Search results for 'Proper Names' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Heidi Tiedke (2011). Proper Names and Their Fictional Uses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):707 - 726.score: 240.0
    Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown that (...)
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  2. Pierre Baumann (2010). Are Proper Names Rigid Designators? Axiomathes 20 (2-3):333-346.score: 240.0
    A widely accepted thesis in the philosophy of language is that natural language proper names are rigid designators, and that they are so de jure, or as a matter of the “semantic rules of the language.” This paper questions this claim, arguing that rigidity cannot be plausibly construed as a property of name types and that the alternative, rigidity construed as a property of tokens, means that they cannot be considered rigid de jure; rigidity in this case must (...)
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  3. Friederike Moltmann, Proper Names, Sortals, and the Mass-Count Distinction.score: 240.0
    This paper reviews the role of sortals in the syntax and semantics of proper names and the related question of a mass-count distinction among proper names. The paper argues that sortals play a significant role with proper names and that that role matches individuating or ‘sortal’ classifiers in languages lacking a mass-count distinction. Proper names do not themselves classify as count, but may classify as mass or rather number-neutral. This also holds for (...)
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  4. Ora Matushansky (2008). On the Linguistic Complexity of Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):573-627.score: 240.0
    While proper names in argument positions have received a lot of attention, this cannot be said about proper names in the naming construction, as in “Call me Al”. I argue that in a number of more or less familiar languages the syntax of naming constructions is such that proper names there have to be analyzed as predicates, whose content mentions the name itself (cf. “quotation theories”). If proper names can enter syntax as (...)
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  5. Michael McKinsey (2010). Understanding Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):325-354.score: 240.0
    There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian (or Russellian) genuine terms, that is, are singular terms whose sole semantic function is to introduce a referent into the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term. This answers the question as to what sort of proposition is expressed by use of sentences containing names. But there is a second serious semantic problem about proper names, that of how the referents of proper names are (...)
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  6. Peter Pagin & Kathrin Glüer (2006). Proper Names and Relational Modality. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):507 - 535.score: 240.0
    Saul Kripke's thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in (...)
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  7. Emar Maier (2009). Proper Names and Indexicals Trigger Rigid Presuppositions. Journal of Semantics 26 (3):253-315.score: 240.0
    I provide a novel semantic analysis of proper names and indexicals, combining insights from the competing traditions of referentialism, championed by Kripke and Kaplan, and descriptivism, introduced by Frege and Russell, and more recently resurrected by Geurts and Elbourne, among others. From the referentialist tradition, I borrow the proof that names and indexicals are not synonymous to any definite description but pick their referent from the context directly. From the descriptivist tradition, I take the observation that (...), and to some extent indexicals, have uses that are best understood by analogy with anaphora and definite descriptions, that is, following Geurts, in terms of presupposition projection. The hybrid analysis that I propose is couched in Layered Discourse Representation Theory. Proper names and indexicals trigger presuppositions in a dedicated layer, which is semantically interpreted as providing a contextual anchor for the interpretation of the other layers. For the proper resolution of DRSs with layered presuppositions, I add two constraints to van der Sandt's algorithm. The resulting proposal accounts for both the classic philosophical examples and the new linguistic data, preserving a unified account of the preferred rigid interpretation of both names and indexicals, while leaving room for non-referential readings under contextual pressure. (shrink)
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  8. Pablo Rychter (2012). Stage Theory and Proper Names. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):367-379.score: 240.0
    In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and persist by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ‘Socrates’ or ‘London’. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what (...)
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  9. Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Public Proper Names, Idiolectal Identifying Descriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (3):317-326.score: 240.0
    Direct reference theorists tell us that proper names have no semantic value other than their bearers, and that the connection between name and bearer is unmediated by descriptions or descriptive information. And yet, these theorists also acknowledge that we produce our name-containing utterances with descriptions on our minds. After arguing that direct reference proponents have failed to give descriptions their due, I show that appeal to speaker-associated descriptions is required if the direct reference portrayal of speakers wielding and (...)
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  10. Ralph Clark (2011). Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names. Philosophia 39 (2):251-265.score: 240.0
    I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence (...)
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  11. Dolf Rami (2014). The Use-Conditional Indexical Conception of Proper Names. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):119-150.score: 240.0
    In this essay I will defend a novel version of the indexical view on proper names. According to this version, proper names have a relatively sparse truth-conditional meaning that is represented by their rigid content and indexical character, but a relatively rich use-conditional meaning, which I call the (contextual) constraint of a proper name. Firstly, I will provide a brief outline of my favoured indexical view on names in contrast to other indexical views proposed (...)
