Search results for 'Psychological Reductionism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Andrew Melnyk (2006). Functionalism and Psychological Reductionism: Friends, Not Foes. In Maurice Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction.score: 104.0
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  2. Robert M. Galatzer-Levy (2005). Exploring Psychological Complexity Through Dynamic Systems Theory: A Complement to Reductionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):206-207.score: 96.0
    Dynamic systems theory (DS) provides tools for exploring how simpler elements can interact to produce complex psychological configurations. It may, as Lewis demonstrates, provide means for explicating relationships between two reductionist approaches to overlapping sets of phenomena. The result is a description of psychological phenomena at a level that begins to achieve the richness we would hope to achieve in examining psychological life as it is experienced and explored in psychoanalysis.
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  3. Cory D. Wright (2007). Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct? In Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.score: 92.0
    Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic operations of (...)
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  4. Daniel Giberman (2009). Who They Are and What de Se: Burge on Quasi-Memory. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):297 - 311.score: 90.0
    Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that (...)
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  5. Julian Baggini, Psychological Reductionism About Persons: A Critical Development.score: 90.0
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  6. Steve Nolan (2009). In Defence of the Indefensible: An Alternative to John Paley's Reductionist, Atheistic, Psychological Alternative to Spirituality. Nursing Philosophy 10 (3):203-213.score: 84.0
    John Paley has rightly observed that, while spirituality is widely discussed in the nursing literature, the discussions are uncritical and unproblematic. In an effort 'to reconfigure the spirituality-in-nursing debate, and to position it where it belongs: in the literature on health psychology and social psychology, and not in a disciplinary cul-de-sac labelled "unfathomable mystery" ', Paley has proposed an alternative, reductionist approach to spirituality. In this paper, I identify two critiques developed by Paley: one political, the other 'logical'. Paley's political (...)
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  7. Douglas S. Hardy (2003). Radical Reductionism in the Psychological Study of Religion: Prospects for an Alternative Critical Methodology1. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 25 (1):25-41.score: 74.0
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  8. Austen Clark (1980). Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms: An Examination of Reductionism in Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 72.0
  9. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2005). Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):319 – 333.score: 70.0
    Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being 'higher-order' properties functionally defined over 'lower-order' properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. (...)
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  10. Dingmar Van Eck, Huib Looren De Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (2006). Evaluating New Wave Reductionism: The Case of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):167-196.score: 70.0
    Faculty Of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands m.k.d.schouten{at}uvt.nl' + u + '@' + d + ''//--> This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. (...)
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  11. Thomas M. Olshewsky (1975). Dispositions and Reductionism in Psychology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 5 (October):129-44.score: 64.0
    1) reductionism in psychology is not a single move regarding a single conceptual issue, but is rather a complex of concerns with a network of conceptually interrelated issues. 2) reductionistic moves tend to explicitly rely upon or implicitly presuppose the use of dispositional terms. 3) dispositional terms will not serve to effect reductionistic programs because they themselves require many of the features that those programs require excising. 4) if dispositionals are not themselves logically tied to intentionals, they at least (...)
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  12. Denis Robinson (2007). Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 3. Oxford University Press. 3-32.score: 60.0
    I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...)
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  13. Lawrence A. Shapiro, Reductionism, Embodiment, and the Generality of Psychology.score: 60.0
    A central controversy in philosophy of psychology pits reductionists against, for lack of a better term, autonomists. The reductionist’s burden is to show that psychology is, at best, merely a heuristic device for describing phenomena that are, when speaking more precisely, just physical. I say “at best,” because reductionists are prone to less conciliatory remarks, such as: “psychological property P just is physical property N, so scientific explanation might as well focus exclusively on N,” and “psychological property P (...)
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  14. Robert C. Richardson (1980). Reductionist Research Programmes in Psychology. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:171 - 183.score: 60.0
    Reductionist research programmes in psychology, and elsewhere, are typified by a number of research strategies and methodological assumptions. The current essay isolates and examines some typical reductionist assumptions as they have been embodied in psychological research. Through a brief examination of the use of lesion studies coupled with functional deficit analyses, it is argued that localizationist approaches to the study of brain function incorporate at least four interlocking hypotheses. Two of the hypotheses are examined in detail. It is urged (...)
