Search results for 'Private Language' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Francois-Igor Pris (2014). Phenomenal Concepts are Consistent with Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument. NB: Philosophical Investigations (Russian E-Journal) 7:64-98.
    In a recent paper, Papineau argued that phenomenal concepts are inconsistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument, and that the problem is with Wittgenstein’s argument. Against Papineau, we argue that phenomenal concepts are consistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. Inconsistency can appear when either Wittgenstein’s argument or phenomenal concepts are incorrectly or restrictively understood.
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  2.  69
    Derek A. McDougall (2013). The Role of Philosophical Investigations § 258: What is 'the Private Language Argument'? Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):44-71.
    The Private Language Sections of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, -/- generally agreed to run from §§ 243 - 271, but extending to § 315 with the book’s continued -/- treatment of the private object model and the inner and outer conception of the mind, have -/- proved remarkably resistant to any generally agreed interpretation. Even today, ways of -/- looking at these sections which were first in vogue half a century ago when discussions of -/- this aspect (...)
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  3.  69
    John A. Humphrey (1996). Kripke's Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story? Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW), if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics (a failure that is justified, (...)
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  4.  60
    C. D. Meyers & Sara Waller (2009). Psychological Investigations: The Private Language Argument and Inferences in Contemporary Cognitive Science. Synthese 171 (1):135-156.
    Some of the methods for data collection in experimental psychology, as well as many of the inferences from observed behavior or image scanning, are based on the implicit premise that language use can be linked, via the meaning of words, to specific subjective states. Wittgenstein’s well known private language argument (PLA), however, calls into question the legitimacy of such inferences. According to a strong interpretation of PLA, all of the elements of a language must be publicly (...)
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  5.  22
    Douglas N. Walton & K. T. Strongman (1998). Neonate Crusoes, the Private Language Argument and Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):443-65.
    This article questions social constructionists' claims to introduce Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. The philosophical fiction of a neonate Crusoe is introduced to cast doubt on the interpretations and use of the private language argument to support a new psychology developed by the constructionists. It is argued that a neonate Crusoe's viability in philosophy and apparent absence in psychology offends against the integrity of the philosophical contribution Wittgenstein might make to psychology. The consequences of accepting Crusoe's viability are explored (...)
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  6.  18
    P. von Morstein (1980). Kripke, Wittgenstein and the Private Language Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:61-74.
    "Agreement" is the key notion in Wittgenstein's explanation of the possibility of public language. Agreement in judgements constitutes the justification for asserting agreement in definitions. The determinates of rules are empirical; rules as determinables are transcendental. Rules are on the limit of public language, and not within it. Wittgenstein's skeptical solutions to skepticism about language and about the given are transcendentalistic. His skeptical solutions in other areas are conventionalistic. Skepticism about mental phenomena is not solved because of (...)
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  7. Crispin Wright (1984). Kripke's Account of the Argument Against Private Language. Journal of Philosophy 81 (12):759-78.
  8. Peter Hutcheson (1986). Husserl's Alleged Private Language. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):133-136.
  9. Uri Almagor (1990). Odors and Private Language: Observations on the Phenomenology of Scent. [REVIEW] Human Studies 13 (3):253-274.
  10. Oswald Hanfling (1984). What Does the Private Language Argument Prove? Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):468-481.
  11.  85
    Paul Hoffman (1985). Kripke on Private Language. Philosophical Studies 47 (1):23-28.
  12.  63
    Paul K. Moser (1992). Beyond the Private Language Argument. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):77-89.
  13.  46
    J. Temkin (1986). A Private Language Argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):109-121.
  14. Owen Roger Jones (1971). The Private Language Argument. Macmillan.
  15.  32
    Michael Williams (1983). Wittgenstein on Representation, Privileged Objects and Private Language. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (March):57-78.