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  12. Emar Maier (forthcoming). Reference, Binding, and Presupposition: Three Perspectives on the Semantics of Proper Names. Erkenntnis:to appear.score: 240.0
    Linguistics and philosophy have provided distinct views on the nature of reference to individuals in language. In philosophy, in particular in the tradition of direct reference, the distinction is between reference and description. In linguistics, in particular in the tradition of generative grammar, the distinction is between pronouns and R-expressions. I argue for a third conception, grounded in dynamic semantics, in which the main watershed is between definites, which trigger presuppositions that want to be bound, and indefinites, which set up (...)
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  13. Emar Maier (2007). Proper Names as Rigid Presuppositions. In Estella Puig-Waldmüller (ed.), Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung 11. 418-32.score: 240.0
    Since Kripke introduced rigid designation as an alternative to the Frege/Russell analysis of referential terms as definite descriptions, there has been an ongoing debate between 'descriptivists' and 'referentialists', mostly focusing on the semantics of proper names. Nowadays descriptivists can draw on a much richer set of linguistic data (including bound and accommodated proper names in discourse) as well as new semantic machinery (E-type syntax/semantics, DRT, presupposition-as-anaphora) to strengthen their case. After reviewing the current state of the (...)
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  14. Sellars on Proper Names (1978). Keith Lehrer. In Joseph Pitt (ed.), The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions. D. Reidel. 217.score: 240.0
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  15. Linguistic Roles & Proper Names (1978). Jay F. Rosenberg. In Joseph Pitt (ed.), The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions. D. Reidel. 12--189.score: 240.0
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  16. Heidi Savage, The Problem with Meta-Linguistic Analyses of the Meanings of Proper Names.score: 240.0
    Some time ago, Kripke argued that meta-linguistic analyses of proper names were utterly uninformative. I suggest here that his objection relies on conflating the language used to talk about a particular language L -- the meta-language -- with direct speech reports made within a language -- the object language. Making this distinction leads to an understanding of meta-linguistic analyses of proper names that are not simply tautologous, so long as we do not understand the meta-linguistic analysis (...)
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  17. Mark Textor (2010). Proper Names and Practices: On Reference Without Referents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):105-118.score: 224.0
    This is review essay of Mark Sainsbury's Reference without Referents. Its main part is a critical discussion of Sainsbury's proposal for the individuation of proper name using practices.
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  18. Mark Textor (2007). Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended. Mind 116 (464):947-982.score: 208.0
    Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. (...)
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  19. Carlo Semenza (2009). The Neuropsychology of Proper Names. Mind and Language 24 (4):347-369.score: 180.0
    The difference between common and proper names seems to derive from specific semantic characteristics of proper names. In particular, proper names refer to specific individual entities or events, and unlike common names, rarely map onto more general semantic characteristics (attributes, concepts, categories). This fact makes the link proper names have with their reference particularly fragile. Processing proper names seems, as a consequence, to require special cognitive and neural resources. Neuropsychological (...)
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  20. Chen Bo (2011). Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.score: 180.0
    After a brief review of the notions of necessity and a priority, this paper scrutinizes Kripke's arguments for supposedly contingent a priori propositions and necessary a posteriori propositions involving proper names, and reaches a negative conclusion, i.e. there are no such propositions, or at least the propositions Kripke gives as examples are not such propositions. All of us, including Kripke himself, still have to face the old question raised by Hume, i.e. how can we justify the necessity and (...)
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  21. Imogen Dickie (2011). How Proper Names Refer. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.score: 180.0
    This paper develops a new account of reference-fixing for proper names. The account is built around an intuitive claim about reference fixing: the claim that I am a participant in a practice of using α to refer to o only if my uses of α are constrained by the representationally relevant ways it is possible for o to behave. §I raises examples that suggest that a right account of how proper names refer should incorporate this claim. (...)
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  22. Michael Wreen (1998). Proper Names and the Necessity of Identity Statements. Synthese 114 (2):319-335.score: 180.0
    An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if it's true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like(A) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
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  23. Claudio F. Costa (2011). A Meta-Descriptivist Theory of Proper Names. Ratio 24 (3):259-281.score: 180.0
    This paper proposes a new, stronger version of the cluster theory of proper names. It introduces a meta-identifying rule that can establish a cluster's main descriptions and explain how they must be satisfied in order to allow the application of a proper name. At the same time, it preserves some main insights of the causal-historical view. With the resulting rule we can not only give a more detailed reply to the counter-examples to descriptivism, but also explain the (...)
