Search results for 'Professor Max Velmans' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Max Velmans (ed.) (2000). Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.score: 520.0
  2. Max Velmans (2000). Understanding Consciousness. Routledge.score: 520.0
    The mysteries of consciousness have gripped the human imagination for over 2,500 years. At the dawn of the new millennium, Understanding Consciousness provides new solutions to some of the deepest puzzles surrounding its nature and function. Drawing on recent scientific discoveries, Max Velmans challenges conventional reductionist thought, providing an understanding of how consciousness relates to the brain and physical world that is neither dualist, nor reductionist. Understanding Consciousness will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Max Velmans (2007). The Co-Evolution of Matter and Consciousness. Velmans, Prof Max (2007) the Co-Evolution of Matter and Consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)] 44 (2):273-282.score: 480.0
    Theories about the evolution of consciousness relate in an intimate way to theories about the distribution of consciousness, which range from the view that only human beings are conscious to the view that all matter is in some sense conscious. Broadly speaking, such theories can be classified into discontinuity theories and continuity theories. Discontinuity theories propose that consciousness emerged only when material forms reached a given stage of evolution, but propose different criteria for the stage at which this occurred. Continuity (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Max Velmans (2007). How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423.score: 360.0
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Max Velmans (2003). Preconscious Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):42-61.score: 300.0
    This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will. Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Max Velmans (1995). The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):255-65.score: 300.0
    Many of the arguments about how to address the hard versus the easy questions of consciousness put by Chalmers (1995) are similar to ones I have developed in Velmans (1991a,b; 1993a). This includes the multiplicity of mind/body problems, the limits of functional explanation, the need for a nonreductionist approach, and the notion that consciousness may be related to neural/physical representation via a dual-aspect theory of information. But there are also differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Prof Max Velmans, Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology.score: 300.0
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomenena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Max Velmans (2003). Is the World in the Brain, or the Brain in the World? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):427-429.score: 300.0
    Lehar provides useful insights into spatially extended phenomenology that may have major consequences for neuroscience. However, Lehar's biological naturalism leads to counterintuitive conclusions, and he does not give an accurate account of preceding and competing work. This commentary compares Lehar's analysis with that of Velmans, which addresses similar issues but draws opposite conclusions. Lehar argues that the phenomenal world is in the brain and concludes that the physical skull is beyond the phenomenal world. Velmans argues that the brain (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Max Velmans (2009). Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. Routledge/Psychology Press.score: 300.0
    A current, comprehensive summary of Velmans' theoretical work that updates and deepens the analysis given in Edition 1. Part 1 reviews the strengths and weaknesses of all currently dominant theories of consciousness in a form suitable for undergraduates, postgraduates and researchers focusing mainly on dualism, physicalism, functionalism and consciousness in machines. Part 2 gives a new analysis of consciousness, grounded in its everyday phenomenology, which undermines the basis of the dualism versus reductionist debate. It also examines the consequences for (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Max Velmans, Defining Consciousness.score: 240.0
    The following extracts with connecting comments suggest a departure point for a definitions of consciousness that preserves its everyday phenomenology while allowing an understanding of what consciousness is to deepen as scientific investigation proceeds. I argue that current definitions are often theory-driven rather than following the contours of ordinary experience. Consequently they are sometimes too broad, sometimes too narrow, and sometimes not definitions of phenomenal consciousness at all. As an alternative, an ecologically valid, reflexive approach to consciousness is suggested that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Max Velmans (2004). Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.score: 240.0
    Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Prof Max Velmans (2009). How to Define Consciousness—and How Not to Define Consciousness. Cogprints.score: 240.0
    Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Max Velmans (2007). Reflexive Monism. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 15 (2):5-50.score: 240.0
    Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Max Velmans (2001). A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Communication and Cognition 34 (1):39-59.score: 240.0
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the 'mantle of science,' it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Prof Max Velmans (2007). How to Separate Conceptual Issues From Empirical Ones in the Study of Consciousness. In Rahul Banerjee & Bikas Chakrabarti (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Elsevier.score: 240.0
    Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in cognitive science, neuroscience and related sciences, using relatively conventional third-person research methods. However not all the problems of consciousness can be resolved in this way. These problems may be grouped into problems that require empirical advance, those that require theoretical advance, and those that require a re-examination of some of our pre-theoretical assumptions. I give examples of these, and focus on two problems—what consciousness is, and what (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.score: 240.0
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Max Velmans (2007). Where Experiences Are: Dualist, Physicalist, Enactive and Reflexive Accounts of Phenomenal Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):547-563.score: 240.0
    Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models locate conscious (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Max Velmans (2007). Heterophenomenology Vs. Critical Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):221-230.score: 240.0
    Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Max Velmans (1998). Goodbye to Reductionism: Complementary First and Third-Person Approaches to Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--45.score: 240.0
    This chapter argues that dualist vs. reductionist debates adopt an implicit description of consciousness that does not resemble ordinary experience. If one adopts an accurate description of conscious phenomenology along with an understanding of the fundamental differences between correlation, causation and ontological identity, reductionism cannot succeed. However the alternative is not a dualism that places consciousness beyond science. Rather, it is a nonreductionist science of consciousness.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Max Velmans (2002). How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):3-29.score: 240.0
    In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other ‘mental interventions’ can be therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, there is no accepted theory of mind/body interaction and this has (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Max Velmans (1999). When Perception Becomes Conscious. British Journal of Psychology 90 (4):543-566.score: 240.0
    The study of preconscious versus conscious processing has an extensive history in cognitive psychology, dating back to the writings of William James. Much of the experimental work on this issue has focused on perception, conceived of as input analysis, and on the relation of consciousness to attentional processing. The present paper examines when input analysis becomes conscious from the perspectives of cognitive modelling, methodology, and a more detailed understanding of what is meant by "conscious processing." Current evidence suggests that perception (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Prof Max Velmans (2009). Psychophysical Nature. In Cogprints.score: 240.0
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Max Velmans (2007). Psychophysical Nature. In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Springer.score: 240.0
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Max Velmans (1990). Consciousness, Brain, and the Physical World. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):77-99.score: 240.0
    Dualist and Reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state of or function of the brain. They assume, however, that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. According to the present paper this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science. Drawing on evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, the case is made that the physical world as-perceived is a (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Anthony P. Atkinson, I. S. Baker, Susan J. Blackmore, William Braud, Jean E. Burns, R. H. S. Carpenter, Christopher J. S. Clarke, Ralph D. Ellis, David Fontana, Christopher C. French, D. Radin, M. Schlitz, Stefan Schmidt & Max Velmans (2005). Open Peer Commentary on 'the Sense of Being Stared At' Parts 1 &. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (6):50-116.score: 240.0
  26. Max Velmans (2007). An Epistemology for the Study of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 711--725.score: 240.0
    This is a prepublication version of the final chapter from the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. In it I re-examine the basic conditions required for a study of conscious experiences in the light of progress made in recent years in the field of consciousness studies. I argue that neither dualist nor reductionist assumptions about subjectivity versus objectivity and the privacy of experience versus the public nature of scientific observations allow an adequate understanding of how studies of consciousness actually proceed. The chapter (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Zara M. Bergström, Max Velmans, Jan de Fockert & Alan Richardson-Klavehn (2007). ERP Evidence for Successful Voluntary Avoidance of Conscious Recollection. Brain Research 1151:119-133.score: 240.0
  28. Max Velmans, Heterophenomenogy Versus Critical Phenomenology: A Dialogue with Dan Dennett.score: 240.0
    ABSTRACT. The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in the period 14th to 28th June, 2001. The discussion tries to clarify some essential features of the "heterophenomenology" developed in his book Consciousness Explained (1996), and how this differs from a form of "critical phenomenology" implicit in my own book Understanding Consciousness (2000), and developed in my edited Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: new methodologies and maps (2000). The departure point for the discussion is a paper (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Prof Max Velmans, A Brief Note on How Phenomenal Objects Relate to Objects Themselves.score: 240.0
    This brief note corrects some basic errors in Meijsing’s (2011) JCS paper on “The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space”, concerning the status of phenomenal objects in the reflexive model of perception. In particular I clarify the precise sense in which a phenomenal object relates to the object itself (the noumenal object) in visual perception.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Max Velmans (1994). A Reflexive Science of Consciousness. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). 404--416.score: 240.0
    Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Prof Max Velmans (2011). Can Evolutionary Theory Explain the Existence of Consciousness? A Review of Humphrey, N. (2010) Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. London: Quercus, ISBN 9781849162371. Journal of Consciousness Studies.score: 240.0
    This review summarises why it is difficult for Darwinian evolutionary theory to explain the existence and function of consciousness. It then evaluates whether Humphrey's book Soul Dust overcomes these problems. According to Humphrey, consciousness is an illusion constructed by the brain to enhance reproductive fitness by motivating creatures that have it to stay alive. Although the review entirely accepts that consciousness gives a first-person meaning to existence, it concludes that Humphrey does not give a convincing account of how this can (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Max Velmans (2002). Could Phenomenal Consciousness Function as a Cognitive Unconscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):357-358.score: 240.0
    Evidence for unconscious semantic representation suggests that a cognitive unconscious exists. Phenomenal consciousness cannot easily be shown to deal with complex cognitive operations such as those involved in language translation and creativity. A self-organising phenomenal consciousness that controls brain functions also runs into mind/body problems (well recognised in the consciousness studies literature) that Perruchet & Vinter must address.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Max Velmans (2002). Making Sense of Causal Interactions Between Consciousness and Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):69-95.score: 240.0
