Search results for 'Psychological Reductionism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  1
    Andrew Melnyk (2006). Functionalism and Psychological Reductionism: Friends, Not Foes. In Maurice Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Blackwell 31-50.
    The paper argues that a broadly functionalist picture of psychological phenomena is quite consistent with at least one interesting thesis of psychological reductionism.
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  2. Robert Stewart (2005). Maddening Melancholy: The Perils of Psychological Reductionism in Walker Percy, Richard Ford, and Jonathan Franzen. Janus Head 8 (2).
    Over the past twenty odd years, North America has witnessed the complete medicalization of unhappiness by transforming it into depression, which has been conceived in psychologically reductionistic terms. Many are unhappy with this state of affairs, including the contemporary American novelists, Walker Percy, Richard Ford, and Jonathan Franzen. This paper explores why they are unhappy with this trend and why they reject psychological reductionism in favor of a vision of life that is more thoroughly moral in its outlook.
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  3. Julian Baggini, Psychological Reductionism About Persons: A Critical Development.
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  4.  10
    Robert M. Galatzer-Levy (2005). Exploring Psychological Complexity Through Dynamic Systems Theory: A Complement to Reductionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):206-207.
    Dynamic systems theory (DS) provides tools for exploring how simpler elements can interact to produce complex psychological configurations. It may, as Lewis demonstrates, provide means for explicating relationships between two reductionist approaches to overlapping sets of phenomena. The result is a description of psychological phenomena at a level that begins to achieve the richness we would hope to achieve in examining psychological life as it is experienced and explored in psychoanalysis.
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  5.  15
    Steve Nolan (2009). In Defence of the Indefensible: An Alternative to John Paley's Reductionist, Atheistic, Psychological Alternative to Spirituality. Nursing Philosophy 10 (3):203-213.
    John Paley has rightly observed that, while spirituality is widely discussed in the nursing literature, the discussions are uncritical and unproblematic. In an effort 'to reconfigure the spirituality-in-nursing debate, and to position it where it belongs: in the literature on health psychology and social psychology, and not in a disciplinary cul-de-sac labelled "unfathomable mystery" ', Paley has proposed an alternative, reductionist approach to spirituality. In this paper, I identify two critiques developed by Paley: one political, the other 'logical'. Paley's political (...)
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  6. Austen Clark (1980). Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms: An Examination of Reductionism in Psychology. Oxford University Press.
  7.  1
    Douglas S. Hardy (2003). Radical Reductionism in the Psychological Study of Religion: Prospects for an Alternative Critical Methodology1. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 25 (1):25-41.
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  8. Cory D. Wright (2007). Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct? In Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell
    Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic operations (...)
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  9. Daniel Giberman (2009). Who They Are and What de Se: Burge on Quasi-Memory. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):297 - 311.
    Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that (...)
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  10. Robert Schroer (2013). Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):339-356.
    The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...)
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  11. Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer (2014). Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies (3):1-25.
    A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment (...)
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  12.  90
    Dingmar Van Eck, Huib Looren De Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (2006). Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):167-196.
    Faculty Of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands m.k.d.schouten{at}uvt.nl' + u + '@' + d + ''//--> This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. (...)
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  13.  62
    Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2005). Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):319 – 333.
    Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being 'higher-order' properties functionally defined over 'lower-order' properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. (...)
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  14.  20
    Kathleen Lennon (1984). Anti-Reductionist Materialism. Inquiry 27 (December):363-380.
    This paper characterizes a form of materialism which is strongly anti?reductionist with regard to mental predicates. It argues against the functionalist views of writers such as Brian Loar on the basis that the counterfactual interdependencies of intentional states are governed by constraints of rationality embodied in semantic links which cannot be captured in non?intentional, functionalist terms. However, contrary to what is commonly supposed, such anti?reductionism requires neither instrumentalism about the mental nor opposition to a causal explanatory view of intentional (...)
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  15.  72
    Denis Robinson (2007). Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 3. Oxford University Press 3-32.
    I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...)
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  16. John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
    As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level (...)
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  17.  5
    Alfred Gierer (1996). Organisms-Mechanisms: Stahl, Wolff, and the Case Against Reductionist Exclusion. Science in Context 9 (4).
    Unlike Aristotelian physics with its teleological notions, modern physics was developed exclusively in relation to the nonliving domain. This raised the question as to whether mechanics applies to organisms, and if so, to what extent. From the seventeenth century on, mechanistic ideas became prominent in biological and medical theory. Contemporary biology explains essential features of life on the basis of physical laws and processes. This does not prove, however, that the early mechanists were essentially right. In the eighteenth century, following (...)
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  18.  52
    Max Velmans (2007). Psychophysical Nature. In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Springer
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model (...)
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  19.  38
    John Sutton (1999). The Churchlands' Neuron Doctrine: Both Cognitive and Reductionist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):850-851.
    According to Gold & Stoljar, one cannot consistently be both reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then, I reject their characterization of reductionism. Reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. (...)
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  20.  6
    Lisa Feldman Barrett (2013). Psychological Construction: The Darwinian Approach to the Science of Emotion. Emotion Review 5 (4):379-389.
    Psychological construction constitutes a different paradigm for the scientific study of emotion when compared to the current paradigm that is inspired by faculty psychology. This new paradigm is more consistent with the post-Darwinian conceptual framework in biology that includes a focus on (a) population thinking (vs. typologies), (b) domain-general core systems (vs. physical essences), and (c) constructive analysis (vs. reductionism). Three psychological construction approaches (the OCC model, the iterative reprocessing model, and the conceptual act theory) are discussed (...)
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  21.  3
    Stanton Peele (1990). Behavior in a Vacuum: Social-Psychological Theories of Addiction That Deny the Social and Psychological Meanings of Behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (3-4):513-530.
    Social psychologists have been in the forefront of the development of modern theories of cigarette smoking and obesity. These theories are reductionist: they account for behavior in purely physiological terms and regard cognitive, value, personality, and social class factors as secondary or irrelevant. Yet, from their beginnings, these theories have failed to account for major aspects of the behaviors under investigation, aspects apparently related to personal intention and social background. While it may seem suprising that work by social psychologists denies (...)
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  22.  3
    E. Rae Harcum (1991). Behavioral Paradigm for a Psychological Resolution of the Free Will Issue. Journal of Mind and Behavior 93 (1):93-114.
