Search results for 'Probabilities' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  86
    Andrei Khrennikov (2015). CHSH Inequality: Quantum Probabilities as Classical Conditional Probabilities. Foundations of Physics 45 (7):711-725.
    In this note we demonstrate that the results of observations in the EPR–Bohm–Bell experiment can be described within the classical probabilistic framework. However, the “quantum probabilities” have to be interpreted as conditional probabilities, where conditioning is with respect to fixed experimental settings. Our approach is based on the complete account of randomness involved in the experiment. The crucial point is that randomness of selections of experimental settings has to be taken into account within one consistent framework covering all (...)
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  2. Jarosław Pykacz (2006). “Solution” of the EPR Paradox: Negative, or Rather Fuzzy Probabilities? [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 36 (3):437-442.
    Negative probabilities were several times proposed in the literature as a way to reconcile violation of Bell-type inequalities with the premise of local realism. It is argued that instead of using negative probabilities that have no physical meaning one can use for this purpose fuzzy probabilities that have sound and unambiguous interpretation.
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  3. Alan Hájek & Michael Smithson (2012). Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 187 (1):33-48.
    We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required . Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with (...)
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  4.  4
    Claus Beisbart (2016). A Humean Guide to Spielraum Probabilities. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):189-216.
    The most promising accounts of ontic probability include the Spielraum conception of probabilities, which can be traced back to J. von Kries and H. Poincaré, and the best system account by D. Lewis. This paper aims at comparing both accounts and at combining them to obtain the best of both worlds. The extensions of both Spielraum and best system probabilities do not coincide because the former only apply to systems with a special dynamics. Conversely, Spielraum probabilities may (...)
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  5.  90
    Horacio Arló-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner (2010). Ambiguity Aversion: The Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 172 (1):37 - 55.
    Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem (...)
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  6.  91
    Igor Douven & Jos Uffink (2012). Quantum Probabilities and the Conjunction Principle. Synthese 184 (1):109-114.
    A recent argument by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio purports to show that we can uphold the principle that competently forming conjunctions is a knowledge-preserving operation only at the cost of a rampant skepticism about the future. A key premise of their argument is that, in light of quantum-mechanical considerations, future contingents never quite have chance 1 of being true. We argue, by drawing attention to the order of magnitude of the relevant quantum probabilities, that the skeptical threat of Hawthorne and (...)
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  7.  73
    Peter Baumann (2008). Single-Case Probabilities and the Case of Monty Hall: Levy's View. Synthese 162 (2):265 - 273.
    In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here.
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  8.  11
    Christopher Schwand, Rudolf Vetschera & Lea M. Wakolbinger (2010). The Influence of Probabilities on the Response Mode Bias in Utility Elicitation. Theory and Decision 69 (3):395-416.
    The response mode bias, in which subjects exhibit different risk attitudes when assessing certainty equivalents versus indifference probabilities, is a well-known phenomenon in the assessment of utility functions. In this empirical study, we develop and apply a cardinal measure of risk attitudes to analyze not only the existence, but also the strength of this phenomenon. Since probability levels involved in decision problems are already known to have a strong impact on behavior, we use this approach to study the impact (...)
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  9.  9
    Robert B. Griffiths (2003). Probabilities and Quantum Reality: Are There Correlata? [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 33 (10):1423-1459.
    Any attempt to introduce probabilities into quantum mechanics faces difficulties due to the mathematical structure of Hilbert space, as reflected in Birkhoff and von Neumann's proposal for a quantum logic. The (consistent or decoherent) histories solution is provided by its single framework rule, an approach that includes conventional (Copenhagen) quantum theory as a special case. Mermin's Ithaca interpretation addresses the same problem by defining probabilities which make no reference to a sample space or event algebra (“correlations without correlata”). (...)
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  10.  19
    John M. Myers (2006). Conditional Probabilities and Density Operators in Quantum Modeling. Foundations of Physics 36 (7):1012-1035.
    Motivated by a recent proof of free choices in linking equations to the experiments they describe, I clarify some relations among purely mathematical entities featured in quantum mechanics (probabilities, density operators, partial traces, and operator-valued measures), thereby allowing applications of these entities to the modeling of a wider variety of physical situations. I relate conditional probabilities associated with projection-valued measures to conditional density operators identical, in some cases but not in others, to the usual reduced density operators. While (...)
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  11.  18
    Andrei Y. Khrennikov & Elena R. Loubenets (2004). On Relations Between Probabilities Under Quantum and Classical Measurements. Foundations of Physics 34 (4):689-704.
    We show that the so-called quantum probabilistic rule, usually introduced in the physical literature as an argument of the essential distinction between the probability relations under quantum and classical measurements, is not, as it is commonly accepted, in contrast to the rule for the addition of probabilities of mutually exclusive events. The latter is valid under all experimental situations upon classical and quantum systems. We discuss also the quantum measurement situation that is similar to the classical one, described by (...)
