Search results for 'Probabilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nicholas Maxwell (1985). Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible? Philosophy of Science 52 (1):23-43.
    In this paper I expound an argument which seems to establish that probabilism and special relativity are incompatible. I examine the argument critically, and consider its implications for interpretative problems of quantum theory, and for theoretical physics as a whole.
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  2.  35
    Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Problems for Pure Probabilism About Promotion. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1371-1386.
    Humean promotionalists about reasons think that whether there is a reason for an agent to ϕ depends on whether her ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one of her desires. Several authors have recently defended probabilistic accounts of promotion, according to which an agent’s ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of one of her desires just in case her ϕ-ing makes the satisfaction of that desire more probable relative to some baseline. In this paper I do three things. First, I formalize (...)
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  3. Paul D. Thorn (2013). Cognitivist Probabilism. In Vit Punochar & Petr Svarny (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2012. College Publications 201-213.
    In this article, I introduce the term “cognitivism” as a name for the thesis that degrees of belief are equivalent to full beliefs about truth-valued propositions. The thesis (of cognitivism) that degrees of belief are equivalent to full beliefs is equivocal, inasmuch as different sorts of equivalence may be postulated between degrees of belief and full beliefs. The simplest sort of equivalence (and the sort of equivalence that I discuss here) identifies having a given degree of belief with having a (...)
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  4. Nicholas Maxwell (1988). Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible? Philosophy of Science 55 (4):640-645.
    Are special relativity and probabilism compatible? Dieks argues that they are. But the possible universe he specifies, designed to exemplify both probabilism and special relativity, either incorporates a universal "now" (and is thus incompatible with special relativity), or amounts to a many world universe (which I have discussed, and rejected as too ad hoc to be taken seriously), or fails to have any one definite overall Minkowskian-type space-time structure (and thus differs drastically from special relativity as ordinarily understood). (...)
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  5.  29
    Richard Bradley (2005). Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
    Richard Jeffrey espoused an antifoundationalist variant of Bayesian thinking that he termed ‘Radical Probabilism’. Radical Probabilism denies both the existence of an ideal, unbiased starting point for our attempts to learn about the world and the dogma of classical Bayesianism that the only justified change of belief is one based on the learning of certainties. Probabilistic judgment is basic and irreducible. Bayesian conditioning is appropriate when interaction with the environment yields new certainty of belief in some proposition but (...)
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  6.  68
    Mark Kaplan (2010). In Defense of Modest Probabilism. Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.
    Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged (...)
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  7.  22
    Alan Hájek (2009). Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism? In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Springer 229--251.
    Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem (...)
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  8.  13
    William J. Talbott (forthcoming). A Non-Probabilist Principle of Higher-Order Reasoning. Synthese:1-47.
    The author uses a series of examples to illustrate two versions of a new, nonprobabilist principle of epistemic rationality, the special and general versions of the metacognitive, expected relative frequency principle. These are used to explain the rationality of revisions to an agent’s degrees of confidence in propositions based on evidence of the reliability or unreliability of the cognitive processes responsible for them—especially reductions in confidence assignments to propositions antecedently regarded as certain—including certainty-reductions to instances of the law of excluded (...)
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  9.  15
    Luigi Secchi (2014). The Main Two Arguments for Probabilism Are Flawed. Synthese 191 (3):287-295.
    Probabilism, the view that agents have numerical degrees of beliefs that conform to the axioms of probability, has been defended by the vast majority of its proponents by way of either of two arguments, the Dutch Book Argument and the Representation Theorems Argument. In this paper I argue that both arguments are flawed. The Dutch Book Argument is based on an unwarranted, ad hoc premise that cannot be dispensed with. The Representation Theorems Argument hinges on an invalid implication.
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  10. H. Orri Stefánsson (forthcoming). What is "Real" in Probabilism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper defends two related claims about belief. First, the claim that unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real. Second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.