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  15. Robert Schroer (2013). Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of Being a Temporally Extended Self. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):339-356.score: 54.0
    The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...)
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  16. Max Velmans (2007). Psychophysical Nature. In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Springer.score: 54.0
    There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model (...)
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  17. Richard Montgomery (1990). The Reductionist Ideal in Cognitive Psychology. Synthese 85 (November):279-314.score: 54.0
    I offer support for the view that physicalist theories of cognition don't reduce to neurophysiological theories. On my view, the mind-brain relationship is to be explained in terms of evolutionary forces, some of which tug in the direction of a reductionistic mind-brain relationship, and some of which which tug in the opposite direction. This theory of forces makes possible an anti-reductionist account of the cognitive mind-brain relationship which avoids psychophysical anomalism. This theory thus also responds to the complaint which arguably (...)
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  18. Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer (2014). Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies:1-25.score: 54.0
    A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment (...)
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  19. Maurice Kenneth Davy Schouten & Huibert Looren de Jong (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction. Blackwell Pub..score: 54.0
    The Matter of the Mind addresses and illuminates the relationship between psychology and neuroscience by focusing on the topic of reduction. Written by leading philosophers in the field Discusses recent theorizing in the mind-brain sciences and reviews and weighs the evidence in favour of reductionism against the backdrop of recent important advances within psychology and the neurosciences Collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behaviour, reward (...)
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  20. Kathleen Lennon (1984). Anti-Reductionist Materialism. Inquiry 27 (December):363-380.score: 54.0
    This paper characterizes a form of materialism which is strongly anti?reductionist with regard to mental predicates. It argues against the functionalist views of writers such as Brian Loar on the basis that the counterfactual interdependencies of intentional states are governed by constraints of rationality embodied in semantic links which cannot be captured in non?intentional, functionalist terms. However, contrary to what is commonly supposed, such anti?reductionism requires neither instrumentalism about the mental nor opposition to a causal explanatory view of intentional (...)
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  21. Alan Zaitchik (1981). Intentionalism and Physical Reductionism in Computational Psychology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):23-41.score: 54.0
  22. Anne Jaap Jacobson (2005). Is the Brain a Memory Box? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):271-278.score: 52.0
    Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.
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  23. Joseph M. Notterman (2000). Note on Reductionism in Cognitive Psychology: Reification of Cognitive Processes Into Mind, Mind-Brain Equivalence, and Brain-Computer Analogy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):116-121.score: 52.0
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  24. Arno Ros (1996). Bemerkungen Zum Verhältnis Zwischen Neurophysiologie Und Psychologie. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 27 (1):91 - 130.score: 48.0
    Remarks on the Relations between Neurophysiology and Psychology. In the last decades of Analytical Philosophy, contributions to the so-called mind-body-problem have been suffering by several serious methodological misunderstandings: they have failed, for instance, to distinguish between explanations of particular and strictly general ("necessary") properties and between two important senses of existential statements; and they have overlooked the role conceptual explanations play in the development of science. Changing our methodological premisses, we should be able to put questions like that of the (...)
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  25. Andrew Miles (2009). Towards a Medicine of the Whole Person – Knowledge, Practice and Holism in the Care of the Sick. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 15 (6):887-890.score: 48.0
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  26. John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):411-434.score: 42.0
    As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level (...)
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  27. John Sutton (1999). The Churchlands' Neuron Doctrine: Both Cognitive and Reductionist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):850-851.score: 42.0
    According to Gold & Stoljar, one cannot consistently be both reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then, I reject their characterization of reductionism. Reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. (...)
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  28. Guillermo Del Pinal & Marco J. Nathan (2013). There and Up Again: On the Uses and Misuses of Neuroimaging in Psychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology 30 (4):233-252.score: 42.0
    The aim of this article is to discuss the conditions under which functional neuroimaging can contribute to the study of higher cognition. We begin by presenting two case studies—on moral and economic decision making—which will help us identify and examine one of the main ways in which neuroimaging can help advance the study of higher cognition. We agree with critics that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies seldom “refine” or “confirm” particular psychological hypotheses, or even provide details of the (...)
