Search results for 'Proposition (Logic History' (try it on Scholar)

71 found
Order:
  1. Anthony Palmer (1988). Concept and Object: The Unity of the Proposition in Logic and Psychology. Routledge.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  2.  68
    Graham Stevens (2005). The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy: Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Proposition. Routledge.
    This monograph offers a reappraisal of the role of Bertrand Russell's philosophical works in establishing the analytical tradition in philosophy. It's main aims are to improve our understanding of the history of analytical philosophy, to engage in the important disputes surrounding the interpretation of Russell's philosophy, and to make a contribution to central issues in current analytical philosophy. Hence, this book will find a place on the bookshelf of many philosophers across the world.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  3. Gabriël Nuchelmans (1980). Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition. North Holland Pub. Co..
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  4. Gabriël Nuchelmans (1973). Theories of the Proposition. Amsterdam,North-Holland Pub. Co..
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  5. Nandita Bandyopadhyay (1988). Being, Meaning, and Proposition: A Comparative Study of Bhartṛhari, Russell, Frege, and Strawson. Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
  6. der Schaar & Maria Sandra (1991). G.F. Stout's Theory of Judgment and Proposition: Proefschrift Ter Verkrijging Van De Graad Van Doktor. M.S. Van Der Schaar.
  7.  32
    John Corcoran (2010). Counterarguments and Counterexamples. In Luis Vega (ed.), Luis Vega, Ed. Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación, y Retórica. Madrid: Trotta. 137-142.
    English translation of an entry on pages 137–42 of the Spanish-language dictionary of logic: Luis Vega, Ed. Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación, y Retórica. Madrid: Trotta. -/- DEDICATION: To my friend and collaborator Kevin Tracy. -/- This short essay—containing careful definitions of ‘counterargument’ and ‘counterexample’—is not an easy read but it is one you’ll be glad you struggled through. It contains some carefully chosen examples suitable for classroom discussion. -/- Using the word ‘counterexample’ instead of ‘counterargument’ in connection with Aristotle’s invalidity (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  35
    Gregory Landini (1998). Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory. Oxford University Press.
    This book explores an important central thread that unifies Russell's thoughts on logic in two works previously considered at odds with each other, the Principles of Mathematics and the later Principia Mathematica. This thread is Russell's doctrine that logic is an absolutely general science and that any calculus for it must embrace wholly unrestricted variables. The heart of Landini's book is a careful analysis of Russell's largely unpublished "substitutional" theory. On Landini's showing, the substitutional theory reveals the unity of Russell's (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  9. Edward A. Synan (1979). Thomas Aquinas: Propositions and Parables. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
  10.  43
    John Corcoran (1998). INFORMATION-THEORETIC LOGIC. In C. Martínez U. Rivas & L. Villegas-Forero (eds.), Truth in Perspective edited by C. Martínez, U. Rivas, L. Villegas-Forero, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, England (1998) 113-135. ASHGATE 113-135.
    Information-theoretic approaches to formal logic analyse the "common intuitive" concept of propositional implication (or argumental validity) in terms of information content of propositions and sets of propositions: one given proposition implies a second if the former contains all of the information contained by the latter; an argument is valid if the conclusion contains no information beyond that of the premise-set. This paper locates information-theoretic approaches historically, philosophically and pragmatically. Advantages and disadvantages are identified by examining such approaches in themselves (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11.  90
    John Corcoran (2014). ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC AND EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):131-2.
    John Corcoran and George Boger. Aristotelian logic and Euclidean geometry. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 20 (2014) 131. -/- By an Aristotelian logic we mean any system of direct and indirect deductions, chains of reasoning linking conclusions to premises—complete syllogisms, to use Aristotle’s phrase—1) intended to show that their conclusions follow logically from their respective premises and 2) resembling those in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Such systems presuppose existence of cases where it is not obvious that the conclusion follows from the premises: (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. John Corcoran, LOGIC TEACHING IN THE 21ST CENTURY.
    We are much better equipped to let the facts reveal themselves to us instead of blinding ourselves to them or stubbornly trying to force them into preconceived molds. We no longer embarrass ourselves in front of our students, for example, by insisting that “Some Xs are Y” means the same as “Some X is Y”, and lamely adding “for purposes of logic” whenever there is pushback. Logic teaching in this century can exploit the new spirit of objectivity, humility, clarity, observationalism, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  67
    John Corcoran (1988). REVIEW OF 1988. Saccheri, G. Euclides Vindicatus (1733), Edited and Translated by G. B. Halsted, 2nd Ed. (1986), in Mathematical Reviews MR0862448. 88j:01013. MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 88 (J):88j:01013.
