This contribution will be organized in three parts conceptually linked to each other. The first one will concern the ancient question “what is life?” seen according to a modern systemic view, the second with evolution based on Darwinian natural selection, the third with the notion of “being human” in relation to our genome.
The main aim of the paper is to reinforce the notion that emergence is a basic characteristic of the molecular sciences in general and chemistry in particular. Although this point is well accepted, even in the primary reference on emergence, the keyword emergence is rarely utilized by chemists and molecular biologists and chemistry textbooks for undergraduates. The possible reasons for this situation are discussed. The paper first re-introduces the concept of emergence based on very simple geometrical forms; and considers some (...) simple chemical examples among low and high molecular weight compounds. On the basis of these chemical examples, a few interesting philosophical issues inherent to the field of emergence are discussed – again making the point that such examples, given their clarity and simplicity, permit one to better understand the complex philosophical issues. Thus, the question of predictability is discussed, namely whether and to what extent can emergent properties be predicted on the basis of the component’s properties; or the question of the explicability (a top down process). The relation between reductionism and emergentism is also discussed as well as the notion of downward causality and double causality (macrodeterminism); namely the question whether and to what extent the emergent properties of the higher hierarchic level affect the properties of the lower level components. Finally, the question is analyzed, whether life can be considered as an emergent property. More generally, the final point is made, that the re-introduction of the notion of emergence in chemistry, and in particular in the teaching, may bring about a deeper understanding of the meaning of chemical complexity and may bring chemistry closer to the humanistic areas of philosophy and epistemology. (shrink)
From the Proceedings of the meeting Mind and Life XII, 'What is matter, what is life?', held in Dharamsala, India, in 2002, in the presence of His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama.
α-Helical coiled coils are usually stabilized by hydrophobic interfaces between the two constituent α-helices, in the form of ‘knobs-into-holes’ packing of non-polar residues arranged in repeating heptad patterns. Here we examine the corresponding ‘hydrophobic cores’ that stabilize bundles of four α-helices. In particular, we study three different kinds of bundle, involving four α-helices of identical sequence: two pack in a parallel and one in an anti-parallel orientation. We point out that the simplest way of understanding the packing of these 4-helix (...) bundles is to use Crick's original idea that the helices are held together by ‘hydrophobic stripes’, which are readily visualized on the cylindrical surface lattice of the α-helices; and that the ‘helix-crossing angle’—which determines, in particular, whether supercoiling is left- or right-handed—is fixed by the slope of the lattice lines that contain the hydrophobic residues. In our three examples the constituent α-helices have hydrophobic repeat patterns of 7, 11 and 4 residues, respectively; and we associate the different overall conformations with ‘knobs-into-holes’ packing along the 7-, 11- and 4-start lines, respectively, of the cylindrical surface lattices of the constituent α-helices. For the first two examples, all four interfaces between adjacent helices are geometrically equivalent; but in the third, one of the four interfaces differs significantly from the others. We provide a geometrical explanation for this non-equivalence in terms of two different but equivalent ways of assembling this bundle, which may possibly constitute a bistable molecular ‘switch’ with a coaxial throw of about 12 Å. The geometrical ideas that we deploy in this paper provide the simplest and clearest description of the structure of helical bundles. In an appendix, we describe briefly a computer program that we have devised in order to search for ‘knobs-into-holes’ packing between α-helices in proteins. (shrink)
This essay examines some aspects of the conceptions of reason in the thought of Luigi Giussani and John Henry Newman. Although the two writers have different approaches and emphases, their notions of reason display striking complementarities, especially in regard to the complex relationship of the reason and the will, converging probabilities, and the operation of reason in relation to faith (informal inference).
Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;} O propósito do presente texto é trazer à luz breves considerações acerca do formar como “fazer” que, enquanto faz, inventa o “modo de fazê-lo”: uma perspectiva estética em Luigi Pareyson, para quem, “produçáo é ao mesmo tempo e indivisivelmente, invençáo”. (...) A interpretaçáo pessoal é o tornar evidente a própria obra, isto é, o dar-se, revelar-se, o descortinar-se da obra em si. O interpretar é de acordo com Pareyson, em si, sempre pessoal; entretanto é apenas uma forma dentre tantas outras possíveis. A pluralidade das interpretações náo deve ser considerada uma desvantagem, longe de ser um “defeito” é já uma revelaçáo da inexorabilidade do pensamento humano. Ao conceber a interpretaçáo como singular, evidencia-se a historicidade do contexto e a personalidade do pensante. Iniciaremos com algumas considerações acerca da estética, em seguida, trataremos da forma como execuçáo e o formar como experimento. Palavras-chave : Estética; Formatividade; Interpretaçáo; Luigi Pareyson; Obra de arte. (shrink)
Kant devotes to the problem of Cartesian skepticism a constant attention throughout his philosophical career. His first attempt to refute the skeptic goes back to the 1755 Nova Delucidatio, while other arguments, both in the pre-critical and in the critical period, follow one another in a rather erratic effort to remove the “scandal” of philosophy, that is, our inability to prove the existence of the external world beyond doubt. This on-going struggle against the skeptic does not end with the 1787 (...) Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason wherein Kant presents his famous Refutation of Idealism. In a series of Reflexionen dating from the late 1780s to the early 1790 and named by Adickes “Reflexionen zum Idealismus,” Kant comes back to the problem that had captured his attention since 1755. (shrink)
This piece criticizes traditional formal and procedural conceptions of democracy, which fail to account for the development of contemporary constitutional democracy. The latter is characterized by a substantive dimension with respect to the content of the decisions taken through the democratic process. The validity of such decision is conditioned by the respect and actualization of fundamental rights, which are established by the constitution. The limits and constraints established by the constitution require juridical science to play a critical and programmatic role (...) vis - à - vis the ‘unlawful’ exercise of public powers, when these enter in contrast with the limits imposed by the constitution. (shrink)
In both Introductions to the Critique of Judgment Kant seems to identify the a priori principle at the basis of aesthetic judgments with the principle that guides reflective judgment in its cognitive inquiry of nature, i.e. the purposiveness of nature or systematicity. For instance Kant writes.
Neurophysiological studies in monkeys and neuroimaging studies in humans support a model of empathy according to which there exists a shared code between perception and production of emotion. The neural circuitry critical to this mechanism is composed of frontal and parietal areas matching the observation and execution of action, and interacting heavily with the superior temporal cortex. Further, this cortical system is linked to the limbic system by means of an anterior sector of the human insular lobe.
Simple assumptions represent a decisive reason to prefer one theory to another in everyday scientific praxis. But this praxis has little philosophical justification, since there exist many notions of simplicity, and those that can be defined precisely strongly depend on the language in which the theory is formulated. The language dependence is a natural feature—to some extent—but it is also believed to be a fatal problem, because, according to a common general argument, the simplicity of a theory is always trivial (...) in a suitably chosen language. But, this trivialization argument is typically either applied to toy-models of scientific theories or applied with little regard for the empirical content of the theory. This paper shows that the trivialization argument fails, when one considers realistic theories and requires their empirical content to be preserved . In fact, the concepts that enable a very simple formulation, are not necessarily measurable, in general. Moreover, the inspection of a theory describing a chaotic billiard shows that precisely those concepts that naturally make the theory extremely simple are provably not measurable. This suggests that—whenever a theory possesses sufficiently complex consequences—the constraint of measurability prevents too simple formulations in any language. This explains why the scientists often regard their assessments of simplicity as largely unambiguous. In order to reveal a cultural bias in the scientists’ assessment, one should explicitly identify different characterizations of simplicity of the assumptions that lead to different theory selections. General arguments are not sufficient. (shrink)
This paper offers a critical analysis of two central issues in Luigi Ferrajoli’s Principia iuris , and more generally of his theory of rights. One is the way in which ‘expectations’ play a crucial role in his deontic theory by establishing the logical basis for his guarantee-based conception of law and rights. The axiomatic way in which Ferrajoli arrives at his conception of fundamental rights is questioned, for it fails to give a full account of the nature of subjective (...) rights. The other issues discussed here is Ferrajoli’s own defence of the universality of fundamental rights, and how this is made to depend on a ‘normative technique’ that one can associate with legal discourse and modern law in Western societies. This, however, poses the problem of how this formal universalism can be reconciled with the intercultural dialogue that Ferrajoli also advocates. (shrink)
