Search results for 'Propositional Function' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Proving in Finite Many-Valued Propositional (forthcoming). An Algorithm for Axiomatizing and Theorem Proving in Finite Many-Valued Propositional Logics* Walter A. Carnielli. Logique Et Analyse.score: 80.0
     
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  2. Michael Anthony Beaney (2009). The Early Life Of Russell's Notion Of A Propositional Function. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4 (1):200.score: 75.0
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  3. Eric J. Loomis (2005). Logical Form and Propositional Function in the Tractatus. Theoria 71 (3):215-240.score: 60.0
    Wittgenstein's Tractatus carefully distinguished the concept all from\nthe notion of a truth-function, and thereby from the quantifiers.\nI argue that Wittgenstein's rationale for this distinction is lost\nunless propositional functions are understood within the context\nof his picture theory of the proposition. Using a model Tractatus\nlanguage, I show how there are two distinct forms of generality implicit\nin quantified Tractatus propositions. Although the explanation given\nin the Tractatus for this distinction is ultimately flawed, the distinction\nitself is a genuine one, and the forms of (...)
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  4. Eleanor Bisbee (1933). The Parmenides in the Light of the Propositional Function. Philosophical Review 42 (6):612-617.score: 45.0
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  5. Edwin Mares (forthcoming). Propositional Function. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 45.0
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  6. João Vergilio Gallerani Cuter (2010). Como negar um nome. Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 14 (2):33-62.score: 45.0
    In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , a name is always a propositional function. Wittgenstein makes a radical shift in the Fregean opposition between saturated and unsaturated entities. Any sentential component which is not itself a sentence is unsaturated. The proposition is therefore a synthesis of propositional functions. The name is just a limit case of propositional function, and as such it can be negated.
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  7. Robert Trueman (2011). Propositional Functions in Extension. Theoria 77 (4):292-311.score: 42.0
    In his “The Foundations of Mathematics”, Ramsey attempted to marry the Tractarian idea that all logical truths are tautologies and vice versa, and the logicism of the Principia. In order to complete his project, Ramsey was forced to introduce propositional functions in extension (PFEs): given Ramsey's definitions of 1 and 2, without PFEs even the quantifier-free arithmetical truth that 1 ≠ 2 is not a tautology. However, a number of commentators have argued that the notion of PFEs is incoherent. (...)
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  8. William P. Bechtel & A. Abrahamson (1990). Beyond the Exclusively Propositional Era. Synthese 82 (2):223-53.score: 42.0
    Contemporary epistemology has assumed that knowledge is represented in sentences or propositions. However, a variety of extensions and alternatives to this view have been proposed in other areas of investigation. We review some of these proposals, focusing on (1) Ryle's notion of knowing how and Hanson's and Kuhn's accounts of theory-laden perception in science; (2) extensions of simple propositional representations in cognitive models and artificial intelligence; (3) the debate concerning imagistic versus propositional representations in cognitive psychology; (4) recent (...)
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  9. Kevin C. Klement, Propositional Logic. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 39.0
    Propositional logic, also known as sentential logic and statement logic, is the branch of logic that studies ways of joining and/or modifying entire propositions, statements or sentences to form more complicated propositions, statements or sentences, as well as the logical relationships and properties that are derived from these methods of combining or altering statements. In propositional logic, the simplest statements are considered as indivisible units, and hence, propositional logic does not study those logical properties and relations that (...)
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  10. Richard L. Cartwright (2005). Remarks on Propositional Functions. Mind 114 (456):915-927.score: 36.0
    Peter Geach has said that Russell's use of ‘propositional function’ is ‘hopelessly confused and inconsistent’. Geach is right, and attempts to say what exactly a Russellian propositional function is, or is supposed to be, are bound to end in frustration. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to pursue an account of propositional functions that accommodates a good deal of what Russell says about them and that can provide some of what he expected of them.
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  11. George Bealer (1989). On the Identification of Properties and Propositional Functions. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1):1 - 14.score: 36.0
    Arguments are given against the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical. The first shows that the familiar extensional treatment of propositional functions -- that, for all x, if f(x) = g(x), then f = g -- must be abandoned. Second, given the usual assumptions of propositional-function semantics, various propositional functions (e.g., constant functions) are shown not to be properties. Third, novel examples are given to show that, if properties were identified with propositional (...)
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  12. Robert Goldblatt & Michael Kane (2010). An Admissible Semantics for Propositionally Quantified Relevant Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):73 - 100.score: 36.0
    The Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logics is extended to give a sound and complete model theory for many propositionally quantified relevant logics (and some non-relevant ones). This involves a restriction on which sets of worlds are admissible as propositions, and an interpretation of propositional quantification that makes ∀ pA true when there is some true admissible proposition that entails all p -instantiations of A . It is also shown that without the admissibility qualification many of the systems considered (...)