     
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  11.  30
    Nicholas Maxwell (forthcoming). Relativity Theory May Not Have the Last Word on the Nature of Time: Quantum Theory and Probabilism. In G. Ghirardi & S. Wuppulur (eds.), Space, Time and the Limits of Human Understanding. Springer
    Two radically different views about time are possible. According to the first, the universe is three dimensional. It has a past and a future, but that does not mean it is spread out in time as it is spread out in the three dimensions of space. This view requires that there is an unambiguous, absolute, cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. According to the second view about time, the universe is four dimensional. It is spread out in both space and time (...)
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  12. Leszek Wronski, A New Way to Block a Dutch Book Argument, or The Stubborn Non-Probabilist.
    We point out a yet unnoticed flaw in Dutch Book arguments that relates to a link between degrees of belief and betting quotients. We offer a set of precise conditions governing when a nonprobabilist is immune to the classical Dutch Book argument. We suggest that diachronic Dutch Book arguments are also affected.
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  13. Nicholas Maxwell (2004). Does Probabilism Solve the Great Quantum Mystery? Theoria 19 (3):321-336.
    What sort of entities are electrons, photons and atoms given their wave-like and particle-like properties? Is nature fundamentally deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) evades answering these two basic questions by being a theory about the results of performing measurements on quantum systems. But this evasion results in OQT being a seriously defective theory. A rival, somewhat ignored strategy is to conjecture that the quantum domain is fundamentally probabilistic. This means quantum entities, interacting with one another probabilistically, must differ (...)
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  14.  8
    Christopher F. French (2015). Explicating Formal Epistemology: Carnap's Legacy as Jeffrey's Radical Probabilism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:33–42.
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  15.  6
    Craig Martin (2009). Conjecture, Probabilism, and Provisional Knowledge in Renaissance Meteorology. Early Science and Medicine 14 (1):265-289.
    For Renaissance Aristotelian natural philosophers, ideally knowledge was certain and based on syllogistic demonstration. Many Italian scholars, such as Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Niccolò Cabeo, considered this ideal as inapplicable to the field of meteorology. Rather, because of the accidental nature of meteorological phenomena and the inherent irregularity of the weather, they believed that causal explanations of meteorology were largely conjectural, provisional, and probabilistic. Several of these natural philosophers applied the standard of "saving the appearances" to the field of (...)
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  16. James M. Joyce (1998). A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
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  17. Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson (2012). An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.
    To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not (...)
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  18.  32
    A. Hajek (2008). Arguments for-or Against-Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.
    Four important arguments for probabilism--the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments--have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem (...)
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  19.  41
    Patrick Maher (2002). Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 69 (1):73-81.
    James Joyce's 'Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism' gives a new argument for the conclusion that a person's credences ought to satisfy the laws of probability. The premises of Joyce's argument include six axioms about what counts as an adequate measure of the distance of a credence function from the truth. This paper shows that (a) Joyce's argument for one of these axioms is invalid, (b) his argument for another axiom has a false premise, (c) neither axiom is plausible, and (d) (...)
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  20. Alan Hájek (2008). Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793 - 819.
    Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem (...)
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  21.  60
    Igor Douven, Leon Horsten & Jan-Willem Romeijn (2010). Probabilist antirealism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):38-63.
    Until now, antirealists have offered sketches of a theory of truth, at best. In this paper, we present a probabilist account of antirealist truth in some formal detail, and we assess its ability to deal with the problems that are standardly taken to beset antirealism.
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  22.  26
    Brian Skyrms (1996). The Structure of Radical Probabilism. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.
    Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.
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  23.  76
    Brian Skyrms (2006). Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):959-968.
    The question of diachronic coherence, coherence of degrees of belief across time, is investigated within the context of Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism. Diachronic coherence is taken as fundamental, and coherence results for degrees of belief at a single time, such as additivity, are recovered only with additional assumptions. Additivity of probabilities of probabilities is seen to be less problematic than additivity of first-order probabilities. Without any assumed model of belief change, diachronic coherence applied to higher-order degrees of belief yields (...)
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  24. Nicholas Maxwell (2006). Special Relativity, Time, Probabilism, and Ultimate Reality. In D. Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime. Elsevier, B. V
    McTaggart distinguished two conceptions of time: the A-series, according to which events are either past, present or future; and the B-series, according to which events are merely earlier or later than other events. Elsewhere, I have argued that these two views, ostensibly about the nature of time, need to be reinterpreted as two views about the nature of the universe. According to the so-called A-theory, the universe is three dimensional, with a past and future; according to the B-theory, the universe (...)
