Search results for 'Properties' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Sharon R. Ford (2010). What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure. Dissertation, University of Queenslandscore: 24.0
    This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Todd Buras (2006). Counterpart Theory, Natural Properties, and Essentialism. Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):27-42.score: 24.0
    David Lewis advised essentialists to judge his counterpart theory a false friend. He also argued that counterpart theory needs natural properties. This essay argues that natural properties are all essentialists need to find a true friend in counterpart theory. Section one explains why Lewis takes counterpart theory to be anti-essentialist and why he thinks it needs natural properties. Section two establishes the connection between the natural properties counterpart theory needs and the essentialist consequences Lewis disavows. Section (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert Schroer (2012). Two Challenges That Categorical Properties Pose to Physicalism. Ratio 25 (2):195-206.score: 24.0
    What are physical objects like when they are considered independently of their causal interactions? Many think that the answer to this question involves categorical propertiesproperties that make contributions to their bearers that are independent of any causal interactions those objects may enter into. In this paper, I examine two challenges that this solution poses to Physicalism. The first challenge is that, given that they are distinct from any of the scientifically described causal powers that they happen to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Benjamin Smart, Categorical Properties in Background Independent Substantivalist General Relativity.score: 24.0
    Assuming the increasingly popular background independent substantivalist interpretation of general relativity (GR), in this paper I show that the possibility of spacetime point permutations implies that the locational properties of spacetime points, and structural properties of spacetime are categorical. Categorical properties, however, are often deemed implausible by dispositional monists (Bird 2007; Mumford 2004) due to their quiddistic nature, as their primitive identity entails the unacceptable possibility of properties changing their causal role across possible worlds. The question (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Bart Streumer (2008). Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.score: 24.0
    Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. In this paper, I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. By Douglas Ehring. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):379-382.score: 24.0
    Book review of 'Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation' (2011, OUP). By DOUGLAS EHRING.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Bart Streumer (2013). Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties. In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. OUP. 310-336.score: 24.0
    Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Phil Corkum (2014). Presentism, Truthmakers and Distributional Properties. Synthese 191:3427-46.score: 24.0
    Presentists face a challenge from truthmaker theory: if you hold both that the only existing objects are presently existing and that truth supervenes on being, then you will be hard pressed to identify some existent on which a given true but traceless claim about the past supervenes. One reconciliation strategy, advocated by Cameron (2011), is to appeal to distributional properties so to serve as presently existing truthmakers for past truths. I argue that a presentist ought to deny that distributional (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ronald P. Endicott (2007). Nomic-Role Nonreductionism: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles. Philosophical Topics 35 (1&2):217-240.score: 24.0
    Inspired by recent theories of embodied cognition that emphasize matters of a mind's engineering realization, I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to traditional causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Rather than identify mental properties by a theory that describes their intra-level causal roles via types of inputs, internal states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that also describes inter-level realization roles via types of lower-level engineering, internal mental states, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Aaron Smuts (2011). Grounding Moralism: Moral Flaws and Aesthetic Properties. Journal of Aesthetic Education 45 (4):34-53.score: 24.0
    My goal in this article is to provide support for the claim that moral flaws can be detrimental to an artwork's aesthetic value. I argue that moral flaws can become aesthetic flaws when they defeat the operation of good-making aesthetic properties. I do not defend a new theory of aesthetic properties or aesthetic value; instead, I attempt to show that on both the response-dependence and the supervenience account of aesthetic properties, moral flaws with an artwork are relevant (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Helen Steward (2011). Agency, Properties and Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):390-401.score: 24.0
    The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Agustín Vicente (2011). Functions and Emergence: When Functional Properties Have Something to Say. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):293-312.score: 24.0
    In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science, 2007 ) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such properties can do, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Michael Esfeld (2005). Mental Causation and Mental Properties. Dialectica 59 (1):5-18.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal homogeneity of functional, mental properties against Kim’s attack. It is argued that (a) token identity is sufficient for mental causation, that (b) token identity implies a sort of functional reduction, but that (c) nonetheless functional, mental properties can be causally homogeneous despite being multiply realizable: multiple composition is sufficient for multiple realizability, but multiple composition does not prevent the realizers from having their pertinent effects in common. Thus, the (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Wim de Muijnck (2002). Causation by Relational Properties. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):123-137.score: 24.0
