In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. (...) The work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question. (shrink)

Many arguments have been advanced for the view that "Why be moral?" is a pseudo-question. In this paper I address one of the most widely known and influential of them, one that comes from John Hospers and J. C. Thornton. I do so partly because, strangely, an important phase of that argument has escaped close attention. It warrants such attention because, firstly, not only is it important to the argument in which it appears, it is important in wider respects. (...) For instance, if it is sound it has weighty consequences even if the argument in which it figures fails. Secondly, it is not sound; it succumbs to a simple objection. (shrink)

We present a game mechanic called pseudo-visibility for games inhabited by non-player characters (NPCs) driven by reinforcement learning (RL). NPCs are incentivized to pretend they cannot see pseudo-visible players: the training environment simulates an NPC to determine how the NPC would act if the pseudo-visible player were invisible, and penalizes the NPC for acting differently. NPCs are thereby trained to selectively ignore pseudo-visible players, except when they judge that the reaction penalty is an acceptable tradeoff (e.g., (...) a guard might accept the penalty in order to protect a treasure because losing the treasure would hurt even more). We describe an RL agent transformation which allows RL agents that would not otherwise do so to perform some limited self-reflection to learn the training environments in question. (shrink)

This article questions whether past experience with nationalisms rooted in history, language, custom and religion will be much of a guide to pseudo-nationalisms that arise in a globalized age with increasingly ‘liquid’ societies.

Which entities should be accepted as part of the furniture of the world, and which not? What are pseudo-objects, if they are not properly objects? This collection explores the answers given to these questions by some key philosophers throughout the 20th century. It brings together essays by leading scholars on a subject of central importance to both metaphysics and the history of philosophy.".

In the twentieth century, philosophers tackled many of the philosophical problems of previous generations by dissolving them--attacking them as linguistic illusions and showing that the problems, when closely inspected, were not problems at all. Roy A. Sorensen takes the most important and interesting examples from one hundred years of analytic philosophy to consolidate a different theory of dissolution. Pseudo-Problems offers a fascinating alternative history of twentieth century analytic philosophy. It seeks to outline a unified account of dissolution that can (...) consolidate the piecemeal insights of analytic philosophers. An accessible account of questionable questions, the book represents an important contribution to the debates about creativity and problem solving. (shrink)

The analyses thus far undertaken of cost theory and utility theory have viewed these doctrines as they originally were, namely, as the contentions of two conflicting groups of value theorists. And had the two rival groups been allowed to continue to match strength on the plane on which Macvane, for example, contended, the result would probably have been the destruction of them both. Underneath surface conflicts, however, the rival theories had much in common. As the twentieth century got under way, (...) this state of affairs was discerned, with the result that in the end there was hand-shaking and backslapping all around and the inauguration of a live-and-let-live policy. Although at first regarding each other as mortal enemies, these two groups of price-determination theorists later came to see in one another something resembling blood kinship. But are the underlying assumptions which classicism and neoclassicism have in common any more realistic and scientific than the specific assumptions already examined? This is a question to which we now turn. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that a profile of the pseudo-sciences can be gained from the scientific pretensions of the pseudo-scientist. These pretensions provide two yardsticks which together take care of the charge of scientific prejudice that any suggested demarcation of pseudo-science has to face. To demonstrate that my analysis has teeth I will apply it to Freud and modern-day Bach-kabbalists. Against Laudan I will argue that the problem of demarcation is not a pseudo-problem, though (...) the discussion will bear out that Laudan's replacement question, namely the question whether someone's theory is well-confirmed, is not, as Lugg claimed, independent of the question as to whether that person is a pseudo-scientist. I further argue that my prototype pseudo-scientists do not have the shortcomings highlighted in Thagard's recent analysis of pseudo-science. (shrink)

We give an example of two ordered structures $\mathcal {M},\mathcal {N}$ in the same language $\mathcal {L}$ with the same universe, the same order and admitting the same one-variable definable subsets such that $\mathcal {M}$ is a model of the common theory of o-minimal $\mathcal {L}$ -structures and $\mathcal {N}$ admits a definable, closed, bounded, and discrete subset and a definable injective self-mapping of that subset which is not surjective. This answers negatively two question by Schoutens; the first being whether (...) there is an axiomatization of the common theory of o-minimal structures in a given language by conditions on one-variable definable sets alone. The second being whether definable completeness and type completeness imply the pigeonhole principle. It also partially answers a question by Fornasiero asking whether definable completeness of an expansion of a real closed field implies the pigeonhole principle. (shrink)