    Girolamo Saccheri (1667--1733) was an Italian Jesuit priest, scholastic philosopher, and mathematician. He earned a permanent place in the history of mathematics by discovering and rigorously deducing an elaborate chain of consequences of an axiom-set for what is now known as hyperbolic (or Lobachevskian) plane geometry. Reviewer's remarks: (1) On two pages of this book Saccheri refers to his previous and equally original book Logica demonstrativa (Turin, 1697) to which 14 of the 16 pages of the editor's "Introduction" are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  7
    Aneta Markoska-Cubrinovska (forthcoming). Possible Worlds in “The Craft of Formal Logic”. Synthese:1-13.
    “The Craft of Formal Logic” is Arthur Prior’s unpublished textbook, written in 1950–51, in which he developed a theory of modality as quantification over possible worlds-like objects. This theory predates most of the prominent pioneering texts in possible worlds semantics and anticipates the significance of its basic concept in modal logic. Prior explicitly defines modal operators as quantifiers of ‘entities’ with modal character. Although he talks about these ‘entities’ only informally, and hesitates how to name them, using alternately the phrases (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  75
    Kevin J. Harrelson (2015). Logic and Ontology in Hegel's Theory of Predication. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1259-1280.
    In this paper I sketch some arguments that underlie Hegel's chapter on judgment, and I attempt to place them within a broad tradition in the history of logic. Focusing on his analysis of simple predicative assertions or ‘positive judgments’, I first argue that Hegel supplies an instructive alternative to the classical technique of existential quantification. The main advantage of his theory lies in his treatment of the ontological implications of judgments, implications that are inadequately captured by quantification. The second (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  30
    Susanne Bobzien (1986). Die stoische Modallogik (Stoic Modal Logic). Königshausen & Neumann.
    ABSTRACT: Part 1 discusses the Stoic notion of propositions (assertibles, axiomata): their definition; their truth-criteria; the relation between sentence and proposition; propositions that perish; propositions that change their truth-value; the temporal dependency of propositions; the temporal dependency of the Stoic notion of truth; pseudo-dates in propositions. Part 2 discusses Stoic modal logic: the Stoic definitions of their modal notions (possibility, impossibility, necessity, non-necessity); the logical relations between the modalities; modalities as properties of propositions; contingent propositions; the relation between the (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17.  10
    Christian Thiel (1994). Friedrich Albert Langes bewundernswerte Logische Studien. History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):105-126.
    Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-1875) author of a famous History of Materialism and Critique of Its Present Significance (1866, English transI. 1877-79, repr. 1925 with introduction by Bertrand Russell), was also interested in the epistemological foundations of formal logic. Part I of his intended two-volume Logische Studien was published posthumously in 1877 by Hermann Cohen, head of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. Lange, departing from Kant, claims that spatial intuition is the source of the apodeictic character not only of the (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  34
    R. A. Bull (1970). An Approach to Tense Logic. Theoria 36 (3):282-300.
    The author's motivation for constructing the calculi of this paper\nis so that time and tense can be "discussed together in the same\nlanguage" (p. 282). Two types of enriched propositional caluli for\ntense logic are considered, both containing ordinary propositional\nvariables for which any proposition may be substituted. One type\nalso contains "clock-propositional" variables, a,b,c, etc., for\nwhich only clock-propositional variables may be substituted and that\ncorrespond to instants or moments in the semantics. The other type\nalso contains "history-propositional" variables, u,v,w, etc., for\nwhich only (...)-propositional variables may be substituted and\nthat correspond to maximally linearly ordered subsets of instants.\nThis second type is for tense logics in which time is not linear\nand where at any moment there may exist alternative future courses\nof events. Quantifiers are included in both types but only for clock-\nand history-propositional variables. However, these quantifiers are\ngiven an essentially substitutional interpretation. In addition,\nbesides each clock-propositional variable being true at exactly one\ninstant, the semantics requires that for each instant there be at\nleast one clock-propositional variable true at that instant, which\nin effect amounts to having each instant of the model "denoted" in\nthe formalism by some clock-propositional variable. Thus it is not\nsurprising that quantification over clock-propositional variables\nturns out to have a "well behaved first-order semantics" (p. 284).\n{One axiom relating history- with clock-propositions seems to need\nrevision: CKTauTbuAUabUba. Since the clock-propositional variables\nmight be true at the same instant the consequent should include an\nalternative, namely, LCab.} Besides the standard truth-functional\nand tense operators G,H,F,P, the author includes L for "it is\nalways the case that". The model-theoretic earlier-than relation\nordering instants and the semantic truth-at (an instant) relation\nare formalized by Uab and Taα (for a wff α) which\nare defined respectively as LCbPa (whenever the clock-proposition\nb is the case the clock-proposition a was the case) and LCaα\n(α is the case whenever the clock-proposition a is the case).\nBecause the future tense operators are definable in terms of U\nand T and the latter are definable in terms of L and P, the\ndual of H, the author notes that his completeness proofs can be\nrestricted to L and H as primitive and with the future tense\noperators used for other interpretations, especially Prior, A.'s\nindeterminist "it will be the case that", where time is not linear.\nThe author concludes with some rather technical observations showing\nthat "in ordinary tense logics the instants are nonstandard elements\nof the models. This provides", according to the author, "a semantic\npressure to build the instants into tense logic, so that they will\nappear as standard elements in the models" (p. 283). (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  19. Nathan U. Salmon & Scott Soames (eds.) (1988). Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford University Press.