    My target article (henceforth referred to as TA) presents evidence for causal interactions between consciousness and brain and some standard ways of accounting for this evidence in clinical practice and neuropsychological theory. I also point out some of the problems of understanding such causal interactions that are not addressed by standard explanations. Most of the residual problems have to do with how to cross the “explanatory gap” from consciousness to brain. I then list some of the reasons why the route (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Max Velmans (1999). Intersubjective Science. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2-3):299-306.score: 240.0
    The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Max Velmans (1995). The Limits of Neuropsychological Models of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703.score: 240.0
    This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Max Velmans (1996). Consciousness and the "Causal Paradox". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):538-542.score: 240.0
    Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity - but viewed from a third-person perspective consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains, producing a "causal paradox". To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first- and third-person access are fundamental. First- and third-person accounts (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Max Velmans (1998). Goodbye to Reductionism. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Mit Press. 2--45.score: 240.0
    To understand consciousness we must first describe what we experience accurately. But oddly, current dualist vs reductionist debates characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience. Indeed, there is no other area of enquiry where the phenomenon to be studied has been so systematically misdescribed. Given this, it is hardly surprising that progress towards understanding the nature of consciousness has been limited.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Max Velmans (1998). Physical, Psychological and Virtual Realities. In Joanne A. Wood (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Routledge. 45-60.score: 240.0
    This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual realities, and challenges some conventional, implicitly dualist assumptions about how these relate to each other. Virtual realities are not easily understood in either dualist or materialist reductive terms, as they exemplify the reflexive nature of perception. The chapter summarises some of the evidence for this “reflexive model”—and examines some of its consequences for the “hard” problem of consciousness. The chapter then goes on to consider how these realities might (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Max Velmans (ed.) (1996). The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews. Routledge.score: 240.0
    Of all the problems facing science none are more challenging yet fascinating than those posed by consciousness. In The Science of Consciousness leading researchers examine how consciousness is being investigated in the key areas of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and clinical psychology. Within cognitive psychology, special focus is given to the function of consciousness, and to the relation of conscious processing to nonconscious processing in perception, learning, memory and information dissemination. Neuropsychology includes examination of the neural conditions for consciousness and the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Max Velmans (1991). Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.score: 240.0
    The sequence of topics in this reply roughly follows that of the target article. The latter focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output. The discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reverse this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, does the reply.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Max Velmans (1997). Is My Unconscious Somebody Else's Consciousness?: A Review of D.Chalmers (1996) the Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations.score: 240.0
    An evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses, and originality of Chalmer's book.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Max Velmans (1990). Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.score: 240.0
    What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Max Velmans (1992). Is Consciousness Integrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):229-230.score: 240.0
    In the visual system, the represented features of individual objects (shape, colour, movement, and so on) are distributed both in space and time within the brain. Representations of inner and outer event sequences arrive through different sense organs at different times, and are likewise distributed. Objects are nevertheless perceived as integrated wholes - and event sequences are experienced to form a coherent "consciousness stream." In their thoughtful article, Dennett & Kinsbourne ask how this is achieved.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Max Velmans (1999). Neural Activation, Information, and Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):172-173.score: 240.0
    O'Brien & Opie defend a “vehicle” rather than a “process” theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is “explicit.” I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Max Velmans (forthcoming). What Makes a Conscious Process Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences:43-44.score: 240.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Max Velmans (1993). A Reflexive Science of Consciousness. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). 404--416.score: 240.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Max Velmans, Yujin Nagasawa, In M. Velmans & Y. Nagasawa (2012). Introduction to Monist Alternatives to Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9):7.score: 240.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Max Velmans (1992). Synopsis of 'Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World'. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):153-157.score: 240.0
    (1992). Synopsis of ‘consciousness, brain and the physical world’. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 153-157. doi: 10.1080/09515089208573049.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Max Velmans (1992). The World as-Perceived, the World as-Described by Physics, and the Thing-Itself: A Reply to Rentoul and Wetherick. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):167 – 172.score: 240.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000