Search results for 'Principle of Alternative Responsibility' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.score: 954.0
    The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that PAP is (...)
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  2. Richard M. Glatz (2008). The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257 - 272.score: 695.0
    Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an (...)
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  3. Joseph Keim Campbell (2008). New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):193 - 201.score: 630.0
    This is the introduction to a volume of new essays in the metaphysics of moral responsibility by John Martin Fischer, Carl Ginet, Ishtiyaque Haji, Alfred R. Mele, Derk Pereboom, Paul Russell, and Peter van Inwagen. I provide some background for the essays, cover the main debates in the metaphysics of moral responsibility, and emphasize some of the authors' contributions to this area of philosophy.
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  4. Harry Frankfurt (1969). ``Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities&Quot. Journal of Philosophy 66:829--839.score: 615.0
  5. Phillip D. Gosselin (1987). The Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (March):91-104.score: 562.0
    In 1969 harry frankfurt attacked the principle of alternate possibilities, I.E., The principle that one is morally responsible for what one has done only if one could have done otherwise. The first two parts of this paper offer a supplement to and clarification of that principle; the third part defends the supplemented version of it against three frankfurt arguments; and the fourth comments on a recent discussion of it by michael zimmerman.
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  6. Eleonore Stump (1999). Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 3 (4):299-324.score: 561.0
    Some defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) have responded to the challenge of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP by arguing that there remains a flicker of freedom -- that is, an alternative possibility for action -- left to the agent in FSCs. I argue that the flicker of freedom strategy is unsuccessful. The strategy requires the supposition that doing an act-on-one''s-own is itself an action of sorts. I argue that either this supposition is confused and (...)
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  7. Seth Shabo (2007). Flickers of Freedom and Modes of Action: A Reply to Timpe. Philosophia 35 (1):63-74.score: 552.0
    In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper, I argue (...)
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  8. David Palmer (2013). Capes on the W-Defense. Philosophia 41 (2):555-566.score: 547.0
    According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Widerker (Philosophical Perspectives 14: 181-201, 2000) offers an intriguing argument for PAP as it applies to moral blameworthiness. His argument is known as the “What-should-he-have-done defense” of PAP or the “W-defense” for short. In a recent article, Capes (Philosophical Studies 150: 61-77, 2010) attacks Widerker’s argument by rejecting the central premise on which it (...)
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  9. David Copp (1997). Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility. Noûs 31 (4):441-456.score: 496.0
    According to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. PAP underlies a familiar argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility with determinism. I argue that Harry Frankfurt's famous argument against PAP is unsuccessful if PAP is interpreted as a principle about blameworthiness. My argument turns on the maxim that "ought implies can" as well as a "finely-nuanced" view of the object of blame. To (...)
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  10. Seth Shabo (2011). Agency Without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt's Counterexample Strategy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.score: 468.0
    In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so (...)
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  11. David Widerker (2003). Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 53--73.score: 465.0
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  12. Ishtiyaque Haji (1994). Doing the Best One Can and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (2):113-127.score: 418.0
    I defend the view that if one ought (morally) always to do the best one can, there cannot be a wrong action one cannot avoid performing for which one is morally responsible. I also argue that there cannot be a wrong action to which there are no alternative possibilities for which an agent is morally responsible if the thesis that ought' implies can' is true. My argument against a fully general principle of alternative possibilities does have implications, (...)
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  13. Robert Lockie (forthcoming). Three Recent Frankfurt Cases. Philosophia:1-28.score: 417.0
    Three recent ‘state of the art’ Frankfurt cases are responded to: Widerker’s Brain-Malfunction-W case and Pereboom’s Tax Evasion cases (2 & 3). These cases are intended by their authors to resurrect the neo-Frankfurt project of overturning the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) in the teeth of the widespread acceptance of some combination of the WKG (Widerker-Kane-Ginet) dilemma, the Flicker of Freedom strategy and the revised PAP response (‘Principle of Alternative Blame’, ‘Principle of Alternative Expectations’). (...)
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  14. Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.score: 415.0
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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  15. Galen Strawson (1986). On the Inevitability of Freedom (From the Compatibilist Point of View). American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):393-400.score: 413.0
    This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.