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  24. Eric Thomas Weber (2008). Proper Names and Persons: Peirce's Semiotic Consideration of Proper Names. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2):pp. 346-362.score: 180.0
    Charles S. Peirce’s theory of proper names bears helpful insights for how we might think about his understanding of persons. Persons, on his view, are continuities, not static objects. I argue that Peirce’s notion of the legisign, particularly proper names, sheds light on the habitual and conventional elements of what it means to be a person. In this paper, I begin with an account of what philosophers of language have said about proper names in (...)
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  25. Osamu Kiritani (2008). Proper Names and Local Information. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (3):281-284.score: 180.0
    Evolutionary theory has recently been applied to language. The aim of this paper is to contribute to such an evolutionary approach to language. I argue that Kripke’s causal account of proper names, from an ecological point of view, captures the information carried by uses of a proper name, which is that a certain object is referred to. My argument appeals to Millikan’s concept of local information, which captures information about the environment useful for an organism.
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  26. David S. Schwarz (1978). Causality, Referring, and Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233.score: 180.0
    I argue that (a) the causal theory of proper names and (b) Kripke's chain of references thesis are logically independent of each other, and that the case for (a) is very weak. I observe that rejecting (a) we lose one powerful reason for treating proper names as rigid designators. I then consider reasons for subscribing to (b), and I argue that (b) is compatible with either a rigid or a non-rigid (descriptive) semantic treatment of proper (...)
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  27. M. D'Cruz (2000). A Theory of Ordinary Proper Names. Mind 109 (436):721-756.score: 180.0
    It is widely believed that the semantic function of an ordinary proper name (e.g. 'Aristotle') is inexplicable in terms of the semantic function of an ordinary definite description (e.g. 'the last great ancient philosopher'), given a Russellian analysis of the latter. This paper questions this belief by suggesting a possible semantic explication. In brief, I propose that an ordinary proper name is a mere placeholder for an arbitrary ordinary definite description true of a given individual. The proposal is (...)
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  28. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2010). Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Proper Names. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (3):341-363.score: 180.0
    Charles Peirce's theory of proper names is intimately connected to a number of central topics in contemporary philosophy of language and logic. Several papers have appeared in the past in which Peirce's theory of names has been attested to be a precursor of the causal-historical theory of reference.2 The causal-historical theory in turn has customarily been pigeonholed as the 'new' theories of reference that have been emerging since the 1950s (Devitt 1981; Donellan 1966; Kripke 1980; Marcus 1950; (...)
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  29. B. Abbott (2002). Discussion Note: Definiteness and Proper Names: Some Bad News for the Description Theory. Journal of Semantics 19 (2):191-201.score: 180.0
    This paper addresses some data put forward by Geurts (1997) in support of his metalinguistic or quotation theory of proper names, according to which a name N means ‘the individual named N’. The data illustrate ten linguistic behaviours claimed to be shared by proper names and definite descriptions. I argue that in some cases the behaviours have a common explanation which is based on a property independent of Geurts' analysis, and that in the remaining cases the (...)
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  30. David G. Robertson (2002). A Patristic Theory of Proper Names. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (1):1-19.score: 180.0
    In the fourth-century Greek theologian Basil of Caesarea is found a discussion of the signification of proper names, which appears to pick up some points from earlier ideas about language. He undertakes an analysis of proper names in response to his theological opponents. I will argue that Basil presents a theory which in some respects anticipates modern description theories. Basil has an idea of the role of cognition in a theory of naming. (edited).
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  31. Ari Maunu (2002). Natural Kind Terms Are Similar to Proper Names in Being World-Independent. Philosophical Writings 19:51-68.score: 180.0
    According to the New Theory of Reference, proper names (and indexicals) and natural kind terms are semantically similar to each other but crucially different from definite descriptions and “ordinary” predicates, respectively. New Theorists say that a name, unlike a definite description, is a directly referential nondescriptional rigid designator, which refers “without a mediation of the content” and is not functional (i.e. lacks a Carnapian intension). Natural kind terms, such as ‘horse’ and ‘water’, are held to have similar distinctions, (...)
