This introduction to the basic ideas of structural prooftheory contains a thorough discussion and comparison of various types of formalization of first-order logic. Examples are given of several areas of application, namely: the metamathematics of pure first-order logic (intuitionistic as well as classical); the theory of logic programming; category theory; modal logic; linear logic; first-order arithmetic and second-order logic. In each case the aim is to illustrate the methods in relatively simple situations and then apply (...) them elsewhere in much more complex settings. There are numerous exercises throughout the text. In general, the only prerequisite is a standard course in first-order logic, making the book ideal for graduate students and beginning researchers in mathematical logic, theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence. For the new edition, many sections have been rewritten to improve clarity, new sections have been added on cut elimination, and solutions to selected exercises have been included. (shrink)
ProofTheory of Modal Logic is devoted to a thorough study of proof systems for modal logics, that is, logics of necessity, possibility, knowledge, belief, time, computations etc. It contains many new technical results and presentations of novel proof procedures. The volume is of immense importance for the interdisciplinary fields of logic, knowledge representation, and automated deduction.
Proof-theoretical notions and techniques, developed on the basis of sentential/symbolic representations of formal proofs, are applied to Euler diagrams. A translation of an Euler diagrammatic system into a natural deduction system is given, and the soundness and faithfulness of the translation are proved. Some consequences of the translation are discussed in view of the notion of free ride, which is mainly discussed in the literature of cognitive science as an account of inferential efficacy of diagrams. The translation enables us (...) to formalize and analyze free ride in terms of prooftheory. The notion of normal form of Euler diagrammatic proofs is investigated, and a normalization theorem is proved. Some consequences of the theorem are further discussed: in particular, an analysis of the structure of normal diagrammatic proofs; a diagrammatic counterpart of the usual subformula property; and a characterization of diagrammatic proofs compared with natural deduction proofs. (shrink)
This volume contains articles covering a broad spectrum of prooftheory, with an emphasis on its mathematical aspects. The articles should not only be interesting to specialists of prooftheory, but should also be accessible to a diverse audience, including logicians, mathematicians, computer scientists and philosophers. Many of the central topics of prooftheory have been included in a self-contained expository of articles, covered in great detail and depth. The chapters are arranged so that (...) the two introductory articles come first; these are then followed by articles from core classical areas of prooftheory; the handbook concludes with articles that deal with topics closely related to computer science. (shrink)
This work is derived from the SERC "Logic for IT" Summer School Conference on ProofTheory held at Leeds University. The contributions come from acknowledged experts and comprise expository and research articles which form an invaluable introduction to prooftheory aimed at both mathematicians and computer scientists.
Jean van Heijenoort was best known for his editorial work in the history of mathematical logic. I survey his contributions to model-theoretic prooftheory, and in particular to the falsifiability tree method. This work of van Heijenoort’s is not widely known, and much of it remains unpublished. A complete list of van Heijenoort’s unpublished writings on tableaux methods and related work in prooftheory is appended.
Goal Directed ProofTheory presents a uniform and coherent methodology for automated deduction in non-classical logics, the relevance of which to computer science is now widely acknowledged. The methodology is based on goal-directed provability. It is a generalization of the logic programming style of deduction, and it is particularly favourable for proof search. The methodology is applied for the first time in a uniform way to a wide range of non-classical systems, covering intuitionistic, intermediate, modal and substructural (...) logics. The book can also be used as an introduction to these logical systems form a procedural perspective. Readership: Computer scientists, mathematicians and philosophers, and anyone interested in the automation of reasoning based on non-classical logics. The book is suitable for self study, its only prerequisite being some elementary knowledge of logic and prooftheory. (shrink)
This book is a specialized monograph on the development of the mathematical and computational metatheory of reductive logic and proof-search including proof-theoretic, semantic/model-theoretic and algorithmic aspects. The scope ranges from the conceptual background to reductive logic, through its mathematical metatheory, to its modern applications in the computational sciences.