    This study provides data for a behavioral paradigm to resolve the free will issue in psychological terms. As predicted, college students selecting among many alternative responses consistently selected according to experimental set, environmental conditions, past experiences and other unknown factors. These explained and unexplained causal factors supplement one another and make varying relative contributions to different behaviors - the Principle of Behavioral Supplementarity. The more psychologically remote the causal factors, the greater proportion of unexplained ones relative to explained ones (...)
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  23. Lawrence A. Shapiro, Reductionism, Embodiment, and the Generality of Psychology.
    A central controversy in philosophy of psychology pits reductionists against, for lack of a better term, autonomists. The reductionist’s burden is to show that psychology is, at best, merely a heuristic device for describing phenomena that are, when speaking more precisely, just physical. I say “at best,” because reductionists are prone to less conciliatory remarks, such as: “psychological property P just is physical property N, so scientific explanation might as well focus exclusively on N,” and “psychological property P (...)
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  24.  4
    Robert C. Richardson (1980). Reductionist Research Programmes in Psychology. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:171 - 183.
    Reductionist research programmes in psychology, and elsewhere, are typified by a number of research strategies and methodological assumptions. The current essay isolates and examines some typical reductionist assumptions as they have been embodied in psychological research. Through a brief examination of the use of lesion studies coupled with functional deficit analyses, it is argued that localizationist approaches to the study of brain function incorporate at least four interlocking hypotheses. Two of the hypotheses are examined in detail. It is urged (...)
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  25.  1
    Reuven Tsur (1997). Sound Affects of Poetry: Critical Impressionism, Reductionism and Cognitive Poetics. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 5 (2):283-304.
    This paper assumes that the literary work of art is a "stratified system of norms", and that the description of each stratum may require a different kind of logic. One of the main problems is the meaningful integration of these descriptions. A speech sound may be described on an acoustic, a phonetic and a phonemic level; normally, its acoustic description is irrelevant to its linguistic or poetic significance. However, in certain circumstances, the acoustic description may account for the emotional quality (...)
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  26.  2
    Adelbert H. Jenkins (1996). Review of Time and Psychological Explanation. [REVIEW] Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):67-72.
    Reviews the book Time and psychological explanation by Brent D. Slife . In this book Prof. Slife has taken on the task of showing how the Western conception of time is a construct whose use in psychology is in need of just such a review. The object of Slife's critique is the modern Western tradition which takes time to be an objective and linear entity. This perspective, of course, derives from the work and thinking of Sir Isaac Newton, and (...)
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  27. Joseph J. Pear (2007). A Historical and Contemporary Look at Psychological Systems. Psychology Press.
    _A Historical and Contemporary Look at Psychological Systems_ offers a novel approach to examining the history and current state of scientific psychology. This boldly original volume analyzes the systems of psychology in an innovative new way. The author provides interconnectedness to, as well as the distinctiveness of, the diverse theoretical approaches to psychology. The book revisits the roots of psychology and traces them to the current state of the field, both theoretically and methodologically. Readers will gain a clearer understanding (...)
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  28.  4
    Andrew Miles (2009). Towards a Medicine of the Whole Person – Knowledge, Practice and Holism in the Care of the Sick. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 15 (6):887-890.
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  29.  39
    David Roden, Reduction, Elimination and Radical Uninterpretability.
    In this paper I argue that the anti-reductionist thesis supports a case for the uselessness of intentional idioms in the interpretation of highly flexible, self-modifying agents that I refer to as “hyperplastic” agents. An agent is hyperplastic if it can make arbitrarily fine changes to any part of its functional or physical structure without compromising its agency or its capacity for hyperplasticity. Using Davidson’s anomalous monism (AM) as an exemplar of anti-reductionism, I argue that AM implies that no hyperplastic (...)
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  30.  3
    Assya Pascalev, Mario Pascalev & James Giordano (forthcoming). Head Transplants, Personal Identity and Neuroethics. Neuroethics:1-8.
    The possibility of a human head transplant poses unprecedented philosophical and neuroethical questions. Principal among them are the personal identity of the resultant individual, her metaphysical and social status: Who will she be and how should the “new” person be treated - morally, legally and socially - given that she incorporates characteristics of two distinct, previously unrelated individuals, and possess both old and new physical, psychological, and social experiences that would not have been available without the transplant? We (...)
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  31.  74
    Guillermo Del Pinal & Marco J. Nathan (2013). There and Up Again: On the Uses and Misuses of Neuroimaging in Psychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology 30 (4):233-252.
    The aim of this article is to discuss the conditions under which functional neuroimaging can contribute to the study of higher cognition. We begin by presenting two case studies—on moral and economic decision making—which will help us identify and examine one of the main ways in which neuroimaging can help advance the study of higher cognition. We agree with critics that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies seldom “refine” or “confirm” particular psychological hypotheses, or even provide details of the (...)
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  32.  30
    Maurice Kenneth Davy Schouten & Huibert Looren de Jong (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction. Blackwell Pub..
    The Matter of the Mind addresses and illuminates the relationship between psychology and neuroscience by focusing on the topic of reduction. Written by leading philosophers in the field Discusses recent theorizing in the mind-brain sciences and reviews and weighs the evidence in favour of reductionism against the backdrop of recent important advances within psychology and the neurosciences Collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behaviour, reward (...)
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  33.  79
    Greg Janzen (2008). Bennett and Hacker on Neural Materialism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):273-286.
    In their recent book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker attack neural materialism (NM), the view, roughly, that mental states (events, processes, etc.) are identical with neural states or material properties of neural states (events, processes, etc.). Specifically, in the penultimate chapter entitled “Reductionism,” they argue that NM is unintelligible, that “there is no sense to literally identifying neural states and configurations with psychological attributes.” This is a provocative claim indeed. If Bennett and Hacker are (...)
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  34.  35
    Anthony Chemero & Charles Heyser (2005). Object Exploration and a Problem with Reductionism. Synthese 147 (3):403 - 423.
    The purpose of this paper is to use neuroscientific evidence to address the philosophical issue of intertheoretic reduction. In particular, we present a literature review and a new experiment to show that the reduction of cognitive psychology to neuroscience is implausible. To make this case, we look at research using object exploration, an important experimental paradigm in neuroscience, behavioral genetics and psychopharmacology. We show that a good deal of object exploration research is potentially confounded precisely because it assumes that (...) generalizations can be reduced to neuroscientific ones. (shrink)
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  35.  13
    Huib Looren de Jong (2006). Explicating Pluralism: Where the Mind to Molecule Pathway Gets Off the Track—Reply to Bickle. Synthese 151 (3):435-443.
    It is argued that John Bickle’s Ruthless Reductionism is flawed as an account of the practice of neuroscience. Examples from genetics and linguistics suggest, first, that not every mind-brain link or gene-phenotype link qualifies as a reduction or as a complete explanation, and, second, that the higher (psychological) level of analysis is not likely to disappear as neuroscience progresses. The most plausible picture of the evolving sciences of the mind-brain seems a patchwork of multiple connections and partial explanations, (...)
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  36.  28
    Anne Jaap Jacobson (2005). Is the Brain a Memory Box? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):271-278.
    Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.
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  37. Edward Manier (1989). Reductionist Rhetoric : Expository Strategies and the Development of the Molecular Neurobiology of Behavior. In Steve Fuller (ed.), The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers
     