  16. Warren B. Smerud (1970). Can There Be a Private Language? Mouton.
  17. Peter Carruthers (1979). The Place of the Private Language Argument in the Philosophy of Language.
     
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  18. Benjamin Ike Ewelu (2008). Private Language Thesis and its Epistemological Import: A Study in Philosophy of Language. Delta Publications.
  19.  53
    Ben Gibran (2012). Philosophy as a Private Language. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):54-73.
    Philosophy (and its corollaries in the human sciences such as literary, social and political theory) is distinguished from other disciplines by a more thoroughgoing emphasis on the a priori. Philosophy makes no claims to predictive power; nor does it aim to conform to popular opinion (beyond ordinary intuitions as recorded by ‘thought experiments’). Many philosophers view the discipline’s self-exemption from ‘real world’ empirical testing as a non-issue or even an advantage, in allowing philosophy to focus on universal and necessary truths. (...)
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  20.  18
    Duncan Richter (2010). Ethics and Private Language. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):181-203.
    There are intriguing hints in the works of Stanley Cavell and Stephen Mulhall of a possible connection between ethics and Wittgenstein’s remarks on private language, which are concerned with expressions of Empfindungen: feelings or sensations. The point of this paper is to make the case explicitly for seeing such a connection. What the point of that is I will address at the end of the paper. If Mulhall and Cavell both know their Wittgenstein and choose their words carefully, (...)
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  21. John McDowell (1989). One Strand in the Private Language Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 33:285-303.
    In reflecting about experience, philosophers are prone to fall into a dualism of conceptual scheme and pre-conceptual given, according to which the most basic judgments of experience are grounded in non-conceptual impingements on subjects of experience. This idea is dubiously coherent: relations of grounding or justification should hold between conceptually structured items. This thought has been widely applied to 'outer' experience; at least some of the Private Language Argument can be read as applying it to 'inner' experience. In (...)
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  22. Stephen Mulhall (2007). Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations, Sections 243-315. Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Mulhall offers a new way of interpreting one of the most famous and contested texts in modern philosophy: remarks on "private language" in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He sheds new light on a central controversy concerning Wittgenstein's early work by showing its relevance to a proper understanding of the later work.
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  23. Marie McGinn (2010). Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations, §§243-315 (Review). [REVIEW] Philosophy and Literature 34 (1):pp. 265-269.
    The primary concern of Stephen Mulhall's book is to investigate an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, associated paradigmatically with Norman Malcolm. On this reading, the grammar of our ordinary concepts of language, reference, meaning, rule, etc. is held to prohibit or exclude the idea of a private language. The attempt to give expression to the idea is held to result in a violation of the grammar of these concepts, which connects them essentially with (...)
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  24. David Papineau (2011). Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):175.
    In this paper I want to consider whether the 'phenomenal concepts' posited by many recent philosophers of mind are consistent with Wittgenstein’s private language argument. The paper will have three sections. In the first I shall explain the rationale for positing phenomenal concepts. In the second I shall argue that phenomenal concepts are indeed inconsistent with the private language argument. In the last I shall ask whether this is bad for phenomenal concepts or bad for Wittgenstein.
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  25.  93
    Stephen Law (2004). Five Private Language Arguments. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (2):159-176.
    This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a 'useable criterion of successful performance' (Pears) or 'operational standard of correctness' (Glock) for its (...)
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  26.  84
    Cyrus Panjvani (2008). Rule-Following, Explanation-Transcendence, and Private Language. Mind 117 (466):303-328.
    I examine what I take to be an important consideration for the later Wittgenstein: the understanding of a rule does not exceed or transcend an understanding of explanations or instructions in the rule. I contend that this consideration plays a central role in the later Wittgenstein's views on rule-following. I first show that it serves as a key premiss in a sceptical argument concerning our ability to follow rules. I then argue that this consideration is vital to Wittgenstein's case against (...)
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  27.  78
    Alex Byrne, Private Language Problem [Addendum].