    The concept of a proposition is important in several areas of philosophy and central to the philosophy of language. This collection of readings investigates many different philosophical issues concerning the nature of propositions and the ways they have been regarded through the years. Reflecting both the history of the topic and the range of contemporary views, the book includes articles from Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, the Russell-Frege Correspondence, Alonzo Church, David Kaplan, John Perry, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Mark (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  20.  38
    David Hyder (2002). The Mechanics of Meaning: Propositional Content and the Logical Space of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Walter De Gruyter.
    In establishing unexpected cross-connections between physics, the theory of perception, and logic, Hyder also makes a valuable contribution to the history of ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  21. E. J. Ashworth (1985). Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics. Variorum Reprints.
    "For riding is required a horse"--"I promise you a horse"--Chimeras and imaginary objects--Theories of the proposition--The structure of mental language--Mental language and the unity of propositions--"Do words signify ideas or things?"--Locke on language--The doctrine of exponibilia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries--Multiple quantification and the use of special quantifiers in early sixteenth century logic--Thomas Bricot(d. 1516) and the Liar paradox--Will Socrates cross the bridge?
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  7
    R. Gregory Taylor (2009). Zermelo's Analysis of 'General Proposition'. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):141-155.
    On Zermelo's view, any mathematical theory presupposes a non-empty domain, the elements of which enjoy equal status; furthermore, mathematical axioms must be chosen from among those propositions that reflect the equal status of domain elements. As for which propositions manage to do this, Zermelo's answer is, those that are ?symmetric?, meaning ?invariant under domain permutations?. We argue that symmetry constitutes Zermelo's conceptual analysis of ?general proposition?. Further, although others are commonly associated with the extension of Klein's Erlanger Programme to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  32
    Tony Street (2000). Avicenna and Tusi on the Contradiction and Conversion of the Absolute. History and Philosophy of Logic 21 (1):45-56.
    Avicenna (d. 1037) and T?s? (d. 1274) have different doctrines on the contradiction and conversion of the absolute proposition. Following Avicenna's presentation of the doctrine in Pointers and reminders, and comparing it with what is given in T?s?'s commentary, allow us to pinpoint a major reason why Avicenna and T?s? have different treatments of the modal syllogistic. Further comparison shows that the syllogistic system Rescher described in his research on Arabic logic more nearly fits T?s? than Avicenna. This in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  36
    Maria van Der Schaar (2008). Locke and Arnauld on Judgment and Proposition. History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (4):327-341.
    To understand pre-Fregean theories of judgment and proposition, such as those found in Locke and the Port-Royal logic, it is important to distinguish between propositions in the modern sense and propositions in the pre-Fregean sense. By making this distinction it becomes clear that these pre-Fregean theories cannot be meant to solve the propositional attitude problem. Notwithstanding this fact, Locke and Arnauld are able to make a distinction between asserted and unasserted propositions (in their sense). The way Locke makes this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  11
    Theodore Hailperin (1984). Boole's Abandoned Propositional Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (1):39-48.