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  25.  2
    Edward Elliott (forthcoming). Probabilism, Representation Theorems, and Whether Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Decision-theoretic representation theorems have been developed and appealed to in the service of two important philosophical projects: in attempts to characterise credences in terms of preferences, and in arguments for probabilism. Theorems developed within the formal framework that Savage developed have played an especially prominent role here. I argue that the use of these ‘Savagean’ theorems create significant difficulties for both projects, but particularly the latter. The origin of the problem directly relates to the question of whether we can (...)
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  26.  36
    James Allen (1994). Academic Probabilism and Stoic Epistemology. Classical Quarterly 44 (1):85.
    Developments in the Academy from the time of Arcesilaus to that of Carneades and his successors tend to be classified under two heads: scepticism and probabilism. Carneades was principally responsible for the Academy's view of the latter subject, and our sources credit him with an elaborate discussion of it. The evidence furnished by those sources is, however, frequently confusing and sometimes self-contradictory. My aim in this paper is to extract a coherent account of Carneades' theory of probability from the (...)
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  27.  30
    Brian Skyrms (2006). Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):959-968.
    The question of diachronic coherence, coherence of degrees of belief across time, is investigated within the context of Richard Jeffrey's radical probabilism. Diachronic coherence is taken as fundamental, and coherence results for degrees of belief at a single time, such as additivity, are recovered only with additional assumptions. Additivity of probabilities of probabilities is seen to be less problematic than additivity of first-order probabilities. Without any assumed model of belief change, diachronic coherence applied to higher-order degrees of belief yields (...)
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  28.  47
    John Hosack (1991). On Probabilism and Induction. Topoi 10 (2):227-229.
    R. C. Jeffrey has proposed probabilism as a solution to Hume's problem of justifying induction. This paper shows that the assumptions of his Estimation Theorem, used to justify induction, can be weakened to provide a more satisfactory interpretation. It is also questioned whether the use of probabilism adds significantly to our understanding (or even Hume's understanding) of the problem of induction.
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  29.  4
    Brian Skyrms (1994). Convergence in Radical Probabilism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:349 - 353.
    It is shown how martingale convergence theorems apply to coherent belief change in radical probabilist epistemology.
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  30.  29
    Maria Carla Galavotti (1996). Probabilism and Beyond. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):253 - 265.
    Richard Jeffrey has labelled his philosophy of probability radical probabilism and qualified this position as Bayesian, nonfoundational and anti-rationalist. This paper explores the roots of radical probabilism, to be traced back to the work of Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti.
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  31.  16
    Göran Duus-Otterström (2009). Almost Pregnant: On Probabilism and its Moral Uses in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):572-594.
    The turn from deterministic to probabilistic explanations has been used to argue that social science does not explain human action in ways that are incompatible with free will, since, according to some accounts of probabilism, causal factors merely influence actions without determining them. I argue that the notion of nondetermining causal influence is a multifaceted and problematic idea, which notably is unclear about whether the probability is objective or subjective, whether it applies to individual occurrences or merely to sets (...)
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  32.  15
    Lyle Zynda (2006). Radical Probabilism Revisited. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980.
    In this essay, I analyze and critique Richard Jeffrey's radical probabilism. The basic theses defining it are examined, particularly the idea that probabilistic coherence involves a kind of "consistency." The main challenges to Jeffrey's view are (1) that there is an inconsistency between regarding probabilities as subjective and some probabilistic judgments as better than others, and (2) that decision theory so conceived has no normative import. I argue that both of these challenges can be met.
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  33.  3
    Daniel Schwartz (2013). Probabilism, Just War and Sovereing Supremacy in the Work of Gabriel Vazquez. History of Political Thought 34 (2):177-194.