    Although the proper formulation and assessment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's argument (or arguments) against the possibility of a private language continues to be disputed, the issue has lost none of its urgency. At stake is a broadly Cartesian conception of experiences that is found today in much philosophy of mind.
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  28. M. Shabbir Ahsen, Private Language Questions in Contemporary Analytical Philosophy Analytical Study of Wittgenstein's Treatments of Private Language and its Implications.
    Wittgenstein's treatment of private language is the dissolution of some of the major problems in traditional philosophy. Philosophical problems, for Wittgenstein, are the conceptual confusion arising due to the abuse of language. They can be fully dispensed with by commanding a clear view of language. Language, for Wittgenstein, is on the one hand, the source of philosophical problems while, on the other hand, it is a means to dispense with them. Private language is (...)
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  29.  67
    Dale Jacquette (1999). Quantum Indeterminacy and Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):79 – 95.
    The demand for 'criteria of correctness' to identify recurring particulars in Wittgenstein's private language argument favors an idealist interpretation of quantum phenomena.The indeterminacy principle in quantum physics and the logic of the private language argument share a common concern with the limitations by which microphysical or sensation particulars can be reidentified. Wittgenstein's criteria for reidentifying particular recurrent private sensations are so general as to apply with equal force to quantum particulars, and to support the idealist (...)
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  30.  44
    Stewart Candlish (1980). The Real Private Language Argument. Philosophy 55 (211):85 - 94.
    It verges on the platitudinous to say that Wittgenstein's own treatment of the question of a private language has been almost lost to view under mountains of commentary in the last twenty years—so much so, that no one with a concern for his own health would try to arrive at a verdict on the question by first mastering the available discussion. But a general acquaintance with the commentaries indicates that opinion on the matter can be roughly divided into (...)
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  31.  10
    Richard J. Norman, Public Reasons and the 'Private Language' Argument.
    The author defends his version of the parallel which can be drawn between Wittgenstein's 'private language' argument and the argument that practical reasons must necessarily be public reasons. This position is compared and contrasted with recent attempts by Christine Korsgaard and Ken O'Day to formulate a 'public reasons' argument. The position is defended against the criticism that it cannt account for the practical force of reasons. Finally it is argued that, although the claim that the reasons must be (...)
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  32.  44
    Newton Garver (1960). Wittgenstein on Private Language. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (3):389-396.
    Could we imagine a language in which a person could express his inner sensations or experiences for his private use? the author explicates wittgenstein's views, Giving one, An expose of certain considerations which lend plausibility to the notion of a private language, And two, A reduction "ad absurdum" of the notion of a private language or private understanding. The utility of a sign and its intelligibility in the common language go hand in (...)
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  33.  12
    John A. Humphrey (2010). Kripke's Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:197-207.
    A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein , if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics to recognize and understand his (...)
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  34.  4
    Stephen Thornton (1996). Wittgenstein Sans the Private Language Argument. Cogito 10 (1):28-34.
    This paper explores Wittgenstein’s account of the semantic differences between the two uses of 'I' in the Blue Book, arguing that, independently of the private language argument, it undermines substance dualism while demonstrating the philosophical misconceptions upon which it is based.
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  35.  22
    Shizuo Takiura (1992). Self and Others in “Private Language”. Human Studies 15 (1):47 - 59.
    The aim of this paper is to restore the interdependent or complementary relationship between self and others against the universalistic one (as I call it) that Kant, for example, once insisted on, by reexamining the concept of so-called private language. I shall consider some views in speech act theory and pragmatics, since there has often been discussion about such a private occurrence as the speaker's sincerity. For example, Jürgen Habermas situates it in the speaker's internal nature as (...)
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  36. Francis Y. Lin (2016). Wittgenstein's Private Language Investigation. Philosophical Investigations 39 (3):n/a-n/a.