456 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 of reflection about rhetorical practices that I suspect Aristotle was trying to elicit in his own time and that Garver is trying to elicit in his. DAVID J. DEPEW California State University, FuUerton Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999. Pp. xvi + 3oo. Cloth, $8o.oo. The importance of doctrines found in the Latin translations of the late fifth-century Greek works of pseudo-Dionysius the (...) Areopagite for the formation of the theologi- cal and philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas is obvious to anyone well-versed in the texts of Aquinas. However, it is by no means obvious how Aquinas read, under- stood, and transformed the Christian Neoplatonic theology of this apparent disciple of Proclus or Damascius so as to make it an integral part of his understanding of God and creation. O'Rourke rightly conceived his task as twofold: first, the texts of Dionysius must be properly understood; second, the interpretation and use of these by Aquinas can itself be assessed and appreciated in its own thirteenth-century con- text. In the first part of the book he examines the question of knowledge of God, with one chapter devoted to Dionysius and a second devoted to Aquinas's use of "Dionysian Elements" in discovering God. Part Two examines their teachings on the "Transcendence of Being and Good" in chapters 3 and 4. Part Three contains three chapters on the "Unity.. (shrink)

Le féminisme a réussi à transformer partiellement le monde dans lequel nous vivons. Mais la résistance de la société traditionnelle à ces changements, ainsi que la remontée de la droite et la valorisation forcenée de l'individualisme, risquent de compromettre ses acquis. Dans ce contexte, l'avènement d'un discours pseudo-féministe qui véhicule les valeurs traditionnellement considérées comme « féminines » par les hommes risque d'embrouiller le message féministe pour tous ceux qui y accordaient créance et espéraient le voir aller plus loin (...) dans sa quête d'une société nouvelle. Nous voulons analyser ce discours en montrant comment il tend à remettre en question l'effort de transformation sociale amorcé par le féminisme.Feminism has partly transformed our world. Traditionnal society's resistance to these changes together with the rise of the Right and individualism endanger these gains. In that context, the advent of pseudo-feminist discourse carrying the values traditionnally seen by men as "féminine" might blur the feminist message for those who give it credit and hope to see it progress in its quest for a new society. We wish to analyse that discourse and show how it tends to challenge the social transformation effort launched through feminism. (shrink)

This volume presents essays and seminars by Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede, two of the most eminent scholars of ancient philosophy in recent decades, on the fascinating and much-debated Seventh Platonic Letter. They question the authenticity of the letter by showing how its philosophical content conflicts with the Platonic dialogues.

Discussion on the Platonic Socrates in relation to the historic Socrates has to some extent subsided in recent years. The older tradition looks like maintaining itself. But the question remains a provocative one, and further light on it would be welcome. It is some years, indeed, since Professor Field showed reason to doubt whether any further light will now be found, and advised reliance on the main line of tradition, through Aristotle, in the belief that we cannot in any case (...) reach behind it. (shrink)

Aristotle’s notion of experience occupies an important place in his account of scientific understanding and its methodology. It is linked, not only to sense-perception and the principles of skill and scientific understanding, but also, methodologically, to ἐπαγωγή. Due to its various involvements it has a complex job to perform. Such a complexity – or Janus-face – gives rise to many questions concerning its status and content. Many of these questions were raised in later antiquity. In the introductory part (...) of the paper I shall give a very brief summary of Aristotle’s notion of experience, concentrating on issues that will be relevant next, and then discuss the explanation we find in a commentary which has come down to us under the name of Philoponus. I do it in the hope that the discussion sheds light on novelties in the commentator’s approach which deserve attention. (shrink)

In pseudo-patient study (PPS), fieldworkers cloak their identities and intentions and pose as This enables them to observe the practice of healthcare from within a naturalistic, nonreactive research setting. Rosenhan and his assistants conducted the most famous PPS, where they faked symptoms of schizophrenia so that they could gain admittance to a mental-health facility and observe the treatment that genuine patients were receiving. More subtle pseudo-patients might arrange over the phone, after reporting varying levels of health insurance. Others (...) might provide dummy lab specimens or test a physician's response to technical questions. A few genuine patients have transformed their legitimate stays in the hospital into fieldwork, transforming themselves into disguised participant-observers. (shrink)

Que Wittgenstein ait été un admirateur de Freud n'est pas surprenant, puisque Freud possédait au plus haut point une qualité que Wittgenstein considérait comme fondamentale en philosophie, à savoir l'aptitude à proposer des analogies nouvelles et éclairantes pour la compréhension de faits qui sont à la fois familiers et énigmatiques. Ce que fait Freud consiste pour lui essentiellement à proposer d'excellentes comparaisons, comme par exemple la comparaison d'un rêve et d'un rébus. Mais les mérites de Freud ne vont pas au-delà (...) de ce qu'on peut exprimer en disant qu'il nous fournit une " représentation des faits " dont personne n'avait eu l'idée avant lui et qui est, en tout état de cause, extrêmement convaincante. Ce que Wittgenstein n'accepte pas est l'aspect proprement explicatif de la théorie, c'est-à-dire, en fin de compte l'inconscient lui-même. Freud a tort de s'exprimer comme s'il avait découvert qu'il y a dans l'esprit humain des haines, des volitions, etc., " inconsciente ", ce qui est tout à fait trompeur, parce que nous pensons à la différence entre une haine " consciente " et une haine " inconscientes ", comme à celle qui existe entre une chaise " vue " et une chaise " non vue ". Freud nous a appris à discerner un but, une intention ou un sens dans des phénomènes qui, comme le rêve ou le lapsus, semblaient à première vue n'en avoir aucun. Mais il les a, pour ce faire, simplement placés dans une perspective entièrement différente de celle à laquelle nous étions habitués. Il commet, selon Wittgenstein, une confusion philosophique caractérisée, lorsqu'il estime avoir mis en évidence l'existence d'une activité psychique inconsciente qui constitue la cause supposée des phénomènes en question. (shrink)