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  16. Peter van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):343-351.score: 412.0
    In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both (...)
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  17. Carlos J. Moya (2009). Alternativas, responsabilidad Y respuesta a razones. Ideas y Valores 58 (141):45-65.score: 402.0
    El objetivo del presente trabajo es defender el Principio de posibilidades alternativas (ppa) frente a dos recientes supuestos contraejemplos a éste, inspirados en el que diseñó, hace ya cuarenta años, Harry Frankfurt. Las tres primeras secciones resumen el estado de la cuestión. A partir de la cuar..
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  18. David P. Hunt (2007). Black the Libertarian. Acta Analytica 22 (1):3-15.score: 401.0
    The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) comes in the form of a dilemma: either the counterexample presupposes determinism, in which case it begs the question; or it does not presuppose determinism, in which case it fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate all alternatives that might plausibly be thought to satisfy PAP. I respond to this challenge with a counterexample in which considering an alternative course of action is a (...)
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  19. Margery Bedford Naylor (1984). Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 46 (September):249-58.score: 399.0
    Harry g frankfurt gave what has been taken to be a counter-Example to the principle that, "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise." I argue that in his case the agent cannot be morally responsible for what he did, Because it was not within his power not to be compelled to do it. So frankfurt's case is not a counter-Example to this principle.
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  20. Stewart Goetz (2001). Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101.score: 399.0
    Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility (...)
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  21. Anne Myhr & Bjørn Myskja (2011). Precaution or Integrated Responsibility Approach to Nanovaccines in Fish Farming? A Critical Appraisal of the UNESCO Precautionary Principle. Nanoethics 5 (1):73-86.score: 396.0
    Nanoparticles have multifaceted advantages in drug administration as vaccine delivery and hence hold promises for improving protection of farmed fish against diseases caused by pathogens. However, there are concerns that the benefits associated with distribution of nanoparticles may also be accompanied with risks to the environment and health. The complexity of the natural and social systems involved implies that the information acquired in quantified risk assessments may be inadequate for evidence-based decisions. One controversial strategy for dealing with this kind of (...)
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  22. Robert Heinaman (1986). Incompatibilism Without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):266-76.score: 387.0
  23. David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.score: 375.0
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  24. Ezio Di Nucci (2010). Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):207-213.score: 372.0
    In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to (...)
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  25. Gerald K. Harrison (2004). The Principle of Avoidable Blame. Ethic@ 3 (1):37-46.score: 371.0
    Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is (...)
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  26. Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.score: 369.0
    Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable (...)
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  27. Michael Robinson (2012). Modified Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples and Flickers of Freedom. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.score: 369.0
    A great deal of attention has been paid recently to the claim that traditional Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which depend for their success on the presence of a perfectly reliable indicator (or prior sign ) of what an agent will freely do if left to act on his own, are guilty of begging the question against incompatibilists, since such indicators seem to presuppose a deterministic relation between an agent’s free action and its causal (...)
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  28. Sam Black & Jon Tweedale (2002). Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: The Use and Abuse of Examples. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 6 (3):281-303.score: 369.0
    The philosophical debate over the compatibility between causaldeterminism and moral responsibility relies heavily on ourreactions to examples. Although we believe that there is noalternative to this methodology in this area of philosophy, someexamples that feature prominently in the literature are positivelymisleading. In this vein, we criticize the use that incompatibilistsmake of the phenomenon of ``brainwashing,'''' as well as the Frankfurt-styleexamples favored by compatibilists. We provide an instance of thekind of thought experiment that is needed to genuinely test thehypothesis that (...)
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  29. Ira M. Schnall (2010). Weak Reasons-Responsiveness Meets its Match: In Defense of David Widerker's Attack on PAP. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.score: 369.0
    David Widerker, long an opponent of Harry Frankfurt's attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), has recently come up with his own Frankfurt-style scenario which he claims might well be a counterexample to PAP. Carlos Moya has argued that this new scenario is not a counterexample to PAP, because in it the agent is not really blameworthy, since he lacks weak reasonsresponsiveness (WRR), a property that John Fischer has argued is a necessary condition of practical rationality, and (...)