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  38. Eugene H. Sloane (1945). Reductionism. Psychological Review 52:214-23.
     
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  39.  20
    Franz Kutschera (1992). Supervenience and Reductionism. Erkenntnis 36 (3):333-343.
    The aim of the paper is to show that claims of supervenience of the mental upon the physical do not define substantial forms of materialism. While weak supervenience holds trivially, even strong supervenience does not justify a claim of identity, dependence or determination; it is only a relation between classifications of persons by psychological and physical properties.
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  40.  16
    Tracey L. Kahan (2000). The “Problem” of Dreaming in NREM Sleep Continues to Challenge Reductionist (Two Generator) Models of Dream Generation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):956-958.
    The “problem” of dreaming in NREM sleep continues to challenge models that propose a causal relationship between REM mechanisms and the psychological features of dreaming. I suggest that, ultimately, efforts to identify correspondences among multiple levels of analysis will be more productive for dream theory than attempts to reduce dreaming to any one level of analysis. [Hobson et al. ; Nielsen].
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  41.  11
    Arno Ros (1996). Bemerkungen Zum Verhältnis Zwischen Neurophysiologie Und Psychologie. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 27 (1):91 - 130.
    Remarks on the Relations between Neurophysiology and Psychology. In the last decades of Analytical Philosophy, contributions to the so-called mind-body-problem have been suffering by several serious methodological misunderstandings: they have failed, for instance, to distinguish between explanations of particular and strictly general ("necessary") properties and between two important senses of existential statements; and they have overlooked the role conceptual explanations play in the development of science. Changing our methodological premisses, we should be able to put questions like that of the (...)
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  42.  5
    Dingmar Van Eck, Huib Looren De Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (2006). Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):167 - 196.
    This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. We analyse a case from research on visual perception, which suggests a much more subtle and complex interplay between psychology and neuroscience (...)
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  43.  6
    Joseph M. Notterman (2001). Reductionism and Dialectical Materialism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):173-178.
    Psychological explanations of how behavior is acquired are compared between the US and pre- and post-Soviet. The comparison is drawn in terms of communist theories of 1-way and 2-way dialectical materialism. Evidence is brought to bear that physiological, necessary and sufficient interpretations , not only still exist in the former Soviet, but--for reasons other than communist theory--are on the upswing in the US. An advantage of America's more open society is that investigators are encouraged to challenge existing theories. An (...)
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  44. J. Gaito (1960). Description, Explanation, and Reductionism in Psychology. Psychological Reports 6:203-5.
     
