Search results for 'Probabilism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nicholas Maxwell (1985). Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible? Philosophy of Science 52 (1):23-43.score: 18.0
    In this paper I expound an argument which seems to establish that probabilism and special relativity are incompatible. I examine the argument critically, and consider its implications for interpretative problems of quantum theory, and for theoretical physics as a whole.
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  2. Nicholas Maxwell (1988). Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible? Philosophy of Science 55 (4):640-645.score: 18.0
    Are special relativity and probabilism compatible? Dieks argues that they are. But the possible universe he specifies, designed to exemplify both probabilism and special relativity, either incorporates a universal "now" (and is thus incompatible with special relativity), or amounts to a many world universe (which I have discussed, and rejected as too ad hoc to be taken seriously), or fails to have any one definite overall Minkowskian-type space-time structure (and thus differs drastically from special relativity as ordinarily understood). (...)
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  3. Mark Kaplan (2010). In Defense of Modest Probabilism. Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.score: 18.0
    Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged (...)
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  4. Paul D. Thorn (2013). Cognitivist Probabilism. In Vit Punochar & Petr Svarny (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2012. College Publications. 201-213.score: 18.0
    In this article, I introduce the term “cognitivism” as a name for the thesis that degrees of belief are equivalent to full beliefs about truth-valued propositions. The thesis (of cognitivism) that degrees of belief are equivalent to full beliefs is equivocal, inasmuch as different sorts of equivalence may be postulated between degrees of belief and full beliefs. The simplest sort of equivalence (and the sort of equivalence that I discuss here) identifies having a given degree of belief with having a (...)
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  5. Luigi Secchi (2014). The Main Two Arguments for Probabilism Are Flawed. Synthese 191 (3):287-295.score: 18.0
    Probabilism, the view that agents have numerical degrees of beliefs that conform to the axioms of probability, has been defended by the vast majority of its proponents by way of either of two arguments, the Dutch Book Argument and the Representation Theorems Argument. In this paper I argue that both arguments are flawed. The Dutch Book Argument is based on an unwarranted, ad hoc premise that cannot be dispensed with. The Representation Theorems Argument hinges on an invalid implication.
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  6. Richard Bradley (2005). Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.score: 18.0
    Richard Jeffrey espoused an antifoundationalist variant of Bayesian thinking that he termed ‘Radical Probabilism’. Radical Probabilism denies both the existence of an ideal, unbiased starting point for our attempts to learn about the world and the dogma of classical Bayesianism that the only justified change of belief is one based on the learning of certainties. Probabilistic judgment is basic and irreducible. Bayesian conditioning is appropriate when interaction with the environment yields new certainty of belief in some proposition but (...)
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  7. Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Problems for Pure Probabilism About Promotion (and a Disjunctive Alternative). Philosophical Studies:1-16.score: 18.0
    Humean promotionalists about reasons think that whether there is a reason for an agent to ϕ depends on whether her ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one of her desires. Several authors have recently defended probabilistic accounts of promotion, according to which an agent’s ϕ-ing promotes the satisfaction of one of her desires just in case her ϕ-ing makes the satisfaction of that desire more probable relative to some baseline. In this paper I do three things. First, I formalize (...)
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  8. Craig Martin (2009). Conjecture, Probabilism, and Provisional Knowledge in Renaissance Meteorology. Early Science and Medicine 14 (1):265-289.score: 15.0
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  9. James M. Joyce (1998). A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.score: 12.0
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
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  10. Nicholas Maxwell (2006). Special Relativity, Time, Probabilism, and Ultimate Reality. In D. Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime. Elsevier, B. V.score: 12.0
    McTaggart distinguished two conceptions of time: the A-series, according to which events are either past, present or future; and the B-series, according to which events are merely earlier or later than other events. Elsewhere, I have argued that these two views, ostensibly about the nature of time, need to be reinterpreted as two views about the nature of the universe. According to the so-called A-theory, the universe is three dimensional, with a past and future; according to the B-theory, the universe (...)