    The approach used by Boole in Mathematical analysis of logic to develop propositional logic was based on the idea of ?cases? or ?conjunctures of circumstances?. But this was dropped in Laws of thought in favor of one which Boole considered to be more satisfactory, that of using the notion of ?time for which a proposition is true?. We show that, when suitable clarifications and corrections are made, the earlier approach? which accords with modern logic in eschewing the extraneous notion (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  8
    Peter Loptson (1980). Logic and Contingent Existence. History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):171-185.
    It is argued here that Prior's non-standard modal system Q, and the Parry-Dunn system of analytic implication, though entirely independent and independently motivated systems, together provide a rationale for explicating the concept of validity in a non-standard way; their implications are explored for the theory of natural deduction as well as for modal logic and the concept of entailment. I give an account of formal logic from this non-standard viewpoint, together with an informal presentation of the system that unites the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  52
    John Corcoran, Meanings of Non Sequitur.
    Contrary to dictionaries, a non sequitur isn’t “any statement that doesn’t follow logically from previous statements”. Otherwise, every opening statement would be a non sequitur: a non sequitur is a statement claimed to follow from previous statements but that doesn’t follow. If the sentence making a given statement doesn’t contain ‘thus’, ‘so’, ‘hence’, ‘therefore’, or something else indicating an implication claim, the statement isn’t a non sequitur in this sense. But this is only one of several senses of that expression, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. John Corcoran (2005). Wholistic Reference, Truth-Values, Universes of Discourse, and Formal Ontology: Tréplica to Oswaldo Chateaubriand. Manuscrito 28 (1):143-167.
    ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  43
    John Corcoran & Anthony Ramnauth (2013). Equality and Identity. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19:255-256.
    Equality and identity. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 (2013) 255-6. (Coauthor: Anthony Ramnauth) Also see https://www.academia.edu/s/a6bf02aaab This article uses ‘equals’ [‘is equal to’] and ‘is’ [‘is identical to’, ‘is one and the same as’] as they are used in ordinary exact English. In a logically perfect language the oxymoron ‘the numbers 3 and 2+1 are the same number’ could not be said. Likewise, ‘the number 3 and the number 2+1 are one number’ is just as bad from a logical point (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. John Corcoran & Susan Wood (1980). Boole's Criteria for Validity and Invalidity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (4):609-638.
    It is one thing for a given proposition to follow or to not follow from a given set of propositions and it is quite another thing for it to be shown either that the given proposition follows or that it does not follow.* Using a formal deduction to show that a conclusion follows and using a countermodel to show that a conclusion does not follow are both traditional practices recognized by Aristotle and used down through the history (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  31.  17
    J. Corcoran (2005). Counterexamples and Proexamples. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11:460.
    Corcoran, J. 2005. Counterexamples and proexamples. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11(2005) 460. -/- John Corcoran, Counterexamples and Proexamples. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu Every perfect number that is not even is a counterexample for the universal proposition that every perfect number is even. Conversely, every counterexample for the proposition “every perfect number is even” is a perfect number that is not even. Every perfect number that is odd is a proexample for the existential (...) that some perfect number is odd. Conversely, every proexample for the proposition “some perfect number is odd” is a perfect number that is odd. As trivial these remarks may seem, they can not be taken for granted, even in mathematical and logical texts designed to introduce their respective subjects. One well-reviewed book on counterexamples in analysis says that in order to demonstrate that a universal proposition is false it is necessary and sufficient to construct a counterexample. It is easy to see that it is not necessary to construct a counterexample to demonstrate that the proposition “every true proposition is known to be true” is false–necessity fails. Moreover the mere construction of an object that happens to be a counterexample does not by itself demonstrate that it is a counterexample–sufficiency fails. In order to demonstrate that a universal proposition is false it is neither necessary nor sufficient to construct a counterexample. Likewise, of course, in order to demonstrate that an existential proposition is true it is neither necessary nor sufficient to construct a proexample. This article defines the above relational concepts of counterexample and of proexample, it discusses their surprising history and philosophy, it gives many examples of uses of these and related concepts in the literature and it discusses some of the many errors that have been made as a result of overlooking the challenging subtlety of the proper use of these two basic and indispensable concepts. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  64
    Stephen Maitzen (1998). The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure. Synthese 114 (2):337-354.
    The Knower Paradox has had a brief but eventful history, and principles of epistemic closure (which say that a subject automatically knows any proposition she knows to be materially implied, or logically entailed, by a proposition she already knows) have been the subject of tremendous debate in epistemic logic and epistemology more generally, especially because the fate of standard arguments for and against skepticism seems to turn on the fate of closure. As far as I can tell, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  8
    John Corcoran (1979). Review of Hintikka and Remes. The Method of Analysis (Reidel, 1974). MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 58:3202-3.