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  13. Petar Maksimović & Predrag Janičić (2006). Simple Characterization of Functionally Complete One‐Element Sets of Propositional Connectives. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 52 (5):498-504.score: 30.0
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  14. A. N. Prior (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-106.score: 30.0
  15. Peter Roeper & Hugues Leblanc (1999). Absolute Probability Functions for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):223-234.score: 26.0
    Provided here is a characterisation of absolute probability functions for intuitionistic (propositional) logic L, i.e. a set of constraints on the unary functions P from the statements of L to the reals, which insures that (i) if a statement A of L is provable in L, then P(A) = 1 for every P, L's axiomatisation being thus sound in the probabilistic sense, and (ii) if P(A) = 1 for every P, then A is provable in L, L's axiomatisation being (...)
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  16. Czesław Lejewski (1989). Formalization of Functionally Complete Propositional Calculus with the Functor of Implication as the Only Primitive Term. Studia Logica 48 (4):479 - 494.score: 24.0
    The most difficult problem that Leniewski came across in constructing his system of the foundations of mathematics was the problem of defining definitions, as he used to put it. He solved it to his satisfaction only when he had completed the formalization of his protothetic and ontology. By formalization of a deductive system one ought to understand in this context the statement, as precise and unambiguous as possible, of the conditions an expression has to satisfy if it is added to (...)
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  17. Ariadna Chernavska (1981). The Impossibility of a Bivalent Truth-Functional Semantics for the Non-Boolean Propositional Structures of Quantum Mechanics. Philosophia 10 (1-2):1-18.score: 24.0
    The general fact of the impossibility of a bivalent, truth-functional semantics for the propositional structures determined by quantum mechanics should be more subtly demarcated according to whether the structures are taken to be orthomodular latticesP L or partial-Boolean algebrasP A; according to whether the semantic mappings are required to be truth-functional or truth-functional ; and according to whether two-or-higher dimensional Hilbert spaceP structures or three-or-higher dimensional Hilbert spaceP structures are being considered. If the quantumP structures are taken to be (...)
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  18. Alexander Citkin (2008). A Mind of a Non-Countable Set of Ideas. Logic and Logical Philosophy 17 (1-2):23-39.score: 24.0
    The paper is dedicated to the 80th birthday of the outstanding Russian logician A.V. Kuznetsov. It is addressing a history of the ideas and research conducted by him in non-classical and intermediate logics.
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  19. Avery Andrews (2010). Propositional Glue and the Projection Architecture of LFG. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (3):141-170.score: 23.0
    Although ‘glue semantics’ is the most extensively developed theory of semantic composition for LFG, it is not very well integrated into the LFG projection architecture, due to the absence of a simple and well-explained correspondence between glue-proofs and f-structures. In this paper I will show that we can improve this situation with two steps: (1) Replace the current quantificational formulations of glue (either Girard’s system F, or first order linear logic) with strictly propositional linear logic (the quantifier, unit and (...)
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  20. Friederike Moltmann (2003). Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions. Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118.score: 21.0
    The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account (...)
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  21. John Zeimbekis (2004). Propositional Attitudes in Fiction. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.score: 21.0
    Theories that seek to explain the status of psychological states experienced in fictional contexts either claim that those states are special propositional attitudes specific to fictional contexts (make-believe attitudes), or else define them as normal propositional attitudes by stretching the concept of a propositional attitude to include ‘objectless’ states that do not imply constraints such as truth or satisfaction. I argue that the first theory is either vacuous or false, and that the second, by defining the reality (...)
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  22. Berit Brogaard (2008). Knowledge-the and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):147-190.score: 21.0
    Determiner phrases embedded under a propositional attitude verb have traditionally been taken to denote answers to implicit questions. For example, 'the capital of Vermont' as it occurs in 'John knows the capital of Vermont' has been thought to denote the proposition which answers the implicit question 'what is the capital of Vermont?' Thus, where 'know' is treated as a propositional attitude verb rather than an acquaintance verb, 'John knows the capital of Vermont' is true iff John knows that (...)
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  23. Tadeusz W. Zawidzki (2008). The Function of Folk Psychology: Mind Reading or Mind Shaping? Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):193 – 210.score: 21.0
    I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining (...)
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  24. Todd Long (2012). Mentalist Evidentialism Vindicated (and a Super-Blooper Epistemic Design Problem for Proper Function Justification). Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.score: 21.0
    Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of that input, (...)