Following W.V. Quine’s lead, many metaphysicians consider ontology to be concerned primarily with existential questions of the form, “What is there?”. Moreover, if the position advanced by Rudolf Carnap, in his seminal essay, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology ”, is correct, then many of these existential ontological questions ought to be classified as either trivially answerable or as “pseudo-questions”. One may justifiably wonder, however, whether the Quinean and Carnapian perspective on ontology really does justice to many of (...) the most central concerns of this discipline. This chapter argues, by considering a particular ontological dispute between two different kinds of trope theorists, that some of the most interesting and important debates which properly belong to the study of being, whether we call it “metaphysics” or “ ontology ”, do not concern existential questions at all; rather, such disputes in some cases focus on non-existential disagreements over questions of fundamentality. (shrink)

This paper raises some questions about the formalization of sentences containing ‘if’ or similar expressions. In particular, it focuses on three kinds of sentences that resemble conditionals in some respects but exhibit distinctive logical features that deserve separate consideration: whether-or-not sentences, biscuit conditionals, and concessive conditionals. As will be suggested, the examples discussed show in different ways that an adequate formalization of a sentence must take into account the content expressed by the sentence. This upshot is arguably what one (...) should expect on the view that logical form is determined by truth conditions. (shrink)

In his early philosophy as well as in his middle period, Wittgenstein holds a purely syntactic view of logic and mathematics. However, his syntactic foundation of logic and mathematics is opposed to the axiomatic approach of modern mathematical logic. The object of Wittgenstein’s approach is not the representation of mathematical properties within a logical axiomatic system, but their representation by a symbolism that identifies the properties in question by its syntactic features. It rests on his distinction of descriptions and operations; (...) its aim is to reduce mathematics to operations. This paper illustrates Wittgenstein’s approach by examining his discussion of irrational numbers. (shrink)

I argue that whether abortions are morally permissible depends on whether the fetus has a right to life, the only point of disagreement between the possible theories on this question--the Extreme Conservative, the Middle, and the Extreme Liberal--concerns the relevant temporal proximity to, or degree of probability of actualizing, some selected potential, there is in principle no non-arbitrary way of resolving this disagreement, and hence the problem of abortion is a pseudo-problem inasmuch as it is not theoretically capable of (...) being solved, and legislators should, in the light of this, act as if the Extreme Liberal Theory were true. (shrink)

I argue that (1) whether abortions are morally permissible depends on whether the fetus has a right to life, (2) the only point of disagreement between the possible theories on this question--the Extreme Conservative, the Middle, and the Extreme Liberal--concerns the relevant temporal proximity to, or degree of probability of actualizing, some selected potential, (3) there is in principle no non-arbitrary way of resolving this disagreement, and hence the problem of abortion is a pseudo-problem inasmuch as it is not (...) theoretically capable of being solved, and (4) legislators should, in the light of this, act as if the Extreme Liberal Theory were true. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel on Pseudo-Philosophy: Reading the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit by Andrew Alexander DavisPaul T. WilfordDAVIS, Andrew Alexander. Hegel on Pseudo-Philosophy: Reading the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit. London: Bloomsbury, 2023. ix + 214 pp. Cloth, $125In Hegel on Pseudo-Philosophy, Andrew Davis makes a convincing argument that just as the problem of how to distinguish sophistry from philosophy is a recurrent theme of (...) Plato's dialogues, so too is the problem of sophistry or "pseudo-philosophy" central to the preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Indeed, the problem of how to recognize and guard against pseudo-philosophy is the common theme linking the prefaces to the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Science of Logic, the Encyclopedia, and the Philosophy of Right, each of which endeavors "to reveal something about the essence of philosophy... by highlighting the ways pseudo-philosophy fails to do justice to philosophical content." Such an undertaking is especially important to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, however, because the subject matter [End Page 543] of the work is nothing but the logos of the appearances of spirit. To arrive at knowledge of spirit requires attending to all the various ways in which spirit (or Geist) can appear, but, as Davis remarks, "like life, Geist may be thought as a source of appearances, but not as an appearance itself. It is always 'behind' what appears." As a result, the Phenomenology is an exercise in trying "to grasp what does not appear through appearances alone." Thus, just as the Phenomenology approaches the truth of spirit by considering spirit's partial, abstract, and one-sided modes of appearing, so too does the preface to the Phenomenology approach the truth of philosophy by investigating forms of pseudo-philosophy.As Hegel himself states, there are two principal tasks pursued in the preface: (1) to offer a preliminary sketch of what it would mean for "the cognition of absolute actuality to become perfectly lucid about its own nature;" and (2) to eliminate some "habitually accepted forms of thought" that prove obstacles to philosophic cognition. While most commentators take their bearings from the former, Davis's approach to the preface is unique (to my knowledge) in foregrounding the latter. Yet, as his book unfolds, it becomes clear that the latter is the route into the former. Indeed, one of the central lessons of the book is that, although the elimination of erroneous habits of thought may seem to be merely negative and therefore principally propaedeutic to the positive task of leading the reader toward "absolute knowing," the examination of error is an integral component of grasping the true. If the Phenomenology as a whole is a "highway of despair"—a comprehensive refutation of natural consciousness's pretensions to knowledge that is simultaneously a dialectical ascent to conceptually comprehending knowing (begreifende Wissen)—the preface initiates the reader into the via negativa that philosophic cognition must travel to attain self-knowledge.Davis's book is structured around seven forms of pseudo-philosophy, each of which is treated as a discrete, distinguishable problem in its own right and also as emblematic of the common failure to recognize that the form of philosophy is inseparable from the content of philosophy. As Davis argues, this failure lies at the root of the attempt (common to much of modern philosophy since Descartes) to establish a priori a universal method for thinking (what Leibniz called a mathesis universalis) that will secure certain and indubitable knowledge. But this effort proves self-undermining, always ultimately engendering the very skepticism it seeks to master. Through observing the aporiai generated by forms of pseudo-philosophy, we learn that "the method of philosophy is inseparable from the subject matter of philosophy. Method cannot be isolated and discussed on its own. Philosophy is thinking (form) about thinking (content)."Davis thus gradually discloses Hegel's positive answer to the question "what is philosophy?" through a series of determinate negations of philosophy's imitations. We learn that philosophy is the recollective, self-comprehending, self-moving thinking of thinking by attending to a set of tendencies that impede philosophy: "a tendency to explain rather than [End Page 544] present (chapter 1), a... (shrink)