    In discussions on mental causation and externalism, it is often assumed that extrinsic, or relational, properties cannot have causal efficacy. In this paper I argue that this assumption is based on a category mistake, in that causal efficacy (dependence among events or states of affairs) is confused with causal influence (persistence of and interaction among objects). I then argue that relational properties are indeed causally efficacious, which I explain with the help of Dretske's notion of a 'structuring cause'.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Alexander Paseau (2012). Resemblance Theories of Properties. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):361-382.score: 24.0
    The paper aims to develop a resemblance theory of properties that technically improves on past versions. The theory is based on a comparative resemblance predicate. In combination with other resources, it solves the various technical problems besetting resemblance nominalism. The paper’s second main aim is to indicate that previously proposed resemblance theories that solve the technical problems, including the comparative theory, are nominalistically unacceptable and have controversial philosophical commitments.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Bart Streumer (2011). Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.score: 24.0
    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson's argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Frank Jackson (1998). Causal Roles and Higher-Order Properties. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):657-661.score: 24.0
    I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that fill some specified wide or distal roles.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties. Ontos-Verlag.score: 24.0
    This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties – of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment. Various accounts of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction are analysed in detail, and it is argued that the most promising approach to defining this distinction is to consider extrinsic properties as a particular type of relational property. Moreover, it is shown that two (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Benjamin Schnieder (2010). Inexpressible Properties and Grelling's Antinomy. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):369 - 385.score: 24.0
    The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p ’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Michael David Kirchhoff (2012). Extended Cognition and Fixed Properties: Steps to a Third-Wave Version of Extended Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):287-308.score: 24.0
    This paper explores several paths a distinctive third wave of extended cognition might take. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings of first- and second-wave extended cognition associated with a tendency to conceive of the properties of internal and external processes as fixed and non-interchangeable. First, in the domain of cognitive transformation, I argue that a problematic tendency of the complementarity model is that it presupposes that socio-cultural resources augment but do not significantly transform the brain’s representational (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Harold Noonan & Mark Jago (2012). The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties. Thought 1 (2):134-140.score: 24.0
    According to genuine modal realism, some things (including numbers and properties) lack distinct counterparts in different worlds. So how can they possess any of their properties contingently? Egan (2004) argues that to explain such accidental property possession, the genuine modal realist must depart from Lewis and identify properties with functions, rather than with sets of possibilia. We disagree. The genuine modal realist already has the resources to handle Egan's proposed counterexamples. As we show, she does not need (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Ben Blumson, Pictures and Properties.score: 24.0
    It’s a platitude that a picture is realistic to the degree to which it resembles what it represents (in relevant respects). But if properties are abundant and degrees of resemblance are proportions of properties in common, then the degree of resemblance between different particulars is constant (or undefined), which is inconsonant with the platitude. This paper argues this problem should be resolved by revising the analysis of degrees of resemblance in terms of proportion of properties in common, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Andrea Borghini & Giorgio Lando (2011). Natural Properties, Supervenience, and Composition. Humana.Mente 19:79-104.score: 24.0
    The interpretation of Lewis?s doctrine of natural properties is difficult and controversial, especially when it comes to the bearers of natural properties. According to the prevailing reading ? the minimalist view ? perfectly natural properties pertain to the micro-physical realm and are instantiated by entities without proper parts or point-like. This paper argues that there are reasons internal to a broadly Lewisian kind of metaphysics to think that the minimalist view is fundamentally flawed and that a liberal (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Robert Francescotti (1999). Mere Cambridge Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):295-308.score: 24.0
    The predicates 'is outgrown by Theaetetus,' 'is 300 miles west of a lemur,' and 'is such that 9 is odd' denote properties, but there is a sense in which these properties are not genuine features of the objects that have them. The fact that we find these mere-Cambridge properties odd has something to do with their relational character. But relationality in itself is not an adequate criterion for property-genuineness for there are many relational properties that do (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Daniel von Wachter, Armstrongian Particulars with Necessary Properties.score: 24.0
    David Armstrong has argued that the properties of a thing are parts of it and predications are necessary. This article criticises this view and presents and alternative.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jason Costanzo (forthcoming). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.score: 24.0
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Jeffrey K. McDonough, Comments on Andy Egan’s "Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties&Quot;.score: 24.0