The question considered is whether it is possible to trace a theoretical strategy for a criminal policy on the basis of Marx's work. The answer offered is that Marxian political and economic analysis does not supply any general theory of criminality and that any attempt to formulate such a theory (as in Lenin, Paukanis or Gramsci) necessarily leads to authoritarian and regressive conceptions of crime and punishment. Nevertheless the authors maintain that it is possible to trace three theoretical suggestions within (...) Marxian thought which allow of a fruitful approach to the criminal question. The first suggestion relates to the economic roots of many aspects of modern criminality; the second regards the Christian and bourgeois superstition of moral liberty and individual culpability; the third suggestion deals with the lack of a guaranteed social space as the prime root of crime. These theoretical suggestions permit clarification of the social character of penal responsibility and this character points to the need for the socialization (but not deregulation) of criminal treatment. (shrink)
Neither the apparently cold-blooded murder of a complete stranger, the central event in The Stranger, nor Hugo's murder of Hoederer in Dirty Hands—a political assassination or crime of passion, depending on how one views it—can be considered unusual acts, in literature or in life. The topic of murder has itself created an extremely popular genre: the detective novel or "whodunit," which has become a huge industry and has aficionados everywhere, Sartre being one. In French theater, the topic of political assassination (...) has resulted in such famous plays as de Musset's Lorenzaccio (1834), which ostensibly deals with Florence in the sixteenth century and the tyrannical Alexandre de Médicis, who is assassinated by his young cousin, but is in fact "a limpid transposition of the failed revolution of July 1830." It is well known that Sartre was an admirer of Musset and Romantic theater. In 1946, Jean Cocteau, who helped with the staging of Les Mains sales (Dirty Hands), wrote L'Aigle ` deux têtes (The Two-Headed Eagle), which was inspired "by the sad life of Empress Elisabeth of Austria and her tragic death by the hand of the Franco-Italian assassin, Luigi Lucheni." Sartre himself, in Nausea, has Anny use the engraving in Michelet's Histoire de France depicting the assassination of the Duke de Guise as a perfect illustration of "privileged situations.". (shrink)
Among contemporary forms of constitutionalism, Luigi Ferrajoli’s Garantismo may be considered as the rather unfashionable attempt to build up a comprehensive and multi-layered theory, which still takes seriously the positivist heritage. This paper offers, in brief outline, a synthetic view of the social setting, the philosophical background, and the basic features of this conception of constitutionalism, when compared with legal positivism and other mainstream forms of (neo)constitutionalism.
I describe two approaches to modelling the universe, the one having its origin in topos theory and differential geometry, the other in set theory. The first is synthetic differential geometry. Traditionally, there have been two methods of deriving the theorems of geometry: the analytic and the synthetic. While the analytical method is based on the introduction of numerical coordinates, and so on the theory of real numbers, the idea behind the synthetic approach is to furnish the subject of geometry with (...) a purely geometric foundation in which the theorems are then deduced by purely logical means from an initial body of postulates. The most familiar examples of the synthetic geometry are classical Euclidean geometry and the synthetic projective geometry introduced by Desargues in the 17th century and revived and developed by Carnot, Poncelet, Steiner and others during the 19th century. The power of analytic geometry derives very largely from the fact that it permits the methods of the calculus, and, more generally, of mathematical analysis, to be introduced into geometry, leading in particular to differential geometry (a term, by the way, introduced in 1894 by the Italian geometer Luigi Bianchi). That being the case, the idea of a “synthetic” differential geometry seems elusive: how can differential geometry be placed on a “purely geometric” or “axiomatic” foundation when the apparatus of the calculus seems inextricably involved? To my knowledge there have been two attempts to develop a synthetic differential geometry. The first was initiated by Herbert Busemann in the 1940s, building on earlier work of Paul Finsler. Here the idea was to build a differential geometry that, in its author’s words, “requires no derivatives”: the basic objects in Busemann’s approach are not differentiable manifolds, but metric spaces of a certain type in which the notion of a geodesic can be defined in an intrinsic manner. I shall not have anything more to say about this approach. The second approach, that with which I shall be concerned here, was originally proposed in the 1960s by F.. (shrink)
Luigi Sacco (1769–1863) was the main protagonist of early vaccination campaign in Italy. He found a native source of vaccine lymph: with that, he personally vaccinated more than 500,000 people and furnished all Italy and some Middle East countries too. Starting from the pictures of his books, Sacco proposed to create wax models of real and spurious smallpox pustules in human, cow, sheep and horse; just to permit, not only to doctors, but also to all other health operators, the (...) identification of the right pustules from where to extract active lymph for vaccination. In the Museum of Pathological Anatomy of the Padua University Medical School, we have four anatomical waxes which corresponded exactly to the explicative pictures in 1809 Sacco’s treatise on Vaccine. We have found the same models also at the University of Milan, Pavia and Bologna—the main cities of Cisalpine Republic , the state of North Italy formed at the epoch of Sacco following the Napoleon conquest. The history of the diffusion of these models presented in this text will be a starting point to develop wider questions. In particular, this history could be useful to improve our understanding of the birth of scientific and experimental medicine through XIX and XX Century. (shrink)