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  30. Eleonore Stump & Libertarian Freedom (1997). The Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In Charles Harry Manekin & Menachem Marc Kellner (eds.), Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives. University Press of Maryland.score: 363.0
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  31. C. P. Ragland (2006). Descartes on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):377-394.score: 360.0
    : The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) says that doing something freely implies being able to do otherwise. I show that Descartes consistently believed not only in PAP, but also in clear and distinct determinism (CDD), which claims that we sometimes cannot but judge true what we clearly perceive. Because Descartes thinks judgment is always a free act, PAP and CDD seem contradictory, but Descartes consistently resolved this apparent contradiction by distinguishing between two senses of 'could have done (...)
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  32. Linas Žalnieriūnas & Tomas Girdenis (2013). Problematic Qualification Aspects of the Avoidance to Maintain a Child and Alternative Ways of Child Maintenance. Jurisprudence 20 (2):707-724.score: 360.0
    The article analyzes one of the fundamental rights – the right to maintenance, which proper implementation ensures normal development of the child. This right matches with the duty of parents to maintain their minor children. Paragraph 6 of Article 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania states that parents have a duty to educate their children to be honest people and loyal citizens, supporting them until adulthood. The obligation to maintain children is established in the first 3.192 Article (...)
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  33. Serena Olsaretti (2009). Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188.score: 354.0
    Contemporary egalitarian theories of justice constrain the demands of equality by responsibility, and do not view as unjust inequalities that are traceable to individuals' choices. This paper argues that, in order to make non-arbitrary determinate judgements of responsibility, any theory of justice needs a principle of stakes , that is, an account of what consequences choices should have. The paper also argues that the principles of stakes seemingly presupposed by egalitarians are implausible, and that adopting alternative (...)
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  34. Kadri Vihvelin (2000). Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.score: 352.0
    The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry (...)
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  35. Stephen John (2010). In Defence of Bad Science and Irrational Policies: An Alternative Account of the Precautionary Principle. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):3 - 18.score: 351.0
    In the first part of the paper, three objections to the precautionary principle are outlined: the principle requires some account of how to balance risks of significant harms; the principle focuses on action and ignores the costs of inaction; and the principle threatens epistemic anarchy. I argue that these objections may overlook two distinctive features of precautionary thought: a suspicion of the value of “full scientific certainty”; and a desire to distinguish environmental doings from allowings. In (...)
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  36. Peter A. French (1984). The Principle of Responsive Adjustment in Corporate Moral Responsibility: The Crash on Mount Erebus. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 3 (2):101 - 111.score: 351.0
    The tragic crash of Air New Zealand's flight TE-901 into Mt. Erebus in Antarctica provides a fascinating case for the exploration of the notion of corporate moral responsibility. A principle of accountability that has Aristotelian roots and is significantly different from the usual strict intentional action principles is examined and defined. That principle maintains that a person can be held morally accountable for previous non-intentional behavior that has harmful effects if the person does not take corrective measures (...)
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  37. G. C. Goddu (2006). More on Blameworthiness and Alternative Possibilities. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):69-75.score: 345.0
    The derivation of the generally held Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), roughly ‘you are morally responsible only if you could do otherwise’, from an even more generally held moral principle, K (for Kant), that roughly speaking ‘ought implies can’, has recently been the focus of significant debate. In this paper I shall argue that by focusing on PAP interpreted in terms of commissions alone an alternative derivation of PAP interpreted in terms of omissions is being overlooked. (...)
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  38. John Martin Fischer (1998). Moral Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Free Will: Reply to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):215-220.score: 342.0
    In _The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 373-381, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book _The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type examples: moral responsibility need not require (...) possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principle the principle of possible prevention and the no-matter-what principle are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases. (shrink)
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  39. Max Siegel (2013). Revising the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Stance 6:15-20.score: 336.0
    This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The paper first describes the principle as articulated by A.J. Ayer. Subsequently, the paper examines Frankfurt’s critique and proposed revision of the principle and argues that Frankfurt’s proposal relies on an excessively simplistic account of practical reasoning, which fails to account for the possibility of moral dilemmas. In response, the paper offers a further revision of PAP, which accounts for (...)