    Comments on Andy Egan’s "Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties," presented at California State University Long Beach, CA 2003.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Kent Johnson & Wayne Wright (2006). Colors as Properties of the Special Sciences. Erkenntnis 64 (2):139 - 168.score: 24.0
    We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can by met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major disputes (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Ghislain Guigon (2014). Overall Similarity, Natural Properties, and Paraphrases. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):387-399.score: 24.0
    I call anti-resemblism the thesis that independently of any contextual specification there is no determinate fact of the matter about the comparative overall similarity of things. Anti-resemblism plays crucial roles in the philosophy of David Lewis. For instance, Lewis has argued that his counterpart theory is anti-essentialist on the grounds that counterpart relations are relations of comparative overall similarity and that anti-resemblism is true. After Lewis committed himself to a form of realism about natural properties he maintained that anti-resemblism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Sam Cowling (forthcoming). Non-Qualitative Properties. Erkenntnis.score: 24.0
    The distinction between qualitative properties like mass and shape and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and being next to Obama is important, but remains largely unexamined. After discussing its theoretical significance and cataloguing various kinds of non-qualitative properties, I survey several views about the nature of this distinction and argue that all proposed reductive analyses of this distinction are unsatisfactory. I then defend primitivism, according to which the distinction resists reductive analysis.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jani Hakkarainen (2011). Hume's Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties. Metaphysica 12 (2):197-212.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature , Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory of sense (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. William A. Bauer (2013). Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties. Disputatio 5 (35).score: 24.0
    Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Sharon R. Ford (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 13 (2):195-215.score: 24.0
    Sydney Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar’s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of objects (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Andrew D. Irvine (2010). Frege on Number Properties. Studia Logica 96 (2):239-260.score: 24.0
    In the Grundlagen , Frege offers eight main arguments, together with a series of more minor supporting arguments, against Mill’s view that numbers are “properties of external things”. This paper reviews all eight of these arguments, arguing that none are conclusive.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Ariel Meirav (2009). Properties That Four-Dimensional Objects Cannot Have. Metaphysica 10 (2):135-148.score: 24.0
    The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of additively cumulative properties, including mass, volume, and electrical charge. These properties add up over disjoint objects: for example, the mass of a whole composed of two disjoint objects is a sum of the individual masses of the objects. The difficulty with such properties for four-dimensionalism stems from the way this theory makes persistence depend on the existence of disjoint objects at disjoint times. I consider various possible (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jan Treur (2005). States of Change: Explaining Dynamics by Anticipatory State Properties. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):441-471.score: 24.0
    In cognitive science, the dynamical systems theory (DST) has recently been advocated as an approach to cognitive modeling that is better suited to the dynamics of cognitive processes than the symbolic/computational approaches are. Often, the differences between DST and the symbolic/computational approach are emphasized. However, alternatively their commonalities can be analyzed and a unifying framework can be sought. In this paper, the possibility of such a unifying perspective on dynamics is analyzed. The analysis covers dynamics in cognitive disciplines, as well (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Andrea Borghini (2012). The Adverbial Theory of Properties. Metaphysica 13 (2):107-123.score: 24.0
    The paper presents a novel version of universalism—the thesis according to which there are only universals, no individuals—which is cashed out in terms of an adverbial analysis of predication. According to the theory, every spatiotemporal occurrence of a universal U can be expressed by a sentence which asserts the existence of U adverbially modified by the spatiotemporal region at which it exists. After some preliminary remarks on the interpretation of natural language, a formal semantics for the theory is first provided, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Natural Properties and Bottomless Determination. Americal Philosophical Quarterly.score: 24.0
    It is widely held that some properties are more natural than others and that, as David Lewis put it, “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). The general line of thought is that such ‘elitism’ about properties is justified as it can give simple and elegant solutions to a number of old metaphysical and philosophical problems. My aim is to analyze what these (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Andrew Botterell (1998). Mellor on Negative Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):523-526.score: 24.0
    DH Mellor has argued that there can be no negative, disjunctive, or conjunctive properties. This argument has been criticized by Alex Oliver on the grounds that it rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts, but it seems to me that a simpler criticism is available. According to this criticism, the problem with Mellor's argument is that it trades on an ambiguity in the semantics of the phrase "the fact that", according to which "the fact that" can be understood (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Douglas Edwards (2014). Properties. Polity Press.score: 24.0