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  45. Mark Crooks (2002). Four Rejoinders: A Dialogue in Continuation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):249-278.
    Defenses of realist reductionism may involve petitio principii by a tacit and inadvertent reintroduction of naïve realism through continued supposition of stimulus and sensory fields' conflation. The legitimate meaningfulness of identity statements involving scientific discoveries is examined, as are their illicit or gratuitous expressions. While experimental psychological data has a role to play in refutation of direct realism, we should not underestimate the ingenuity of its proponents' extenuations , hence the need for emphasizing the logic of perceptual processes (...)
     
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  46. R. Jessor (1958). The Problem of Reductionism in Psychology. Psychological Review 65:170-78.
     
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  47. R. L. Martindale & R. J. Seidel (1959). Reductionism: Its Prodigal Encores. Psychological Reports 5:213-16.
     
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  48. John W. Bickle (2008). Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. A Bradford Book.
    One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the old mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioral and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physical.In Psychoneural Reduction, John Bickle presents (...)
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  49. David O. Brink, Handout #8: Normative Authority and Metaphysical Egoism.
    Doubts about the adequacy of appeals to impartial practical reason give those with rationalist sympathies reason to explore the metaphysical, and not merely strategic, reconciliation of prudence and altruism contained in metaphysical egoism. Even if we recognize impartial practical reason, the supremacy of moral demands may depend upon the plausibility of metaphysical egoism. For as long as we recognize the demands of prudence, the conflict between altruism and prudence will threaten altruism's supremacy. We might consider one version of metaphysical egoism (...)
     
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  50.  45
    Edward K. Kaplan (1972). Gaston Bachelard's Philosophy of Imagination: An Introduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (1):1-24.
    A psychology, Phenomenology and ontology of creativity developed by this french epistemologist and historian of science (1884-1962) are systematically described. Starting from analysis of image networks in literature, Bachelard presents imagination as autonomous, A power of human transcendence, A force preceding perception and memory. He ultimately surpasses psychological reductionism. Imagination of form is inferior to imagination of matter (depth); yet they both are secondary to dynamic imagination. Bachelard's fundamental method is a phenomenological study of images as origins of (...)
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