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  32. Baruch A. Brody (1979). Kripke on Proper Names. In A. French Peter, E. Uehling Theodore, Howard Jr & K. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. University of Minnesota Press. 64-69.score: 180.0
    Kripke has argued that proper names, as rigid designators, cannot be equivalent in meaning to definite descriptions. in this paper, i argue that definite descriptions are sometimes used rigidly and that proper names are equivalent to definite descriptions used rigidly.
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  33. Stephen P. Schwartz (2013). Mill and Kripke on Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):925 - 945.score: 180.0
    Saul Kripke in his revolutionary and influential series of lectures from the early 1970s (later published as the book Naming and Necessity) famously resurrected John Stuart Mill's theory of proper names. Kripke at the same time rejected Mill's theory of general terms. According to Kripke, many natural kind terms do not fit Mill's account of general terms and are closer to proper names. Unfortunately, Kripke and his followers ignored key passages in Mill's A System of Logic (...)
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  34. Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy (2003). What Proper Names, and Their Absence, Do Not Demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):288-289.score: 180.0
    Hurford claims that empty variables antedated proper names in linguistic (not merely logical) predicate-argument structure, and this had an effect on visual perception. But his evidence, drawn from proper names and the supposed inability of nonhumans to recognise individual conspecifics, is weak. So visual perception seems less relevant to the evolution of grammar than Hurford thinks.
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  35. D. Geoffrey Hall (2009). Proper Names in Early Word Learning: Rethinking a Theoretical Account of Lexical Development. Mind and Language 24 (4):404-432.score: 180.0
    There is evidence that children learn both proper names and count nouns from the outset of lexical development. Furthermore, children's first proper names are typically words for people, whereas their first count nouns are commonly terms for other objects, including artifacts. I argue that these facts represent a challenge for two well-known theoretical accounts of object word learning. I defend an alternative account, which credits young children with conceptual resources to acquire words for both individual objects (...)
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  36. Diego Marconi, Competence and Proper Names.score: 180.0
    This paper is concerned with the semantics of proper names from two different points of view. As everyboy knows, there is a standard account of the semantics of proper names - it is Kripke's account, essentially. And there is a certain amount of neuropsychological research on proper names, or on the mental representation, or processing of proper names -not too small an amount, at this point. There is a certain amount of evidence, (...)
     
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  37. Paul Bloom, Preschoolers Are Sensitive to the Speaker's Knowledge When Learning Proper Names.score: 180.0
    Unobservable properties that are specific to individuals, such as their proper names, can only be known by people who are familiar with those individuals. Do young children utilize this “familiarity principle” when learning language? Experiment 1 tested whether forty-eight 2- to 4-year-old children were able to determine the referent of a proper name such as “Jessie” based on the knowledge that the speaker was familiar with one individual but unfamiliar with the other. Even 2-year-olds successfully identified Jessie (...)
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  38. David Boersema (2007). Geach on Proper Names. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:37-42.score: 180.0
    Recently, several philosophers of language have claimed that, at least in some respects, Peter Geach proposed a view about proper names that anticipated important features of the causal theory (or historical chain theory) that was later set forth by Saul Kripke and others. Quentin Smith, for example, in his essay, "Direct, Rigid Designation and A Posteriori Necessity: A History and Critique," says explicitly that "Geach (1969) ... originated the causal or 'historical chain' theory of names" (1999). In (...)
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  39. Michael McKinsey (1971). Searle on Proper Names. Philosophical Review 80 (2):220-229.score: 180.0
    Searle has proposed a "presupposition-Theory" of proper names in which he maintains that names are not short for descriptions and which, He claims, Solves frege's puzzle as to how an identity-Sentence containing co-Referential names can be informative. Two possible interpretations of searle's view are proposed, And it is argued that neither interpretation can be used to solve frege's puzzle and that, On the most plausible interpretation of his view, Searle is committed to the thesis that (...) are short for descriptions after all. (shrink)
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  40. Dolf Rami (2013). On the Unification Argument for the Predicate View on Proper Names. Synthese:1-22.score: 180.0
    The predicate view on proper names opts for a uniform semantic representation of proper nouns like ‘Alfred’ as predicates on the level of logical form. Early defences of this view can be found in Sloat (Language, vol. 45, pp. 26–30, 1969) and Burge (J. Philos. 70: 425–439, 1973), but there is an increasing more recent interest in this view on proper names. My paper aims to provide a reconstruction and critique of Burge’s main argument for (...)