A combination of epistemic logic and dynamic logic of programs is presented. Although rich enough to formalize some simple game-theoretic scenarios, its axiomatization is problematic as it leads to the paradoxical conclusion that agents are omniscient. A cut-free labelled Gentzen-style proof system is then introduced where knowledge and action, as well as their combinations, are formulated as rules of inference, rather than axioms. This provides a logical framework for reasoning about games in a modular and systematic way, and to (...) give a step-by-step reconstruction of agents omniscience. In particular, its semantic assumptions are made explicit and a possible solution can be found in weakening the properties of the knowledge operator. (shrink)
In the last decade the concept of context has been extensivelyexploited in many research areas, e.g., distributed artificialintelligence, multi agent systems, distributed databases, informationintegration, cognitive science, and epistemology. Three alternative approaches to the formalization of the notion ofcontext have been proposed: Giunchiglia and Serafini's Multi LanguageSystems (ML systems), McCarthy's modal logics of contexts, andGabbay's Labelled Deductive Systems.Previous papers have argued in favor of ML systems with respect to theother approaches. Our aim in this paper is to support these arguments froma (...) theoretical perspective. We provide a very general definition of ML systems, which covers allthe ML systems used in the literature, and we develop a proof theoryfor an important subclass of them: the MR systems. We prove variousimportant results; among other things, we prove a normal form theorem,the sub-formula property, and the decidability of an importantinstance of the class of the MR systems. The paper concludes with a detailed comparison among the alternativeapproaches. (shrink)
Aim of this work is to investigate from a proof-theoretic viewpoint a propositional and a predicate sequent calculus with an ω–type schema of inference that naturally interpret the propositional and the predicate until–free fragments of Linear Time Logic LTL respectively. The two calculi are based on a natural extension of ordinary sequents and of standard modal rules. We examine the pure propositional case (no extralogical axioms), the propositional and the first order predicate cases (both with a possibly infinite set (...) of extralogical axioms). For each system we provide a syntactic proof of cut elimination and a proof of completeness. (shrink)
Families of types are fundamental objects in Martin-Löf type theory. When extending the notion of setoid (type with an equivalence relation) to families of setoids, a choice between proof-relevant or proof-irrelevant indexing appears. It is shown that a family of types may be canonically extended to a proof-relevant family of setoids via the identity types, but that such a family is in general proof-irrelevant if, and only if, the proof-objects of identity types are unique. (...) A similar result is shown for fibre representations of families. The ubiquitous role of proof-irrelevant families is discussed. (shrink)
I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the prooftheory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of (...) logical consequence. (shrink)
A variety of projects in prooftheory of relevance to the philosophy of mathematics are surveyed, including Gödel's incompleteness theorems, conservation results, independence results, ordinal analysis, predicativity, reverse mathematics, speed-up results, and provability logics.
The ability to reason and think in a logical manner forms the basis of learning for most mathematics, computer science, philosophy and logic students. Based on the author's teaching notes at the University of Maryland and aimed at a broad audience, this text covers the fundamental topics in classical logic in an extremely clear, thorough and accurate style that is accessible to all the above. Covering propositional logic, first-order logic, and second-order logic, as well as prooftheory, computability (...)theory, and model theory, the text also contains numerous carefully graded exercises and is ideal for a first or refresher course. (shrink)
1. Pohlers and The Problem. I first met Wolfram Pohlers at a workshop on prooftheory organized by Walter Felscher that was held in Tübingen in early April, 1973. Among others at that workshop relevant to the work surveyed here were Kurt Schütte, Wolfram’s teacher in Munich, and Wolfram’s fellow student Wilfried Buchholz. This is not meant to slight in the least the many other fine logicians who participated there.2 In Tübingen I gave a couple of survey (...) lectures on results and problems in prooftheory that had been occupying much of my attention during the previous decade. The following was the central problem that I emphasized there: The need for an ordinally informative, conceptually clear, proof-theoretic reduction of classical theories of iterated arithmetical inductive definitions to corresponding constructive systems. As will be explained below, meeting that need would be significant for the then ongoing efforts at establishing the constructive foundation for and proof-theoretic ordinal analysis of certain impredicative subsystems of classical analysis. I also spoke in Tübingen about.. (shrink)
The foundations of mathematics are divided into prooftheory and set theory. Prooftheory tries to justify the world of infinite mind from the standpoint of finite mind. Set theory tries to know more and more of the world of the infinite mind. The development of two subjects are discussed including a new proof of the accessibility of ordinal diagrams. Finally the world of large cardinals appears when we go slightly beyond girard's categorical (...) approach to prooftheory. (shrink)
We discuss the development of metamathematics in the Hilbert school, and Hilbert’s proof-theoretic program in particular. We place this program in a broader historical and philosophical context, especially with respect to nineteenth century developments in mathematics and logic. Finally, we show how these considerations help frame our understanding of metamathematics and prooftheory today.