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  40. David C. Blumenfeld (1971). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 68 (March):339-44.score: 333.0
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  41. John M. Etheredge (1999). The Perceived Role of Ethics and Social Responsibility: An Alternative Scale Structure. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 18 (1):51 - 64.score: 333.0
    The Perceived Role of Ethics and Social Responsibility (PRESOR) instrument was developed in the United States by Singhapakdi et al. (1996b) as a reliable and valid scale to measure the perceived role of ethics and social responsibility in achieving organizational effectiveness. This study was carried out to confirm the factorial structure of the instrument and to assess its reliability and validity for use in Hong Kong, the finance and service heart of the Asia-Pacific region and a culture with (...)
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  42. Michael Robinson (2013). The Limits of Limited-Blockage Frankfurt-Style Cases. Philosophical Studies (3):1-18.score: 333.0
    Philosophers employing Frankfurt-style cases to challenge the principle of alternative possibilities have mostly sought to construct scenarios that eliminate as many of an agent’s alternatives as possible—and all alternatives at the moment of action, within the agent’s control—without causally determining the agent’s actions. One of the chief difficulties for this traditional approach is that the closer one gets to ruling out absolutely all alternative possibilities the more it appears that agents’ actions in these cases are causally determined. (...)
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  43. Joshua Spencer (2013). What Time Travelers Cannot Not Do (but Are Responsible for Anyway). Philosophical Studies 166 (1):149-162.score: 332.5
    The Principle of Alternative Possibilities is the intuitive idea that someone is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt has famously presented putative counterexamples to this intuitive principle. In this paper, I formulate a simple version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a course-grained notion of actions. After warming up with a Frankfurt-Style Counterexample to this principle, I introduce a new kind of counterexample based on (...)
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  44. Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.score: 332.0
    In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those (...)
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  45. E. Grab-Schmidt (2005). Freedom in Responsibility: On the Relevance of “Sin” As a Hermeneutic Guiding Principle in Bioethical Decision Making. Christian Bioethics 11 (2):147-165.score: 324.0
    (2005). Freedom in Responsibility: On the Relevance of “Sin” As a Hermeneutic Guiding Principle in Bioethical Decision Making. Christian Bioethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 147-165.
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  46. David Widerker (2000). ``Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254.score: 323.5
    In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge (G-scenario). Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. (...)
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  47. James Turner Johnson (2013). Religion, Violence, and Human Rights. Journal of Religious Ethics 41 (1):1-14.score: 306.0
    Beginning with the support given by religious groups to humanitarian intervention for the protection of basic human rights in the debates of the 1990s, this essay examines the use of the human rights idea in relation to international law on armed conflict, the “Responsibility To Protect” doctrine, and the development of the idea of sovereignty associated with the “Westphalian system” of international order, identifying a dilemma: that the idea of human rights undergirds both the principle of non-intervention in (...)
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  48. Michael Otsuka (2010). A Rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):37 - 42.score: 303.0
    In Otsuka ( 1998 ), I endorse an incompatibilist Principle of Avoidable Blame. In this rejoinder to Fischer and Tognazzini ( 2009 ), I defend this principle against their charge that it is vulnerable to Frankfurt-type counterexample.
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  49. Morten Severinsen (2001). Principles Behind Definitions of Diseases – a Criticism of the Principle of Disease Mechanism and the Development of a Pragmatic Alternative. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (4):319-336.score: 303.0
    Many philosophers and medical scientists assume thatdisease categories or entities used to classify concrete cases ofdisease, are often defined by disease mechanisms or causalprocesses. Others suggest that diseases should always be definedin this manner. This paper discusses these standpoints criticallyand concludes that they are untenable, not only when `diseasemechanism' refers to an objective mechanism, but also when`mechanism' refers to a pragmatically demarcated part of thetotal ``objective'' causal structure of diseases. As an alternativeto principles that use the concept of disease mechanism (...)
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