We show that Zilber’s conjecture that complex exponentiation is isomorphic to his pseudo-exponentiation follows from the a priori simpler conjecture that they are elementarily equivalent. An analysis of the first-order types in pseudo-exponentiation leads to a description of the elementary embeddings, and the result that pseudo-exponential fields are precisely the models of their common first-order theory which are atomic over exponential transcendence bases. We also show that the class of all pseudo-exponential fields is an example of (...) a nonfinitary abstract elementary class, answering a question of Kesälä and Baldwin. (shrink)

* This work has been evolving for a while now. Some parts trace back to the few pages on the context-dependency of quantifiers in my dissertation. Reading Recanati’s paper on domains of discourse made me rethink some of my earlier conclusions without in the end actually changing them much. Other parts formed the material for several discussions in my seminar on context-dependency at MIT in the fall of 1995, which included several sessions exploring the issues raised in an early version (...) of Kratzer. Connecting the choice function approach to indefinites with a general analysis of contextual domain restriction was an idea that I considered then without however working out any details. Conversations with Lisa Matthewson and studying her paper inspired me to tackle the problem again. Connections to questions about the context-dependency of conditional sentences also tickled my fancy, since I have been working on conditionals for a while now. Having the opportunity to present this material at the Vilem Mathesius Series provided the impetus to flesh out some of my vague thoughts. Major influences come from the work done in recent years at MIT by Lisa Matthewson, Philippe Schlenker, Julie Legate, and Uli Sauerland. I thank Irene Heim, Lisa Matthewson, Orin Percus, Philippe Schlenker, and Jason Stanley for illuminating discussions about this material. At this point, I see this talk as a report on the state of the art, exploring an intriguing possible connection, but I do not claim substantial intellectual property rights. Mistakes are certainly mine, achievements are probably not. (shrink)

The main feature of Whitebook's reply is that he does not give an inch and, more convinced than ever, keeps charging the windmills of redemption and revolution with the same lame theoretical weapons he had previously deployed. Only this time, he seeks reinforcements by appealing to the “heavies”: Habermas, Castoriadis and Heller. Since multiplying zero by any figure still yields zero, no substantive progress has been made. It would be futile to reiterate the same objections once again. Rather, to move (...) the debate beyond dead center it may be helpful to pose new questions, e.g., in terms of the status of the concepts employed and the political consequences they entail. (shrink)

A bewildering array of accounts of the ontology of musical works is available. Philosophers have held that works of music are sets of performances, abstract, eternal sound-event types, initiated types, compositional action types, compositional action tokens, ideas in a composer’s mind and continuants that perdure. This paper maintains that questions in the ontology of music are, in Rudolf Carnap’s sense of the term, pseudo-problems. That is, there is no alethic basis for choosing between rival musical ontologies. While we (...) have no alethic basis for choosing any ontology of music, pragmatic reasons can be given for favoring certain ontologies of musical works over others. (shrink)