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  29. Lisa Feldman Barrett (2013). Psychological Construction: The Darwinian Approach to the Science of Emotion. Emotion Review 5 (4):379-389.score: 42.0
    Psychological construction constitutes a different paradigm for the scientific study of emotion when compared to the current paradigm that is inspired by faculty psychology. This new paradigm is more consistent with the post-Darwinian conceptual framework in biology that includes a focus on (a) population thinking (vs. typologies), (b) domain-general core systems (vs. physical essences), and (c) constructive analysis (vs. reductionism). Three psychological construction approaches (the OCC model, the iterative reprocessing model, and the conceptual act theory) are discussed (...)
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  30. J. Gaito (1960). Description, Explanation, and Reductionism in Psychology. Psychological Reports 6:203-5.score: 42.0
     
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  31. R. Jessor (1958). The Problem of Reductionism in Psychology. Psychological Review 65:170-78.score: 42.0
     
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  32. Thomas Schramme (2013). On the Autonomy of the Concept of Disease in Psychiatry. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 38.0
    Does the reference to a mental realm in using the notion of mental disorder lead to a dilemma that consists in either implying a Cartesian account of the mind-body relation or in the need to give up a notion of mental disorder in its own right? Many psychiatrists seem to believe that denying substance dualism requires a purely neurophysiological stance for explaining mental disorder. However, this conviction is based on a limited awareness of the philosophical debate on the mind-body problem. (...)
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  33. Greg Janzen (2008). Bennett and Hacker on Neural Materialism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):273-286.score: 36.0
    In their recent book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker attack neural materialism (NM), the view, roughly, that mental states (events, processes, etc.) are identical with neural states or material properties of neural states (events, processes, etc.). Specifically, in the penultimate chapter entitled “Reductionism,” they argue that NM is unintelligible, that “there is no sense to literally identifying neural states and configurations with psychological attributes.” This is a provocative claim indeed. If Bennett and Hacker are (...)
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  34. John Bickle (1996). New Wave Psychophysical Reductionism and the Methodological Caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):57-78.score: 36.0
  35. John Paley (2010). Spirituality and Reductionism: Three Replies. Nursing Philosophy 11 (3):178-190.score: 36.0
    Several authors have commented on my reductionist account of spirituality in nursing, describing it variously as naïve, disrespectful, demeaning, paternalistic, arrogant, reifying, indicative of a closed mind, akin to positivism, a procrustean bed, a perpetuation of fraud, a matter of faith, an attempt to secure ideological power, and a perspective that puritanically forbids interesting philosophical topics. In responding to this list of felonies and misdemeanours, I try to justify my excesses by arguing that the critics have not really understood what (...)
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  36. Huib Looren de Jong (2006). Explicating Pluralism: Where the Mind to Molecule Pathway Gets Off the Track—Reply to Bickle. Synthese 151 (3):435-443.score: 36.0
    It is argued that John Bickle’s Ruthless Reductionism is flawed as an account of the practice of neuroscience. Examples from genetics and linguistics suggest, first, that not every mind-brain link or gene-phenotype link qualifies as a reduction or as a complete explanation, and, second, that the higher (psychological) level of analysis is not likely to disappear as neuroscience progresses. The most plausible picture of the evolving sciences of the mind-brain seems a patchwork of multiple connections and partial explanations, (...)
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  37. Richard Combes (1988). Ockhamite Reductionism. International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (September):325-36.score: 36.0
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  38. Andrew Lugg (1975). Putnam on Reductionism. Cognition 3 (3):289-293.score: 36.0
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  39. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1992). Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):408-28.score: 34.0
    In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can "illuminate" issues that were incompletely treated in another. In this paper, I explain how this "illumination" would (...)
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  40. John Bolender (1995). Is Multiple Realizability Compatible with Antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.score: 34.0
    Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is (...)
