concrete cases ofdisease, are often defined by disease mechanisms or causalprocesses. Others suggest that diseases should always be definedin this manner. This paper discusses these standpoints criticallyand concludes that they are untenable, not only when `diseasemechanism' refers to an objective mechanism, but also when`mechanism' refers to a pragmatically demarcated part of thetotal ``objective'' causal structure of diseases. As an alternativeto principles that use the concept of disease mechanism (...)
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  39. Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.
    Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable (...)
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  40. Carl Ginet (1996). In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.
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  41. Serena Olsaretti (2009). Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188.
    Contemporary egalitarian theories of justice constrain the demands of equality by responsibility, and do not view as unjust inequalities that are traceable to individuals' choices. This paper argues that, in order to make non-arbitrary determinate judgements of responsibility, any theory of justice needs a principle of stakes , that is, an account of what consequences choices should have. The paper also argues that the principles of stakes seemingly presupposed by egalitarians are implausible, and that adopting alternative (...)
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  42.  4
    Linas Žalnieriūnas & Tomas Girdenis (2013). Problematic Qualification Aspects of the Avoidance to Maintain a Child and Alternative Ways of Child Maintenance. Jurisprudence 20 (2):707-724.
    The article analyzes one of the fundamental rights – the right to maintenance, which proper implementation ensures normal development of the child. This right matches with the duty of parents to maintain their minor children. Paragraph 6 of Article 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania states that parents have a duty to educate their children to be honest people and loyal citizens, supporting them until adulthood. The obligation to maintain children is established in the first 3.192 Article (...)
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  43.  28
    Walter Glannon (1995). Responsibility and the Principle of Possible Action. Journal of Philosophy 92 (5):261-274.
  44. Eleonore Stump (1996). Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In Jeff Jordan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield 73-88.
  45. Eleonore Stump (1990). Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In M. Beaty (ed.), Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy. University of Notre Dame Press 254-285.
     
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  46.  1
    Gerald Harrison (2011). Frankfurt's Refutation of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
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  47.  44
    David Widerker (2005). Blameworthiness, Non-Robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):292–306.
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  48. David Widerker (2000). Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look. Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):181-202.
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  49. John Martin Fischer (1998). Moral Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Free Will: Reply to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):215-220.
    In _The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 373-381, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book _The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type examples: moral responsibility need not require (...) possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principle the principle of possible prevention and the no-matter-what principle are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases. (shrink)
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  50.  5
    Peter Furlong (2015). Aquinas, the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, and Augustine’s Axiom. International Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):179-196.
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