Since the 1960s, the Green movement has been seen as an innovative leftist phenomenon. From the times of Peter Kropotkin,1 it has been assumed that environmental concerns belong to the Left. Recent studies, however, have shown that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries there were political ecologists associated with the radical Right.2 Some supported National Socialism, eugenics, the mystical union of mankind and nature, and other esoteric practices. Given this historical precedent, recent leftist flirtations with ecology raise a (...) number of moral and political questions concerning the ideological character of ecology, since the latter can take a variety…. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el siglo xi, la literatura dialógica nacida en el seno del cristianismo latino ha incluido en su repertorio de interlocutores a uno que resulta en todos los casos ficcional: el gentil. De allí que quepa preguntarse cuál es el propósito de dialogar con una otredad imaginaria. Se examinan las construcciones identitarias de los dos primeros personajes gentiles de los que hasta ahora se tiene noticia: el de la Disputatio christiani cumgentili de Gilberto Crispino y el de la Disputatio (...) inter christianum et gentilem del Pseudo-Anselmo. A partir de estas construcciones, se discutirá la función que cada gentil desempeña en su respectivo diálogo, con el objetivo de establecer qué relación mantienen estas identidades dialogantes con la intentio operis. ABSTRACT In the 11th century, the dialogical literature that emerged in the context of Latin Christianity included, among its repertoire of interlocutors, one that was always fictional: the Gentile. Thus, the question arises as to the purpose of entering into dialogue with an imaginary other. The article examines the constructions of identity of the first two known Gentile characters: that of Gilberto Crispino's Disputatio christiani cum gentili and that of Pseudo-Anselm's Disputatio inter christianum et gentilem. On the basis of these constructions, we discuss the role played by each Gentile in his respective dialogue, in order to establish the relationship between these participating identities and the intentio operis. (shrink)

When classes of structures are not first-order definable, we might still try to find a nice description. There are two common ways for doing this. One is to expand the language, leading to notions of pseudo-elementary classes, and the other is to allow infinite conjuncts and disjuncts. In this paper we examine the intersection. Namely, we address the question: Which classes of structures are both pseudo-elementary and ${\mathcal {L}}_{\omega _1, \omega }$ -elementary? We find that these are exactly (...) the classes that can be defined by an infinitary formula that has no infinitary disjunctions. (shrink)

This essay is part of larger project in which I attempt to show that Western formal logic, from its inception in Aristotle onward, has both been partially constituted by, and partially constitutive of, what has become known as racism. More specifically, (a) racist/quasi-racist/proto-racist political forces were part of the impetus for logic’s attempt to classify the world into mutually exclusive, hierarchically-valued categories in the first place; and (b) these classifications, in turn, have been deployed throughout history to justify and empower (...) racism/quasi-racism/proto-racism. In other words, (a) an important part of the chaos and messiness that so troubles logic has been the natural bio-cultural diversity of human beings as described by concepts such as race and ethnicity; and (b) once these concepts were historically in place, taken for granted, buttressed with pseudo-science, and had their origins forgotten, they became tools for the oppression of diverse human groups. The central thesis of this essay is that close readings of a variety of Leibniz’s writings (including several essays and one letter) will reveal a pattern of mutual dependency and creation in regard to logic and racism in Leibniz. My conclusion will be that there is a meaningful connection between logic and racism (or at least between logic and politics in general) in Leibniz such that one should be skeptical of his logic’s claim to offer transparent and neutral descriptions of the world as well as imperatives for action. Put differently, I want to ask the following specific question: how do Leibniz’s own racially-informed political goals, along with the emergence of race-centric European colonialism, both invest and disguise themselves within Leibniz’s mathematizing of logic? (shrink)

Of the many Schoolmen who read the pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum secretorum in the thirteenth century, none was more enthusiastic about this book than Roger Bacon. So highly did Bacon regard the Secretum that he prepared a redaction of the text, annotated it, and wrote an accompanying introductory treatise. Historians have long recognized the importance of Bacon's confrontation with the Secretum, but they have also misunderstood it. They have wrongly divided up Bacon's Secretum project between two widely separated dates. They have (...) left unasked the capital question of why Bacon undertook this project. More generally, they have fundamentally misjudged the place of the Secretum in Bacon's intellectual biography. Consequently, there are several distortions and gaps in the picture of Bacon's career currently circulating that deserve our critical attention. (shrink)

This paper presents several results on the non-commutative fuzzy logic HpsUL, a Hilbert system whose corresponding algebraic semantics is the variety of bounded representable residuated lattices. In particular, we prove that HpsUL is not complete with respect to algebras based on the real unit interval, which answers the question posed by Metcalfe, Olivetti and Gabbay and shows that HpsUL is not the logic of pseudo-uninorms and their residua.