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  12.  10
    Lyle C. Gurrin, Peter D. Sly & Paul R. Burton (2002). Using Imprecise Probabilities to Address the Questions of Inference and Decision in Randomized Clinical Trials. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 8 (2):255-268.
    Randomized controlled clinical trials play an important role in the development of new medical therapies. There is, however, an ethical issue surrounding the use of randomized treatment allocation when the patient is suffering from a life threatening condition and requires immediate treatment. Such patients can only benefit from the treatment they actually receive and not from the alternative therapy, even if it ultimately proves to be superior. We discuss a novel new way to analyse data from such clinical trials based (...)
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  13.  16
    Matthew R. Kelley & Robert J. Lemke (2015). Gender Differences When Subjective Probabilities Affect Risky Decisions: An Analysis From the Television Game Show Cash Cab. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 78 (1):153-170.
    This study uses the television show Cash Cab as a natural experiment to investigate gender differences in decision making under uncertainty. As expected, men are much more likely to accept the end-of-game gamble than are women, but men and women appear to weigh performance variables differently when relying on subjective probabilities. At best men base their risky decisions on general aspects of their previous “good” play (not all of which is relevant at the time the decision is made) and (...)
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  14.  8
    Mohamed A. Amer (1985). Extension of Relatively |Sigma-Additive Probabilities on Boolean Algebras of Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (3):589 - 596.
    Contrary to what is stated in Lemma 7.1 of [8], it is shown that some Boolean algebras of finitary logic admit finitely additive probabilities that are not σ-additive. Consequences of Lemma 7.1 are reconsidered. The concept of a C-σ-additive probability on B (where B and C are Boolean algebras, and $\mathscr{B} \subseteq \mathscr{C}$ ) is introduced, and a generalization of Hahn's extension theorem is proved. This and other results are employed to show that every S̄(L)-σ-additive probability on s̄(L) can (...)
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  15.  9
    Ruth Weintraub (1990). Objectivism Without Objective Probabilities. Theoria 56 (1-2):23-41.
    After defending the pluralistic approach to the interpretation of probability statements, I argue that the correctness of objective probability statements is not to be explained in terms of objective probabilities attached to propositions. Such an explanation will enable us to uphold an intuitively appealing connection between probability and action only in indeterministic contexts, whereas the objectivity of probability statements doesn’t depend on the truth of indeterminism. I show how objective probability statements can be interpreted without ascribing objective probabilities (...)
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  16.  11
    Hugues Leblanc (1962). Statistical and Inductive Probabilities. Dover Publications.
    This evenhanded treatment addresses the decades-old dispute among probability theorists, asserting that both statistical and inductive probabilities may be treated as sentence-theoretic measurements, and that the latter qualify as estimates of the former. Beginning with a survey of the essentials of sentence theory and of set theory, the author examines statistical probabilities, showing that statistical probabilities may be passed on to sentences, and thereby qualify as truth-values. An exploration of inductive probabilities follows, demonstrating their reinterpretation as (...)
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  17. Bas van Fraassen (1976). Probabilities of Conditionals. In C. Hooker (ed.), Foundations of probability theory, statistical inference, and statistical theories of science.
  18. Jake Chandler (2014). Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out (...)
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  19. Jordan Howard Sobel (2009). Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.
    There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability kinematics’ or ’Jeffrey-conditioning’ is, (...)
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  20. Andrei Khrennikov (2005). The Principle of Supplementarity: A Contextual Probabilistic Viewpoint to Complementarity, the Interference of Probabilities and Incompatibility of Variables in Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Physics 35 (10):1655-1693.
  21. Rob Lawlor (2006). Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):149 - 166.
    In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?" John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each.Typically, people have argued as if there was a choice to (...)
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  22.  92
    David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2009). Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.
    Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.
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  23.  2
    George Boole (1951). An Investigation of the Laws of Thought on Which Are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities. Dover Constable.
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  24.  42
    Giuseppe Attanasi & Aldo Montesano (2012). The Price for Information About Probabilities and its Relation with Risk and Ambiguity. Theory and Decision 73 (1):125-160.
    In this article, ambiguity attitude is measured through the maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay to know the probability of an event. Two problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case, buying information implies playing a lottery, while, in the other case, buying information gives also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on the Choquet expected utility model, we study how the decision maker’s risk and (...)
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  25.  29
    Ebbe Groes, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes (1998). Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities. Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66.
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  26.  25
    Ebbe Groes, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes (1998). Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities. Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66.
    We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain (...)
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  27.  20
    Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein (1968). Relative Importance of Probabilities and Payoffs in Risk Taking. Journal of Experimental Psychology 78 (3p2):1.
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  28.  23
    Edi Karni & Zvi Safra (1995). The Impossibility of Experimental Elicitation of Subjective Probabilities. Theory and Decision 38 (3):313-320.