Paul Cohen’s method of forcing, together with Saul Kripke’s related semantics for modal and intuitionistic logic, has had profound eﬀects on a number of branches of mathematical logic, from set theory and model theory to constructive and categorical logic. Here, I argue that forcing also has a place in traditional Hilbert-style prooftheory, where the goal is to formalize portions of ordinary mathematics in restricted axiomatic theories, and study those theories in constructive or syntactic terms. I (...) will discuss the aspects of forcing that are useful in this respect, and some sample applications. The latter include ways of obtaining conservation results for classical and intuitionistic theories, interpreting classical theories in constructive ones, and constructivizing model-theoretic arguments. (shrink)
At the turn of the nineteenth century, mathematics exhibited a style of argumentation that was more explicitly computational than is common today. Over the course of the century, the introduction of abstract algebraic methods helped unify developments in analysis, number theory, geometry, and the theory of equations; and work by mathematicians like Dedekind, Cantor, and Hilbert towards the end of the century introduced set-theoretic language and infinitary methods that served to downplay or suppress computational content. This shift in (...) emphasis away from calculation gave rise to concerns as to whether such methods were meaningful, or appropriate to mathematics. The discovery of paradoxes stemming from overly naive use of set-theoretic language and methods led to even more pressing concerns as to whether the modern methods were even consistent. This led to heated debates in the early twentieth century and what is sometimes called the “crisis of foundations.” In lectures presented in 1922, David Hilbert launched his Beweistheorie, or ProofTheory, which aimed to justify the use of modern methods and settle the problem of foundations once and for all. This, Hilbert argued, could be achieved as follows. (shrink)
We present a survey of prooftheory in the USSR beginning with the paper by Kolmogorov  and ending (mostly) in 1969; the last two sections deal with work done by A. A. Markov and N. A. Shanin in the early seventies, providing a kind of effective interpretation of negative arithmetic formulas. The material is arranged in chronological order and subdivided according to topics of investigation. The exposition is more detailed when the work is little known in the (...) West or the original presentation can be improved using notions or results which appeared later. This includes such topics as Novikov's cut-elimination method (regular formulas) and Maslov's inverse method for the predicate logic. (shrink)
We give an overview of recent results in ordinal analysis. Therefore, we discuss the different frameworks used in mathematical proof-theory, namely "subsystem of analysis" including "reverse mathematics", "Kripke-Platek set theory", "explicit mathematics", "theories of inductive definitions", "constructive set theory", and "Martin-Löf's type theory".
We introduce a Gentzen-style modal predicate logic and prove the cut-elimination theorem for it. This sequent calculus of cut-free proofs is chosen as a proxy to develop the proof-theory of the logics introduced in [14, 15, 4]. We present syntactic proofs for all the metatheoretical results that were proved model-theoretically in loc. cit. and moreover prove that the form of weak reflection proved in these papers is as strong as possible.
In the 1970s, Robin Giles introduced a game combining Lorenzen-style dialogue rules with a simple scheme for betting on the truth of atomic statements, and showed that the existence of winning strategies for the game corresponds to the validity of formulas in Łukasiewicz logic. In this paper, it is shown that ‘disjunctive strategies’ for Giles’s game, combining ordinary strategies for all instances of the game played on the same formula, may be interpreted as derivations in a corresponding proof system. (...) In particular, such strategies mirror derivations in a hypersequent calculus developed in recent work on the prooftheory of Łukasiewicz logic. (shrink)
The goals of reduction andreductionism in the natural sciences are mainly explanatoryin character, while those inmathematics are primarily foundational.In contrast to global reductionistprograms which aim to reduce all ofmathematics to one supposedly ``universal'' system or foundational scheme, reductive prooftheory pursues local reductions of one formal system to another which is more justified in some sense. In this direction, two specific rationales have been proposed as aims for reductive prooftheory, the constructive consistency-proof rationale and (...) the foundational reduction rationale. However, recent advances in prooftheory force one to consider the viability of these rationales. Despite the genuine problems of foundational significance raised by that work, the paper concludes with a defense of reductive prooftheory at a minimum as one of the principal means to lay out what rests on what in mathematics. In an extensive appendix to the paper,various reduction relations betweensystems are explained and compared, and arguments against proof-theoretic reduction as a ``good'' reducibilityrelation are taken up and rebutted. (shrink)
Our first aim is to make the study of informal notions of proof plausible. Put differently, since the raison d'étre of anything like existing prooftheory seems to rest on such notions, the aim is nothing else but to make a case for prooftheory; ...