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  11. Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson (2012). An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.score: 12.0
    To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not (...)
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  12. Alan Hájek (2008). Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793 - 819.score: 12.0
    Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem (...)
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  13. Igor Douven, Leon Horsten & Jan-Willem Romeijn (2010). Probabilist antirealism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):38-63.score: 12.0
    Until now, antirealists have offered sketches of a theory of truth, at best. In this paper, we present a probabilist account of antirealist truth in some formal detail, and we assess its ability to deal with the problems that are standardly taken to beset antirealism.
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  14. Maria Carla Galavotti (1996). Probabilism and Beyond. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):253 - 265.score: 12.0
    Richard Jeffrey has labelled his philosophy of probability radical probabilism and qualified this position as Bayesian, nonfoundational and anti-rationalist. This paper explores the roots of radical probabilism, to be traced back to the work of Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti.
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  15. John Hosack (1991). On Probabilism and Induction. Topoi 10 (2):227-229.score: 12.0
    R. C. Jeffrey has proposed probabilism as a solution to Hume's problem of justifying induction. This paper shows that the assumptions of his Estimation Theorem, used to justify induction, can be weakened to provide a more satisfactory interpretation. It is also questioned whether the use of probabilism adds significantly to our understanding (or even Hume's understanding) of the problem of induction.
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  16. Patrick Maher (2002). Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 69 (1):73-81.score: 12.0
    James Joyce's 'Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism' gives a new argument for the conclusion that a person's credences ought to satisfy the laws of probability. The premises of Joyce's argument include six axioms about what counts as an adequate measure of the distance of a credence function from the truth. This paper shows that (a) Joyce's argument for one of these axioms is invalid, (b) his argument for another axiom has a false premise, (c) neither axiom is plausible, and (d) (...)
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  17. Brian Skyrms (2006). Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):959-968.score: 12.0
    The question of diachronic coherence, coherence of degrees of belief across time, is investigated within the context of Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism. Diachronic coherence is taken as fundamental, and coherence results for degrees of belief at a single time, such as additivity, are recovered only with additional assumptions. Additivity of probabilities of probabilities is seen to be less problematic than additivity of first-order probabilities. Without any assumed model of belief change, diachronic coherence applied to higher-order degrees of belief yields (...)
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  18. Brian Skyrms (1996). The Structure of Radical Probabilism. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.score: 12.0
    Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.
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  19. Göran Duus-Otterström (2009). Almost Pregnant: On Probabilism and its Moral Uses in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):572-594.score: 12.0
    The turn from deterministic to probabilistic explanations has been used to argue that social science does not explain human action in ways that are incompatible with free will, since, according to some accounts of probabilism, causal factors merely influence actions without determining them. I argue that the notion of nondetermining causal influence is a multifaceted and problematic idea, which notably is unclear about whether the probability is objective or subjective, whether it applies to individual occurrences or merely to sets (...)
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  20. Alan H.´ajek (2008). Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793 - 819.score: 12.0
    Four important arguments for probabilism--the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments--have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem (...)
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  21. A. Hajek (2008). Arguments for-or Against-Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.score: 12.0
    Four important arguments for probabilism--the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments--have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem (...)
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  22. Lyle Zynda (2006). Radical Probabilism Revisited. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980.score: 12.0
    In this essay, I analyze and critique Richard Jeffrey's radical probabilism. The basic theses defining it are examined, particularly the idea that probabilistic coherence involves a kind of "consistency." The main challenges to Jeffrey's view are (1) that there is an inconsistency between regarding probabilities as subjective and some probabilistic judgments as better than others, and (2) that decision theory so conceived has no normative import. I argue that both of these challenges can be met.
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  23. Jonathan Hill (2009). Probabilism Today: Permissibility and Multi-Account Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):235-250.score: 12.0
    In ethics, ?probabilism? refers to a position defended by a number of Catholic theologians, mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They held that, when one is uncertain which of a range of actions is the right one to perform, it is permissible to perform any which has a good chance of being the right one?even if there is another which has a better chance. This paper considers the value of this position from the viewpoint of modern ethical philosophy. (...)