    John Corcoran. 1979 Review of Hintikka and Remes. The Method of Analysis (Reidel, 1974). Mathematical Reviews 58 3202 #21388. -/- The “method of analysis” is a technique used by ancient Greek mathematicians (and perhaps by Descartes, Newton, and others) in connection with discovery of proofs of difficult theorems and in connection with discovery of constructions of elusive geometric figures. Although this method was originally applied in geometry, its later application to number played an important role in the early development of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  55
    John Corcoran & Sriram Nambiar (2014). De Morgan on Euclid’s Fourth Postulate. Journal of Symbolic Logic 20:250-1.
    This paper will annoy modern logicians who follow Bertrand Russell in taking pleasure in denigrating Aristotle for [allegedly] being ignorant of relational propositions. To be sure this paper does not clear Aristotle of the charge. On the contrary, it shows that such ignorance, which seems unforgivable in the current century, still dominated the thinking of one of the greatest modern logicians as late as 1831. Today it is difficult to accept the proposition that Aristotle was blind to the fact (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  47
    Kevin C. Klement (2010). The Functions of Russell's No Class Theory. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):633-664.
    §1. Introduction. Although Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (hereafter, PM ), published almost precisely a century ago, is widely heralded as a watershed moment in the history of mathematical logic, in many ways it is still not well understood. Complaints abound to the effect that the presentation is imprecise and obscure, especially with regard to the precise details of the ramified theory of types, and the philosophical explanation and motivation underlying it, all of which was primarily Russell’s responsibility. This (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  36.  19
    John Corcoran (2013). Aristotle’s “Whenever Three Terms”. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19:234-235.
    The premise-fact confusion in Aristotle’s PRIOR ANALYTICS. -/- The premise-fact fallacy is talking about premises when the facts are what matters or talking about facts when the premises are what matters. It is not useful to put too fine a point on this pencil. -/- In one form it is thinking that the truth-values of premises are relevant to what their consequences in fact are, or relevant to determining what their consequences are. Thus, e.g., someone commits the premise-fact fallacy if (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  40
    Richard Gaskin (1997). Russell and Richard Brinkley on the Unity of the Proposition. History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):139-150.
    Between 1903 and 1918 Russell made a number of attempts to understand the unity of the proposition, but his attempts all foundered on his failure clearly to distinguish between different senses in which the relation R might be said to relate a and b in the proposition aRb: he failed to distinguish between the relation as truth-maker and the relation as unifier, and consequently committed himself again and again to the unacceptable consequence that only true propositions are genuinely (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  17
    Gabriel Nuchelmans (1994). Can a Mental Proposition Change its Truth‐Value? Some 17th-Century Views. History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):69-84.
    In the first half of the 17th century the Aristotelian view that the same statement or belief may be true at one time and false at another and, on the other hand, the conception of a mental proposition as a fully explicit thought that lends a definite meaning to a declarative sentence originated a lively debate concerning the question whether a mental proposition can change its truth-value.In this article it is shown that the defenders of a negative answer (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  14
    Feliz Molina (2013). Readymades in the Social Sphere: An Interview with Daniel Peltz. Continent 3 (1):17-24.
    Since 2008 I have been closely following the conceptual/performance/video work of Daniel Peltz. Gently rendered through media installation, ethnographic, and performance strategies, Peltz’s work reverently and warmly engages the inner workings of social systems, leaving elegant rips and tears in any given socio/cultural quilt. He engages readymades (of social and media constructions) and uses what are identified as interruptionist/interventionist strategies to disrupt parts of an existing social system, thus allowing for something other to emerge. Like the stereoscope that requires two (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  7
    Dora Sanchez Garcia (1985). Definición de la norma verdadera. Theoria 1 (2):535-544.
    In this article, we will concentrate on the two true norm definitions that have existed throughout the history of the Deontic Logic: that offered by Professor Kalinowski and that proposed by the semantics of possible worlds. The former is based on Tarski’s definition of the true proposition, but it has the drawback of depending on a concrete, philosophical theory concerning the nature of norms. The latter, widely accepted nowadays, presents difficulties which we will analyse, using as a reference, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  3
    Dora Sanchez Garcia (1985). Definición de la Norma Verdadera. Theoria 1 (2):535-544.