We carry out a unified investigation of two prominent topics in prooftheory and order algebra: cut-elimination and completion, in the setting of substructural logics and residuated lattices. We introduce the substructural hierarchy — a new classification of logical axioms (algebraic equations) over full Lambek calculus FL, and show that a stronger form of cut-elimination for extensions of FL and the MacNeille completion for subvarieties of pointed residuated lattices coincide up to the level N2 in the hierarchy. Negative (...) results, which indicate limitations of cut-elimination and the MacNeille completion, as well as of the expressive power of structural sequent calculus rules, are also provided. Our arguments interweave prooftheory and algebra, leading to an integrated discipline which we call algebraic prooftheory. (shrink)
We introduce a first order extension of GL, called ML 3 , and develop its prooftheory via a proxy cut-free sequent calculus GLTS. We prove the highly nontrivial result that cut is a derived rule in GLTS, a result that is unavailable in other known first-order extensions of GL. This leads to proofs of weak reflection and the related conservation result for ML 3 , as well as proofs for Craig’s interpolation theorem for GLTS. Turning to semantics (...) we prove that ML 3 is sound with respect to arithmetical interpretations and that it is also sound and complete with respect to converse well-founded and transitive finite Kripke models. This leads us to expect that a Solovay-like proof of arithmetical completeness of ML 3 is possible. (shrink)
The II-calculus, a theory of first-order dependent function types in Curry-Howard-de Bruijn correspondence with a fragment of minimal first-order logic, is defined as a system of (linearized) natural deduction. In this paper, we present a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the II-calculus and prove the cut-elimination theorem.The cut-elimination result builds upon the existence of normal forms for the natural deduction system and can be considered to be analogous to a proof provided by Prawitz for first-order logic. The type-theoretic setting (...) considered here elegantly illustrates the distinction between the processes of normalization in a natural deduction system and cut-elimination in a Gentzen-style sequent calculus. (shrink)
Contraction-free sequent calculi for intuitionistic theories of apartness and order are given and cut-elimination for the calculi proved. Among the consequences of the result is the disjunction property for these theories. Through methods of proof analysis and permutation of rules, we establish conservativity of the theory of apartness over the theory of equality defined as the negation of apartness, for sequents in which all atomic formulas appear negated. The proof extends to conservativity results for the theories (...) of constructive order over the usual theories of order. (shrink)
In this paper we give relational semantics and an accompanying relational prooftheory for full Lambek calculus (a sequent calculus which we denote by FL). We start with the Kripke semantics for FL as discussed in  and develop a second Kripke-style semantics, RelKripke semantics, as a bridge to relational semantics. The RelKripke semantics consists of a set with two distinguished elements, two ternary relations and a list of conditions on the relations. It is accompanied by a Kripke-style (...) valuation system analogous to that in . Soundness and completeness theorems with respect to FL hold for RelKripke models. Then, in the spirit of the work of Orlowska , , and Buszkowski and Orlowska , we develop relational logic RFL. The adjective relational is used to emphasize the fact that RFL has a semantics wherein formulas are interpreted as relations. We prove that a sequent Γ → α in FL is provable if and only if a translation, t( $\gamma_1 \bullet \cdots \bullet \gamma_n \supset \alpha)\varepsilon \upsilon u$ , has a cut-complete fundamental proof tree. This result is constructive: that is, if a cut-complete proof tree for $t(\gamma_1 \bullet \cdots \bullet \gamma_n \supset \alpha)\varepsilon \upsilon u$ is not fundamental, we can use the failed proof search to build a relational countermodel for $t(\gamma_1 \bullet \cdots \bullet \gamma_n \supset \alpha)\varepsilon \upsilon u$ and from this, build a RelKripke countermodel for $\gamma_1 \bullet \cdots \bullet \gamma_n \supset \alpha$ . These results allow us to add FL, the basic substructural logic, to the list of those logies of importance in computer science with a relational prooftheory. (shrink)
This paper is concerned with the structure of texts in which aproof is presented. Some parts of such a text are assumptions, otherparts are conclusions. We show how the structural organisation of thetext into assumptions and conclusions helps to check the validity of theproof. Then we go on to use the structural information for theformulation of proof rules, i.e., rules for the (re-)construction ofproof texts. The running example is intuitionistic propositional logicwith connectives , and. We give new proofs of (...) some familiar results aboutthe prooftheory of this logic to indicate how the new techniques workout. (shrink)
A general definition theory should serve as a foundation for the mathematical study of definitional structures. The central notion of such a theory is a precise explication of the intuitively given notion of a definitional structure. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the prooftheory of partial inductive definitions as a foundation for this kind of a more general definition theory. Among the examples discussed is a suggestion for a more abstract definition of (...) lambda-terms (derivations in natural deduction) that could provide a basis for a more systematic definitional approach to general prooftheory. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: Prologue: Hilbert's Last Problem; 1. Introduction; Part I. Proof Systems Based on Natural Deduction: 2. Rules of proof: natural deduction; 3. Axiomatic systems; 4. Order and lattice theory; 5. Theories with existence axioms; Part II. Proof Systems Based on Sequent Calculus: 6. Rules of proof: sequent calculus; 7. Linear order; Part III. Proof Systems for Geometric Theories: 8. Geometric theories; 9. Classical and intuitionistic axiomatics; 10. Proof analysis in elementary (...) geometry; Part IV. Proof Systems for Nonclassical Logics: 11. Modal logic; 12. Quantified modal logic, provability logic, and so on; Bibliography; Index of names; Index of subjects. (shrink)