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  25. John Dilworth & Dylan Sabo (2013). A Dual-Component View of Propositional Grasping. Erkenntnis:1-12.score: 21.0
    On a traditional or default view of the grasping or understanding of a singular proposition by an individual, it is assumed to be a unitary or holistic activity. However, naturalistic views of cognition plausibly could analyze propositional thinking in terms of more than one distinctive functional stage of cognitive processing, suggesting at least the potential legitimacy of a non-unitary analysis of propositional grasping. We outline a novel dual-component view of this kind, and show that it is well supported (...)
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  26. Jaroslav Peregrin, Is Propositional Calculus Categorical?score: 21.0
    According to the standard definition, a first-order theory is categorical if all its models are isomorphic. The idea behind this definition obviously is that of capturing semantic notions in axiomatic terms: to be categorical is to be, in this respect, successful. Thus, for example, we may want to axiomatically delimit the concept of natural number, as it is given by the pre-theoretic semantic intuitions and reconstructed by the standard model. The well-known results state that this cannot be done within first-order (...)
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  27. Mika Oksanen, Doxastic Logic of Demonstratives; Indexical and Reflexive Pronouns in Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes.score: 21.0
    In this article I will develop the first steps of a wholly general theory of how indexical and reflexive pronouns function in propositional attitude ascriptions. This will involve a theory of ascriptions of de se beliefs and de se utterances, which can probably be also generalized so as to apply to ascriptions of other attitudes. It will also involve a theory about the ascriptions of beliefs or other attitudes a person has at a time about what happens then (...)
     
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  28. Dimitri Pataraia (2006). Description of All Functions Definable by Formulæ of the 2nd Order Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus on Some Linear Heyting Algebras. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 16 (3-4):457-483.score: 21.0
    Explicit description of maps definable by formulæ of the second order intuitionistic propositional calculus is given on two classes of linear Heyting algebras?the dense ones and the ones which possess successors. As a consequence, it is shown that over these classes every formula is equivalent to a quantifier free formula in the dense case, and to a formula with quantifiers confined to the applications of the successor in the second case.
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  29. Peter Hylton (2008). Propositions, Functions, and Analysis: Selected Essays on Russell's Philosophy. OUP Oxford.score: 20.0
    The work of Bertrand Russell had a decisive influence on the emergence of analytic philosophy, and on its subsequent development. The essays collected in this volume, by one of the leading authorities on Russell's philosophy, all aim at recapturing and articulating aspects of Russell's philosophical vision during his most influential and important period, the two decades following his break with Idealism in 1899. One theme of the collection concerns Russell's views about propositions and their analysis, and the relation of those (...)
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  30. Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.score: 18.0
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based (...)
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  31. Rachel Barney (2008). Aristotle's Argument for a Human Function. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34:293-322.score: 18.0
    A generally ignored feature of Aristotle’s famous function argument is its reliance on the claim that practitioners of the crafts (technai) have functions: but this claim does important work. Aristotle is pointing to the fact that we judge everyday rational agency and agents by norms which are independent of their contingent desires: a good doctor is not just one who happens to achieve his personal goals through his work. But, Aristotle argues, such norms can only be binding on individuals (...)
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  32. Antti Revonsuo (2000). The Reinterpretation of Dreams: An Evolutionary Hypothesis of the Function of Dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):877-901.score: 18.0
    Several theories claim that dreaming is a random by-product of REM sleep physiology and that it does not serve any natural function. Phenomenal dream content, however, is not as disorganized as such views imply. The form and content of dreams is not random but organized and selective: during dreaming, the brain constructs a complex model of the world in which certain types of elements, when compared to waking life, are underrepresented whereas others are over represented. Furthermore, dream content is (...)
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  33. Shan Gao, The Wave Function and Its Evolution.score: 18.0
    The meaning of the wave function and its evolution are investigated. First, we argue that the wave function in quantum mechanics is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations in space. Next, we show that the linear non-relativistic evolution of the wave function of an isolated system obeys the free Schrödinger equation due to the requirements of (...)
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  34. Sean Crawford (2014). Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes? Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.score: 18.0
    Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such (...)
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  35. Shan Gao, Protective Measurement and the Meaning of the Wave Function.score: 18.0
    This article analyzes the implications of protective measurement for the meaning of the wave function. According to protective measurement, a charged quantum system has mass and charge density proportional to the modulus square of its wave function. It is shown that the mass and charge density is not real but effective, formed by the ergodic motion of a localized particle with the total mass and charge of the system. Moreover, it is argued that the ergodic motion is not (...)