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  41. Rogier Kievit, Willem Eduard Frankenhuis, Lourens Waldorp & Denny Borsboom (2013). Simpson's Paradox in Psychological Science: A Practical Guide. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 34.0
    The direction of an association at the population-level may be reversed within the subgroups comprising that population—a striking observation called Simpson’s paradox. When facing this pattern, psychologists often view it as anomalous. Here, we argue that Simpson’s paradox is more common than conventionally thought, and typically results in incorrect interpretations – potentially with harmful consequences. We support this claim by drawing on empirical results from cognitive neuroscience, behavior genetics, psychopathology, personality psychology, educational psychology, intelligence research, and simulation studies. We show (...)
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  42. J. Gaito & D. Leonard (1965). Philosophical and Empirical Reductionism in Psychology. Journal of General Psychology 72:69-75.score: 32.0
  43. Michael E. Hyland (1995). Against Nomological Reductionism in Psychology: A Response to Robinson. New Ideas in Psychology 13:9-11.score: 32.0
  44. David O. Brink, Handout #8: Normative Authority and Metaphysical Egoism.score: 30.0
    Doubts about the adequacy of appeals to impartial practical reason give those with rationalist sympathies reason to explore the metaphysical, and not merely strategic, reconciliation of prudence and altruism contained in metaphysical egoism. Even if we recognize impartial practical reason, the supremacy of moral demands may depend upon the plausibility of metaphysical egoism. For as long as we recognize the demands of prudence, the conflict between altruism and prudence will threaten altruism's supremacy. We might consider one version of metaphysical egoism (...)
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  45. Kourken Michaelian (2010). In Defence of Gullibility: The Epistemology of Testimony and the Psychology of Deception Detection. Synthese 176 (3):399-427.score: 30.0
    Research in the psychology of deception detection implies that Fricker, in making her case for reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, overestimates both the epistemic demerits of the antireductionist policy of trusting speakers blindly and the epistemic merits of the reductionist policy of monitoring speakers for trustworthiness: folk psychological prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding, it turns out that monitoring is on a par (in terms both of the reliability of the process and of the sensitivity of the beliefs (...)
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  46. Steven W. Horst (2007). Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...)
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  47. Edward K. Kaplan (1972). Gaston Bachelard's Philosophy of Imagination: An Introduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (1):1-24.score: 30.0
    A psychology, Phenomenology and ontology of creativity developed by this french epistemologist and historian of science (1884-1962) are systematically described. Starting from analysis of image networks in literature, Bachelard presents imagination as autonomous, A power of human transcendence, A force preceding perception and memory. He ultimately surpasses psychological reductionism. Imagination of form is inferior to imagination of matter (depth); yet they both are secondary to dynamic imagination. Bachelard's fundamental method is a phenomenological study of images as origins of (...)
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  48. Ingar Brinck, Persons, Ontology, Methodology, Values.score: 30.0
    So-called “Wide Psychological Reductionism”, and similar neo-Lockean views of personal identity, are both important and popular. Yet they seem to demand of their adherents commitment to controversial views both in ontology and in philosophical methodology. The consequent debates interweave methodological, ontological, and evaluative issues in interesting ways. We will examine some of these issues, and explore some of the more recent developments and transformations which Psychological views have led to. The focus will be selective and we will (...)
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  49. John Bickle (1995). Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.score: 30.0
    The need for representations and computations over their contents in psychological explanations is often cited as both the mark of the genuinely cognitive and a source of skepticism about the reducibility of cognitive theories to neuroscience. A generic version of this anti-reductionist argument is rejected in this paper as unsound, since (i) current thinking about associative learning emphasizes the need for cognitivist resources in theories adequate to explain even the simplest form of this phenomena (Pavlovian conditioning), and yet (ii) (...)
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  50. A. Ward, Our Survival.score: 30.0
    [First paragraphs] Reductionists about personal identity contend that there is nothing more to our survival than a series of causally related experiences and/or bodily continuities. Our belief in a separately existing self or subject of experiences is held to be unjustified, and we are recommended to reduce the conception of our own identity over time by jettisoning this belief. The particular form of reductionism that places the true view of our identity in a series of causally related experiences is (...)
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