This introduction to mathematical logic starts with propositional calculus and first-order logic. Topics covered include syntax, semantics, soundness, completeness, independence, normal forms, vertical paths through negation normal formulas, compactness, Smullyan's Unifying Principle, natural deduction, cut-elimination, semantic tableaux, Skolemization, Herbrand's Theorem, unification, duality, interpolation, and definability. The last three chapters of the book provide an introduction to type theory (higher-order logic). It is shown how various mathematical concepts can be formalized in this very expressive formal language. This expressive notation facilitates (...) proofs of the classical incompleteness and undecidability theorems which are very elegant and easy to understand. The discussion of semantics makes clear the important distinction between standard and nonstandard models which is so important in understanding puzzling phenomena such as the incompleteness theorems and Skolem's Paradox about countable models of set theory. Some of the numerous exercises require giving formal proofs. A computer program called ETPS which is available from the web facilitates doing and checking such exercises. Audience: This volume will be of interest to mathematicians, computer scientists, and philosophers in universities, as well as to computer scientists in industry who wish to use higher-order logic for hardware and software specification and verification. (shrink)
In this paper we first briefly review Bell's (1964, 1966) Theorem to see how it invalidates any deterministic "hidden variable" account of the apparent indeterminacy of quantum mechanics (QM). Then we show that quantum uncertainty, at the level of DNA mutations, can "percolate" up to have major populational effects. Interesting as this point may be it does not show any autonomous indeterminism of the evolutionary process. In the next two sections we investigate drift and natural selection as the locus of (...) autonomous biological indeterminacy. Here we conclude that the population-level indeterminacy of natural selection and drift are ultimately based on the assumption of a fundamental indeterminacy at the level of the lives and deaths of individual organisms. The following section examines this assumption and defends it from the determinists' attack. Then we show that, even if one rejects the assumption, there is still an important reason why one might think evolutionary theory (ET) is autonomously indeterministic. In the concluding section we contrast the arguments we have mounted against a deterministic hidden variable account of ET with the proof of the impossibility of such an account of QM. (shrink)
Linear logic is a new logic which was recently developed by Girard in order to provide a logical basis for the study of parallelism. It is described and investigated in Gi]. Girard's presentation of his logic is not so standard. In this paper we shall provide more standard proof systems and semantics. We shall also extend part of Girard's results by investigating the consequence relations associated with Linear Logic and by proving corresponding str ong completeness theorems. Finally, we shall (...) investigate the relation between Linear Logic and previously known systems, especially Relevance logics. (shrink)
We study the proof-theoretic relationship between two deductive systems for the modal mu-calculus. First we recall an infinitary system which contains an omega rule allowing to derive the truth of a greatest fixed point from the truth of each of its (infinitely many) approximations. Then we recall a second infinitary calculus which is based on non-well-founded trees. In this system proofs are finitely branching but may contain infinite branches as long as some greatest fixed point is unfolded infinitely often (...) along every branch. The main contribution of our paper is a translation from proofs in the first system to proofs in the second system. Completeness of the second system then follows from completeness of the first, and a new proof of the finite model property also follows as a corollary. (shrink)
How do ordinals measure the strength and computational power of formal theories? This paper is concerned with the connection between ordinal representation systems and theories established in ordinal analyses. It focusses on results which explain the nature of this connection in terms of semantical and computational notions from model theory, set theory, and generalized recursion theory.
Leibniz propôs que demonstrações fossem reformuladas como deduções a partir de identidades, e que proposições do tipo A = A fossem a fonte única de verdade. Neste artigo, procuro explicar essa teoria da prova (e do conhecimento), assim como seus conceitos elementares, ou seja, os conceitos de identidade, verdade (ou possibilidade) e proposição (inclusive a teoria leibniziana da redutibilidade a proposições sujeito-predicado). Leibniz proposed that demonstrations be reformulated as deductions from identities, and that propositions of the type A = A (...) be the only source of truth. In this article, I aim to explain this theory of proof (and knowledge), as well as its elementary concepts, such as identity, truth (or possibility) and proposition (including Leibniz's theory of reducibility of propositions to subject-predicate form). (shrink)