    The world is populated with many different objects, to which we often attribute properties: we say, for example, that grass is green, that the earth is spherical, that humans are animals, and that murder is wrong. We also take it that these properties are things in their own right: there is something in which being green, or spherical, or an animal, or wrong, consists, and that certain scientific or normative projects are engaged in uncovering the essences of such (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Crispin Sartwell (2011). The Shape of the World: What If Aesthetic Properties Were Real? Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 22 (40-41).score: 24.0
    Perhaps we should entertain the idea that aesthetic properties are no less (but no more) objective than properties like weight or shape. Indeed, the weight and shape of something are themselves aesthetic properties of that thing. And we might speculate or (what the heck) assert that aesthetic properties are no more (but no less) socially constructed than size or material composition, for example. Indeed the size and material composition of something are aesthetic properties of it. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Andreas Bartels (2013). Why Metrical Properties Are Not Powers. Synthese 190 (12):2001-2013.score: 24.0
    What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Hemdat Lerman (2012). Demonstrative Content and the Experience of Properties. Dialectica 66 (4):489-515.score: 24.0
    John McDowell (in Mind and World) and Bill Brewer (in Perception and Reason) argue that the content of our perceptual experience is conceptual in the following sense. It is of the type of content that could be the content of a judgement – that is, a content which results from the actualization of two (or more) conceptual abilities. Specifically, they suggest that the conceptual abilities actualized in experience are demonstrative abilities, and thus the resulting content is of the type we (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Sharon Ford (2012). Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar’s Critique of Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 13 (2):195-215.score: 24.0
    Sydney Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar’s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of objects (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Newton Costa, Olimpia Lombardi & Mariano Lastiri (2013). A Modal Ontology of Properties for Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 190 (17):3671-3693.score: 24.0
    Our purpose in this paper is to delineate an ontology for quantum mechanics that results adequate to the formalism of the theory. We will restrict our aim to the search of an ontology that expresses the conceptual content of the recently proposed modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, according to which the domain referred to by non-relativistic quantum mechanics is an ontology of properties. The usual strategy in the literature has been to focus on only one of the interpretive problems of the theory (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Matthew Tugby (2013). Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties. Synthese 191 (6):1-16.score: 24.0
    Notoriously, the dispositional view of natural properties is thought to face a number of regress problems, one of which points to an epistemological worry. In this paper, I argue that the rival categorical view is also susceptible to the same kind of regress problem. This problem can be overcome, most plausibly, with the development of a structuralist epistemology. After identifying problems faced by alternative solutions, I sketch the main features of this structuralist epistemological approach, referring to graph-theoretic modelling in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jonas Christensen (forthcoming). Determinable Properties and Overdetermination of Causal Powers. Philosophia:1-17.score: 24.0
    Do determinable properties such as colour, mass, and height exist in addition to their corresponding determinates, being red, having a mass of 1 kilogram, and having a height of 2 metres? Optimists say yes, pessimists say no. Among the latter are Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives who argue that optimism leads to systematic overdetermination of causal powers and hence should be rejected on the grounds that the position is ontologically unparsimonious. In this paper I defend optimism against this charge (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Sharon R. Ford (2007). An Analysis of Properties in John Heil’s "From an Ontological Point of View&Quot;. In G. Romano & Malatesti (eds.), From an Ontological Point of View, SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review, Symposium. SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.score: 24.0
    In this paper I argue that the requirement for the qualitative is theory-dependent, determined by the fundamental assumptions built into the ontology. John Heil’s qualitative, in its role as individuator of objects and powers, is required only by a theory that posits a world of distinct objects or powers. Does Heil’s ‘deep’ view of the world, such that there is only one powerful object (e.g. a field containing modes or properties which we perceive as manifest everyday objects) require the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Roberto Laura & Leonardo Vanni (2009). Time Translation of Quantum Properties. Foundations of Physics 39 (2):160-173.score: 24.0
    Based on the notion of time translation, we develop a formalism to deal with the logic of quantum properties at different times. In our formalism it is possible to enlarge the usual notion of context to include composed properties involving properties at different times. We compare our results with the theory of consistent histories.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Manuel Liz (2001). New Physical Properties. In Tian Yu Cao (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 10: Philosophy of Science. Philosophy Doc Ctr. 29-41.score: 24.0
    Discussions on physicalism, reduction, special sciences, the layered image of reality, multiple realizability, emergence, downward causation, and so forth, typically make the ontological presupposition that there is no room for new properties in the physical world. It is my purpose in this paper to explore the alternative hypothesis that there can be—and in fact are—new physical properties. In the first section, I will propose a brief analysis of the notions of property, physical property, and new physical property. In (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000