The problem of consciousness is explored in the article from conceptual and terminologi­cal perspective. The question of the origins of the ambiguity of the relevant philosophical terms is discussed and relevant examples are given. The basic premise of the study is the as­sertion that abstraction works as a differentiation of differences that characterize and sep­arate kinds of experience. A methodological distinction is made between abstraction and pseudo-abstraction, which can bear the same name, in this case “consciousness”. Termi­nology is interpreted (...) as naming of abstractions of different levels and of realizable expe­riences. The term “consciousness” denotes an element of the ultimate distinction “con­sciousness/objective world”, abstracted from a series of distinctions that characterize the types and levels of experience. Pseudo-abstraction is formed from a series of pre-ex­isting meanings of the word “consciousness” without regard to realizable types of experi­ence as types of distinctions. There are two main alternative trends in the formulation of the problem of consciousness – structural-genetic and phenomenological. The high­lighted tendencies have something in common: the vagueness of the meaning in the use of the word “consciousness” and its functioning as a pseudo-abstraction. The ideological aspect of the problem is also considered. The principle of empiricism is identified with the recognition of the primacy of the diversity of experience as the source of abstraction. An alternative is formulated concerning the problem of the unity of consciousness. Husserl’s argumentation, through which an attempt is made to single out the sphere of consciousness as independent of any type of objectivity and as self-sufficient is analyzed, as well as the way he introduces such terms as “consciousness”, “sensation”, “experi­ence”, “perception” “intentionality”. Husserl’s thought experiment, the purpose of which is to prove the identity of the sensation of color from a real and illusory object, is sub­jected to a detailed analysis. (shrink)

The catalogues of works by John Buridan include a commentary on the De secretis mulierum by pseudo-Albertus Magnus. The same commentary is also attributed to Buridan in more general studies on medieval natural philosophy as well as in catalogues of manuscripts and repertories of incipits of medieval scientific writings. In most cases, a unique manuscript copy of this commentary is mentioned, namely Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA Q.299. However, in her Répertoire of Masters of Arts at the University of (...) Paris, Olga Weijers claims that Buridan’s commentary on De secretis mulierum can also be found in a different redaction in another manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Ms. lat. 8513. This article examines the question of the attribution of these texts to Buridan. First, it argues that the Parisian text is not a commentary by Buridan on De secretis mulierum but rather a different version of pseudo-Albertus’ work, and second, that Buridan can be considered the author of the quest... (shrink)

This article aims to shed light on certain aspects of Iamblichus’ theory of time that have not been sufficiently examined to date in the scholarly literature. As of today, there are a mere handful of scholarly works tackling Iamblichus’ solutions to the paradoxes of time in particular, and his contribution to the developments of the Neoplatonic theory of the subject more generally. This article attempts to redress the lack of literature on this topic by examining Iamblichus’ response to Aristotle’s and (...) Pseudo-Archytas’ theories of time. It begins with a brief survey of the philosophical developments that led to and were formative for Iamblichus’ philosophical explorations of the area in question. Then it moves on to provide a detailed account of Iamblichus’ own unique and puzzling theory of time. The author applies the method of comparative analysis, scrutinizing Iamblichus’ solution to the paradoxes of time against the backdrop of Aristotle’s and Pseudo-Archytas’ theories. The author identifies firm scholarly grounds for doing so from within the tradition of Iamblichus studies initiated by the ground-breaking research of Shmuel Sambursky and Salomon Pines and continued, inter alia, in the subtly nuanced analysis of Richard Sorabji and John Dillon. The author concludes that Iamblichus successfully resolved the paradoxes of time and that his conception lent itself to a more effective highlighting of the ordering function of time. (shrink)

This article aims to shed light on certain aspects of Iamblichus’ theory of time that have not been sufficiently examined to date in the scholarly literature. As of today, there are a mere handful of scholarly works tackling Iamblichus’ solutions to the paradoxes of time in particular, and his contribution to the developments of the Neoplatonic theory of the subject more generally. This article attempts to redress the lack of literature on this topic by examining Iamblichus’ response to Aristotle’s and (...) Pseudo-Archytas’ theories of time. It begins with a brief survey of the philosophical developments that led to and were formative for Iamblichus’ philosophical explorations of the area in question. Then it moves on to provide a detailed account of Iamblichus’ own unique and puzzling theory of time. The author applies the method of comparative analysis, scrutinizing Iamblichus’ solution to the paradoxes of time against the backdrop of Aristotle’s and Pseudo-Archytas’ theories. The author identifies firm scholarly grounds for doing so from within the tradition of Iamblichus studies initiated by the ground-breaking research of Shmuel Sambursky and Salomon Pines and continued, inter alia, in the subtly nuanced analysis of Richard Sorabji and John Dillon. The author concludes that Iamblichus successfully resolved the paradoxes of time and that his conception lent itself to a more effective highlighting of the ordering function of time. (shrink)

Arguing against the doctrine of double effect, Bennett claims that the terror bomber only intends to make his victims appear dead. An obvious reply is that he intends to make them appear dead by killing them. I argue that the alleged refutations of this reply rest on a mistaken test question to determine what an agent intends, as Bennett's own test question confirms, and that Bennett is misled by confusing metaphorical death and literal death. Moreover, Bennett's argument is half-hearted anyway, (...) and going the whole way would not only undermine the DDE but also Quinn's revision of it. (shrink)