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  24. Walter Redmond (1998). Conscience as Moral Judgment: The Probabilist Blending of the Logics of Knowledge and Responsibility. Journal of Religious Ethics 26 (2):389 - 405.score: 12.0
    Probabilism is a Scholastic discussion of conscience beginning in the sixteenth century and lasting over four hundred years. To tackle historical issues in normative ethics, the participants had to work out a general "metaethical" theory relating epistemic and deontic logics, the logics of knowledge and virtue. May I act if I am unsure that I may? How, when I am in doubt, can I acquire the critical mass of rationality that virtue demands? The normative aspect of the controversy has (...)
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  25. Brian Skyrms (1994). Convergence in Radical Probabilism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:349 - 353.score: 12.0
    It is shown how martingale convergence theorems apply to coherent belief change in radical probabilist epistemology.
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  26. Daniel Schwartz (2013). Probabilism, Just War and Sovereing Supremacy in the Work of Gabriel Vazquez. History of Political Thought 34 (2):177-194.score: 12.0
    Proponents of probabilism argued that 'when an opinion is probable it may be followed even when the contrary opinion is more probable'. Gabriel Vazquez (1549-1604) was the first Jesuit theologian to defend and expand this doctrine. The prevalent theory of sovereignty at the time held that: (1) when sovereigns are victims of wrongs, they take on the role of international judges (thus just wars are just punishments); and (2) the sovereign need not stand before the judgment of any other (...)
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  27. Nicholas Maxwell (2004). Does Probabilism Solve the Great Quantum Mystery? Theoria 19 (3):321-336.score: 10.0
    What sort of entities are electrons, photons and atoms given their wave-like and particle-like properties? Is nature fundamentally deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) evades answering these two basic questions by being a theory about the results of performing measurements on quantum systems. But this evasion results in OQT being a seriously defective theory. A rival, somewhat ignored strategy is to conjecture that the quantum domain is fundamentally probabilistic. This means quantum entities, interacting with one another probabilistically, must differ (...)
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  28. David Christensen (2001). Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.score: 10.0
    Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case (...)
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  29. Seth Yalcin (forthcoming). Context Probabilism. In M. Aloni (ed.), 18th Amsterdam Colloquium. Springer.score: 10.0
    We investigate a basic probabilistic dynamic semantics for a fragment containing conditionals, probability operators, modals, and attitude verbs, with the aim of shedding light on the prospects for adding probabilistic structure to models of the conversational common ground.
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  30. Nicholas Maxwell (1993). On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):341-348.score: 9.0
    In a recent paper, Howard Stein makes a number of criticisms of an earlier paper of mine ('Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?', Phil. Sci., 1985), which explored the question of whether the idea that the future is genuinely 'open' in a probabilistic universe is compatible with special relativity. I disagree with almost all of Stein's criticisms.
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  31. Richard Pettigrew (2012). Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle. Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.score: 9.0
    In ‘A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Jim Joyce attempts to ‘depragmatize’ de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our partial beliefs ought to satisfy the axioms of probability calculus. In this paper, I adapt Joyce’s argument to give a non-pragmatic vindication of various versions of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, such as the version based on Isaac Levi's account of admissibility, Michael Thau and Ned Hall's New Principle, and Jenann Ismael's Generalized Principal Principle. Joyce enumerates properties that must be (...)
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  32. Daniel Simberloff (1980). A Succession of Paradigms in Ecology: Essentialism to Materialism and Probabilism. Synthese 43 (1):3 - 39.score: 9.0
  33. Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak, Separability Assumptions in Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.score: 9.0
    - In decision theory, an agent is deciding how to value a gamble that results in different outcomes in different states. Each outcome gets a utility value for the agent.