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  36. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013). Propositional Faith: What It is and What It is Not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):357-372.score: 18.0
    Reprinted in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, Wadsworth 2013, 6th edition, with an additional section entitled, "Reasons for the Common View," eds Michael Rea and Louis Pojman. What is propositional faith? At a first approximation, we might answer that it is the psychological attitude picked out by standard uses of the English locution “S has faith that p,” where p takes declarative sentences as instances, as in “He has faith that they’ll win”. Although correct, this answer is not nearly (...)
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  37. Shan Gao, Meaning of the Wave Function.score: 18.0
    We investigate the meaning of the wave function by analyzing the mass and charge density distributions of a quantum system. According to protective measurement, a charged quantum system has effective mass and charge density distributing in space, proportional to the square of the absolute value of its wave function. In a realistic interpretation, the wave function of a quantum system can be taken as a description of either a physical field or the ergodic motion of a particle. (...)
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  38. John N. Williams (2008). Propositional Knowledge and Know-How. Synthese 165 (1):107 - 125.score: 18.0
    This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and (...)
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  39. Susanne Bobzien (2003). Stoic Logic. In Brad Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.score: 18.0
    ABSTRACT: An introduction to Stoic logic. Stoic logic can in many respects be regarded as a fore-runner of modern propositional logic. I discuss: 1. the Stoic notion of sayables or meanings (lekta); the Stoic assertibles (axiomata) and their similarities and differences to modern propositions; the time-dependency of their truth; 2.-3. assertibles with demonstratives and quantified assertibles and their truth-conditions; truth-functionality of negations and conjunctions; non-truth-functionality of disjunctions and conditionals; language regimentation and ‘bracketing’ devices; Stoic basic principles of propositional (...)
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  40. Peter J. Graham (forthcoming). The Function of Perception. In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library.score: 18.0
    What is the biological function of perception? I hold perception, especially visual perception in humans, has the biological function of accurately representing the environment. Tyler Burge argues this cannot be so in Origins of Objectivity (Oxford, 2010), for accuracy is a semantical relationship and not, as such, a practical matter. Burge also provides a supporting example. I rebut the argument and the example. Accuracy is sometimes also a practical matter if accuracy partly explains how perception contributes to survival (...)
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  41. Shan Gao, Derivation of the Meaning of the Wave Function.score: 18.0
    We show that the physical meaning of the wave function can be derived based on the established parts of quantum mechanics. It turns out that the wave function represents the state of random discontinuous motion of particles, and its modulus square determines the probability density of the particles appearing in certain positions in space.
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  42. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.score: 18.0
    The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works.
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  43. Thomas Kelly (2002). The Rationality of Belief and Other Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we (...)
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  44. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.score: 18.0
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...)
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  45. Mark E. Richard (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.score: 18.0
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important (...)
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  46. Bence Nanay (2010). A Modal Theory of Function. Journal of Philosophy 107 (8):412-431.score: 18.0
    The function of a trait token is usually defined in terms of some properties of other (past, present, future) tokens of the same trait type. I argue that this strategy is problematic, as trait types are (at least partly) individuated by their functional properties, which would lead to circularity. In order to avoid this problem, I suggest a way to define the function of a trait token in terms of the properties of the very same trait token. To (...)
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  47. Ron Amundson & George V. Lauder (1994). Function Without Purpose. Biology and Philosophy 9 (4):443-469.score: 18.0
    Philosophers of evolutionary biology favor the so-called etiological concept of function according to which the function of a trait is its evolutionary purpose, defined as the effect for which that trait was favored by natural selection. We term this the selected effect (SE) analysis of function. An alternative account of function was introduced by Robert Cummins in a non-evolutionary and non-purposive context. Cummins''s account has received attention but little support from philosophers of biology. This paper will (...)
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  48. Michael Bertrand (2013). Proper Environment and the SEP Account of Biological Function. Synthese 190 (9):1503-1517.score: 18.0
    The survival enhancing propensity (SEP) account has a crucial role to play in the analysis of proper function. However, a central feature of the account, its specification of the proper environment to which functions are relativized, is seriously underdeveloped. In this paper, I argue that existent accounts of proper environment fail because they either allow too many or too few characters to count as proper functions. While SEP accounts retain their promise, they are unworkable because of their inability to (...)
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  49. Robert M. Gordon (2007). Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.score: 18.0
    An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying (...)
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  50. Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.) (forthcoming). Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Ever since Frege, propositions have played a central role in philosophy of language. Propositions are generally conceived as abstract objects that have truth conditions essentially and fulfill both the role of the meaning of sentences and of the objects or content of propositional attitudes. More recently, the abstract conception of propositions has given rise to serious dissatisfaction among a number of philosophers, who have instead proposed a conception of propositional content based on cognitive acts (Hanks, Moltmann, Soames). This (...)
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