    In this paper, I first review previous interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, revealing their inadequacies, and then present my own interpretation. Basing mainly on Wittgenstein's notes for lectures on private sensations, I establish the following points: ‘remembering the connection right’ means ‘reidentifying sensation-types’; the reason for ‘no criterion of correctness’ is that nothing, especially no inner mechanisms nor external devices, can be utilised by the private speaker to tell whether some sensations are of one (...)
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  37. Stephen Mulhall (2007). Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Stephen Mulhall presents a detailed critical commentary on sections 243-315 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: the famous remarks on 'private language'. In so doing, he makes detailed use of Stanley Cavell's interpretations of these remarks; and relates disputes about how to interpret this aspect of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to a recent, highly influential controversy about how to interpret Wittgenstein's early text, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by drawing and testing out a distinction between resolute and substantial understandings of the related notions (...)
     
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  38. Stephen Mulhall (2008). Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Stephen Mulhall offers a new way of interpreting one of the most famous and contested texts in modern philosophy: remarks on 'private language' in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He sheds new light on a central controversy concerning Wittgenstein's early work by showing its relevance to a proper understanding of the later work.
     
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  39. Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
    In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule.
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  40. Brian Garrett (2002). Cartesianism and the Private Language Argument. Sorites 14:57-62.
    In this paper, I argue that neither the #257 argument nor the #258 argument in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations undermines the coherence of the Cartesian Model, according to which a sensation word, such as `headache' or `tickle', gets its meaning in virtue of an act of `inner' association or ostensive definition. In addition, I argue against the standard assumption that the diarist's language of #258 is logically private.
     
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  41.  79
    Rush Rhees (1984). The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience - I: Notes of Wittgenstein's Lectures, 1936. Philosophical Investigations 7 (1):1-45.
  42.  68
    Rush Rhees (1984). The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience - II: Notes of Wittgenstein's Lectures, 1936. Philosophical Investigations 7 (2):101-140.
  43.  65
    Peter D. Klein (1969). The Private Language Argument and the Sense-Datum Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):325-343.
  44.  3
    L. C. Holborow, John Turk Saunders & Donald F. Henze (1970). The Private-Language Problem: A Philosophical Dialogue. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):185.
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  45.  1
    C. D. Meyers & Sara Waller (2009). Psychological Investigations: The Private Language Argument and Inferences in Contemporary Cognitive Science. Synthese 171 (1):135-156.
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  46. G. E. M. Anscombe (1985). Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):103-9.
  47. Genia Schoenbaumsfeld (2008). Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations, §§ 243–315, by Stephen Mulhall. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. 148. H/B£ 19.99. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1108-1112.
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  48. Nick Zangwill (2011). Music, Essential Metaphor, and Private Language. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):1.
    Music is elusive. describing it is problematic. In particular its aesthetic properties cannot be captured in literal description. Beyond very simple terms, they cannot be literally described. In this sense, the aesthetic description of music is essentially nonliteral. An adequate aesthetic description of music must have resort to metaphor or other nonliteral devices. I maintain that this is because of the nature of the aesthetic properties being described. I defend this view against an apparently simple objection put by Malcolm Budd. (...)
     
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  49.  51
    Stewart Candlish, Private Language. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    cannot understand the language.”[1] This is not intended to cover (easily imaginable) cases of recording one's experiences in a personal code, for such a code, however obscure in fact, could in principle be deciphered. What Wittgenstein had in mind is a language conceived as necessarily comprehensible only to its single originator because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others.
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  50.  50
    Liliana Albertazzi & Roberto Poli, Attaining Objectivity: Phenomenological Reduction and the Private Language Argument.
    Twentieth Century philosophical thought has expressed itself for the most part through two great Movements: the phenomenological and the analytical. Each movement originated in reaction against idealistic—or at least antirealistic—views of "the world". And each has collapsed back into an idealism not different in effect from that which it initially rejected. Both movements began with an appeal to meanings or concepts, regarded as objective realities capable of entering the flow of experience without loss of their objective status or of their (...)
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