Cet article propose la première édition critique complète des Questions de Jean Buridan sur la Physiognomonie pseudo-aristotélicienne. L’introduction situe le texte dans la tradition physiognomonique médiévale, tout en indiquant les relations de la physiognomonie à la sémiologie, à l’astrologie et à la philosophie morale. L’édition se fonde sur trois manuscrits principaux, et un quatrième pour l’une des deux versions de la première question. Suit l’édition d’une version d’authenticité douteuse, qui recoupe en partie la version éditée, et de trois (...) questions sur la physiognomonie extraites d’un texte qui semble composite, formé de questions de Buridan ou d’esprit buridanien. (shrink)

The article presents the preliminary results of the author’s study of the unedited homily De transfiguratione et eleemosyna, ascribed to John Chrysostom. The question of the manuscript tradition is first discussed. The article shows that Maurice Sachot is right when he indicates only the manuscript Romanus Angelicus gr. 125 as a manuscript witness of this homily and that the other two witnesses indicated by Pinakes are erroneous. Then, the descriptions of the folios that preserve the homily are analysed in the (...) light of a new examination of them. This re-examination shows that hitherto several sources that inspired the compiler have gone unnoticed. This is followed by a brief summary of the contents of the homily and an analysis of the passages in which almsgiving is mentioned.Contribution: The article offers a re-examination of the folios 353v–361 from the manuscript Romanus Angelicus gr. 125, the first presentation of the content of the homily De transfiguratione et eleemosyna, and tries to shed light on the association of the theme of the Transfiguration with almsgiving. (shrink)

IN the heroic Latin hexameter, after the essential alternation of long and short syllables, by far the most important feature is unquestionably the caesura. Nevertheless, ancient writers on metre dismiss it with the most cursory notice; all we get from them is that the chief caesura is the penthemimeral, the trochaic and hephthemimeral coming next; the fourth trochaic and the bucolic are usually rejected, and the trihemimeral is mentioned only by Ausonius, Modern writers, among whom are Müller and Winbolt, deal (...) with the question at greater length, but do not agree even on fundamental points, and often base their statements on an insufficient analysis of the extant remains of Latin hexameter verse. The purpose of the following paper is to attempt a more complete analysis, at least in the case of Virgil, the acknowledged master of the Latin hexameter. But before we proceed further there are two preliminaries which must be settled—what are the main types of caesura, and how many caesurae are admissible in one verse? (shrink)

Le regard théologique sur la question du mal a progressé en Occident grâce à la lecture des Noms divins de Denys, et à l'analyse scientifique de Thomas d'Aquin. Il est cependant intéressant de souligner le nouvel ordre et les rectifications que Thomas d'Aquin apporte à la pensée de Denys dont il est tributaire. Imprégné de la philosophie néoplatonicienne, Denys apparaît dans son ouvrage comme faisant une théologie de l'amour et du Bien. Le Bien y est non seulement objet d'amour, mais (...) il appelle un ordre et une vie. Le mal ne peut être situé que par rapport à l'opération vitale défaillante. Par rapport à Denys, Thomas d'Aquin opère une inversion de pensée. Son apport propre est de dépasser les deux positions de Denys selon qui le mal n'a pas de cause propre, le Bien étant fin de tous les maux. Le mal, qui reste accidentel pour Thomas, est aussi le fruit d'une relation déséquilibrée. Conséquence du péché en tant que mal de peine, tout est-il résolu par là quant au problème du mal ? Par delà saint Thomas, n'y a-t-il pas demande aujourd'hui d'un regard lucide sur la relation réciproque, c'est-à-dire le rôle inhibiteur que joue souvent l'excès de souffrance dans la relation à Dieu ? Theology's attitude to the question of evil has progressed in the West, thanks to the study of Dionysius' Divine Names and the scientific analysis of Thomas Aquinas. It is, nevertheless, interesting to underline the new method and rectifications that Thomas Aquinas brings to the thought of Dionysius, upon which he depends. Dionysius, impregnated with neo-Platonic philosophy, seems to elaborate a theology of love and the Good in his work. He sees the Good as not only the object of love, but calling for an order and a life. Evil can only be situated in terms of a vital operation that is faulted. In comparison with Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas operates an inversion of thought. His own contribution is to go beyond the two positions of Dionysius, according to whom evil does not have its own cause, the Good being the end of all evils. Evil, which remains accidental for Thomas, is also the fruit of an unbalanced relation. The consequence of sin in terms of the evil of pain does this resolve all the problems concerning evil ? Beyond St. Thomas, isn’t there a need today of a clear perspective about reciprocal relation, the inhibiting role that the excess of suffering often plays in the relation to God ? (shrink)