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  41. John Rogers Searle (1982). Proper Names and Intentionality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (3):205-225.score: 180.0
    The purpose of this article is to explain how an account of proper names can be incorporated into a general account of the intentionality of mind and language. I show that such an account supports the so-Called descriptivist conception of proper names and in so doing I answer the objections of causal theorists.
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  42. Robin Attfield (1983). Miller, Kripke, Bach and the Meaning of Proper Names. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):153-158.score: 180.0
    Examples are presented which raise problems for theories of proper names which deny their equivalence either with descriptions (miller, Kripke) or with non-Trivial descriptions (bach). These examples of names equivalent to the same descriptions for all the possible worlds in which their bearers exist require the theories to be abandoned or at least modified as to their scope.
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  43. Michael Corrado (1973). Proper Names and Necessary Properties. Philosophical Studies 24 (2):112 - 118.score: 180.0
    It has been proposed that, Under the restriction of singular terms to proper names, Singular de re propositions would be equivalent to certain de dicto propositions. But that is so only if a certain thesis--A thesis which is itself irreducibly de re--Is true of proper names. The conclusion is that the restriction to proper names is not, By itself, Sufficient to render the de re and de dicto equivalent.
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  44. M. Fletcher Maumus (2012). Proper Names. Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):41-56.score: 180.0
    Principally under the influence of Saul Kripke (1972), philosophical semantics since the closing decades of 20th century has been dominated by thephenomenon Nathan Salmon (1986) aptly dubbed Direct Reference “mania.” Accordingly, it is now practically orthodox to hold that the meanings of proper names are entirely exhausted by their referents and devoid of any descriptive content. The return to a purely referential semantics of names has, nevertheless, coincided with a resurgence of some of the very puzzles that (...)
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  45. Zsófia Zvolenszky (2012). Searle on Analyticity, Necessity, and Proper Names. Organon F 19 (2):109-136.score: 180.0
    My aim is to show that once we appreciate how Searle (1958) fills in the details of his account of proper names – which I will dub the presuppositional view – and how we might supplement it further, we are in for a twofold discovery. First, Searle’s account is crucially unlike the so-called cluster-of-descriptions view, which many philosophers take Searle to have held. Second, the presuppositional view he did hold is interesting, plausible, and worthy of serious reconsideration. The (...)
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  46. Proper Names Revisited (2010). 51 Years On: Searle on Proper Names Revisited. In Jan G. Michel, Dirk Franken & Attila Karakus (eds.), John R. Searle: Thinking About the Real World. Ontos. 117.score: 180.0
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  47. John David Stone (1982). Proper Names as Connoting Expressions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):233-239.score: 180.0
    Close attention to the meanings of certain sentences--Counterfactual-Identity sentences--Reveals that no theory in which proper names are simple designators can be a complete and correct semantics of english. An account of connotation is outlined according to which connotation varies with the linguistic environment and with the context of utterance: this accounts for the fact that no proper name is synonymous with a cluster of descriptions.
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  48. John Tienson (1986). An Observation on Common Names and Proper Names. Analysis 46 (2):73 - 76.score: 180.0
    Common names, for Mill, have both connotation and denotation. Thus ‘horse’ connotes certain properties, and the name ‘horse’ denotes the things that have those properties. By contrast, proper names have no connotations; they do not denote in virtue of the possession of certain properties by their denotations, but so to speak, directly. Thus Socrates received his name by being dubbed ‘Socrates’; and he might just as well have been given any other name. This contrast is misleading. After (...)
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  49. Charles E. Jarrett (forthcoming). On Proper Names. Philosophy Research Archives.score: 180.0
    The main goal of this paper is to show that in "speech acts", john searle fails to establish his thesis that proper names have sense, or descriptive content. it is argued, by considering counterexamples, that searle's test for the analyticity of statements is inadequate, that the argument from the "principle of identification" is therefore mistaken, and that, because of lack of attention to the distinction between meaning and sense (descriptive content), the argument from identity statements fails to establish (...)
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  50. Giuseppe Longobardi (2001). How Comparative is Semantics? A Unified ParametricTheory of Bare Nouns and Proper Names. Natural Language Semantics 9 (4):335-369.score: 180.0
    One of the two central suggestions put forth in Longobardi (1991, 1994) was that Romance/English differences in the syntax of proper names were parametrically connected to supposed differences in the semantics of bare (plural and mass) common nouns (BNs). The present article will pursue this line of investigation, trying to make precise such meaning differences and to understand the reason for their apparently surprising parametric association with the syntax of proper names.It will be shown that in (...)
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