  29.  4
    Lee R. Beach (1968). Probability Magnitudes and Conservative Revision of Subjective Probabilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology 77 (1):57.
  30.  3
    Jean Engler (1958). Marginal and Conditional Stimulus and Response Probabilities in Verbal Conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 55 (4):303.
  31.  5
    M. S. Mayzner & M. E. Tresselt (1962). Anagram Solution Times: A Function of Word Transition Probabilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (5):510.
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  32.  2
    Philip Brickman & Scott M. Pierce (1972). Estimates of Conditional Probabilities of Confirming Versus Disconfirming Events as a Function of Inference Situation and Prior Evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology 95 (1):235.
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  33.  2
    Cameron R. Peterson, Robert J. Schneider & Alan J. Miller (1965). Sample Size and the Revision of Subjective Probabilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology 69 (5):522.
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  34.  1
    Cameron R. Peterson, Z. J. Ulehla, Alan J. Miller, Lyle E. Bourne Jr & Donald W. Stilson (1965). Internal Consistency of Subjective Probabilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (5):526.
  35.  2
    John G. Borkowski & Gilbert R. Johns (1966). Analysis of Learning Rate and Sampling Probabilities in a Contingent Reinforcement Situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (1):158.
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  36.  1
    Maynard W. Shelly Ii (1958). The Effects of Response Contingent Probabilities Which Favor Response Change. Journal of Experimental Psychology 56 (3):239.
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  37.  2
    Gloria J. Fischer (1971). Number of Event Choices and the Difference Between Event Probabilities in Human Probability Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 89 (1):192.
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  38.  1
    Jerome L. Myers & Donna Cruse (1968). Two-Choice Discrimination Learning as a Function of Stimulus and Event Probabilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology 77 (3p1):453.
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  39.  1
    Marvin H. Detambel (1956). Probabilities of Success and Amounts of Work in a Multichoice Situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 51 (1):41.
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  40. William C. Howell & Joseph F. Funaro (1965). Prediction on the Basis of Conditional Probabilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology 69 (1):92.
  41. Sheila G. Zipf (1961). The Effects of Amount of Reward, Requirement, and Several Related Probabilities on Human Performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (5):503.
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  42.  16
    Anna Mahtani (2016). Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour. Noûs 50 (2).
    Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use this point to argue against a range of responses to the ‘two bets’ argument for sharp probabilities.
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  43. Adam Elga (2010). Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (05).
    Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.
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  44.  10
    Yoaav Isaacs (forthcoming). Probabilities Cannot Be Rationally Neglected. Mind:fzv151.
    In response to Smith, I argue that probabilities cannot be rationally neglected. I show that Smith’s proposal for ignoring low-probability outcomes must, on pain of violating dominance reasoning, license taking arbitrarily high risk for arbitrarily little reward.
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  45. Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele (2014). Should Subjective Probabilities Be Sharp? Episteme 11 (3):277-289.
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga , that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly (...)
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  46.  57
    Ken Levy (2007). Baumann on the Monty Hall Problem and Single-Case Probabilities. Synthese 158 (1):139-151.
    Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games. Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann's particular arguments for these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that (...)
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  47.  76
    Elliott Sober (2010). Evolutionary Theory and the Reality of Macro Probabilities. In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer 133--60.
    Evolutionary theory is awash with probabilities. For example, natural selection is said to occur when there is variation in fitness, and fitness is standardly decomposed into two components, viability and fertility, each of which is understood probabilistically. With respect to viability, a fertilized egg is said to have a certain chance of surviving to reproductive age; with respect to fertility, an adult is said to have an expected number of offspring.1 There is more to evolutionary theory than the theory (...)
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  48. Christopher J. G. Meacham (2010). Contemporary Approaches to Statistical Mechanical Probabilities: A Critical Commentary - Part I: The Indifference Approach. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1116-1126.
    This pair of articles provides a critical commentary on contemporary approaches to statistical mechanical probabilities. These articles focus on the two ways of understanding these probabilities that have received the most attention in the recent literature: the epistemic indifference approach, and the Lewis-style regularity approach. These articles describe these approaches, highlight the main points of contention, and make some attempts to advance the discussion. The first of these articles provides a brief sketch of statistical mechanics, and discusses the (...)
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  49. Michel Bitbol (2011). Traces of Objectivity: Causality and Probabilities in Quantum Physics. Diogenes 58 (4):30-57.
    It is pointed out that the probabilistic character of a theory does not indicate by itself a distancing with respect to the norms of objectification. Instead, the very structure of the calculation of probabilities utilised by this theory is capable of bearing the trace of a constitution of objectivity in Kant’s sense. Accordingly, the procedure of the constitution of objectivity is first studied in standard and in quantum cases with due reference to modern cognitive science. Then, an examination of (...)
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  50.  6
    Anna Mahtani, Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour.
    Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use this point to argue against a range of responses to the 'two bets' argument for sharp probabilities.
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