    In this article, we will concentrate on the two true norm definitions that have existed throughout the history of the Deontic Logic: that offered by Professor Kalinowski and that proposed by the semantics of possible worlds. The former is based on Tarski’s definition of the true proposition, but it has the drawback of depending on a concrete, philosophical theory concerning the nature of norms. The latter, widely accepted nowadays, presents difficulties which we will analyse, using as a reference, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  1
    Philipp P. Fehl (1979). Farewell to Jokes: The Last "Capricci" of Giovanni Domenico Tiepolo and the Tradition of Irony in Venetian Painting. Critical Inquiry 5 (4):761-791.
    Capricci are nonsense drawings that delineate an elusive but inevitable sense behind or, better, within the palpable nonsense of the elementary proposition of a drawing; they are capers on a tightrope stretched between the poles of pathos and the ridiculous. We shall succeed in not falling only if we step forward boldly and know not only what we are doing but also what we are up against in the making of a picture as well as in living in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  3
    G. J. Whitrow (1950). On the Synthetic Aspect of Mathematics. Philosophy 25 (95):326 - 330.
    In the most recent edition of Language, Truth and Logic , Professor A. J. Ayer still maintains that pure mathematics is analytic, being in fact merely a vast system of tautology. He is much more confident about this than are most contemporary professional mathematicians who have investigated the foundations of their subject. Following the breakdown of the efforts both of Frege and of Russell and Whitehead to derive pure mathematics from logic, i.e. to prove that the denial of any one (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. S. Auroux (1985). G. NUCHELMANS "Judgement and Proposition. From Descartes to Kant". [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1):129.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. L. Hickman (1981). G. NUCHELMANS "Late Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition". [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of Logic 2:138.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  75
    Kevin C. Klement (2001). Russell's Paradox in Appendix B of the Principles of Mathematics : Was Frege's Response Adequate? History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):13-28.
    In their correspondence in 1902 and 1903, after discussing the Russell paradox, Russell and Frege discussed the paradox of propositions considered informally in Appendix B of Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. It seems that the proposition, p, stating the logical product of the class w, namely, the class of all propositions stating the logical product of a class they are not in, is in w if and only if it is not. Frege believed that this paradox was avoided within his (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  47.  36
    Stephen Read (2010). Field's Paradox and Its Medieval Solution. History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (2):161-176.
    Hartry Field's revised logic for the theory of truth in his new book, Saving Truth from Paradox , seeking to preserve Tarski's T-scheme, does not admit a full theory of negation. In response, Crispin Wright proposed that the negation of a proposition is the proposition saying that some proposition inconsistent with the first is true. For this to work, we have to show that this proposition is entailed by any proposition incompatible with the first, that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48.  14
    George Boger (1998). Completion, Reduction and Analysis: Three Proof-Theoretic Processes in Aristotle'sprior Analytics. History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (4):187-226.
    Three distinctly different interpretations of Aristotle?s notion of a sullogismos in Prior Analytics can be traced: (1) a valid or invalid premise-conclusion argument (2) a single, logically true conditional proposition and (3) a cogent argumentation or deduction. Remarkably the three interpretations hold similar notions about the logical relationships among the sullogismoi. This is most apparent in their conflating three processes that Aristotle especially distinguishes: completion (A4-6)reduction(A7) and analysis (A45). Interpretive problems result from not sufficiently recognizing Aristotle?s remarkable degree of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  31
    Ivor Grattan-Guinness (2012). A New–Old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):245 - 290.
    We seek means of distinguishing logical knowledge from other kinds of knowledge, especially mathematics. The attempt is restricted to classical two-valued logic and assumes that the basic notion in logic is the proposition. First, we explain the distinction between the parts and the moments of a whole, and theories of ?sortal terms?, two theories that will feature prominently. Second, we propose that logic comprises four ?momental sectors?: the propositional and the functional calculi, the calculus of asserted propositions, and rules (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  13
    Michael B. Papazian (2001). Chrysippus and the Destruction of Propositions: A Defence of the Standard Interpretation. History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):1-12.
    One of the most intriguing claims of Stoic logic is Chrysippus's denial of the modal principle that the impossible does not follow from the possible. Chrysippus's argument against this principle involves the idea that some propositions are ?destroyed? or ?perish?. According to the standard interpretation of Chrysippus's argument, propositions cease to exist when they are destroyed. Ide has presented an alternative interpretation according to which destroyed propositions persist after destruction and are false. I argue that Ide's alternative interpretation as well (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 71