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  34. Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak, Advice-Giving and Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.score: 9.0
    Dutch Book Arguments. B is susceptibility to sure monetary loss (in a certain betting set-up), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the DBT and the Converse DBT. Representation Theorem Arguments. B is having preferences that violate some of Savage’s axioms (and/or being unrepresentable as an expected utility maximizer), and F is the formal role played by non-Pr b’s in the RT.
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  35. Ted Honderich, A Quick Tour of Causation, Probabilism, Determinism, Freedom and Responsibility.score: 9.0
    The same two kinds of conditional connections in the world, each dependent on the situation, hold between each event in certain sets of events that we can call causal circumstances for the lighting. A causal circumstance cc) included the event that for some reason we pick out and call the cause -- the striking s).
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  36. Bruno De Finetti (1989). Probabilism: A Critical Essay on the Theory of Probability and on the Value of Science. Erkenntnis 31 (2/3):169 - 223.score: 9.0
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  37. Malcolm R. Forster (1995). Bayes and Bust: Simplicity as a Problem for a Probabilist's Approach to Confirmation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):399-424.score: 9.0
    The central problem with Bayesian philosophy of science is that it cannot take account of the relevance of simplicity and unification to confirmation, induction, and scientific inference. The standard Bayesian folklore about factoring simplicity into the priors, and convergence theorems as a way of grounding their objectivity are some of the myths that Earman's book does not address adequately. 1Review of John Earman: Bayes or Bust?, Cambridge, MA. MIT Press, 1992, £33.75cloth.
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  38. Bruno De Finetti (1989). Probabilism. Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):169-223.score: 9.0
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  39. Branden Fitelson (2012). Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 79 (1):167-174.score: 9.0
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  40. J. Robert G. Williams (2012). Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):811-840.score: 9.0
    Jeff Paris (2001) proves a generalized Dutch Book theorem. If a belief state is not a generalized probability (a kind of probability appropriate for generalized distributions of truth-values) then one faces ‘sure loss’ books of bets. In <span class='Hi'>Williams</span> (manuscript) I showed that Joyce’s (1998) accuracy-domination theorem applies to the same set of generalized probabilities. What is the relationship between these two results? This note shows that (when ‘accuracy’ is treated via the Brier Score) both results are easy corollaries of (...)
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  41. James Allen (1994). Academic Probabilism and Stoic Epistemology. Classical Quarterly 44 (01):85-.score: 9.0
  42. Maria Carla Galavotti, Kinds of Probabilism.score: 9.0
    The first part of the article deals with the theories of probability and induction put forward by Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap. It will be argued that, despite fundamental differences, Carnap's and Reichenbach's views on probability are closely linked with the problem of meaning generated by logical empiricism, and are characterized by the logico-semantical approach typical of this philosophical current. Moreover, their notions of probability are both meant to combine a logical and an empirical element. Of these, Carnap over the (...)
     
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  43. S. L. Zabell (2002). It All Adds Up: The Dynamic Coherence of Radical Probabilism. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S98-S103.score: 9.0
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  44. Richard Jeffrey (1992). Radical Probabilism (Prospectus for a User's Manual). Philosophical Issues 2:193-204.score: 9.0
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  45. Richard Jeffrey (1986). Probabilism and Induction. Topoi 5 (1):51-58.score: 9.0
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  46. Arthur Paul Pedersen & Clark Glymour (2012). What Language Dependence Problem? A Reply for Joyce to Fitelson on Joyce. Philosophy of Science 79 (4):561-574.score: 9.0
    In an essay recently published in this journal, Branden Fitelson argues that a variant of Miller’s argument for the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce’s notion of accuracy of credences formulated in terms of scoring rules, resulting in a general potential problem for Joyce’s argument for probabilism. We argue that no relevant problem of the sort Fitelson supposes arises since his main theorem and his supporting arguments presuppose the validity of nonlinear transformations of (...)
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  47. Stephen J. Barker (1998). Predetermination and Tense Probabilism. Analysis 58 (4):290–296.score: 9.0
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