    Proponents of probabilism argued that 'when an opinion is probable it may be followed even when the contrary opinion is more probable'. Gabriel Vazquez (1549-1604) was the first Jesuit theologian to defend and expand this doctrine. The prevalent theory of sovereignty at the time held that: (1) when sovereigns are victims of wrongs, they take on the role of international judges (thus just wars are just punishments); and (2) the sovereign need not stand before the judgment of any other (...)
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  34.  6
    Jonathan Hill (2009). Probabilism Today: Permissibility and Multi-Account Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):235-250.
    In ethics, ?probabilism? refers to a position defended by a number of Catholic theologians, mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They held that, when one is uncertain which of a range of actions is the right one to perform, it is permissible to perform any which has a good chance of being the right one?even if there is another which has a better chance. This paper considers the value of this position from the viewpoint of modern ethical philosophy. (...)
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  35. Seamus Bradley and Katie Steele (2015). Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist. Philosophy of Science 83 (1):1-28.
    This paper considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid `free' evidence before making a decision, and rational agents may have imprecise beliefs and/or desires. Indeed, we show that Good's theorem concerning the invariable choice-worthiness of free evidence does not generalise to the imprecise realm, given the plausible existing decision theories for handling imprecision. A key ingredient in the analysis, and a potential source of controversy, is the (...)
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  36.  17
    Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele, Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist.
    This paper considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid `free' evidence before making a decision, and rational agents may have imprecise beliefs and/or desires. Indeed, we show that Good's theorem concerning the invariable choice-worthiness of free evidence does not generalise to the imprecise realm, given the plausible existing decision theories for handling imprecision. A key ingredient in the analysis, and a potential source of controversy, is the (...)
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  37.  37
    J. Robert G. Williams (2012). Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):811-840.
    Jeff Paris proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In Williams I showed that Joyce’s accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that both results are easy corollaries of the core result that Paris appeals to in proving his dutch book theorem. We see that every point of accuracy-domination defines a (...)
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  38.  73
    Seth Yalcin (forthcoming). Context Probabilism. In M. Aloni (ed.), 18th Amsterdam Colloquium. Springer
    We investigate a basic probabilistic dynamic semantics for a fragment containing conditionals, probability operators, modals, and attitude verbs, with the aim of shedding light on the prospects for adding probabilistic structure to models of the conversational common ground.
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  39.  9
    Edwin Mares (2014). Belief Revision, Probabilism, and Logic Choice. Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):647-670.
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  40. Mark Kaplan (2009). Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press
     
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  41.  3
    Nicholas Maxwell, Relativity Theory May Not Have the Last Word on the Nature of Time: Quantum Theory and Probabilism.
    Two radically different views about time are possible. According to the first, the universe is three dimensional. It has a past and a future, but that does not mean it is spread out in time as it is spread out in the three dimensions of space. This view requires that there is an unambiguous, absolute, cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. According to the second view about time, the universe is four dimensional. It is spread out in both space and time (...)
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  42.  52
    David Christensen (2001). Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.
    Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case (...)
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  43.  39
    Branden Fitelson (2012). Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 79 (1):167-174.
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  44.  32
    Richard Bradley (2005). Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
  45.  23
    Richard Pettigrew, Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia.
  46.  87
    Daniel Simberloff (1980). A Succession of Paradigms in Ecology: Essentialism to Materialism and Probabilism. Synthese 43 (1):3 - 39.
  47.  31
    S. L. Zabell (2002). It All Adds Up: The Dynamic Coherence of Radical Probabilism. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S98-S103.
  48.  21
    James M. Joycetl (1998). A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
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  49.  33
    Malcolm R. Forster (1995). Bayes and Bust: Simplicity as a Problem for a Probabilist's Approach to Confirmation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):399-424.
    The central problem with Bayesian philosophy of science is that it cannot take account of the relevance of simplicity and unification to confirmation, induction, and scientific inference. The standard Bayesian folklore about factoring simplicity into the priors, and convergence theorems as a way of grounding their objectivity are some of the myths that Earman's book does not address adequately. 1Review of John Earman: Bayes or Bust?, Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 1992, £33.75cloth.
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  50.  90
    Stephen J. Barker (1998). Predetermination and Tense Probabilism. Analysis 58 (4):290–296.
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