L’essai de rapprocher le monde de Dante dans sa complexité de la spiritualité et des constructions théologiques de Denys l’Aréopagite n’a pas encore produit un résultat unanime. Malgré une proximité de thèmes, la richesse des formes du monde dantesque, sa sensibilité aux événements historiques et la figure de Béatrice semblent, au moins en partie, résister à l’intensité silencieuse de la théologie dionysienne. L’article met en évidence le caractère décisif de la question de l’obscurité dans la tentative d’établir un rapport entre (...) la perspective dantesque et celle de Denys. À partir de la sémantisation variée du rapport entre la lumière et les ténèbres à l’œuvre chez Dante, on cherche à établir la persistance d’une inspiration dionysienne – avec une attention particulière à l’articulation entre la vision de Dieu, l’obscurité et le mouvement du désir –, telle qu’elle émerge du Chant XXXIII du Paradis. (shrink)

Dans cet article nous avons essayé d'examiner la valeur de l'attribution traditionelle du commentaire De Anima à Simplicius. En comparant ce traité aux grands commentaires de Simplicius (sur les Catégories, la Physique et le De Caelo d'Aristote), nous avons été en effet frappés par les divergences de style, et de langue, ainsi que par la différente manière de commenter. Dans la première partie nous démontrons que l'auteur de l'In D.A. a écrit également la Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, qui nous a été (...) transmise sous le nom de Priscien le Lydien. 1° Dans le In D.A. l'auteur renvoie à une de ses œuvres, qu'il appelle „Epitomé de la Physique de Théophraste". En réalité, cette référence se rapporte à un passage de la Métaphrase de Priscien, où la même problématique est exposée dans des termes identiques. — 2° Une comparaison détaillée, qui porte sur l'ensemble des deux œuvres, nous révèle une telle ressemblance de style et de pensée — il y a même des phrases à peu près identiques — qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer que par l'hypothèse de l'identité de l'auteur. Dans la deuxième partie nous essayons d'identifier l'auteur de ces deux œuvres qui pourtant nous ont été transmises sous deux noms différents. L'étude de la tradition directe et indirecte n'apporte guère de solution, puisque l'attribution des deux textes, l'un à Simplicius, l'autre à Priscien, y paraît très solide. Ce n'est donc que par une critique interne de l'In D.A., notamment par la confrontation avec les commentaires de Simplicius, dont l'attribution est certaine, que la question pourra être tranchée. 1° Dans l'In D.A. l'auteur renvoie trois fois à son commentaire sur la Physique. Pourtant, il est bien difficile de retrouver dans le grand commentaire de Simplicius trois passages dont le contenu et surtout le vocabulaire prouvent que l'auteur s'y réfère. — 2° Dans l'In D.A. on ne retrouve pas les traits caractéristiques de la méthode de commenter de Simplicius, ni l'approche du texte par la documentation historique, ni les longues discussions avec les exégètes antérieurs, ni l'exposé prolixe et bien structuré; d'autre part aucun des commentaires de Simplicius ne témoigne de la phraséologie tortueuse de notre oeuvre, ni de ses formules stéréotypées. — 3° La différence doctrinale est encore plus importante. Nulle part chez Simplicius n'apparaît la théorie de l'âme comme όριστική, qui est si fondamentale dans l'In D.A. (όρίζω y est un concept-clé). Les rares digressions de l'In D.A. à propos de questions physiques et logiques ne correspondent pas aux exposés de Simplicius sur les mêmes problèmes. Ainsi nous avons confronté la doctrine de la ‚physis', de l'âme et de son ‚automotion’ et enfin le rapport entre le ‚genre’ et les différences ‚constitutives’ et ‚diérétiques’. De tout cela se dégage une telle divergence entre l'In D. A. et les autres commentaires qu'elle ne peut s'expliquer par une évolution chez Simplicius lui-même. L'in D.A. lui est donc faussement attribué; et puisque nous avons établi que ce commentaire est du même auteur que la Métaphrase, nous pouvons conclure qu'il a été vraisemblablement écrit par Priscien le Lydien, un philosophe néoplatonicien dont nous savons seulement qu'il a accompagné Damascius et Simplicius en exil en Perse. (shrink)

Dans les Communia salmantins -- la plus vaste compilation didactique latine médiévale connue à ce jour et que l'on peut nommer ainsi, d'après la localisation du manuscrit depuis le XVe siècle, même si ces Points communs tirent vraisemblablement leur origine de la Faculté des arts de l'Université de Paris --, ces sections sur les philosophies morale et naturelle sont encadrées par celles, en cours d'édition et de traduction, sur la logique (Nova Logica, Vetus Logica) et sur la grammaire (de Priscien, (...) Institutiones grammaticae, XVII-XVIII, I-XVI). Ce livre -- qui présente commodément les éditions et les traductions en colonnes parallèles, tout en étant complété par une liste des tableaux et illustrations de meme qu'un index des noms -- fait donc partie d'un ensemble dont la publication est destinée à enrichir significativement notre connaissance de l'exégèse des corpus aristotélicien, boécien et priscianien, ainsi que celle de l'enseignement dialectique, par questions et réponses, des disciplines philosophiques dans l'institution universitaire du siècle d'or de la scolastique, au meme titre que le célèbre Guide de l'étudiant (parisien) du manuscrit Ripoll 109 auquel il s'apparente."--Publisher's description. (shrink)